

YEARBOOK

**of Foreign Policy
of the Slovak Republic**

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Preface

The year 2005 was unique for Slovakia's foreign policy. It was the first year of a full-fledged membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures. While 2004 was a year of identification of the post-integration foreign policy priorities, the year 2005 can be characterized as the first year of their implementation. The ambition of the *Yearbook* is – at the appropriate level and with the possibility of identifying perspective trends – to look for the answers to new coherences that, in a broader European context, are most topical for Slovakia. Twelve authors attempted to find the answer to questions how Slovakia implemented its new priorities in the new environment.

This edition of the *Yearbook* focused on five foreign policy issues characterizing the foreign policy development in 2005, such as the EU and NATO membership, Slovakia's activities within international organizations and concrete implementation of the foreign policy priorities.

The first chapter focuses on Slovakia's membership in the EU. Aneta Világi, the analyst of the *European Integration research program* at RC SFPA, deals with the topic of discourse on the *EU Constitutional Treaty*. She concentrates especially on development of the *EU Constitutional Treaty* ratification process in Slovakia as well as the impact of the unsuccessful ratification in the Netherlands and France on its further development. In conclusion she suggests for the Slovak diplomacy to use the stagnation period to form its own priorities in case the discussion on further development after the unsuccessful ratification is open. Vladimír Bilčík, the Head of the *European Integration research program* at RC SFPA, examines the official standpoints of Slovakia towards the EU enlargement and focuses on the main points of discussion on further enlargement in 2005, including the issue of absorption capacity.

The second chapter is devoted to the security policy. It is open by an article of the analyst of the *Center for European and North-Atlantic Affairs* Vladimír Tarasovič. He assesses the key events or changes from the point of view of the EU and NATO. Vladimír Tarasovič also analyzed the most significant security policy documents adopted by the Slovak Government in 2005. The reflection of the mentioned document in practice was analyzed by Miroslav Kysel, an analyst from the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

The analysis of Ivo Samson, Head of the *International Security research program* at RC SFPA, opens the third chapter of the *Yearbook*. In his analysis, he focuses on

the candidacy and preparation of the Slovak Republic for the UN Security Council membership as well as on the fundamentals, principles, priorities and possible dilemmas of Slovakia's activities in UN SC. Peter Lizák of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic takes a more detailed look at Slovakia's current performance and the future prospects in OSCE. The issues in Central Europe are analyzed by Tomáš Strážay, Head of the *Central and South-eastern Europe* research program. He assesses the key points as well as the problematic issues playing a significant role within the *Visegrad Four*, the *Central European Initiative* and *Regional Partnership*. Tomáš Strážay also attempts to determine the fields of cooperation which the individual groupings could realize in the short as well as medium-term perspective.

The fourth chapter assesses implementation of the main foreign policy priorities such as Ukraine and the Western Balkans. Alexander Duleba, director of the RC SPPA, focuses on the relations with Ukraine. He considers the years 2004 and 2005 a breakthrough in the approach towards the Ukraine considering the development of Slovak-Ukraine relations. Moreover, he stresses that only in 2005 did the outlines of Slovakia's post-integration eastern policy meet the interests of Slovakia, which could significantly contribute to the common EU and NATO policies. The contribution of Eliška Sláviková of *People in Peril* reflects on the base forming the decision to include the Western Balkans into the foreign policy priorities of Slovakia. It also reflects the practical realization of the policy towards the Balkans. She assesses Slovak bilateral relations with the individual countries of the Balkans as well as relations at the EU level and attempts to answer the question where Slovakia could see its working space in the Balkans.

Slovakia's Foreign Policy Tools is the name of the last thematic chapter in the Yearbook. Naturally, this chapter begins with the analysis of the Slovak development assistance as the main bilateral tool of Slovakia's foreign policy. Peter Hulényi of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR takes a closer look at the Slovak ODA. He analyzes the 2005 success of the Slovak ODA in more detail and, rather than talking about the failures, he points out the challenges *Slovak Aid* will face in 2006.

Foreign economic policy is reviewed by Tomáš Taraba of Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency. The public opinion on foreign policy issues is traditionally the field which Oľga Gyárfášová of Institute for Public Affairs covers in the Yearbook. Her research outlines that there was a significant positive change in the public opinion on Slovakia's performance in the field of foreign policy.

Besides these analyses, the Yearbook includes a chronology of the most important events in the Slovak foreign policy in 2005 and selects political documents and other information (e.g. the structure and representatives of the MFA SR, a list of diplomatic missions and representatives of SR abroad, the SR diplomatic bodies, army missions abroad etc.).

I strongly believe that all those interested in the foreign policy of Slovakia and its development in 2005 will find this publication useful.

Peter Brezáni

Slovak Republic
in the European Union

Aneta Világi

Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe¹

Although history of European integration has known discussions about the final direction of the European Union, the so-called *finalité*, for as long as since the 1950's, the text entitled "constitution", for many federalists a sign of hope that European integration will move towards a federal state, emerged only recently. The modern history of constitution in Europe can be surveyed back to year 2000 when the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, on the ground of Humboldt University, gave his breakthrough speech in which he retrieved the idea of drafting the European Constitution. In the following months, other important figures of European politics joined in debates about the necessity, advantages and disadvantages of such a step. Following the unsatisfying results of negotiations about the *Treaty of Nice* (December 2000) and following the call of the *Laeken Declaration* (December 2001), the task to draw up the Constitution for the EU was finally taken over by the *European Convention*, which appointed itself into this role. The final text of the Treaty elaborated based on negotiations of this Convention – and as many critics claim, originating mainly from the quills of Valéry Giscard d'Estaigne – was first submitted to the European Council in December 2003. The representatives of EU member states did not reach an agreement on the final draft of the text of the *Constitutional Treaty* (CT) and, therefore, after negotiations and adjustments, the document was resubmitted to the European Council in June 2004 when it finally gained a general approval. The representatives

¹ This article originated thanks to research grant of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR that Aneta Antušová and Vladimír Bilčík participated in. Article presents exclusively opinions of author.

of all EU member states signed the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*² in October 2004 in Rome. The year of 2005 became very crucial for CT as it was the year of its ratification.

In the area where the Convention failed in a large extent, namely in guaranteeing a broad public discussion about the future of the EU, the task of the Convention was to be taken over by ratification processes and mainly discussions about the treaty that

Should anticipate ratification itself in all single member states. Public debate was expected to force political leaders clearly to specify their positions on further development of the EU. Today we can say that encouragement of the public debate on the future of the European integration was only partially successful in the member states. The typical feature of the states where national parliaments ratified CT is the absence of any public discussion about the EU development whatsoever while the countries where a referendum took place touched this topic only to a very small extent.

The ratification process of CT was characterized mainly by the fact that the voters' decision was influenced primarily by domestic political mood and circumstances.

Similarly to the situation during the last European Parliament elections³, the campaign for the CT (at least in the countries where it took place) also confirmed the lasting absence of the European dimension in the debate on the European issues. Despite the fact that the text of the CT was the same with the same formulations in every country, public debate on it or around it was influenced by the national context and, therefore, in different countries different aspects of the CT were emphasized. Regarding different national public opinions, the same argument was often used differently in different national contexts. Strengthening of the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) can serve as an example. In traditionally neutral countries, CFSP was perceived with a more negative connotation, which served as an argument against the CT, while in other countries where the public opinion is positively inclined to strengthening the EU on the international scene it served as an argument in favour of the ratification of treaty.

The Sea of Apathy and Islands of „Positive Deviation“

Since the very beginning of the period of the Constitutional Treaty elaboration, the Slovak society started to show a significant level of apathy and this state lasted

² In this text, *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* will also be titled shorter as the *Constitutional Treaty* and we will use the abbreviation *CT*.

³ See for example A. Antušová, "Slovenské voľby do Európskeho parlamentu – nechcené dieťa?", *Listy SFPA*, July – August 2004.

throughout the whole ratification process. The only voters more interested in the text of the treaty were the conservatives, which is the reason why the Slovak debate on the CT focused mainly on topics interesting to this particular group of citizens, namely on the question whether the Constitutional Treaty is establishing the EU super-state.

The debate on the suitable way of ratification in case of the CT was linked to the question to what extent the Constitutional Treaty changes the character of the EU. The expert public was divided into two groups – one welcomed ratification of the treaty by means of a referendum while the other preferred an approval of the document by the National Council of the Slovak Republic (NC SR). Supporters of the referendum used two main arguments. The first argument against ratification of the CT in the NC SR was the above-mentioned change of the nature of the EU. According to the Constitution of SR, citizens in a referendum should approve of any accession of a country to a state union with other countries. According to the opinion of this group represented mainly by the conservatives, the CT was the cause of this situation. Other supporters of the referendum emphasized mainly the space for a real information campaign.

On other hand, the opponents of the ratification in a referendum emphasized unnecessary financial expenses of organizing a referendum. They did not see any reason for the referendum to take place. This issue has not been solved yet. At the moment, a decision of the Constitutional Court of SR in this issue is expected because after the CT was approved in the NC SR, a group of citizens submitted a request for legal proceeding in the Constitutional Court.

Slovakia lacked a public discussion encouraged by political parties, media or an information campaign. However, at the time when the *European Convention* was being formed, the Slovak National Convention about future of the EU started to function and, in 2004, this convention was transformed into the *National Convention about the EU*. Within this platform, the CT and its impact on individual sector policies was discussed. However, the discussion did not attract greater attention of the media, which is why there is the prevailing opinion in the society that the Members of the Parliament decided about the CT without a broader public debate.

The debate about the CT in Slovakia promoted in the media was political and dominated by the views of the opponents of the CT. They mainly pointed at the threat of loss of the sovereignty of member states if measurements in the CT were approved of, the insufficient quality of the treaty text, the bureaucratic nature of the EU and the lack of reference to the Christian values in the Preamble.

Two causes of the already-mentioned apathy prevail, namely the way of ratification and the social-cultural specifics of the Slovak society. There is one fundamental feature in the countries where ratification of the CT by the national parliaments occurred – there was no or very limited public debate about the CT as well as about further development of the EU. Another common feature is the fact that, in these countries, the CT was approved of by the vast majority of the Members of Parliament.

A similar situation occurred in Slovakia, as well. A successful approval of the treaty in the NC SR⁴ was anticipated by the poor public discussion. Only the parliamentary factions of KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) and KSS (Communist Party of Slovakia) voted against the treaty.

The most important actors in the discussion about the CT among the EU member countries in general were the national governments. The reason was partly the fact that in most of the countries, it was the government that decided about the manner and timing of the ratification and in some countries the governments were forced to take the initiative as they were committed to it by having signed the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* in October 2004 in Rome. At the time when the politicians and the people responsible for the ratification in Slovakia were deliberating about the way of ratification, supporters of the referendum were arguing that holding a nationwide plebiscite about the CT is necessary mainly because the text of the CT would be broadly discussed. The opponents of the ratification in the referendum, on the other hand, emphasized that a public debate and an information campaign could run independently in both cases, with or without the referendum. Today, it is clear that the Slovak government did not consider the other option.

Another factor that, in my opinion, influenced the fact that Slovakia lacked a public debate were the particularities of the Slovak society. Slovaks do not go on strike; we don't have the tradition of public engagement and the media do not play the traditional role of "watchdogs" of democracy, either. In case of the European integration, this statement applies even more. The specific approach to the European topics is to a large extent caused mainly by the Slovak insufficient experience of accession processes. Slovakia's membership in the EU itself is, so to say, 'sacred' and the performance of our politicians and the public in the European affairs comes across as rather timid. Malová, Láštic a Rybář explain the current strategies of Slovakia as a new members state as out-of-date historical experience. "Similar trends in the case of Slovakia were significantly stigmatized by the experience from invoking the political conditionality in years 1994 – 1998."⁵

The Treaty Doomed to Fail?

Although the Constitutional Treaty has been an ambitious project since the very beginning, it is not unfeasible. Regarding the experience of the EU with application

⁴ From 147 present voting Members of Parliament, 116 voted for *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*, 27 were against and 4 abstained.

⁵ D. Malová, E. Láštic, M. Rybář *Slovensko ako nový členský štát Európskej únie: Výzva z periferie?* (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005), p. 25.

Summary of the current state of CT ratification

<i>Ratification in referendum</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful • Unsuccessful • Postponed indefinitely 	Luxembourg, Spain France, Netherlands Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic
<i>Ratification in Parliament</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Successful • Successful, but ratification process not accomplished yet • Postponed indefinitely 	Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Malta, Austria, Slovenia, Italy, Belgium, Estonia Germany, Slovakia Finland, Sweden

and implementation of demanding political projects, it could be assumed that success will come if responsibility for it will be taken over by a strong political figure devoted to the idea of necessity of such a document for further development of the European Union or if there is a situation on the international scene which will move the European integration forwards. However, in 2005, none of these conditions were fulfilled.

On 14 July 2005, the Constitutional Court of the SR suspended ratification of the Constitutional Treaty when it accepted a complaint by 13 citizens arguing that not holding a referendum concerning the issue of the CT breached their civil rights. The complaint referred to the Decree of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (NC SR) no. 1 596 from 11 May 2005, in which NC SR I declared its agreement with the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* while, at the same time, approving of a constitutional law about the accession of the SR to a state union with other states. The claimants, referring to the article 127 of the Constitution of the SR state in their complaint that in case of the CT going into power, the EU would become a state union and according to the given article of the Constitution of the SR, the Slovak Republic may access a state union only based on a constitutional law confirmed by a referendum. In its statement from 25 August 2005, the NC SR claims that it is “contestable whether the Slovak Republic accesses the European Union by approving of the given Treaty that – according to the opinion of the claimants – would give the EU character of a state union since the Slovak Republic has been member of the EU since 1 May last year”. The basic difference in views lies in the question whether the CT changes the nature of the EU. The Constitutional Court issued an anticipation which suspended the possibility of performance of the Decree of the NC SR no. 1 596. As long as the Constitutional Court does not make a decision about the issue given, the ratification process in Slovakia cannot be considered accomplished.

Because Germany has not accomplished the ratification process, either, and further eight countries have not even started it, it is more than likely that the CT will not be sealed by the end of 2006. The *General Affairs Council*⁶ reacted to the situation in the “problematic” countries (France, Netherlands) and the “hesitating” countries, thus deciding to prolong the period of reflection to a minimum of half a year until Germany takes over the chairmanship of the EU. The German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Jacques Chirac, who is to take over the position of Chairman from Merkel, have already declared that they would re-encourage the discussion and that the final decision about the destiny of the Constitutional Treaty should be taken during the French presidency.

What next, Slovakia?

The probability that the *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* will be approved of in a regular procedure is low. In the effort to maintain the momentum of the integration process, statesmen and diplomats should consider purposeful and real alternatives as soon as possible. The legal text unwisely entitled the “Constitution of Europe” also contains less controversial and more useful regulations than the title itself. The institutional innovations, which constitute the political consensus on the public support, could provide the EU with an impulse at the time when it helplessly shuffles in place.

The Slovak diplomacy should use the last period of reflection to formulate its own priorities in case of opening new discussion after the unsuccessful accomplishment of the ratification of the Treaty. Given the fact that the text of the CT does not reflect more original priorities of the SR and, in the meantime, the situation in other member states has changed, as well, the reflection about Slovak priorities in the institutional design of the EU and its competencies would be very appropriate.

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⁶ In meetings of General Affairs Council (GAC) participate Ministers of Foreign Affairs of EU member states.

Vladimír Bilčík

The Slovak Republic and EU Enlargement

Even though the Slovak Republic officially supports the policy of further enlargement of the European Union, this support has its limits. In view of the main aspects of Slovakia's involvement in the EU during the year 2005, the then Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda stated in front of the members of the *Committee on European Affairs of the National Council of the SR* that a year and a half after joining the Union, it has become apparent that Slovakia is not only a consumer but also a creator of EU policies. While submitting the comprehensive report on the first year of Slovakia's membership in the EU, from 1 May 2004 to 30 April 2005 M. Dzurinda highlighted the contribution of Slovakia especially to the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia.¹ Considering the strategic decisions on the political arrangement of the EU, it would seem that Slovakia's representatives are mainly adopting a supranational approach, according to which the Union is an autonomous unit "primarily designed for finding policy solutions in the interest of a common European good".²

In spite of its strong support for Croatia's integration ambitions the SR has differential positions on the future enlargement of the EU. These manifested themselves most visibly during the discussion on opening the accession negotiations with Turkey.

¹ SITA, 20 October 2005. Besides the contribution of the SR to the opening of the accession negotiations with Croatia Mikuláš Dzurinda also commended the launch of the *Minerva* program, in the framework of the *Lisbon Strategy*

² I used this argument in relation to the form of foreign and security policy of the EU, In: V. Bilčík, "Shaping the EU as an External Actor: Slovakia's Shifting Role Conceptions", *Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 40 – 51. The subject of the supranational approach is addressed by J. Beyers, J. Trondal, "How Nation-States Hit Europe: Ambiguity and Representation in the European Union", *West European Politics* Vol. 27, No. 5 (2004), p. 920.

In addition to this, during 2005 Slovak political representatives started to take into account the so-called absorption capacity of the EU when discussing future admission of new member states. The approach of the SR towards enlargement also influences its position in the current EU, as the country is not yet a fully integrated member state in several policy areas.

This contribution briefly charts the framework and official positions of the SR towards EU enlargement and pursues the main points of the discussion on future enlargement in 2005, including the problem of the absorption capacity of the EU. In conclusion, it shortly reflects on possible alterations of Slovakia's positions towards future geographical limits of the European Union.

Slovakia and the Policy of EU Enlargement

At the time of Slovakia's accession to the EU, the country's political representatives supported the policy of further enlargement of the Union. As an acceding country in 2003 Slovakia agreed with the plan of accepting Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in 2007. It thus expressed a certain natural amount of political solidarity with the states that started accession negotiations with the Union at the same time as Bratislava, in February 2000.

The then Prime Minister M. Dzurinda also enthusiastically supported the rapid integration of Croatia into the EU. Relations with the Western Balkan states became one of the official priorities of foreign policy of the SR after the country joined the Union and the Premier formed a particularly good personal relationship with the Prime Minister of Croatia Ivo Sanader.³

Thanks to the positive European Council Conclusions from December 2004 also supported by Slovakia, the commencement of talks on the accession of Croatia to the EU was planned for the spring of 2005.

However, in the case of opening accession negotiations with Turkey Slovakia did not adopt an unambiguous position. On the contrary, the question of a possible enlargement of the EU to Turkey produced one of the most intensive domestic discussions since the SR joined the Union. This discussion revealed a whole range of political perspectives touching on issues of political, geographical and cultural limits when considering further enlargement of the EU.

The European Council planned to resolve the start of accession negotiations with Turkey at the summit in December 2004. In autumn 2004, the *Christian Democratic*

³ The presence of I. Sanader at the pre-election meeting of SDKÚ on 15 June 2006, when the Croatian Prime Minister expressed support for M. Dzurinda in the parliamentary elections, which took place in the SR on 17 June 2006 represents recent evidence of the strong personal relationship between the two politicians.

Movement (KDH) from the coalition government of M. Dzurinda⁴, clearly opposed the opening of accession negotiations with Ankara and the accession of Turkey to the EU and declared support for the proposal of the German Christian Democrats, offering Turkey the so-called privileged partnership. Two other coalition parties – the *Slovak Democratic and Christian Union* (SDKÚ) and the *Party of the Hungarian Coalition* (SMK) – along with the then second largest opposition party the *Movement for a Democratic Slovakia* (HZDS) – issued cautious and rather half-hearted, although not negative statements on this subject. Open support for the commencement of accession negotiations with Turkey was declared by the coalition party *Alliance of a New Citizen* (ANO) and the largest opposition party *SMER*. In a broader context of the Union the positions of political parties thus reflected the majority positions of individual families of European political parties. While most of the conservative political parties in the member states of the EU adopted a reserved or a negative attitude, most European socialists and liberals supported the ambitions of Ankara to begin direct talks on the conditions of EU membership.⁵

The fact that the National Council of the SR exerted its new constitutional right to bind members of the government with a specific position for negotiations in the Council of Ministers and the European Council in the debate on the start of accession negotiations with Turkey just underlines the domestic political importance of this matter. On 30 November 2004, the parliament passed by a decisive majority of Members of Parliament (113 out of 150) a resolution on motion of the government of the SR, in which it bound “the member of the government of the SR to promote such a manner of opening accession talks with Turkey at the summit of the European Council that would respect the inevitability of fulfilling criteria and that would not infer a commitment of the European Union to accept Turkey as a member of the European union”.⁶ At the same time the National Council of the SR passed a draft resolution submitted in the debate by František Mikloško, Member of Parliament for KDH. On its basis the parliament “acknowledges the genocide of Armenians in the year 1915, during which hundreds of thousands of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire died and considers this act to be a crime against humanity.”⁷ It was particularly this declaration, which raised essential questions in Turkey on the actual extent of Slovakia’s support for the Turkish integration ambitions.

The Slovak Republic did eventually join the countries, which agreed with the decision of the European Council summit in December 2004, offering Turkey an opportunity to begin accession negotiations in October 2005, but the position of the SR indicated very

⁴ The government coalition of M. Dzurinda was formed by four political parties: SDKÚ, SMK, KDH and ANO.

⁵ The British Conservative party, which has constantly supported enlargement of the EU to Turkey, was one of the obvious exceptions within the right spectrum of European political parties.

⁶ *Uznesenie NR SR No. 1 340.*

⁷ *Uznesenie NR SR No. 1 341.*

clearly the limits of the official support for Turkish membership in the EU. These were also transmitted into the Conclusions of the European Council, which emphasized in December 2004 that the negotiations of the EU with Turkey would take place under the strict supervision of the European Commission and member countries, their time span is expected to be at least ten years and the commencement of negotiations does not guarantee their success in the form of the full-fledged membership of Turkey in the European Union.

Slovakia and EU Enlargement in 2005⁸

During 2005, the Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda became one of the loud proponents and motors of a quick integration of Croatia into the EU. The Council of Ministers decided at the beginning of 2005 that in spite of the original anticipations, the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia would be postponed to an uncertain date after March 2005. A number of EU countries stated the insufficient cooperation of Zagreb with the *International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia* (ICTY) in arresting and handing over the Croatian general Ante Gotovina charged with war crimes as the main reason. It is important to mention that various member states of the EU perceived the level of cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY differently.

The SR, for example, made efforts for a repeated consideration of Croatia's ambitions but the change did not occur until October 2005. During the very difficult talks on the mandate of the EU for accession negotiations with Turkey, the ICTY announced through its chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte that Zagreb was fully cooperating with the Hague.⁹ Slovakia endorsed the opening of accession talks with Croatia immediately after the statement of del Ponte on the basis of which a parallel political agreement on EU mandates for the accession negotiations with Croatia and with Turkey was born on October 4, 2005.¹⁰

Political representatives of the SR welcomed the compromise decision of the EU on the commitment to negotiate the accession conditions with Ankara and Zagreb. The Prime Minister Dzurinda highlighted the security aspect of this decision: "Europe

⁸ This part largely draws from V. Bilčík, "Slovenská republika a Európska únia" (The Slovak Republic and the European union), M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútora (eds.) *Slovensko 2005 – Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006), p. 345 – 359.

⁹ It is also possible that the statement of Carla del Ponte was partially politically motivated because some member states, like Austria, refused to approve the mandate of the Union for negotiations with Turkey without a parallel opening of negotiations with Croatia. The fact is, however, that general Ante Gotovina was apprehended on the Canary Islands and handed over to the Hague several weeks after the official initiation of accession negotiations with Croatia.

¹⁰ *TASR*, 3 October 2005.

will become much safer by the positive development in Turkey, the positive development in the Western Balkans and the positive development in the countries of former Yugoslavia.” The Minister for Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan revealed the significance of political context by saying: “We realized very well, that if we were to send out another negative signal, that there would not be an agreement even in the question of enlargement, it would simply be bad” At the same time he underlined the different character of future EU talks with Turkey: “The accession negotiations with Turkey will be very hard, very long and very complicated, which follows from the nature of the state.”¹¹ The Prime Minister added that Slovakia would offer Croatia cooperation in the negotiations of individual chapters and that it would at the same time make efforts to support Ukraine and Serbia and Montenegro on their paths to the EU.

From the Prime Minister’s statement it is clear, that in the issue of enlargement Slovakia intends to focus on the priority countries of its foreign policy, which do not include Turkey. If we were to summarize the main differences in the positions of the SR towards the two countries aspiring to get closer to EU membership in 2005, we can state that while the SR sometimes neglected the importance of Zagreb’s commitments to the ICTY, it intensively emphasized the importance of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria in the case of Turkey. In other words, key decision-makers were almost non-critically united on the matter of Croatia’s integration goals but they were considerably more reluctant to back potential accession of Turkey to the EU.

The Question of the EU Absorption Capacity

In spite of the aforementioned promises there is a question mark hanging over the next enlargement of the European Union. The Prime Minister Dzurinda confirmed this during his official visit in Germany on his meeting with the then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder by surprisingly saying that the absorption capacity of the EU is limited and the enlargement needs a break.¹² It is necessary to perceive this statement in the context of Dzurinda’s stay in Berlin where further enlargement was not accepted with enthusiasm. At the same time, though, the statement of the Slovak Prime Minister raised doubts about domestic coordination of foreign policy positions of the SR, particularly with respect to further EU enlargement. Dzurinda spoke his words on the same day when the President of the Croatian Republic Stipe Mesić visited Slovakia where instead of Dzurinda’s caution or even skepticism in Berlin, he listened to statements of support position by the highest constitutional authority of the SR. Although the President Ivan Gašparovič did express support for Croatia, he publicly

¹¹ *SITA*, 4 October 2005.

¹² *SITA*, 3 November 2005.

confused it with Serbia during the press conference. Sometimes the main actors of Slovakia's foreign and European policy have trouble not only with the coordination of their own positions. They also fail to remember fundamental facts. Although officially Slovakia's position towards the integration ambitions of countries like Croatia or Serbia and Montenegro remains unchanged, the words of M. Dzurinda reflect broader tensions within the Union on the further acceptance of new member countries. Even the region of the Western Balkans continues to be problematic. Foreign policy of the Slovak Republic presents the countries of this region as priorities of its interest and its outer activities. In 2003, the member states of the EU openly declared the policy of future enlargements to these countries but in November 2005 at the meeting of the *General Affairs and External Relations Council* (GEARC) France blocked the decision to grant the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the status of a candidate country. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs Phillippe Douste-Blazy argued that the EU needs a more extensive discussion on the next enlargement, which should take place in 2006.¹³ Political leaders of France eventually altered their position and agreed with the granting of the candidate country status to Macedonia at the European Council on 15 –16 December 2005. Yet, the Conclusions of the very same European Council emphasized that future enlargement should be a subject to further discussion and that the EU should take into consideration its own capacity to accept new members successfully (see *European Council Conclusions*, December 15- 16, 2005). From the point of view of the declared interests of the SR, the fate of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, or even Ukraine as future members of the EU remains thus uncertain.

The unsuccessful ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands was one of the important factors in the deciding on the start of accession negotiations with Croatia and Turkey. After the unsuccessful referendums in these two EU countries political leaders of the EU focused on achieving positive, albeit compromise, agreements in other sensitive political areas including the enlargement. But the very discussion on the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia and especially with Turkey along with the attitude of France to the status of Macedonia clearly indicate that after the anticipated acceptance of Bulgaria and Romania as new EU member states in 2007, every subsequent enlargement will be very complicated. Future admittance of Croatia could be a certain exception though Zagreb's potential EU entry will probably raise a new discussion on the absorption capacity of the EU since the currently effective EU institutional arrangements stemming from the *Treaty of Nice* account for 27 member countries.

Although the EU continues to declare its open door policy towards countries of the Western Balkan, for many member states the question of the readiness of EU institutions to function in an enlarged format remains unresolved after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty. In addition, in the case of Turkey, the EU's recently adopted financial perspective for the years 2007-2013 does not at all indicate a possible integration of Ankara into the EU within the upcoming EU budgetary period. To

¹³ *TASR*, 12 December 2005.

sum up, the Union does stick to an open door policy verbally but the endpoint of that policy remains so illusive that the doors of the EU may very swiftly and suddenly shut even for some well-prepared candidates.

Slovakia and Prospects for Enlargement Policy

The criteria for accession to the EU have become stricter and more politicized since the Conclusions of the European Council summit in Copenhagen in June 1993, which opened up the possibility of enlarging the European Communities to post-communist countries of Europe. The ability to manifest the stability of institutions ensuring democracy, rule of law and of human and minority rights became fundamental conditions for EU membership in Copenhagen some thirteen years ago. Today, in the case of the Western Balkans cooperation with the ICTY plays at least an equally important role (it is necessary to underline that very legitimately).¹⁴ While the Conclusions of the Copenhagen summit did state that enlargement itself could not disrupt the functioning of the European Communities¹⁵, nowadays the question of the so-called absorption capacity of the EU is truly dominant in the debate on further enlargement.

For the moment, the Slovak Republic plays the role of a committed and largely constructive new member state of the EU. Political leaders of the SR generally declare support for the enlargement policy. However, the voice of Slovakia in the Union is limited. The progressive fulfillment of crucial commitments of the *Accession Treaty to the EU* remains Slovakia's main task in the EU. This means that the largest challenge for Slovakia is the successful completion of its own integration process into the EU. This is the crucial task for the politicians not only in 2006, but is also the key challenge for the new government composed after the parliamentary elections in June 2006. Only after the abolition of all major political and institutional differences within the existing Union can Slovakia gain a truly equal and politically more relevant position for the co-formulation of the Union's policies. The ability of both older and newer member states to cope with the full implementation of the EU's four essential freedoms across the whole Union as well as with the introduction of a common currency in post-communist EU member states and the enlargement of the Schengen area to these countries might strengthen Slovakia's political position and its voice vis-à-vis other member states and in relation to neighboring countries of the Union aspiring to future integration into the EU.

¹⁴ Other crucial conditions from the Copenhagen summit concerned the existence of a market economy and the ability to withstand the competitive pressure within the Common European market, as well as the ability to adopt and apply the legal framework of the European Communities in practice.

¹⁵ See Council of the European Union, *Presidency Conclusions: Copenhagen European Council*. Brussels 1993.

Ironically though, after overcoming its own peripheral position inside the enlarged European Union, Slovakia may not become an enthusiastic supporter of enlargement. One of the questions, which can play a major part in relation to further enlargement from Slovakia's point of view, is the problem of economic and financial implications of EU widening on member states and thus the will of these states to support the principle of solidarity towards poorer applicants for EU membership. At the same time Slovakia's integration priorities will also be directly influenced by the new distribution of domestic political forces after the parliamentary elections in 2006. For example, the personal relationship of the new Prime Minister Robert Fico with the leaders of Croatia could be different from the relationship between Mikuláš Dzurinda and Ivo Sanader.

As the authors of the first comprehensive Slovak publication on Slovakia as a new member state of the EU (Malová, Láštic, Rybář) have written: "the examination of the interaction of the actors and institutions and the character of Slovak democracy leads us to a conclusion, that the integration positions, as articulated by the governmental representation from the accession of Slovakia to the EU, are potentially very fragile and they do not represent a foundation for the permanently sustainable integration strategies of the state".¹⁶ The current integration priorities are "partially a result of random events, the outcome of the elections in the year 2002 and, what is most important, they are not a product of the coordination and consensus of many actors, but only of a part of the political elite, which is currently in the crucial decision-making positions. Thus, they are vulnerable in their essence, because they lack broader political and social support".¹⁷ This also concerns the future deliberations on the position of Slovakia towards the political and geographical limits of the European Union.

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¹⁶ D. Malová, E. Láštic, M. Rybář *Slovensko ako nový členský štát Európskej únie: Výzva z periferie?* (Bratislava: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2005), p. 9.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

Security Policy
of the Slovak Republic

Vladimír Tarasovič

The Development of the NATO and the EU Security Policy in 2005 in the Context of the Security and Defense Policy of the SR

The comprehensive defense review of the SR in 2005 has show that the Slovak Republic was able to react to the fundamental change of its political-security situation after the accession to NATO and the EU. The defense of the state has been firmly anchored in the framework of the collective defense of NATO. We do not have to rely on our own strength any longer and so we can focus on our tasks and interests in a larger entity.

Martin Fedor, Defense Minister of the SR

The year 2005 was the first whole year of Slovakia's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union and the first year of evaluation in this regard. The SR was able to react to the fundamental change of its political-security situation after the accession to NATO and the EU and despite several enduring problems Slovakia has achieved a number of considerable successes in the security and defense fields throughout this period. The National Council of the SR passed new security documents in September 2005 – *The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* and *Defense Strategy of the Slovak Republic* – while this year, Slovakia continued its active participation in 14 missions and operations, comprised of 563 members towards the end of the year.

In NATO's view, the year 2005 was not a year of great decisions but rather a year of intensive work on the transformation of the Alliance and on the projects adopted by NATO during its last two summits. The Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer rated the year as very successful because, in his view, the Alliance was able to face diverse and far more complex challenges than heretofore.

The year 2005 was not abundant in events signifying revolutionary changes in the security policy of the EU, either. It was assumed that throughout the year the main efforts would be centered on achieving the trouble-free ratification of the constitutional treaty. After the unsuccessful referendums in France and the Netherlands, many member states decided to postpone the plebiscites and the debate began about the various possibilities of overcoming this grave crisis in the whole of the EU.

Stopping the ratification process also had an impact on the security and defense policy of the EU, because the constitutional treaty encompassed several development impulses. Despite the above-mentioned problem, tangible progress has been achieved in the area of European defense. Whereas after St. Malo European defense was merely a project, now it has become a reality. Europe has presently got all the necessary instruments to support what has been accomplished in this area so far¹. The year 2005 has also shown that both organizations will have to consider further intensification of their cooperation so that the final effect will bring synergy, not duplicity.

Slovakia – Adoption of Fundamental Security Documents in 2005

In the second year of NATO and EU membership, Slovakia reevaluated its strategic security framework and assembled new fundamental security documents defining its security interests and security and defense policies. When Slovakia realized that the actualization of security documents enacted in the year 2001 would not be possible or effective, two completely new documents were assembled in 2005 – *The Security strategy of the Slovak Republic* and *The Defense strategy of the Slovak Republic*. Both documents are methodically and by content derived from *The NATO Strategic Concept* and *The European Security Strategy* and due to their simultaneous preparation they are sufficiently linked with one another. Considering the experience of the Visegrad countries admitted into NATO in 1999, it is possible to criticize their delay since they were enacted less than a year before the end of the mandate of the government, which means that their realization will to a large extent be the task of the following government.

¹ J. Chapman *Report: Closing Ranks: What Future for European Defense*. An evening debate in Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels, 21 November 2005.

This deficiency can be partially reduced when they are passed by the parliament and thus their realization might not become problematic in spite of the fact that their obligatory character is not yet sufficiently resolved.²

*The Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic (SS SR) 2005*³ takes into consideration the elemental changes of the security environment and the new commitments of Slovakia after the accession to NATO and the EU. In comparison with the SS SR 2001, the shift is most visible in the definition of the interests of the SR deduced from the values declared by Slovakia⁴, which were not defined in this manner by the preceding security strategy.

Positive shifts were also accomplished in defining the security policy of the SR. The largest section of the document is dedicated to this area. It is probably most visible in relation to the organizations of NATO and the EU. Even though NATO and the EU were characterized as the decisive factors of ensuring security in Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region in the year 2001, as well, the influence of both organizations was analyzed in one article along with the OSCE and with the declaration of active participation of the SR in the realization of the *Charter for European Security*.⁵ In the present document, as it seems from the Slovak point of view, NATO continues to be the main platform for the development of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic region, while the need for inner unity along with transformation and adaptation to the new security threats is emphasized. In relation to the EU, an active stance is adopted towards the formation and implementation of the CFSP, the development of capacities for the security and defense policy of the EU, while preserving complementarity with NATO. The SS SR 2001 only connected the Union with the stability and security of the economy while the formation of a security and defense framework was merely observed.⁶

*The Defense Strategy of the Slovak Republic (DS SR) 2005*⁷ took the place of the defense and military strategies from the period of transition from individual to collective defense and focuses the attention on fulfilling commitments and effective use of the possibilities that Slovakia has as a member of the Alliance and the Union. The DS SR elaborates the conclusions of the SS SR in questions related to defense. It determines the elemental goal of the defense policy, the basic requests for the state

² *Komplexné hodnotenie obrany SR za rok 2005. (The comprehensive defense review of the SR in 2005).* www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/060403_komplexne_hodnotenie.pdf.

³ Passed by the National Council of the SR on 27 September 2005.

⁴ *The Security Strategy of the SR 2005.* http://www.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=118bs_05.pdf, articles 4 a 5.

⁵ *The Security Strategy of the SR 2001.* <http://www.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=118>, article 36.

⁶ *Komplexné hodnotenie obrany SR za rok 2005.* www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/060403_komplexne_hodnotenie.pdf.

⁷ *The Defense Strategy of the SR 2005.* <http://www.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=118>. Passed by the National Council of the SR on 23 September 2005.

defense system, the extent of use of the armed forces in future operations, the key roles of the armed forces and the requests for their qualification with emphasis on their deployability and sustainability in operations under the conditions of collective defense. For the first time it also defines the military-political ambition of the state.⁸

The Development of the NATO Security Policy in 2005 in the Context of the Security and Defense Policy of the SR

The Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer rated the year 2005 as very successful from the point of view of the Alliance. In his view, NATO was able to face diverse challenges, often absolutely new and far more complex – from the immediate aid to Pakistan after the devastating earthquake in October 2005, through the logistic support for the African Union during the transportation of its armed forces into Sudan, to the opening of the *Joint Staff College* in Iraq.⁹ The year 2005 was not supposed to be a year of great decisions for NATO but a year of everyday work on the transformation of the Alliance and on those projects adopted by NATO on its last two summits which are closely related to the transformation – in Prague in 2002 (the improvement of its capabilities) and in Istanbul in 2004 (the initiation of the cooperation with the Mediterranean countries and the countries of the Persian gulf). The past year should also have proved that the military transformation of the Alliance is successfully progressing and that the goal of achieving full operational readiness of the *NATO Response Force* by 2006 will be fulfilled.

The Transformation of NATO – the Development of New Capabilities

At present, NATO is in a process of enormous transformation. From a static alliance of collective defense, like it was at the end of the cold war, which never engaged in any military operation, NATO transformed itself into an organization able to lead 8 military operations at the same time and, in addition, enlarge from the original 16 member countries to 26 in 2005. It is necessary to take into account the sustaining of partnership with 30 Eurasian countries and another 22 countries of the wider Middle East.¹⁰

⁸ *The Security Strategy of the SR 2001*. <http://www.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=118>.

⁹ *End of year message by NATO Secretary General*, 16. 12. 2005. In: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s051216a.htm>.

¹⁰ K. Volker *Transatlantic Security: The Importance of NATO Today*. Commentary at the Howard University's Model NATO conference, Washington, D.C., 23 February 2006. <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2006/62073.htm>.

The international credibility and real effectiveness of the Alliance does depend on its military ability to act but military power without the correct political and security strategy does not represent anything else than a financially demanding and practically useless instrument. This is why the transformation of NATO focuses not only on the reform of the armed forces and the improvement of military capabilities but on the intensification of the political and security dialogue and the enhancement of planning and budget procedures, as well. The SR identifies itself with this strategic vision. This was confirmed by the former Deputy Defense Minister of the SR Martin Fedor on the international conference in Bratislava on September 30, 2005, by his saying that: “the transatlantic community is the backbone of international peace and prosperity. Europe is America’s closest ally and the transatlantic cooperation must continue in a manner which allows the foundations of world peace and stability to be built for future generations”.¹¹ In spite of the successful progress of the transformation of military capabilities of the Alliance, last year it failed to fulfill all the tasks adopted at the *Prague summit* in 2002. Shortfalls continue to exist in four key areas: CBRN defense; information superiority; combat efficiency; deployability and sustainability.¹² The SR also fulfilled its NATO membership commitments with certain shortcomings. The Defense Minister of the SR M. Fedor noted this, as well, at the conference of the security community *The comprehensive defense review of the SR in the year 2005* on April 25, 2006: “We have fulfilled the primary objective for the year 2005 – the preparation of a mechanized combat battalion. The staff of the battalion of rapid response in Martin has been affirmed by the Alliance. By the inclusion of air force fighters into the integrated air defense system of the Alliance NATINADS¹³ Slovakia has secured its airspace. I mentioned shortcomings. These are mainly related to certain aspects of the building of military capabilities according to the planning standards of NATO – *The Goals of Forces*¹⁴ – even though we are fulfilling the main areas and we also accept their increasing level of difficulty.”¹⁵ The greatest remaining problem of the Alliance is the insufficient capability of European allies to provide strategic transport. If it fails to solve this problem soon, NATO will not be able to respond promptly enough in regions distant from its “homeland”. There are other deficiencies that NATO struggles to eliminate, namely

¹¹ M. Korba, “Vonkajšia bezpečnosť a obrana” (“External Security and Defense”), M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútorá (eds.) *Slovensko 2005 – Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006).

¹² J. Scheffer *NATO’s Political and Military Transformation: Two Sides of the Same Coin*. 14 April 2005. http://www.nato.int/docu/conf/2005/050414_pdd/index.html.

¹³ NATINADS – NATO Integrated Air Defense System.

¹⁴ Since the year 2004, the SR has been participating in the fulfillment of *The Goals of Forces*, which became the priority of the reform of the armed forces. With 28 goals, the insufficient language skills, lack of personnel, lower training quality, insufficient outfitting, technical and material support have caused a delay from the approved schedule.

¹⁵ M. Fedor *Komplexné hodnotenie obrany SR za rok 2005.*, speech at the conference of the security community, 25 April 2006. <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=335>.

air-to-air refueling, lack of helicopters and support forces. Slovakia's problem is not only strategic transport but operational transport, as well, and if the matter is not promptly resolved, in several years it might even affect the tactical transport of the Slovak armed forces. This problem is partially addressed by *The Defense strategy of the SR* in the part *Improvement of the Armed Forces*, as follows: "In long-term perspective the aircrafts, ground anti-air defense systems and surveillance units of the air forces will be modernized. This will create conditions for the participation in the antiballistic defense of NATO, for the fire support for ground forces and it will increase the transportation capacities of the air force necessary for the support of ground forces deployed in operations out of the territory of the state."¹⁶

The current strategic transportation of units of the Armed forces of the Slovak Republic (AF SR) is performed by a contracted carrier, with whom the AF SR have arranged an *Agreement on the provision of future transportations*¹⁷ for the years 2005-2007.

The achievement of "initiative operational capability" of the NATO *Response Force* can probably be considered as the greatest accomplishment in the building of new NATO capabilities in the year 2005. This key project of NATO should culminate in October this year, when the NATO forces of rapid response (NRF) should achieve full combat readiness, which represents 25-thousand soldiers in permanent combat readiness, capable of deployment into any part of the world within 5 days.

The NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe general James L. Jones has expressed doubts whether the individual member states of NATO realize that an adequate number of soldiers for further rotations in case of deployment is necessary for the full combat readiness of the *NATO Response Force*. According to the general there is a lack of 25% soldiers for the first rotation and 30-35% for the second rotation.¹⁸ Slovakia decided to involve its armed forces in NRF in the horizon of the year 2012. Forces and recourses for NRF 7 (readiness by July 1, 2005) are in the last stage of preparation. The SR will provide *The RCHBO (CBRN) Training and Test Center*, personnel to the international staff and a guard unit for NRF 7 and NRF 8. The preparation of the rapid response battalion for NRF 10 has also commenced. The Slovak Republic has also met the criteria for joining the air defense NATINADS. However, instead of the two declared airplanes Mig-29 it only provided one.

The AF SR (fully professional since January 1, 2006) will probably not be able to avoid problems with managing further rotations as they are currently missing 4,256 professional soldiers and they are only filled up to 76%. Slovakia was able to fill the declared units of the AF SR according to the requests of the Alliance (95% at minimum) but this caused the reduction of other units to the extent of 62%.¹⁹

¹⁶ *The Defense Strategy of the SR 2005*. <http://www.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=118>.

¹⁷ *Komplexné hodnotenie obrany SR za rok 2005*. <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=335>.

¹⁸ G. Harding, "NATO General Calls for Proactive Alliance", *Washington Times*, 31 March 2006. <http://washtimes.com/upi/20060331-110641-5179r.htm>.

¹⁹ *Komplexné hodnotenie obrany SR za rok 2005*. <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=335>.

It is possible to assume that this problem will become an intensively discussed issue during the preparations of the NATO summit in Riga in November, amidst the discussion about the future of NATO. NATO's Strategic Concept from the year 1999 does not reflect the present needs any more and it is assumed that decisions concerning the future role and priorities of NATO will be made at the summit. According to the statements of several NATO representatives, the Alliance will need to emphasize issues like the ensuring of the security of energy supplies and vital infrastructure, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, contribution to the global war against terror and the expansion of stabilization and reconstruction roles of the Alliance.

ESDP in the Context of Slovakia's Security and Defense policy

European politicians as well as the experts dealing with the questions of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) realize that the elemental basis for its success is a functional CFSP. From the point of its creation, this collides with the ambitions of large member countries, to use the EU as a multiplier for the realization of their own foreign policy and security policy interests, which results in problematic adoptions of common positions of the EU. It is no surprise, then, that an opinion is spreading within the expert community that until the identified and defined European interests are understood as common interests derived from national interests and not as a sum of interests of individual states, the Union cannot think of its own position as a global actor.²⁰ In other words, to be a global actor presupposes, in the first place, to be a compact political actor in one's own self.

The adoption of *The European security strategy* (ESS) at the end of the year 2003 was the first evolutionary impulse for the commencement of the process of developing the EU as a global actor. *The Constitutional Treaty for the EU* (constitutional treaty) was to be another impulse, comprising many positive development moments, which represented a certain change in the security policy paradigms. This concerns the ensuring of aid in case of a military attack, a clause of solidarity in the case of a terrorist strike, the establishment of *The European Defense Agency* (EDA) as well as the agreement on the establishment of a permanent structured cooperation between states, to address the demanding criteria for military capabilities and the possibility of their deployment.²¹ The problems with the ratification of the constitutional treaty, which began by the

²⁰ E. Reiter, "Die Situation der EU in ihrer geplanten strategischen Überdehnung", *Europäische Sicherheit* No. 4/2005, pp. 34 – 44.

²¹ *Ibidem*.

unsuccessful referendums in France and the Netherlands in the first half of the year 2005, did not endanger the cooperation in the preparation of the rapid response forces and the establishment of the EDA because they are part of the common interest of all member states of the EU and in legal conformity with the Nice Treaty. However, the clause of solidarity and the structured cooperation cannot be implemented without the constitutional treaty. The interruption of the ratification process of the constitutional treaty means a complication for further perspective of development of the ESDP, as well, because the treaty defines the methods of its fulfillment. Besides, the treaty must be perceived as an integral part of a broader concept in which the ESS is a part at the strategic level and the missions of the ESDP a part at the operational level.

After joining the EU, the SR actively participated in the ESDP. In the context of its “Euro-Atlantic” strategic orientation, stated in the new security strategy, Slovakia formulated all of its positions to ESDP projects and initiatives according to their complementarity with NATO. The largest emphasis was not placed on the political-declaratory domain of the activities of the EU as a global actor but on the operational and practical domain of reinforcing military and civilian instruments of crisis management.²²

The Building of Military and Civilian Capabilities of the EU

The fundamental goal of the ESDP is the control of international and crisis management operations including the prevention of conflicts and the building of relevant military and civilian capabilities. The highest representatives of the EU member states realize that the fulfillment of their foreign policy and security ambitions is limited by the known deficiencies in the area of military capabilities. Consequently, changes were made in the approach to the formation of the ESDP and since 2004 greater stress has been placed on the qualitative indicators of the improvement of military instruments of crisis management.²³

The Improvement of Military Capabilities of the EU

The Requests and the Progress

The ability of the ESDP to adapt to the rapidly changing international security environment is an advantage which the EU should not only maintain but also develop into the future. The Defense Minister of Great Britain John Reid confirmed this on

²² *The Defense Strategy of the SR 2005*. <http://www.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=118>, p. 13; M. Korba, “Vonkajšia bezpečnosť a obrana”, M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútora (eds.) *Slovensko 2005 – Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006). p. 375.

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 375 – 376.

November 21, 2005 during the *Bibliothèque Solvay's Debate* on the future of European defense by saying: "The essence of the ESDP must be flexibility."²⁴

Battle groups (BG) are the basic element of European flexibility, which guarantee the immediate and autonomous operations of the EU. One battle group is on permanent standby from the beginning of the year 2005, from the year 2007 two battle groups capable of running two almost simultaneous operations of rapid response should be on standby. However, at the coordination conference for battle groups the Council of the EU stated that to ensure the full operational capability in the years 2007 and 2008 one battle group is still missing for the second half of the year 2007. This problem was solved at the second coordination conference for battle groups on November 8, 2005, by the commitment of Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus to form the *Balkan battle group for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions*. The Defense ministers of the EU formulated a new catalogue of military requests in November 2005, with the objective to identify capabilities necessary for further evolution of the ESDP in the framework of the HG 2010.

Slovakia's involvement in the creation of a combined battalion battle group in cooperation with Poland, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania, capable of deployment in the year 2010, with 250 members of the AF SR, confirms the political will of the SR to participate in the improvement of the military capabilities of the EU. Signing a treaty with the Czech Republic on creation of a Czecho-Slovak battle group was Slovakia's second contribution to the building of military capabilities of the EU. Its deployment readiness is expected as early as the second half of the year 2009 and Slovakia should contribute 300 soldiers.²⁵

The European Defense Agency

The establishment of the EDA independently of the ratification process of the constitutional treaty ensured that the agency is able to work on the fulfillment of its goals without restraint. The agency is vitally important for the European countries because all of them need to strengthen their defense capabilities and defense industry. The first year of its existence, when the Steering board of the EDA opened the European defense equipment market²⁶, has already shown that this was the right decision. The agency made progress in three other very important projects adopted

²⁴ J. Chapman *Report: Closing Ranks: What Future for European Defense*. An evening debate in Bibliothèque Solvay. Brussels, 21 November 2005.

²⁵ *Komplexné hodnotenie obrany SR za rok 2005*. www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/060403_komplexne_hodnotenie.pdf; M. Korba, "Vonkajšia bezpečnosť a obrana", M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútorá (eds.) *Slovensko 2005 – Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006).

²⁶ The goal of this decision is to contribute to the consolidation and strengthening of the European defense industry base by the free intergovernmental regime without constraints, based on the agreed norms for defense procurement.

for the year 2005: C3 – Command, Control, Communications; unmanned air vehicles and armored fighting vehicles.²⁷

In the future, the EDA has an ambition to expand its involvement beyond the Union, mostly to Africa in the framework of the EU – African Union cooperation.²⁸ The Slovak Republic is its regular member and supports its development with the emphasis on the full involvement of Slovakia's industrial and technological base in the development of the European defense market.²⁹ Reciprocally, it offers its capabilities and infrastructure for the testing of military technology.

Slovakia has not yet been successful in acquiring its representation in the EDA structures. As in many preceding cases, Slovakia has made its position more difficult by its indecisiveness and hesitating. This case concerns a very sensitive question of the Slovak defense industry. The secondary cause might be the fact that the defense industry in Slovakia comprises of several institutions (The Ministry of Defense, The Ministry of Agriculture, The Association of Defense Industry).³⁰ Due to this, a joint coordination committee was established to carry out tasks concerning the EDA under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, which should be responsible for the formulation of national positions on this area.

The Improvement of Civilian Capabilities of the EU

During the year 2005 considerable progress has been achieved in the fulfillment of the *Civilian Headline Goal 2008* (CHG 2008), which is to ensure the increase of the EU civilian capabilities necessary for the execution of the ambitions of the Union declared in the ESS. The objective is rapidly to create deployable Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) by the end of the year 2006, each with approximately 100 experts in fields defined by the ESS: border patrol; organized crime; sexual and violent crimes; human trafficking and human rights. The commitment to fulfill the CHG 2008 was confirmed at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the increase of civilian capabilities on November 21, 2005 and the Council of the EU consequently adopted the *Civilian Capability Improvement Plan*, with a three-step content:

- active support of the participation of crucial national investors and the passing on of positive experiences from these types of missions;
- support of these missions along with the necessary equipment, logistics, ensuring the security, human and financial recourses;

²⁷ *Presidency Report on ESDP*. 15891/05 The Council of the EU, 19 December 2005.

²⁸ M. Alliot-Marie, J. Reid, "Carriers Deal Signals Important Step in EU Defense Links", *Finance Times*, 6 June 2005.

²⁹ *The Security Strategy of the SR 2005*. <http://www.mepoforum.sk/index.php?id=118>.

³⁰ An analytical speech of the Defense Minister on the foreign policy, 28 April 2005; <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=25&type=news&id=3&method=main&art=3984&PHPSESSID=755e4a7e584a7cc1aabe4219ef9417a4>.

- continued working on the capabilities ensuring rapid response and deployability;³¹ Slovakia is falling behind in the improvement of crisis management capabilities and it does not provide enough trained personnel for the needs of the EU. This deficiency is also addressed (both directly and indirectly) in its fundamental security documents, however the solution must be comprehensive in the framework of the national security system.

Civil-Military Coordination

The alteration of the security environment at the beginning of the 21st century induced the reevaluation of the approaches to the use of military and civilian instruments because the forces will no longer be used solely for military interventions but they will have to guarantee peace, security and democracy. This requires a layout of a substantially greater emphasis on effective civil-military coordination in international crisis management. The EU has established a civil-military unit, which should ensure the effective coordination of relevant actors of crisis management by complex planning within the EU as well as between the EU and outside actors (the UN, NATO, the OSCE, Non-EU European NATO members).³² The civil-military coordination was one of the priorities of the British presidency and will be part of the priorities of the following Austrian and Finnish presidencies.

EU and NATO Relations

The relations between both organizations are determined by two factors. Firstly, it's the double membership, when most of the countries are members of both organizations. This is a condition for the second factor, which is the identical agenda – the build-up and expansion of democracy and freedom. It is only logical, then, that both organizations are present in the same regions – the Balkans, Afghanistan, North Africa and the Middle East.

In spite of the current climate of the amelioration and strengthening of transatlantic relations, accented as well by the visit of president George Bush in Europe in February 2005, the NATO-EU dialogue is not sufficient. Different opinions exist on how to expand the development of European capabilities and structures allowing Europe to carry out independent actions without negatively influencing the cooperation of NATO and the EU.

³¹ *Presidency Report on ESDP*. 15891/05 The Council of the EU, December 19, 2005.

³² *Ibidem*.

The present agenda of joint meetings is restricted to the implementation of the *Berlin plus* treaties (the operation *Althea* in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the cooperation within the NATO-EU *Capability Group*). The crucial security areas such as terrorism or the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction are not a part of the NATO-EU security dialogue.³³ Since both sides feel this deficiency, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of NATO approved the extension of the political dialogue with the EU with other strategic problems on an informal meeting in Vilnius on April 20-21, 2005. Beside the successful cooperation of both organizations in the Balkans, the cooperation in other regions does not reach this level. For example, in the region of South Caucasus, which is strategically crucially important for both organizations, no institutional cooperation exists, so far. At the same time, this region needs support including activities from pure military cooperation to crisis management, peacekeeping, civilian emergency planning and others. There are other regions where both organizations often work on similar activities but without their mutual coordination (Africa – Sudan and Congo, the Middle East and the Mediterranean). The rational cooperation of NATO and the EU is in the essential interest of the SR because it represents the primary condition for preservation of the effectiveness and the significance of both organizations. In case of the close coordination of their activities in ensuring the security and stability within the boundaries of the member states, the risk of the penetration of outer threats into their territories is lesser than in the case of their mutual rivalry and competition.³⁴

Conclusions

Slovakia has been able to react to the fundamental change of its political-security situation after the accession to NATO and the EU rather successfully not only in practical steps, but with two new security documents, as well. Although the government program as well as the mentioned alteration of the security situation conditioned their assembling, their adoption in the last year of the electoral term was not very fortunate.

In these documents the SR clearly defined its security policy, focusing on the Euro-Atlantic alliance and the relation to the organizations of NATO and the EU, of which Slovakia became a full-fledged member in the year 2004. NATO is considered to be the main platform for the development of cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. In relation to the EU, Slovakia does maintain an active stance towards the formation

³³ *Defense: Ministers to evaluate military operation in Bosnia*. European Report, 12 October 2005.

³⁴ M. Korba, "Vonkajšia bezpečnosť a obrana", M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútora (eds.) *Slovensko 2005 – Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006).

and implementation of the CFSP and the building of capacities for the ESDP, but only while preserving complementarity with NATO.

Despite the tangible successes of Slovakia's security and defense policies last year, the SR had a number of shortcomings, mainly related to certain aspects of the development of military capabilities according to the planning standards of NATO and civil capabilities of the EU. If we were to compare the approach of the SR to security tasks appointed to it by NATO and the EU, the shortfall would be considerably more significant in the relation to the EU. After joining the Union, Slovakia did actively participate in the ESDP but, unfortunately, did not cope with certain projects. The most visible is the project of the EDA, which was underestimated in its initial phase. As a result, Slovakia lacks a representative in the governing bodies of this agency and his absence, as further progress has revealed, is currently negatively influencing the opportunities of the participation of Slovakia's defense industry in European projects. The civilian capabilities of crisis management are another area underestimated by Slovakia in the past. Slovakia does not have enough trained personnel for the needs of the EU.

This deficiency is mentioned (both directly and indirectly) in *The Security strategy* and *The Defense strategy of the SR* but the solution must be comprehensive and it must be found in the framework of the national security system.

The common denominator of the mentioned problems is the insufficient defense budget, which Slovakia failed to increase to the declared level of 2% in the preceding period. The unsolved question of the expenses for unplanned operations, deployment of forces in NRF and in battle groups is closely connected to this matter.

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Miroslav Kysel

The Reflection of Fundamental Security Policy Documents in Practice

Active participation of Slovak Armed Forces (AF SR) in international peace missions for peacekeeping, preserving security, crisis management and fighting against terrorism is one of the main components of the foreign and security policy of the Slovak Republic since her formation in 1993. The number of active members of the AF SR in peace missions as well as the international organization in charge reflected the current foreign policy ambitions and interests of Slovakia. In the first years of its existence as a sovereign state, Slovakia's peace missions under UN command dominated foreign participation of the AF SR. The ambitions of Slovakia to become a member of the European union, but especially NATO, called for a need of participation in missions under the command of the Alliance. After the 1998 parliamentary elections, an increase in the number of armed forces members in peace missions was ordered as well as the successive re-evaluation of the activities in individual operations and missions, with primary emphasis on operations under NATO command. Active participation in operations under its command was to serve as a demonstration of Slovakia's preparedness to become a full member of the Alliance. In accordance with its capacities, Slovakia participated in observing and monitoring missions under EU command and the *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe* (OSCE) respectively. The alteration of the security environment due to the events after 11 September 2001 and particularly the accession of Slovakia into NATO and the EU raised a need to prepare and accept new security policy documents to replace the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2001*, *Defense Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2001* and *Military Strategy of the Slovak Republic 2001*. The new security policy (strategic security) documents, *the Security*

Strategy of the Slovak Republic and *Defense Strategy of the Slovak Republic*, were enacted in 2005¹. Both are linked to the *NATO Strategic Concept* and the *European Security Strategy* by content as well as by method.

As both documents imply, the necessity to engage in compliance with the security interests of Slovakia in prevention of crisis situations and conflict management in unstable parts of the world, which requires a number of qualitative changes in the character of state defense, will, amongst others, be a role of defending the state within requests for the security of Slovakia. In view of the anticipated development in the security situation, the armed forces will most likely be deployed into peace support missions and missions against terrorism, which are primarily focused on prevention of crisis situations and stabilizing relations. The military policy ambition of Slovakia towards the end of the year 2010 is the preparedness of the AF SR for the participation in at least two simultaneous missions. Achieving preparedness for participation in an operation under NATO command will be a priority while an operation for peace support under the command of one of the international organizations will generally be of secondary importance².

Participation of Members of the AF SR in Foreign Operations and Missions in 2005

In 2005, the members of the AF SR participated in 14 peace missions in 9 countries on 3 continents, as follows:

- in 3 peace support missions under NATO command;
- in 2 peace missions under UN command;
- in 5 peace missions and observing and monitoring missions under the command of NATO, UN, OSCE, EU;
- in 2 operations under the command of coalition forces.

By 31 December 2005, 566³ members of the AF SR have participated in foreign operations. Overall, more than 1700 members of the armed forces have taken part in fulfilling tasks in foreign missions in 2005.

¹ The National Council of the Slovak Republic passed the Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic on 27 September 2005 and the Defense Strategy of the Slovak Republic on 23 September 2005.

² The Defense Strategy of the Slovak Republic, September 2005, article 26, 27.

³ All figures of members of the armed forces participating in individual missions and operations are drawn from *Slovakia in NATO*, Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 2005.

Peace support operations under NATO command

Operation KFOR, Kosovo

Throughout last year, the Slovak contingent operated in Kosovo, with 98 members of the armed forces in action. Within the range of operative responsibility of the company, these troops repeatedly performed monitoring of locations and civilian structures by patrolling, secured local infrastructure, safeguarded the continuous safe return of refugees, provided support for the activities of humanitarian organizations on the Kosovo territory and created conditions for the peaceful cohabitation of Kosovo Serbs and Albanians in the operational radius of the battalion⁴.

Operation ISAF, Afghanistan

Last year the Slovak contingent was present in Afghanistan in the size of a de-mining engineer platoon (17 soldiers), whose assignment consisted of de-mining tasks in the open areas of the international airport Kaia. On December 1, 2005, the termination of the involvement of members of the AF SR in the operation *Enduring freedom* was approved and authorization was granted for the deployment of a construction engineer unit of the AF SR into the operation ISAF in Afghanistan. A multifunctional engineer unit for ISAF was created on January 1, 2006 by merging the construction engineer unit under the operation *Enduring freedom* with the de-mining engineer platoon from ISAF.

Mission NTM-I, Iraq

5 members of the AF SR took part in this mission. Its goal is to help build, train and equip the new Iraqi armed forces. This mission is a standalone training mission in Iraq under NATO command. In its activities the mission cooperates with multinational coalition forces in Iraq under the command of the USA.

UN Peace Operations

UN Peace Mission UNFICYP, Cyprus

The Slovak contingent of 196 members of the armed forces has been carrying out its duties in the range of operative responsibility as well as tasks necessary for the

⁴ <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=80>.

command of the peace mission UNFICYP derived from the mandate and the purpose of the peace mission. The goal of the mission lies in preventing the renewal of combat between the Greeks and the Turks in Cyprus, securing the maintenance of the truce between the two hostile sides and enforcing law and order on the island. The fact that for the first time in history Slovakia has assumed command in one of the three sectors of the mission is a significant element of the participation of the Slovak party in the UNFICYP on Cyprus. Soldiers of the AF SR occupy posts at the Headquarters of UNFICYP in Nicosia, at the commanding posts of Sector IV along with Hungarian soldiers, in the commanding company and in the second guard company. In order to maintain the integrity of the buffer zone, the units of the contingent carry out monitoring and patrolling tasks in this zone, tasks securing its integrity during the so-called main period of demonstrations, tasks securing all civilian projects within the area of the zone, tasks deduced from the so-called anti-hunt provisions and tasks connected to assigning force reserves and resources for the command of the mission UNFICYP, as well as forces and resources for its own sector reserve. In the area of responsibility of SLOVHUNCON, the buffer zone represents 110 km². Apart from tasks within the area of responsibility, members of the Slovak contingent carry out assignments on behalf of the contingents of Argentina (sector 1) and Great Britain (sector 2). Members of the engineer platoon perform maintenance of structures and setting up of engineering networks for the mission headquarters in Nicosia⁵.

UN Peace Mission UNDOF, Golan Heights

The Slovak contingent of 94 members of the armed forces has been carrying out its assignment in the mission UNDOF in the ranks of the Austrian battalion AUSBATT. The Slovak third company in the ranks of the Austrian battalion fulfils its duties from seven permanent positions in an area of 58 km². Tasks are fulfilled by deploying daily patrols afoot, daily and nightly motorized patrols and special night patrols, which raises the flexibility and effectiveness of pursued tasks. The company keeps a constant separate patrol of rapid response and a group of rapid response, which are deployed in case of inner disturbances and to protect the forces and resources of the UN units. The mission UNDOF in accordance with the treaty between the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Israel about the detachment of armed forces, ensures monitoring, patrolling and inspection of the regime in the zone of separation, which was created by the detachment of the armed forces of the conflicting parties⁶.

⁵ <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=76>.

⁶ <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=74>.

Peace, Observer and Monitoring Missions under the NATO, UN, OSCE and the EU command

Observer Mission under the NATO command, NATO Headquarters Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Last year 4 officers of the AF SR served in this mission, they fulfilled tasks in the field of logistics, air operations, civil-military relations and the field of evidence export and import of weapons and ammunition at the NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo.

UN Observer Mission UNTSO, Middle East

The mission UNTSO is charged with observation on the Syrian and Lebanese borders with Israel. Its main objective remains the same, i.e. inspection in important locations according to the treaty from 1974. The mission is composed of 80 observers from 19 countries.

Two officers of the AF SR served as military observers in this mission. The Slovak officers carried out tasks in observing the compliance with the content of the truce treaty between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights, by monitoring the situation on the Israeli-Lebanese border, by patrolling and executing inspections. They also took part in special investigation and in training new observers. They were assigned to observing groups on observer outposts. One of the members fulfilled tasks in Israel and the other in Syria⁷.

UN Observer Mission UNAMSIL, Sierra Leone

One officer of the AF SR served in this mission. The Security Council of the UN evaluated the political and military situation in Sierra Leone in 2005 as sufficiently stable. After the realization of local municipal elections in March 2005 the observers continued in monitoring the state administration, the police, the army and the economic situation. The military part of the mission terminated its activities on 20 December 2005 and the entire mission UNAMSIL was terminated on 31 December 2005.

EU Observer Mission EUMM, Territory of Former Yugoslavia

Two members of the AF SR served in this mission. Their occupation consisted of monitoring the situation in the border area of Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia and

⁷ <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=78>.

Montenegro and Albania. The monitoring of the implementation of various election results (presidential, parliamentary, municipal) in this area was also an important task.

ALTHEA, Bosnia and Herzegovina

In this mission, four members of the AF SR fulfilled assignments in the headquarters of operation ALTHEA-EUFOR in Sarajevo. This operation is a significant contribution to the political commitment of the EU, the assistance program (continuous police and monitoring missions) with an ambition to help Bosnia and Herzegovina take another step towards European integration in the context of the stabilization and unification process. The Thessalonica declaration from 2003 confirmed that the future of the western Balkan countries lies on the shoulders of the EU. The ALTHEA operation is merely one part of a complex commitment of the EU towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. This adds a new dimension to the heretofore-existing political contracts, support programs, monitoring missions and inspection in the country⁸. Following the government resolution no. 924 of November 23, 2005, a guard platoon of 35 members of the AF SR with adequate technical equipment will be deployed into the operation ALTHEA-EUFOR. By deploying this platoon, Slovakia will contribute to the elimination of insufficient capabilities in the operation ALTHEA.

OSCE Observer Mission, Georgia

One military observer from Slovakia participated in the mission of the OSCE in Georgia from February 1, 2005. On the grounds of the refusal of further continuance of the mission on part of the Russian federation, the mandate of the mission was not prolonged.

The main goal of the mission of the OSCE was the facilitation of negotiations between the conflicting parties towards achieving a peace settlement by diplomatic means in the Georgia-Ossetian and the Georgia-Abkhaz conflict, support of human rights preservation, creation of democratic institutions and monitoring of joint peace forces.

The member of the AF SR fulfilled observer tasks on the borders between Georgia, Chechnya and the Ingush Republic by patrolling in mountain terrain⁹.

⁸ <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=313>.

⁹ <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=84>.

Peace Support Missions under the Command of Coalition Forces

Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan

An engineer unit (40 soldiers) of the AF SR took part in this mission with the goal of reconstructing the airport in Bagram. A multifunctional engineer unit for ISAF was created on January 1, 2006 by the merger of this construction engineer unit under the operation *Enduring freedom* with the de-mining engineer platoon from ISAF.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Slovak contingent of 104 members of the armed forces operated in Iraq as a part of the stabilizing forces in the Polish sector between Baghdad and Basra. The company is directly subordinated to the headquarters of the multinational division and its duty is to perform demining and pyrotechnical operations as well as the disposal of weapons and ammunition in Iraq¹⁰.

Conclusions

Participation of members of the AF SR in foreign operations and missions has a priceless effect on the augmentation of unit and personal professionalism and build-up of the preparedness (interoperability) of the AF SR to fulfill tasks according to the standards of NATO. For staff members and headquarters, engagement in these missions and operations presents priceless practical experience, in which they can test their abilities to fulfill battle operations, take responsibility for their effectiveness as well as for the lives of their subordinates amidst battlefield conditions. The application of these acquired experiences in education and training of the armed forces in Slovakia remains a vital need. The multinational character of peace operations (especially peace support operations under NATO command, but EU, as well) brings forth a requirement to provide interoperable organic units with experiences from joint activities in operations or joint training programs, equipped with standard communication systems and capable of applying standard procedures particularly in the field of command and logistic support. The creation of special-purpose structured units (at the expense of organic units) adjusted to specific tasks in individual operations appears to be

¹⁰ <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=87>.

a grave problem when foreign missions and operations are to be filled. This approach significantly hinders the formation of the preparation of these units and decreases the effectiveness of training other organic units of the armed forces in domestic conditions.

Providing members of the armed forces serving in foreign operations and missions with high quality equipment and technology is a long-term deficiency. Problems with tires in Iraq, with armored terrain vehicles in Bosnia and Herzegovina et cetera may serve as an example. However, the most apparent problem is the outfitting of the soldiers. This matter comprises not only clothing and footwear into tough weather conditions but also as fundamental a component as a carrying system, which should allow functional deposition and use of arms and other material. Recently introduced plans for modernization of a soldier's personal gear prove the priority bestowed upon the basic executive component of all armed forces, the individual soldier, in the reform system of the armed forces. Besides supporting peace and stability throughout the world and backing foreign policy interests of the SR, capabilities enhancement should be another important factor influencing the participation of members of the AF SR in peace operations. This means that the practical fulfillment of tasks in foreign missions and operations should contribute to the advancement of combat and expert knowledge as the experience of individuals, commanders and staff. From this standpoint, for example, the duties related to the reconstruction of the airport in Afghanistan seem backhanded at the very least. Regarding the involvement of Slovakia in activities supporting and maintaining peace in the world, it is necessary on the ground of prior experiences to implement the strategy of symmetric participation.

Deducing from both security policy documents, the priority of deployment of the AF SR into foreign missions and operations is the participation under the command of NATO and the EU, where in the case of operations under EU command the principle of complementarity would be applied. In both strategies, the SR declares active participation in operations under the auspices of the UN, OSCE, and potentially in ad hoc coalitions. Due to our commitments to NATO and the EU, the involvement of the AF SR in this type of operations has reached a phase of elemental conflict between the ambitions of the state and the possibilities of the armed forces. The gradual increase of the number of members of the armed forces in foreign missions activated a multitude of problems in the area of selection of personnel and the area of equipping operations with the desired technology and materials. The goal of the preparation of the armed forces towards the year 2010 is to ensure the participation of its members and units in at least two simultaneous missions. Participation in an operation under NATO command will be a priority while an operation for peace support under the command of one of the international organizations will generally be of secondary importance. In 2005, members of the AF SR served in 14 peace missions and operations. Amongst these, relatively numerous contingents are currently in operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (after the arrival of the guard unit), in Kosovo, Cyprus, the Golan Heights, Afghanistan and in Iraq, under the command of NATO, the EU, the UN and the coalition forces.

The Defense Strategy of the Slovak Republic does not include the definition of the term operation. Because of this, it is not clear whether the term only stands for the deployment of military units into combat operations or whether the term comprises peace operations or potentially the sort of operations in which the armed forces are involved currently. Thus, on the ground of this strategy, it is not clear whether Slovakia plans prospectively to decrease the number of foreign operations or not. The present number of operations (14) and the number of members of the armed forces in these operations (approx. 600) is at the edge of the possibilities of the AF SR and poses exceptional requirements on their provision. The progressive aim should lead to the reduction of the number of operations and missions and the increase of their so called added value, which implies focusing on operations and missions that correspond the most with the foreign policy and security policy orientation of the SR and add the most to the enhancement of capabilities of units preferentially designated for the demands of NATO (rapid response units). From the point of view of regional involvement, the deployment of members of the armed forces is primary particularly in operations in the western Balkans, which represents one of the main foreign policy and security policy priorities of the SR. Naturally, it is necessary not to forget the commitments of Slovakia to the other international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE). It is essential to mention the deliberations on deploying units prepared for operations under NATO command into operations under EU command in view of the principle of complementarity.

The following model of the AF SR members' participation might emerge as an example from the stated perceptions:

Operations under NATO command:

- continue and, if necessary, reinforce the involvement in KFOR according to the demands and requirements, including the acquisition and occupation of higher command and staff posts;
- continue in NTM-I;
- progressively terminate the participation in ISAF¹¹.

Operations under the command of coalition forces:

- continue and, if necessary, reinforce involvement in operation *Iraqi Freedom* according to the demands and requirements

UN Operations and Missions:

- continue in the mission UNFICYP;
- progressively terminate the participation in UNDOF;
- continue in observer missions.

¹¹ The other possibility is to progressively terminate the operation *Iraqi freedom* and reinforce the participation in the operation ISAF instead.

EU Operations and Missions:

- continue and, if necessary, reinforce involvement in ALTHEA according to the demands and requirements;
- continue in the monitoring mission.

OSCE Missions:

- join observer and monitoring missions according to the demands and requirements.

This proposal of the AF SR members' participation in foreign operations and missions creates a compromise between the involvement on behalf of individual international organizations (NATO, EU, UN, OSCE, coalitions *ad hoc*), grants better opportunities for the enhancement of capabilities and, from the geographical point of view, fulfills the priorities of the foreign policy of Slovakia (the western Balkans). It is necessary to mention that the Ministry of Defense of SR has already issued some rationalization measures in this direction. Specifically, the number of members of the armed forces has been raised in the operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina by 40 and in the operation KFOR in Kosovo by 35. It is the unit participating in the operation KFOR that can be perceived as a typical foreign mission of the future.

The passing of the *Act on State Service of Professional Soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic* had a significant impact on the fulfillment of tasks by members of the AF SR in foreign missions. This Act regulates, amongst others, the career advancement and personnel management of the AF SR. Concerning foreign missions the Act disposes of the possibility of volunteering for these operations and the deployment of members of the AF SR will be organized in a manner standard in every NATO army – by order. To be precise, it is necessary to mention that the preceding novelized Act already stated the possibility of deploying a professional soldier into a foreign operation without his consent. The factor of volunteering was commonly exploited by the political representatives of the state in cases of tragic events linked to the duties of service in foreign operations, when they would not fail to emphasize that the victims joined the operations in question voluntarily. The new Act rendered the service in foreign operations more attractive by increasing the foreign remunerations. Due to the shortness of time in practical force, it is premature to evaluate the contribution of the Act to the overall augmentation of the quality and professionalism of the armed forces. Taking the fulfillment of tasks in foreign operations into account, it is possible to assess that the Act stipulates exceptional requirements on personnel management with the goal of an adequate distribution of professional soldiers to posts in the armed forces. There have been several cases where posts offered to professional soldiers returning from foreign operations and missions were not appropriate to their experience and previous posts. Some of them decided to solve this matter by leaving into reserve.

Another step which should take a major part in the improvement of the preparation of the armed forces as well as the deployment of its members into foreign operations is the abolition of the compulsory military service by December 31, 2005. The full professionalization of the AF SR creates conditions for high-quality training of units and staff for the fulfillment of given tasks in foreign operations.

The article 53 of the *Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic* states that the Slovak Republic will actively cooperate with non-state actors (non-governmental organizations, private sector) in solving problems of failing states, regional and intrastate conflicts, problems with trafficking arms and people, production and distribution of humanitarian and development aid and other areas. *The Defense strategy of the Slovak Republic* does not specify the means of realization of this cooperation. Another capability which must be adopted by the armed forces is the area of the so-called civil-military relations (CIMIC). Amongst other duties, CIMIC coordinates and guides the activities of national and local authorities, municipal offices and non-governmental and international organizations in a manner that consolidates the civil environment to prevent any threats for the success of the mission¹². A team of specialists must be available for the support of CIMIC structures; these experts in specific areas are called into the mission only for the time necessary to resolve the highly specialized task. This is where space within CIMIC might exist for the communication and realization of article 53.

The participation of members of the armed forces in foreign peace operations in 2005 contributed to the promotion and good representation of the state and its armed forces on the international scene. Further offers to join newly created operations, requests to extend the participation of the armed forces in current operations or increase the number of troops in these operations, which have been received by Slovakia on the ground of achieved results, are a proof of the quality fulfillment of tasks in foreign missions and operations. The *Security strategy of the Slovak Republic* and the *Defense strategy of the Slovak Republic* represent an adequate instrument for the realization of the foreign policy and security commitments and interests of Slovakia into the future.

¹² *Obrana*, October 2005, p. 23.

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Obrana. (Bratislava: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, October 2005), p. 23. <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=35>.

Slovak Republic
in the International Organizations

Ivo Samson

Preparation of the Slovak Republic for Non-Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council

For the first time since its foundation in 1993, the Slovak Republic has gained an opportunity to become a (non-permanent) member of the Security Council of the Organization of the United Nations (UN SC) for the years 2006-2007, which was confirmed during the year of 2005. The relative confidence that SR will win this prestigious seat was predicted as early as 2004 when the 22-member *Eastern European Regional Group* (EERG) which occupies one seat in the UN SC approved of the SR candidacy for this position on 30 November 2006, which made Slovakia the only candidate. The whole process within EERG was formally accomplished by sending the letter from EERG Chairman to the UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan and to Chairmen of other regional groups. The election in the General Assembly of the UN for the UN SC took place on 10 October 2005. SR was elected non-permanent member of the UN SC by 185 votes out of the total of 191 UN member countries. Only six countries abstained.¹

During the years 2006 and 2007, Slovakia along with other five permanent member countries and with nine non-permanent UN SC members will take part in active forming of the world politics from the position in an institution with the strongest international mandate for co-responsibility for stability and peace in the world and it

¹ *Správa o plnení úloh zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky v roku 2005. (Report on Fulfilling Tasks of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in Year 2005).* <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/pk/mat/217-vyhodnotenie.rtf>.

will also be responsible for forming positions of the international community regarding global security threats.

Although the debate on the UN reform (including the UN SC reform) at the moment is rather sceptical, after the UN summit on 14 – 16th September 2005 and after the following 60th Session of the General Assembly of the UN, the reform is still a very closely followed agenda for the future. However, possibilities for its realization are very misty. The UN SC reform occupied a separate chapter of the UN reform but as the *Report about Fulfilling Tasks of Foreign Policy of the Slovak*

Republic in Year 2005 states “it is an extraordinarily sensitive and long-lasting process in which consensus was not reached”.² Although the UN reform in the end did not become the most current topic for the coming period as expected, this will give Slovakia (despite the lasting support of the complex UN reform) a chance to concentrate on traditional activities of the UN SC, which is predominantly the solution of current global security crises.

International Activities of Slovakia between 59th and 60th Session of the UN General Assembly

In Slovakia, its promising candidacy for the UN SC itself was preceded by a long theoretical discussion about the position of the SR in security architecture of Europe and about possibilities of a small country to act in a global security pattern. Slovakia had already acted before its accession to NATO and the EU as an active part of the security political environment in Europe and even before its integration into the EU Slovakia coordinated its position in the context of multilateral organizations including the UN.³ As well as presented in theoretical discussions, the official representation of the Slovak Republic put great efforts into keeping a chance to fulfill Slovak ambitions to become a non-permanent member of the UN SC, bearing in mind the fact that in 1999, SR lost this seat in competition with another EERG state, namely the Ukraine.⁴ A mass offensive at an official political level from Slovakia appeared when during

² *United Nations*. In: Ibidem

³ P. Weiss, Various Authors *Postavenie Slovenskej republiky v bezpečnostnej architektúre Európy*. (Bratislava: Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2004), p. 23.

⁴ There was a „misunderstanding“ in relation toward Ukraine when in 1999 Ukraine denied reciprocally support Slovak candidacy. SR in the end withdrew its candidacy when during 54th Session of the UN General Assembly already in first round gained only 79 votes (Ukraine 92) and support of the General Assembly in next rounds started to move toward side of Ukraine. In: *Kandidatúra Slovenskej republiky na miesto nestáleho člena BR OSN na obdobie 2006 – 2007*. <http://www.foreign.gov.sk>.

59th Session of the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2004 the delegation of SR, for the first time since its becoming member of the UN led by President of the country Ivan Gašparovič accompanied by Minister of the Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan, also took part in negotiations with the EU member states within the GAREC⁵ format and also in common negotiations of the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs with Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USA and the Russian Federation.⁶

The offensive aiming at gaining a seat of the non-permanent member of the UN SC was preceded by elaboration of the strategy of the Slovak delegation during 59th Session of UN General Assembly⁷. The document set general principles for performance of the SR delegation in position of the EU member state that corresponded with references about foreign relations and the EU foreign policy.⁸ Slovakia placed large emphasis on security issues, particularly on adhering to and developing the international law, on pursuing active multilateralism, conflict prevention, crises management, peace and security preservation, post-conflict social development, fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of WMD but also on acceptance of the *Rome Status of International Criminal Court*. Regardless the fact that the document was merely a formal enrolment to principles generally respected by the UN as a whole, it gave Slovakia a chance to declare a political will needed for reaching a consensus first in EERG in 2004 and then in the UN General Assembly during its 60th session in New York in autumn 2005. Part of this strategy was an unconditioned formulation of support to initiatives in the area of the UN reform and revitalisation of the UN General Assembly including improving the effectiveness of work of its six main committees. This time the task was “easier” for the Slovak delegation because they could refer to common foreign policy aims of the EU. In this phase of preparation for performance of the Slovak delegation for 59th Session of the UN General Assembly, Slovakia could declare it had been trying to win a seat of the non-permanent member of the UN SC for years 2006 – 2007 since 1999 and that it hopes for success of its efforts and that the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly will positively evaluate these efforts since then until present. The Slovak strategy was based on the assumption that after Latvia withdrew its candidacy in June 2001, Slovakia was the only candidate in EERG left that had a chance to be successful in gaining the UN SC seat for the years of 2006-

⁵ *General Affairs and External Relations Council*

⁶ *Správa o plnení úloh slovenskej zahraničnej politiky v roku 2004. (Report on Fulfilling Tasks of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2004)*. http://www.foreign.gov.sk/files/vyhodnoteniezp_2004.pdf, p. 56.

⁷ *Návrh smernice pre postup delegácie Slovenskej republiky na 59. zasadnutí VZ OSN. (Draft of Directive for Advancement of Delegation of Slovak Republic during 59. Session of the UN General Assembly)*. See press conference of the MFA SR to material from 31 August 2004. <http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/TlacovaKonferencia>.

⁸ Main document concerned is: *Priority EÚ na 59. zasadnutí VZ OSN*, approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 12 June 2004.

2007. Such a starting position was much more convenient when compared to the situation in the past when our interests stood in the way of the interests of the Ukraine. In other words, as early as the late 2004 it was clear that if Slovakia remained the only candidate in the regional group, EERG would with a high probability “bordering on certainty” approve of Slovakia as an official candidate. The aim of the Slovak diplomacy was to reach this approval until the beginning of 2005 at the latest.

The 59th Session of the UN General Assembly elected SR for the office of the Vice-Chairman of the Bureau of 4th Committee (the *Separation and Decolonisation Committee*) and for the position of Reporter in bureau of 5th Committee (the *Administration and Budget Committee*). During this session, the Slovak delegation in 1st Committee (the *Committee for Disarmament and International Security*) engaged in issues regarding observation of existing international treaties, conventions and regimes of disarmament, limitation and control of the armament as well as in non-proliferation of conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons by the UN member states. All these and other activities were understood as a good certificate for Slovakia as a country which formulated its interest in the position of a non-permanent member of the UN SC.

The 60th Session of the UN General Assembly, which took place in September 2005, was of particular importance because of the meeting of the heads of states and governments during the Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly. Five years after the so-called Millennium Summit in 2000, this meeting was supposed to evaluate fulfilling of the Millennium Declaration, the development of aims for the new millennium⁹ and the result of main summits and the UN conferences in the economic and social areas. In this session, Slovakia for the second time acted from the position of a EU member state and the election for a non-permanent member of the UN SC was considered to be a *fait accompli* because, despite being the only candidate, Slovakia did not neglect preparation for the election including lobbying. Therefore, a major part of the document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of SR on strategy of the Slovak delegation in the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly was dedicated to compatibility of the Slovak foreign policy aims with EU priorities.¹⁰ At the same time (despite the existing confidence in being elected) it was evident that together with common EU priorities, the most important national priority was a successful accomplishment of the Slovak candidacy for the position of a non-permanent member of the UN SC. The delegation of SR was supposed intensively to pursue candidacy also during this session aiming at gaining the broadest support possible within the UN member states for the election of non-permanent members of the UN SC in October 2005.¹¹

⁹ *UN Millennium Development Goals*. Accepted on 18 September 2000. In: <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>.

¹⁰ “I. Priority EÚ na 60. zasadnutí VZ OSN“, *Návrh smernice pre postup delegácie Slovenskej republiky na 60. zasadnutí VZ OSN*. <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/pk/mat/199-material.htm>.

¹¹ “II. kandidatúra SR do BR OSN”, In: *Ibidem*.

The Importance of the SR Membership in the UN SC for Slovakia

While lobbying for the membership in the UN SC, Slovakia has regularly been declaring endorsement of basic characteristics of the UN SC, which gave its candidacy international prestige. This membership was assessed as one of the most important and prestigious seats within the framework of the multilateral diplomacy, which could be perceived as a tool for constructive contribution to guaranteeing a global peace and security as well as to supporting democratic values. Apart from the fact that the membership of SR in the UN SC was introduced as quasi “complementary” to a historically new status of Slovakia regarding its membership in the EU and NATO or regarding the emphasis put on the new strategic position of the country.¹² The Slovak diplomacy was taking into consideration mainly the fact that a membership in the UN SC apart from an opportunity to co-decide about issues of world peace and security also provides a chance for positive presentation of the country and its diplomacy.

Shortly before voting about the membership in the UN SC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of SR summed up the role of Slovakia in the UN SC as a strive for such a performance that would increase general awareness about the country and he used a parallel to the SR membership in the EU where Slovakia had already gained certain prestige. At the same time, the Minister rather provocatively (probably in reaction to affirmations about the uselessness of the membership of a small state in UN SC) declared that SR is accessing the UN SC as a country with “its own opinions and will not parrot what the others say”.¹³ A discussion about the Slovak performance within the UN SC was not short of questions such as how Slovakia will behave while voting about resolutions in cases in which the member states of the EU in the UN SC will not find consensus among themselves or in case this consensus is not reached between the EU and the US as a long-standing ally of SR. This question is, naturally, very apodictic and can hardly occur in reality because countries of the EU do not have a common strategy towards the US. The president of Slovakia Ivan Gašparovič answered this question in late 2005, evasively saying, “We will rationally adhere to a solution which will be necessary for securing peace”.¹⁴

Slovakia repeatedly declared its intention to use the membership in the UN SC as a tool for increasing general awareness about Slovakia as a factor in international

¹² “Informácia o stave kandidatúry SR do BR OSN”, *Návrh smernice pre postup delegácie Slovenskej republiky na 60. zasadnutí VZ OSN*. <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/pk/mat/199-material.htm>. p. 3.

¹³ “SR už nemusí lobovať za členstvo v BR OSN, zameriava sa na prezentáciu”, *TASR*, New York 16 September 2005.

¹⁴ President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič In: <http://www.svet.czsk.net/clanky/sr/slovenskovbr.html>.

relations, which has the potential to contribute to world peace and security. Slovakia also declared an ambition to offer its capability of enriching a discussion on the ground of the UN SC about views of the country that “has, on the one hand, valuable experience of the process of transformation, building democratic institutions and consolidation of stability in the area of the central Europe by development of good neighbour relations and regional cooperation”.¹⁵ On the other hand, Slovakia offers its experience of mediating in conflicts or crises in the Western Balkan or Cyprus or as an active contributor to peace missions and operations under the leadership of the UN, NATO and the EU. Minister Kukan emphasized that in the past 12 years, SR has been taking active part in the UN activities, result of which is “the fact that our country has participated in 28 UN peace missions located in 21 countries across three continents”.¹⁶ The country declared itself to be unbiased and trustworthy. Positive voices about possibilities of self-realization of Slovakia in the UN SC were heard also from the non-governmental sector. They claimed that a membership in the UN SC is “a proof that also a small country can become a player in the world politics”.¹⁷

International Lobbying and Institutional Preparation for the UN SC Membership

The Minister of Foreign Affairs nominated Peter Burian, ambassador with a special mission for membership in the UN SC (*ambassador-at-large*) for coordination of preparation for the UN SC membership. Peter Burian handed over the letter of credence to the UN General Secretary as early as the end of 2004.¹⁸ Under his leadership, a working group started to operate with the responsibility for a complex campaign and system organization of the future functioning of the country in the position of member of the UN SC. The political and concept management of the whole process of preparation and performance in the UN SC was delegated to the *Management Committee of the MFA SR* subordinated to the State Secretary of this resort. After the official endorsement of the Slovak candidacy by the EERG, the MFA informed the Slovak government about this fact and the media and lobby campaign could start.

¹⁵ “II. kandidatúra SR do BR OSN”, *Návrh smernice pre postup delegácie Slovenskej republiky na 60. zasadnutí VZ OSN*. <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/pk/mat/199-material.htm>.

¹⁶ “Slovensko zasadne v BR OSN”, <http://www.svet.czsk.net/clanky/sr/srbrosn.html>.

¹⁷ Director of the GMF US for Central and Eastern Europe Pavol Demeš. *Pravda* – online, 1 January 2006.

¹⁸ *New Permanent Representative of Slovakia Presents Credentials*. UN – Press Release. Bio/2628, 21/12/2004.

However, confirmation of the candidacy within the EERG group was only the first step followed by a process of lobbying which aimed at gaining the support of the UN member states one by one. This process lasted until 60th Session of the UN General Assembly in autumn 2005. The content of this process was based on written and personal contacts requesting support for the Slovak candidacy as well as agreements about reciprocal supports of candidacies with the other UN member states in which two member states mutually grant vote for their candidacies in the UN. The quorum necessary for electing a non-permanent member in the UN SC is 2/3 of the UN General Assembly members.

Regarding the advantageous position of SR as the only representative of the EERG, lobbying in favour of the Slovak candidacy was not too complicated and Slovakia in the last period before voting in the UN General Assembly itself concentrated more on self-promotion of the country. According to the statement of Minister Kukan in September 2005, this time the UN member states considered Slovakia to be a well-prepared candidate and President Gašparovič assessed that states which would abstain from voting about non-permanent membership of SR in the UN SC “could be counted on the fingers of one hand, two at most”.¹⁹ Ambassador Burian himself gave notice back in September 2005, before voting on the Slovak membership in the UN SC on October 10, 2005 that Slovakia gained promises of support from 172 countries out of the 191-member UN General Assembly.²⁰ The MFA SR employed four more people to form the so-called *Coordination Unit*, created at the beginning of 2005 as a separate working group as a part of the Department of the UN and specialized organizations within the UN system. Apart from the complex organization of the 2005 campaign, this group was also responsible for system organization of the issues of future functioning of a country in this position. This group was transformed into *Coordination Unit for the UN SC* only three months before the end of 2005. According to plan, it should be active during the period of Slovak membership in the UN SC until 12 December 2007.²¹ The State Secretary of the MFA SR will be responsible for management of the Unit unless it should (and this is not in plan) form a separate department within its mission.

¹⁹ “SR už nemusí lobovať za členstvo v BR OSN, zameriava sa na prezentáciu”, *TASR*, New York 16 September 2005.

²⁰ *Ibidem*

²¹ “Príprava štruktúr MZV na zabezpečenie plnenia úloh vyplývajúcich z členstva SR v BR OSN”, *Návrh opatrení na zabezpečenie prípravy a pôsobenia SR v BR OSN*. (Bratislava: Government Office, 18 May 2005). <http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material/nsf>.

Permanent Mission of SR to the UN SC Staff and the Issue of Financial Costs

In 2005, the MFA SR was forced to deal with an insufficient number of personnel of the Permanent Mission (PM) of the Slovak Republic to New York because of new responsibilities that the Slovak membership in the UN SC brought. The MFA SR assessed that the PM will play a key role also in the performance of the SR membership in the UN SC. The existing systematization of the PM consisted of eight diplomats including a permanent representative and his deputy. Two out of these were, apart from their own agenda, also responsible for the performance of the UN SC. This situation was considered unimaginable regarding the importance that SR assigned to membership in the UN SC. That is why MFA SR suggested enlargement of staff of the PM to the UN SC by about six employees (the number increased from two to eight) and one position of security technician. Including the Permanent Representative Pavol Burian, his deputy and the political coordinator, the SR team to the UN SC was formed by ten or eleven employees. The MFA SR substantiated demand for the increased number of personnel as “absolutely indispensable for Slovakia to act in the UN SC as a full-fledged and effective member”.²²

The financial cost of the PM to the UN SC was initially tentatively covered by the government which had detached 10.6 million SKK for preparation for performance of SR in the UN SC back in 2005. In 2006, the government released a reserve in the amount of 35.9 million SKK from its budget to cover the costs of personnel, material-technical and financial functioning of the PM.²³ In 2006, 14 million SKK from the given amount should cover wages of employees, 18 million SKK should cover goods and services and 3.6 million should cover travel expenses.²⁴ In 2007, the total estimated expenses should reach 35.662 million SKK. The MFA SR will claim the given demand in draft state budget for the MFA chapter for the year of 2007.²⁵

The UN SC Environment

Since January 1, 2006, the Slovak Republic has been taking part in the UN SC sessions along with five permanent members and with further nine old and new non-permanent members.²⁶

²² Ibidem.

²³ “Za účasť v BR OSN zaplatíme 36 miliónov” *Pravda*, 22. 3. 2006.

²⁴ “Štatút člena BR OSN nás bude stáť 36 miliónov”, *Aktuálne.sk*. 30 March 2006. <http://aktualne.centrum.sk/domov/clanek.phtml?id=315120>.

²⁵ *Aktuality*, 22 March 2006. http://www.aktuality.sk/index2.php?option=com_content&task=vi.

Before SR assumed its position of the UN SC non-permanent member in 2006, there was a regional pattern for 10 non-permanent members:

- three African members (one of them elected in a different year than the other two);
- two Asian members, each of them elected in alternate years (there is a rule of compulsory representation of the Arab-Muslim country which rotates between Africa and Asia every two years);
- two representatives of Latin America and the Caribbean (each elected in alternate years);
- two representatives of the rest of the West – both elected in the year when no representatives of Eastern Europe are elected (one of these countries must come from Western Europe, the other can be either from Western Europe or from a western state outside Europe).

The particular name list structure of the ten UN SC non-permanent member countries to December 31, 2005 was as follows: Benin – Africa: until 31/12/2005; Tanzania – Africa: from 1/1/2005; Algeria – Africa, representing an Arab-Muslim country: until 31/12/2005; the Philippines – Asia: until 31/12/2005; Japan – Asia: from 1/1/2005; Brazil – Latin America and the Caribbean: until 31/12/2005; Romania – Eastern Europe: until 31/12/2005; Denmark – Western Europe: from 1/1/2005; Greece – Western Europe: from 1/1/2005.

The particular name structure of the ten UN SC non-permanent member countries starting on January 1, 2006 is as follows: Tanzania, Japan, Argentina, Denmark, Greece (all of them from 31/12/2006); Slovakia, Ghana, The Republic of Congo, Qatar, Peru (all of them until December 31, 2007).

Basics, Principles and Priorities of Slovakia's Performance in the UN SC

Regarding the exclusive position of the UN SC within the world order (a sort of monopoly for interpretation of the international law), the international community expects maximum engagement and, at the same time, a high level of expertise from the part of the Slovak PM to the UN SC. Naturally, Slovakia as a small and in the

²⁶ Non-permanent members are elected for the period of two years every year which means that every year in autumn, the UN General Assembly elects half of them, five new members for another two years. Every year five old members end their performance on December 31, and new five members start on January, 1. In: "Security Council", *United Nations Handbook 2004/2005*. (Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), p. 55.

world relatively little-known country, which does not carry the burden of superpower or colonial heritage, will not come across *a priori* prejudice in the environment of some African or Asian countries. The document *The Orientation of the Foreign Policy of SR for Year 2006* released at the end of 2005 counts on utilization of this “lack of burden of historical contexts”²⁷

A specific contribution of Slovakia to pursuing the policies of the allied EU and NATO countries can be found mainly if we take into consideration the fact that in composition of the UN SC from January 1, 2006 the EU and NATO countries have proportionally to the world population a significantly numerous representation. Along with the UN SC permanent members, they present more than half (eight) of all members while among non-permanent members the EU and NATO countries hold exactly half of the number of member states.

The Government of SR differentiates between basic starting points, basic principles, priorities of Slovakia and mechanism of coordination and decision-making as the mechanisms for performance in the UN SC.²⁸

Basic starting points are decisive documents formulated in general diplomatic declarative language such as: a need for the harmonization of state interests and interests of regional integration groupings where SR holds a membership; opportunity for further consolidation of the international position; participation in solution of crises and conflicts within the global scope etc.

Basic principles are defined formally, as well, and sometimes they even duplicate basic starting points: a contribution to the consolidation of the world peace and security; consolidation of credibility and respect from the side of the international community; respect towards basic rules and principles of peace co-existence; commitments towards principles of the organizations, which Slovakia is a member of (the EU, NATO, OSCE, the Council of Europe) etc. among them. Worth of our attention can be the commitment of SR to respect new *Security Strategy of SR* (from September 2005) and in this way the effort to strengthen transatlantic partnerships as well as improving the effectiveness of the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP) of the EU.

The *European Security and Defense Policy* (ESDP) in connection to the UN SC is not mentioned in the given government documents. However, in basic principles, Slovakia is committed to act within the UN SC as a sovereign country, in its own name, based on its own evaluations and own interests. Yet there is no unity in the documents when defining own interests, because sometimes documents speak about “national” and sometimes about “state and national” interests.

The Priorities of Slovakia in the UN SC are defined more in correspondence with the *Security Strategy of SR* from 2005 (and in this sense also in correspondence with

²⁷ “Zameranie zahraničnej politiky SR na rok 2006”, Informačný servis vlády SR 14 December 2005; *HNonline.sk*, 14 December 2005.

²⁸ See quoted government documents.

the European *Security Strategy* from December 2003) than as directed against main security threats of the world today, namely world terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and failing states.

Mechanism of coordination and decision-making refers to the Constitution of SR, current The Government Program Declaration, and The Orientation of the Foreign Policy of SR for year 2006 (sometimes to The *Middle – Term Strategy of the Foreign Policy of SR until 2015*). The most important formulation was probably the statement that direct engagement of the government of SR in indication to the instructions (for the PM) was supposed to take place only in exceptional cases, actually mainly during crises of global importance when force was used or in situations that could directly jeopardize interests of the SR with direct impact on its foreign political position. The simplest interpretation is that the MFA SR and the government itself provide the Slovak PM to UN SC with significant autonomy in taking short-term decisions about current security problems. In situations where a consensus within the UN SC is unlikely to be reached (detering examples of former resolutions on Iraq or the Palestinian – Israeli conflict) the decision – making autonomy of the Slovak PM will probably be limited.

Geographically motivated priorities are more closely specified in the document of the MFA SR²⁹ as the so-called *regional priorities*. Among them are issues as follows:

- *Western Balkans* – this is a long-term priority of the Slovak foreign policy because SR has been engaged in this field both politically and militarily. SR also supports European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the states of the Western Balkans. SR officially states that geographic and language proximity and comparable historical development enable SR to act from the position of a trustworthy expert on the issue. For Slovakia, stabilization and prosperity of this region means a part of stabilization of the whole central European region. On the ground of the UN SC, SR would also like to engage in the process of negotiation about the final status of Kosovo;
- *Eastern Europe* – Slovakia points out the fact that until present, the UN SC has only been engaged in the Georgian – Abkhazian conflict and it declares readiness to take part also in solving other problematic issues of the whole post-soviet area;
- *Cyprus* – within the framework of performance in the UN SC, Slovakia would like to draw from its experience of being a long-term host of bi-lateral talks between the Greek and the Turkish community in Cyprus. SR does not lend itself for the general role of mediator, which belongs to the UN General Secretary, but for the more particular role of mediator of the actual information.

²⁹ *Rámcová stratégia pre pôsobenie SR v Bezpečnostnej rade OSN v rokoch 2006 – 2007*. <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/pk/mat/214-material.htm>.

The Israeli – Palestinian conflict, the African issue³⁰ (namely the situation in Burundi, Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, the Republic of Central Africa, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and in Western Sahara), South and South-Eastern Asia (mainly Indian – Pakistani conflict) and Latin America (Haiti) – these regions are not named as own priority areas of the Slovak performance in the UN SC but rather as priorities of the UN SC as such. SR is aware of the importance and seriousness of these regions for world security and it declares engagement and interest in these areas.

Cross – sectional priorities are partly appearing as duplicating generally formulated priorities and they refer to new security threats, primarily to terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failing states. SR wants to harmonize these priorities with membership in some institutions of the UN SC. Slovakia is expected not to defend itself from assuming two chairing and two vice-chairing positions in some sanction and non-sanction committees of the UN SC. Based on the relatively good expert background, SR expressed its interest in the following posts:

- Chairmanship in the committee dealing with the issue of *non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* (founded based on Resolution UN SC N. 1540), SR will take over from Romania;
- Chairmanship in the sanction committee for Iraq;
- Vice-Chairmanship in the sanction committee for *Al-Qaeda* and *Taliban*.

In the *Framework Strategy* from 2005, SR also admitted the possibility of leadership of some other committees, which will be free (sanction committee for Somalia, sanction committee for Rwanda, sanction committee for Sierra Leone, and sanction committee for the Republic of Congo). The basic and crucial position will be a month-long Chairmanship of the UN SC itself, which SR should assume in February 2007. Slovakia's ambition is to introduce an issue to which, according to the opinion of the MFA SR, the UN SC did not pay enough of attention. Within the agenda of the post-conflict rehabilitation, this issue will concern reforms of the armed forces sector. Slovakia itself has experienced the complicated and continual process of armed forces reform, which after several failures finally reached relative success (known as *Model 2010* or *Model 2015*). Placed directly in some African countries, SR can offer mainly a boost of the armed forces performance effectiveness and mechanisms for more effective state control. This also offers a model for re-integration of armed groups of inhabitants.

The contribution of the SR here, except for its experience of the post-communist armed forces reform, will lie in the political advantage that SR is a relatively unknown, but trustworthy country, which does not arouse post-colonial reminiscences in Africa. This initiative counts on utilization of the experience of the other NATO countries as well as on coordination and cooperation with the African Union.

³⁰ Africa as the UN SC priority covers 70 – 80 % of the agenda of its activities.

Possible Dilemmas of Slovakia in the UN SC

Because Slovakia has always called for regional priorities and the Western Balkan is one of them, the issue of the final status of Kosovo in 2006 will be a test for the Slovak PM because it is possible that during the negotiations on the ground of the UN SC consensus will not be reached. The Iranian question can also pose a few problems because the positions of the Slovak allies from the EU and NATO concerning criticism of Iran's attitude are similar. The test will happen only in case of accepting the character of sanction regimes. The situation is similar when considering the issue of potential escalation of the Palestinian – Israeli conflict where, while passing resolutions against Israel in past, there was no consensus reached either among permanent members from the EU countries (France and Great Britain) or from the USA. For comparison, two immediate predecessors of Slovakia in the UN SC for EERG (Bulgaria and Romania) got into the position where they stood between the interests of the allies in NATO or the EU:

In *the UN SC Resolution* from December 19, 2002 on putting to death toll of the UN employees by Israeli forces and on damaging storages of the World Food Program, the USA vetoed in proportion 12:1 while Bulgaria abstained.

In *the UN SC Resolution* from September 16, 2003 on demand that Israel would abstain from threats to send the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat to exile, the USA vetoed in proportion 11:1, with Great Britain, Germany and Bulgaria abstaining and France and Spain voting for;

In *the UN SC Resolution* from October 14, 2003 on barring Israel from extending security fence³¹, the USA vetoed in proportion 10: 1, Great Britain, Germany and Bulgaria abstained and France and Spain voted for;

In *the UN SC Resolution* from March 25, 2004 on condemnation of Israel for killing Ahmed Jassin³², the USA vetoed in proportion 11: 1, Great Britain, Germany and Romania abstained and France and Spain voted for.

These facts are an example of lack of basic unity within the EU when declared the CFSP in tense situations is permanently failing.³³ This will give a chance to the Slovak Republic to confirm its declaration that on the ground of the UN SC, Slovakia will vote independently, as a sovereign country, based on its own evaluations and own interests.

³¹ UNSC Res. of 14. 10. 2003: Seeks to bar Israel from extending security fence.

³² UNSC Res. of 25. 3. 2004: Condemns Israel for killing Ahmed Yassin.

³³ Germany and Great Britain did not condemn killing of Ahmed Yassin despite the fact that Javier Solavna, High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy, did so.

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Peter Lizák

Slovakia Shares OSCE Values Strengthening Democracy and Security.

Slovakia considers the *Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe* (OSCE) to be one of the key organizations in security architecture.

It is unique in its consensual decision-making and variety of its participating states.

Democratic conditions and stability of internal and external security of a country are, unfortunately, unreachable by one or a series of decisions guaranteeing achievement of this surely desired result. Retention of security and democracy must be strived for with the aim to reach the ideal that is hardly reachable or even precisely defined. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that prospective care negligence of the two basic assumptions of modern prospering society might not show up immediately, but rather in several months' or, even, in several years' time. As a permanent protector of the two key values, the OSCE has thus an important place in the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic.

In the thirtieth year of its existence, the OSCE came through quite a complicated but politically interesting and important period of its internal development, which can affect its position and influence in the future years. It was probably the only international area where two concepts of democracy and security conditions openly met – namely the concept of “guided” democracy and the concept of liberal democracy. The complexity of the OSCE development resided – and this status was not overcome in 2005 – mainly in the critical, even rejecting, attitude of a group of countries to the crucial OSCE activities in the human dimension and requirement of its more visible

involvement in the economic and environmental and politico-military dimensions. Even though the balance of the OSCE activities is supported by the majority of its 55 participating States, change in the direction of the organisation's activities at the expense of the human dimension is mostly refused as well as limitation of the potential and acquis which the OSCE has gained in this dimension.

The need to make the OSCE activities more operational is not questioned by any participating State. That is why the Panel of Eminent Persons was established¹, which introduced its proposals in June last year. With the absence of the political will to reach inevitable compromises even the best proposals have no chance in succeeding.

The degree of the OSCE involvement in the economic, environmental and politico-military dimensions increased during the year. More specific measures confirming endeavours to increase the profile of activities in these fields (the division of the Economic Forum into two meetings, the seminar for experts on military doctrines in February 2006², a new impulse for the Forum for Security Co-operation's work, etc.) were introduced.

In the beginning of 2005, a seemingly technical, albeit crucial issue for the organisation's existence and actions occurred, namely the absence of an approved budget and lack of agreement in terms of contribution. The OSCE suffered both internally and externally from the absence of a budget agreement. The amount of financial contribution of some countries to the organisation's functioning, in their opinion, did not correspond with the direction of the OSCE's activities. During practically the whole of 2005, the organisation worked with a provisional budget copying the financial conditions of 2004. A breakthrough was reached only in November 2005 when an agreement was reached concerning a new amount of contributions of individual countries³ and the OSCE was expected to deal with an internal reform of its activities. The amount of Slovakia's contribution to the OSCE budget was slightly increased. For example, in the case of the basic scale it represents 0.28 % while in the case of contribution to the field missions it represents 0.15 % of the whole budget.

The annual OSCE budget, if compared to other international organisations, is relatively low. During the last year, besides its extra budget sources, it was approximately 168 million Euro.

¹ *OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 16/04 on the Establishment of a Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE.* http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2005/02/4324_en.pdf

² *OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 09/05 on the OSCE Seminar on Military Doctrine.* http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2005/12/18653_en.pdf

³ *OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 704 on Participating State's Scales of Contribution for Years of 2005 – 2007.* http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2006/01/17757_en.pdf

The OSCE in 2005

Slovenia took over the OSCE Chairmanship in a complicated situation in the early 2005. The Organisation did not have an approved budget, did not have agreed scales of contributions and some of the participating States conditioned their active share of OSCE activities by introduction of crucial reforms, increase of transparency of its activities, adoption of Rules of Procedure, gaining legal subjectivity, establishing clear structure of decisions, etc. Based on the existing status, Slovenia also set its priorities directing them towards better balance of the organization's activities in its three dimensions and towards the increase of decision-making transparency.⁴

The Presidency fulfilled several of its resolutions. The Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons and the following high-level consultations were the right step towards realisation of the necessary internal reforms. Even though particular changes have not been formally achieved yet, the Ministerial Council in Ljubljana (December 2005) prepared a set of reform proposals on which the organisation will work during this year.⁵ Furthermore, the Slovenian Presidency with its well-balanced proposal managed to reach agreement on the contribution scales for 2005 – 2007, which was a vital step to normal continuation of the organisation's activity. Thus, it can be stated that Slovenia passed the presidency to the following country (Belgium) in an incomparably better condition than it had taken it over twelve months before.

OSCE Reform

As already mentioned, based on the OSCE Ministerial Council in December 2004 a Panel of Eminent Persons⁶ was created. During the early 2005, the task of the Panel was to review up-to-date OSCE activities, to propose a strategic vision for the organisation in the 21st century and measures to increase its functioning and

⁴ Presentation of the OSCE acting Chairperson in Office D. Rupel during 540th meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council on 13 1 2005. <http://www.osce.org/pc/documents.html?lsi=true&src=4&limit=50&pos=200>

⁵ *OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 17/05 on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE*. http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2005/12/17487_en.pdf

⁶ There were former Commissioner for enlargement and external relations Hans van den Broek (The Netherlands), former Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Nikolay Afanasievsky (RF), former OSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Hoeynck (Germany), former OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Knut Vollebaek (Norway), Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia Miomir Zuzul, Vice Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of Kazakhstan Kuanysh Sultanov, and former US Ambassador to the UN Richard S. Williamson.

effectiveness. The report of the Panel was published in June 2007⁷ and concerned three areas:

- the status and tasks of the OSCE;
- the improvement of complex and co-operative security functioning;
- structural changes of the organisation.

The Report defined major problems of the organisation (non-transparent structure, complicated decision-making mechanisms, the absence of Rules of Procedure, the necessity of boosting effectiveness, etc.) and proposed possible solutions (structural, organisational and operative) with the aim to increase its importance and effectiveness. It confirmed the relevance of the OSCE obligations in the 21st century and the necessity of their consistent implementation. The following proposals are some of the most specific ones concerning structural changes:

- creation of three committees (for the politico-military, economy-environmental and human dimensions) subordinated to the supreme body of the organisation during the period between Ministerial Councils, i.e. the Permanent Council
- clear specification of acting of the Secretary General and Chairman-in-Office (Presiding Country) of the OSCE
- adoption of status and legal subjectivity of the organisation
- codification of Rules of Procedures
- retaining of consensual decision as a general rule.

The recommendations and conclusions of *Panel of Eminent Persons* have been dealt with by participating States since September last year. They have indicated areas, mainly resulting from the Panel's recommendations, which have a chance to gain consensus in a short-, medium- or long-term period. As a result, working group for enhancing effectiveness was created and held its first meeting in early October last year. Unfortunately, due to lack of accordance in individual points as well as the rejecting attitude of several participating States towards individual reform documents a large proportion of it was withdrawn from the 2006 agenda of tasks.

OSCE Activities

Field Missions

The activities of the OSCE Field Missions are an important part and, at the same time, a specific aspect of the organisation's activities. Their scope is very wide and covers various projects from strengthening judicial and legislative conditions of

⁷ *Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Strengthening Effectiveness of the OSCE on the 561st meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council 30 6 2005.* In: http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2006/01/17757_en.pdf

a hosting country through democracy-supporting activities and economic and environmental projects to police and border co-operation. In 2005, the OSCE had 17 Field Missions. In 2005, a mandate of all missions was renewed for the following year except the mission in Uzbekistan, where the mandate was prolonged only until the end of June 2006. The Uzbek party expressed their objections to the existing mandate and proposed its change towards intensification of projects in the economy-environmental sphere. A similar approach to the existing mandate was recorded also in other Central Asian republics, mainly in Kyrgyzstan, without a formal change of the mandate for the time being.

Regional Conflicts in the OSCE Space

The OSCE permanently attempts to solve the existing conflicts on the territory of the participating States, focussing primarily on the Trans-Dniestrian problem, Nagorno Karabakh and South Ossetia as well as the development in the Balkans where it focuses mainly on the implementation of post-conflict rehabilitation projects.

Probably the biggest progress was reached in the South Ossetia case, to which the Ljubljana Ministerial Council adopted a declaration⁸ opening new ways for a solution. Both parties of the conflict came with new peace plans and initiatives. Development has its dynamics, which can be used in a positive way. Although there are still harsh words on both sides, a solution seems to be feasible for all the parties involved.

Throughout the year, possibilities occurred to make a difference in the search for a solution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Repeated meetings were held at the highest political level of the two countries involved in the conflict where the OSCE Ministerial Council adopted a special statement concerning Nagorno Karabakh.⁹ However, the optimistic expectations have not been fulfilled, yet although both sides are still talking about an open chance for a positive solution.

The least progress was seemingly made in the search for a political solution in the conflict in Transdnistria. The internationally unrecognised election for the local parliament in December 2005 did not bring more substantial change of conditions. Despite this fact, the EU support mission on the Ukraine – Transdnistria borders, which was created with the intensive support of the OSCE missions of the EU countries, has brought its first positive results in the form of consistent Transdnistria border control.

⁸ OSCE Ministerial Statement No. 04/05 on Georgia. http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2005/12/17487_en.pdf

⁹ The OSCE Ministerial Statement No. 05/05 on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Group. http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2005/12/17487_en.pdf

At the end of the year, the UN SC decided to commence negotiations about the future status of Kosovo, which will include defining a role and share of responsibility and influence of the international community in Kosovo. Today, a major role is played by the UN's UNMIK, whose third pillar consists of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. It is expected that after closing the Kosovo negotiations, the size of UNMIK presence will be decreased and, on the contrary, the role of the EU and OSCE will be enhanced.

The OSCE played the important role of a mediator in the crisis in Kyrgyzstan after the parliamentary elections in March 2005. The OSCE activities in Bishkek as well as the visit of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for Central Asia and the OSCE Secretary General contributed to finding a solution based on democratic principles and political negotiations. The OSCE responded to the changed political situation in the country by expanding the project activities and financial and personal enhancement of the OSCE Mission. In May 2005, the *OSCE Working Plan for Kyrgyzstan* was adopted, thus creating a basis for development of the Mission's activities in the spheres of priority and the topical needs of the country.

In respect to the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan (12 – 13 May 2005), the OSCE added to the international pressure on Uzbekistan to allow an international examination of the events. This effort, however, remained without any response from the Uzbek party, which provoked an intensive debate among the OSCE participating States about a possible launch of the so-called *Moscow Mechanism* (the examination of events by independent OSCE experts). Unfortunately, the initiation of the mechanisms did not crop up in the end.

Political and Military Activities

The Forum for security co-operation (FSC) is a major OSCE body with a mandate to negotiate and consult issues of military security and stability. In 2005, progress was made in several important fields of the Forum activities. The *FSC Chairman Declaration on major military activities notification* was adopted (FSC Meeting Journal from 5 October 2005, www.osce.org) within confidence and security building measures (CSBMs). The declaration speaks about voluntary notification of major military exercise or military activities not within limits stated by the *Vienna Document from 1999* (Vienna Document 1999 – a part of the Final Act of the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999, www.osce.org) as well as about voluntary inviting of observers. Even though the adopted declaration is not politically binding and is not adopted in the form of the FSC Decision as the other CSBMs, it is an important step towards boosting confidence and security-building measures.

In June 2005, a special FSC meeting was held focusing on the issues of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The role of the OSCE in the implementation process of the UN SC Resolution 1540 (2004) and co-operation of

the OSCE with the UN Commission on SC Resolution 1540 was the central issue of the meeting. A decision on supporting this implementation was adopted.¹⁰

The OSCE continued to implement the OSCE documents concerning small arms and light weapons (SALW) and conventional ammunition. Projects are focused mainly on destruction of these stocks. Five OSCE participating States asked for assistance – Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and the Ukraine.

A great emphasis is being placed on the so-called *mélange* (liquid rocket fuel), which is explosive and can cause vast casualties and environmental damage. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan asked for assistance in its destruction.

In 2005, the Slovak Republic also supported projects focused on destruction of ammunition surplus in the amount of 30.000 Euro for the NATO/PfP Trust Fund.

Within the implementation of the *Open Skies Treaty conditions* (Open Skies Treaty, Slovak Verification Centre, Robert Herz, Bratislava 2002), the first implementation phase ended on 31 December 2005. On 1 January 2006, the second phase started, characterised by the possibility to use all sensors named by the Treaty without any restrictions. The Slovak Republic successfully conducted chairmanship in the main body of the Treaty implementation in the first quarter of 2006. In 2005, the Slovak Republic realised one active overfly over the Russian Federation/Belarus and one flight was made by the Ukraine over the Slovak territory. The implementation so far has proved that this Treaty has an irreplaceable position within confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). In 2005, two new OSCE participating States acceded the Treaty, namely Estonia (23 May 2005) and Latvia (8 July 2005).

In June 2005, the Third Annual Review Conference on security in the OSCE region was held in Vienna (2005 Annual Security Review Conference).¹¹ Its aim was to review the OSCE activities in the sphere of security and stability enhancement in the context of a wider understanding of the OSCE's position. At the same time, the agenda of the Conference primarily reflected the key OSCE document in this field – the *OSCE Strategy on How to Face New Threats and Challenges of Changing Politico-Military Environment in the 21st Century* adopted by the Ministerial Council in Maastricht in 2003¹². The key focus of attention was placed on the war on terrorism. The delegations agreed that the OSCE and other international organisations made in significant progress in this respect but there are still the issues of co-ordination and information exchange to be addressed and new areas appear (such as container and internet security) which must be covered.

¹⁰ *Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 7/05 on Support of Effective Implementation of the UN SC Resolution 1540 (2004)*. http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2005/05/14261_en.pdf

¹¹ *OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 663 on Agenda and Modalities of the Annual Review Conference*. http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2006/01/17757_en.pdf

¹² *OSCE Ministerial Council Decision 01/03 on OSCE Strategy Against Threats for Stability and Security in the 21st Century*. <http://www.osce.org/mc/documents.html?lsi=true&limit=10&grp=331>

In connection with the ratification of 12 global anti-terrorist agreements and protocols from the OSCE participating States, the number of contracting parties from among the participating States was increased to 41 (including the Slovak Republic) by the end of 2005. *The Bucharest Plan of the Anti Terrorism Fight* is thus being gradually fulfilled. The participating States promised to accede 12 global anti-terrorist agreements and protocols. The newest 13th global anti-terrorist instrument is the *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*¹³, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 13 April 2005 and which was ratified by the Slovak Republic as the first country. During the UN Summit on 14 – 16 September 2005, the Convention was opened to signature and, in concord with the declaration of the OSCE Ministers of Foreign Affairs on International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism from 20 June 2005, it was signed by 46 OSCE participating States, including Slovakia.

The Human Dimension Activities

The Human dimension is a priority for a majority of EU and NATO member countries. Activities in this field develop by means of relevant institutions (ODIHR, High Commissioner on National Minorities, OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media, Special Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings) as well as through individual OSCE missions. In 2005, the foremost themes in this area were elections and their observation, tolerance and fight against discrimination, human trafficking, migration and integration and education in the sphere of human rights.

In the same year, the ODIHR sent several election observation and evaluation missions to various kinds of elections (presidential, parliament, local) in the OSCE countries (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, Macedonia, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Albania, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan).

The issue of tolerance and fight against various forms of discrimination was an important theme in 2005. In the beginning of the year, the Slovene Presidency prolonged the 2005 mandate on fight against different forms of intolerance to three Personal Representatives (namely against anti-Semitism, discrimination of Muslims, against racism and xenophobia and against discrimination of Christians and representatives of other religions). In June last year, the *OSCE Conference on anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance*¹⁴ was held in Cordoba and followed the example of similar events of the previous years.

¹³ *International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*. New York, 13 April 2005. <http://untreaty.un.org/English/treaty.asp>

¹⁴ *Cordoba Declaration* from 9 June 2005, Declaration of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. <http://www.osce.org/activities/13539.html>

Throughout the last year, the number of activities of the OSCE High Commissioner on national minorities in Central Asia has been increased (mainly in Kyrgyzstan) and his activities in Southern Caucasus, The Balkans, Ukraine and the Baltic have continued.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media has continued in his geographically balanced approach, specifically focussing on decriminalisation and issues of libel and slander. He also repeatedly put in a plea on the Government of the SR to omit paragraphs concerning criminal charges for libel and slander in the new Criminal Code to be adopted, which finally happened.

In 2005, the OSCE Personal Representative on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings focused on assistance to states in creation or implementation of national action plans and strategies concerning this issue. Several conferences and meetings were held focussing on child victims of trafficking, on combat trafficking in human beings with the aim of forced labour, on combating violence on women, on managing migration and integration, on the role of women in conflict prevention and crisis management.

The Annual *OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting* was traditionally held in Warsaw in the end of September and covered a wide spectrum of activities in the human dimension with a link to NGOs activities.

The Economic and Environmental Dimension

As already mentioned, the year 2005 was marked by a wide debate on strengthening the economic and environmental dimension. The *13th Meeting of the Economic Forum* (23 – 27 May 2005 in Prague) was a key activity in this field, the central theme being the *Demographic trends, migration and integration of persons belonging to national minorities: securing security and sustainable development in the OSCE sphere*. The Forum's efforts resulted in an agreement on preparing an *Action Plan* or strategy on the issues of migration management as well as preparing a *Declaration of Principles of the Integration of Persons belonging to national minorities*.

The economic and environmental dimension has been a long-term weakness of the OSCE, which is a result of limited potential of the organisation in this area, mainly due to lack of expertise and human and financial sources for realisation of larger projects.

Slovakia in the OSCE in 2005

Slovakia is an active and “visible” OSCE participating State. The SR representatives actively and adequately participated in all the important OSCE events in 2005. Bearing in mind the foreign policy priorities and the interest in larger involvement in the

region of the Western Balkans, the SR is a Chief-of-the-File for Croatia, which means that it practically prepares joint declarations of the EU to development in the country and to activities of the OSCE Mission there. In the sphere of the military dimension, the SR actively participated in sponsoring projects for destruction of excess conventional ammunition in the Ukraine.

In 2005, the SR gained the position of the Head of the OSCE Centre in Uzbekistan. The Slovak candidate, the Ambassador Miroslav Jenča was proposed for the position by a Troika decision and he took it in February 2005. In June 2005, the Ambassador Ján Kubiš abandoned his successful 6-year post of the OSCE Secretary General (1999 – 2005). At present, there are 8 Slovak citizens in the OSCE Missions and further three in other OSCE structures.

In 2005, the SR repeatedly sent its representatives to several OSCE/ODIHR election observation missions, namely in Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Macedonia, Albania and Kazakhstan. The fact that last year as well as this year Ľubomír Kopaj, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Ambassador, was repeatedly proposed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to head an OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission may be considered significant. This position specifically concerned observation of the parliamentary elections (27 February) and presidential elections (10 July) in Kyrgyzstan and the parliamentary elections in the Ukraine (26 March 2006). Ambassador Kopaj was also a member (election expert) of The OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission during the presidential elections in Kazakhstan (4 December).

The overall activity of Slovakia in 2005 contributed to the fact that Belgium (the presiding country in 2006) approached the SR with a proposal to overtake a function of Chairman of one of three major working groups within the OSCE in 2006, namely the Working Group on non-Military Aspects of Security. The group will primarily deal with the OSCE activities in the field of combat on terrorism, management and border security, police co-operation and preparation of this year's Review Conference on Security in the OSCE region.

Future Perspectives

The OSCE is not an organisation which sets an example of straight, fast reaching of tangible results. That, after all, has never been its aim. It is really difficult to prove effectiveness of conflict or dispute prevention, which did not appear thanks to of effective tools of prevention in the first place. It is difficult to measure the extent to which regular dialogue and co-operation contributed to preserving and maintaining security. Only their absence could bring such measurable (and almost certainly negative) results but this is, of course, undesirable.

On the other hand, the efforts to search for better use of tools to reach the desirable status (which the OSCE undoubtedly has at its disposal) are right. However, the aim should not be confused with tools. Supporting co-operative security and its complex understanding has proved to be one of the functioning options for creating stable and predictable conditions. The means of their achievement may represent a different level of effectiveness and this is what the OSCE reform debate should be about.

Like other international organisations, the OSCE needs a new impulse and a vision of its future status in the system of international relations. The 30 years of its existence (together with the time of *Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe*) were a good opportunity to review previous development and set new priorities. However, they needed longer to work out and this opportunity was not used properly.

Despite the fact that the OSCE is quite often criticised for its alleged low effectiveness, it remains to be a unique pan-European organisation with a trans-Atlantic and central Asian dimension. Without its activities, the level of distrust may increase significantly among the countries and the threat of new division lines in Europe may reappear.

The politico-military dimension of the OSCE activities plays an important role in building and securing trust among the participating States. A situation where countries would have no possibility of immediate regular contact and sharing military and security information in a previously approved way would in the medium-term run undoubtedly lead to mutual distrust and increase of tension in the European space.

The current status of fuzzy decision-making is convenient to many countries because it does not limit the variety of activities in the given direction. The proposed activities reforms will scarcely ever be fully conducted. However, the fact that reforms are seriously negotiated and the negotiations cannot possibly last too long creates conditions for a sound level of self-reflection and, thus, meets the expectations of participating States. The solution to the current situation lies in the search of consensus in the issue of the reforms' scope while preserving an overall direction of the organisation. It seems to be right to continue supporting the flexible approach to strengthening the politico-military, economic and environmental dimensions of the OSCE activities but not to the detriment of the activities within the human dimension.

The situation in 2005 was a challenge rather than a crisis. Apart from the OSCE, the participating states do not have any other more effective forum for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict restoration, not to mention other positive dimensions of its existence. Other regions of the world are getting inspired by the OSCE experience and are trying to find a way to use it. It would be strange if a continent where such a unique forum of confidence and security-building was created suppressed utilization of the positives which the OSCE undoubtedly brings to its participating States.

Nevertheless, we are far from an ideal situation. Within the organisation, there is still a significant discrepancy in concepts of its functioning. The differences remain in the issue of evaluation of the OSCE obligations fulfilment (mainly the human

dimension ones), concerning effectiveness of the organisation's functioning and the inevitability and scope of its reform, and also understanding the human dimension (mainly election monitoring issues).

As confirmed by the Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons, in several spheres the OSCE mechanisms and activities require changes that will enable it better to react to new challenges and threats. This is why it is important to talk about these changes and the adopted reform plan is a good and factual basis for discussion.

The OSCE retains its important role in the sphere of co-operative security. The lasting interest in its future functioning was finally confirmed by the unusually high participation of ministers heading respective delegations during the last Ministerial Council of the OSCE participating States. The current condition of the organization is considered both technically and contextually better than a year ago. The organisation has agreed on the contribution scales for 2005 -2007 and thus secured the financing of its activities. It also has a new Secretary General and it has agreed on the fundamental direction of its further activities.

Tomáš Strážay

Regional Initiatives in Central Europe in 2005 – from Topical Specialization to Complementarity of Approaches?

In 2005, the development in the most significant groupings in Central Europe – the *Visegrad Four (V4)*, *Central European Initiative (CEI)* and *Regional Partnership (RP)* – fully reflected the 2004 accession of the eight states of Central and Eastern Europe to the European Union. Thus, the new member states had, for the first time in history, the opportunity to participate actively in the EU policies whilst the EU itself became the most important tool of their own foreign policy. 2005 was also the year of increasing topical specialization of the regional groupings as far as the regional priorities are concerned (especially V4 and RP). While V4 countries focused on the countries of the EU Eastern neighborhood, especially on the Ukraine and Belarus, RP's priorities remained in the Western Balkans. The main goals of the *Central European Initiative* are rather general due to its internal heterogeneity, considering the fact that its members are countries of Eastern as well as South-East Europe.

The author neither offers a chronological survey of the events related to the individual regional initiatives nor does he copy their program agenda. He rather seeks to focus on the key points which have had a significant impact on the functioning of V4, CEI and RP. His analysis also aims at proposing the agenda for cooperation which individual regional groupings could realize within a short or medium-term period.

The Visegrad Four

The EU membership fully reflected the selection of topics prevailing in the V4 program agenda in 2005. As for the future of the EU, two topics prevailed: the *EU Constitutional Treaty* and the *Financial Framework for 2007 – 2013*. The EU enlargement posed another topic, namely attitudes towards the Turkey and Croatia negotiations with the EU. From the point of view of the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* one cannot omit the V4 focus on the development in Ukraine. All the above-mentioned fields, except for the Ukraine, have been characterized by a certain dissonance in the recent past. Therefore, in 2005 one cannot speak about a cohesive approach, either.

The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

V4 countries shared different views on the *EU Constitutional Treaty*. It was apparent especially in the case of Poland, which insisted on division of power according to the *Treaty of Nice* at the end of 2003. Even though in December 2003 at the meeting in Dobříš the V4 Prime Ministers declared their support, at the EU summit in Brussels Poland's support of the voting system agreed in the *Treaty of Nice* remained solitary. Hungary, the Czech Republic as well as Slovakia were in favor of the system of the so-called double majority proposed by the *Convention on the Future of Europe*. The Polish coalition and opposition were unified under the "battle-cry" of the *Civil Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)* MP Jan Rokyta: "Nice or Death!" Even the Polish Prime Minister injured after the crash of the governmental helicopter during the Brussels summit was prepared to fly to Brussels and protect the "Polish national interest".¹ The approach of Poland was strongly criticized by Germany and France. Both the Czech and the Slovak Republic showed disapproval of Poland as well. The negotiations on the *Constitutional Treaty* came to an end in June 2004 and, consequently, the document was signed at the Rome summit in October 2004. However, the dissonance caused by the approach of Poland left the debate on the prospects of the V4 formulating a common standpoint towards the crucial matters of the EU future open. The Visegrad countries differed in their ways of treaty ratification, as well. While Poland and the Czech Republic were for ratification via referendum, Slovakia and Hungary favored ratification in parliament.

The EU Constitutional Treaty prospects were among the main points on the agenda at the V4 meeting. In the *Joint Declaration on the EU* from 10 June 2005, the V4 countries' Prime Ministers considered the outcome of the referenda on the

¹ M. Ostrowski, "W gorsecie i w ostrogach", *Polityka* No. 50, 13 December 2003.

Constitutional Treaty a very serious challenge for the European Union.² The Prime Ministers reiterated that the Treaty was a compromise reached in good faith after difficult and complex negotiations. According to the Declaration, the ratification process should proceed, as all member states should express their views on the Treaty. The results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands should be thoroughly analyzed and addressed even though they perhaps reflected rather different problems than the content of the *Constitutional Treaty*.

The Budapest Joint Declaration of the V4 Ministers of Foreign Affairs from 11 July 2005 also focused on the Constitutional Treaty. In the Declaration, the V4 countries expressed their belief that the EU was able to overcome its current problems caused by the referenda in France and the Netherlands. At the same time, they also welcomed the decision taken at the June European Council emphasizing the necessity to look into the specific circumstances in each member state.³ As for the conviction that the ratification process should proceed, it is more than controversial that although the parliament ratification was successful in Hungary and Slovakia, in the case of Slovakia the ratification process is still unsettled. In Poland and the Czech Republic, the ratification process was postponed.⁴

The Financial Framework for 2007 – 2013

While the issue of the *Constitutional Treaty* after the referenda in France and the Netherlands was characterized more or less by convergence at least at the declaration level, the incoherence of approaches was fully shown in the discussion on *Financial Framework for 2007 – 2013*.

The EU Financial Framework poses a long-term financial plan for the projects and activities of the Union. The particular annual budgets and detailed EU programs are prepared based on this framework. Thus, the V4 representatives expressed a significant strategic interest in reaching an agreement, which would assure long-term allocation of financial resources within the EU structural and cohesion funds to Slovakia. However, at the Council meeting held just a few weeks after the referenda in France and the Netherlands, the EU leaders did not achieve this and, therefore, the financial framework issue became an issue for the British Presidency.

² *Joint Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the V4 countries on the EU*. Kazimierz Dolny, 10 June 2005. www.visegradgroup.org.

³ *Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministerial Meeting*. Budapest, 11 June 2005. www.visegradgroup.org.

⁴ See V. Bilčík, "Tichá smrť ústavnej zmluvy EÚ alebo ako ďalej?", *Zahraničná politika* No. 6/2005, pp. 22 – 24.

On 30 August 2005, at the summit of the V4 countries' Prime Ministers and the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, the V4 representatives appealed to Great Britain and other countries to pass the budget for 2007 – 2013 by the end of 2005. Otherwise, the development and competitiveness of the European Union would be slowed down and it would also endanger the possibility of using the resources from the EU funds.⁵ However, the V4 countries shared different views on the amount and allocation of the funds. While the agricultural subsidies played a significant role for Poland, Slovakia was for their decrease and, at the same time, for the increase of education, innovation, IT and research subsidies. At the beginning of December, the Prime Ministers of the V4 countries held negotiations on the EU financial perspective with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Budapest.⁶ Despite the declared solidarity principle, Slovakia was for the adoption of the EU budget even in case Britain's proposal, which for the sake of agreement proposed cuts significantly influencing the new member states, would be passed. In spite of the compromise related to political agreement on the *EU Financial Framework for 2007 – 2013* reached on 15 – 16 December 2005 at the Council meeting in Brussels, Poland gave up its negative attitude as the last V4 country only after the German Chancellor Angela Merkel convinced the Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz by symbolically increasing the Polish income by replacing the money initially addressed for the development of the Eastern Germany regions.

EU Enlargement – The Case of Croatia

In the Declaration of the V4 Countries' Prime Ministers adopted after the meeting in May 2004 in Kroměříž, a few days after their official EU accession, the Prime Ministers expressed their support to the future EU and NATO enlargement.⁷ In June 2005, they returned to the idea of further enlargement in their Declaration issued after the summit in Kazimierz Dolny.⁸ Even though Turkey's accession to the EU poses a greater challenge for the EU than the integration of the countries of the Western Balkans, it was the issue of Croatia that divided the Visegrad Four.

Although the accession negotiations with Croatia were supposed to start in March 2005, they were postponed by a decision of the EU member states. The main argument

⁵ See *SME*, 31 August 2005.

⁶ See *Pravda*, 2 December 2005.

⁷ *Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the European Union*. www.visegradgroup.org/summit.php.

⁸ *Joint Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the V4 countries on the EU*, Kazimierz Dolny, 10 June 2005. www.visegradgroup.org.

for this was the insufficient cooperation with the *International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia* (ICTY). Poland advocated the postponement due to these reasons. On the other hand, Slovakia declared its direct support to the beginning of the negotiation talks with Croatia even at the Summit of the Head of States and Governments of the EU member states held on 22 – 23 March in Brussels. In this regard, Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda underscored that the ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte should not be the only EU source informing about the cooperation with ICTY, which was branded as indirect discreditation of her competences by certain media. Slovakia together with Slovenia, Hungary and Austria asked the Luxembourg chairmanship to add the issue of Croatia to the agenda. Based on this initiative, the EU member states' leaders decided to establish a Special Mission to assess the cooperation with ICTY.⁹ Croatia began its accession talks at the beginning of October along with Turkey, after Carla del Ponte confirmed full cooperation with ICTY. Support to the beginning of the talks in March clearly determined the different approaches of the V4 countries. While Hungary and Slovakia supported the beginning of negotiations in the planned date in March, Poland was strongly against. Perhaps it is not coincidental that the group of countries supporting Croatia echoed the *Regional Partnership* rather than the *Visegrad Four* format.

The European Neighborhood Policy and the Ukraine

Having become EU member states, the V4 countries got the opportunity to be active in the field of the CFSP, *European Neighborhood Policy* including. It was particularly evident in connection with the attitudes towards the Ukraine. The support for changes in the Ukraine stemming from the so-called *Orange revolution* posed a topic in whose respect which the Visegrad countries were unified. It is undoubtedly result of the Polish V4 chairmanship as well as the fact that the Ukraine is a direct neighbor to three out of the four Visegrad countries.

On 10 June 2005, the V4 countries' Prime Ministers expressed their opinions on the situation in the Ukraine as well as the potential cooperation between the V4 and the Ukraine, or the EU and the Ukraine respectively in the Joint Declaration, which could be considered the most important V4 document in 2005 declaring support of the Ukraine.¹⁰ Besides expressing support of the democratic changes in the Ukraine, in the Declaration the V4 leaders pointed out their preparedness to assist the Ukraine

⁹ See *Pravda* 15 March, 21 March and 23 March 2005.

¹⁰ Support to the *Assistance to Ukraine with implementation of EU-Ukraine Action Plan* is included in the special chapter of the *Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministerial Meeting* from July 2005. The representatives of Ukraine, Austria and Slovenia attended the meeting, as well. See *Joint Statement of V4 Foreign Ministerial Meeting*, Budapest, 11 July 2005. www.visegradgroup.org.

in implementing the *EU-Ukraine Action Plan*. Based on the so-called twinning, they also offered exchange of information and experience mainly in the field of institution building, regional cooperation and development as well as implementation of selected reforms. The V4 countries also committed themselves to intensifying the cooperation between the EU and the Ukraine in the matters of the CFSP, justice and home affairs and economic cooperation.¹¹ In his statement, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ferenc Somogyi expressed his support to the Ukrainian path towards the EU on behalf of the V4 countries, Austria and Slovenia.¹²

As for the educational activities' support aimed at the Ukrainian students, the V4 countries introduced the *Ukrainian Scholarship Program*, which is backed by the *International Visegrad Fund* and includes universities from all Visegrad countries.

The Central European Initiative

Assessing the level of the regional cooperation in Central Europe in 2005, one cannot omit Slovakia's chairmanship in the *Central European Initiative*. Even though several analysts consider the CEI a debate forum – concerning its internal heterogeneity and the relatively small budget – Slovakia's chairmanship activities were also reflected, besides organizing the traditional events, in some other initiatives.

In 2005, the CEI remained a platform for mutual discussion, exchange of contacts and experience rather than one for adopting crucial political decisions. It is not expected to change in the near future as there are no relevant arguments for essential change in CEI or the political will. The participation of only two Ministers of Foreign Affairs – besides the host Eduard Kukan and the Croatian minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović – at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of CEI on 26 – 27 May in Tatranská Lomnica merely emphasized the importance individual countries pay to the CEI. Other countries were represented by the State Secretaries.¹³

Besides the general practice related to the support of the future EU and NATO enlargement and cooperation of the EU and NATO countries with the candidate countries or the countries remaining beyond the enlarged EU border respectively, Slovakia's biggest achievement was receiving the support to the Slovak proposal to

¹¹ *Joint Declaration of the Prime Ministers of the V4 countries on the Ukraine*, Kazimierz Dolny, 10 June 2005. www.visegradgroup.org.

¹² See *Pravda* 11 July 2005.

¹³ See SITA, 26 May 2005; also J. Marušiak, Z. Bates, A. Duleba, B. Gábelová-Jančiová, T. Strážay, "Zahraničná politika: hlavné trendy, dvojstranné vzťahy, regionálna spolupráca", M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútora (eds) *Slovensko 2005*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006), pp. 248 – 324.

institutionalize the relations of the CEI with the EU. Based on this proposal, the Joint CEI-EU Committee was established. The committee will monitor the progress of the individual countries towards the Union at least once a year. Furthermore, the European Commission received an observer status in the CEI.¹⁴

Regional Partnership

In 2005, the *Regional Partnership* was influenced by the Austrian dominance. Austria attempted to receive support for initiatives in the region of the Western Balkans mainly from its direct neighbors – Hungary and Slovenia. The development in RP was also marked by the up-coming Austrian Chairmanship in the EU. The development in the Western Balkans posed the crucial foreign policy agenda that Austria focused on.

At the most important meeting within RP on 10 – 11 October 2005 in Budapest, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs together with their counterparts from South-East Europe discussed the European prospects for the Western Balkans. The ministers pointed out that there is a European prospect for the Balkans notwithstanding the fact that there are unresolved issues such as Kosovo or the future of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In the meeting's communiqué, the RP members named the fields in which they would assist to the countries of the Western Balkans: Slovenia committed to assist in the field of veterinary and phyto-sanitary issues; Austria in the field of environment; Hungary in the field of justice and home affairs; Poland in the field of using the EU financial assistance and Slovakia committed itself to sharing its experience in the development of the civil society.¹⁵ The meeting of the ministers was preceded by the meeting of the Spokespersons of Parliament of the RP countries held on 10 June in Ljubljana and Bled.¹⁶ The meeting was attended by the Spokespersons of the Parliaments of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro, as well.¹⁷ Although the meetings of the RP countries' representatives focused primarily on the region of South-East Europe, they dealt with other issues, as well, including coordination of the humanitarian aid to the countries of Southeast

¹⁴ See *Meeting of the Ministers of the Member States of the Central European Initiative*. 27 May 2005. In: www.cei.sk.

¹⁵ See *Foreign ministers of the Regional Partnership countries debate European perspective of the Western Balkans*. http://www.gov.si/mzz/eng/news_room/news/05101101.html.

¹⁶ RP format Formát RP z hľadiska počtu zúčastnených krajín získalo *de facto* aj zasadnutie ministrov zahraničných vecí V4, Rakúska, Slovinska a Ukrajiny z júla 2005.

¹⁷ J. Marušiak, Z. Bates, A. Duleba, B. Gábelová-Jančiová, T. Strážay, "Zahraničná politika: hlavné trendy, dvojstranné vzťahy, regionálna spolupráca", M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútora (eds) *Slovensko 2005*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2006), pp. 248 – 324.

Asia affected by the tsunami. Based on the aid, the international humanitarian force was created within the EU. Apart from that, they also focused on the financial framework for 2007 – 2013 and the Constitutional Treaty. The topics related to the deepening of the integration or functioning of the Union were overshadowed by the foreign policy topics such as enlargement or the neighborhood policy.

Conclusion

It can be stated that 2005 was a year of greater topical specialization of the two regional groupings in Central Europe – the *Visegrad Four* and the *Regional Partnership*. While the V4 countries focused on countries of the EU Eastern neighborhood, especially on the Ukraine and Belarus, the RP's priority remained in the Western Balkans. One can discuss the geographic or geopolitical reasons for such a division but the fact is that while three out of four Visegrad countries share borders with the EU Eastern neighbors, only Hungary neighbors with the countries of the Western Balkans.¹⁸

The topical specialization between V4 and RP also differs in the matter of further European integration on the one hand and the foreign and security policy on the other hand. Whereas V4 focused on both dimensions, which was reflected in the disputes concerning the *Constitutional Treaty* or the *Financial Framework*, the RP primarily focused on the foreign policy. Perhaps thanks to the reduction of the dominating topics, the RP countries succeeded in avoiding dissonance. However, in 2005, more than ever, complementarity was evident between the two regional groupings.

Although the prospects for self-realization in the region of Central Europe are good for all three regional groupings, the *Visegrad Four* seem to be the most effective. Moreover, the V4 countries are an integral part of the other two groupings. Apart from the political will of the stakeholders, it is necessary for V4 to determine the key goals comparable to those of the EU and NATO integration, which unified the V4 countries to maintain such a leading position. Therefore, beside the promotion of the *International Visegrad Fund* activities, in terms of further development of the Visegrad cooperation and given Slovakia's 2006 – 2007 V4 chairmanship it is important to focus on fields such as CFSP, the EU energy policy, the development policy, cooperation in the visa policy and, last but not least, the cooperation development between official and public diplomacy.

¹⁸ Obviously, the statement cannot be generalized. Especially during the Hungarian V4 chairmanship one could witness several initiatives primarily focused on the Western Balkans.

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Slovakia's Foreign Policy Priorities

Alexander Duleba

Relations with Ukraine as Slovakia's Foreign Policy Priority

2005 was the first year of Slovakia's implementing its post-integration foreign policy priorities. In March 2004, the Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, in his speech at the *Foreign Policy Review Conference*, emphasised that Ukraine and the Western Balkans are of primary importance to the Slovak foreign policy after the EU and NATO accession. In his opinion, Slovakia has the ambition to become a supporter of Ukraine and the countries of the Western Balkans in the EU and NATO as well as to assist them in their reforms and civil society development.¹ The first steps towards the Ukraine were made by the Slovak government in 2004.

The Program of Official Assistance to Ukraine administered by UNDP *Trust Fund* became the main tool for building new relations with Ukraine. In July 2004, the *Trust Fund* announced the names of the projects receiving funds on supporting democratization in Belarus and Ukraine. The first official visit of Prime Minister Dzurinda to Ukraine in June 2004 clearly indicated a change in Slovakia's approach towards Ukraine. It was his first official visit to Kiev since he had become Prime Minister. Apart from the meetings with the official representatives, he held negotiations with the then leader of the Ukrainian opposition Viktor Yushchenko. Mikuláš Dzurinda kept the promise he gave to V. Yushchenko during this meeting, namely that the Slovak Government would pay half of the costs linked with the participation of 108 presidential election observers from Slovakia in Ukraine. Slovakia delegated observers

¹ "Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda", P. Brezáni (ed.) *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003*. (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2004) pp. 11 – 17.

within the framework of the OSCE/ODIHR mission, ENEMO – an organization associating 17 non-governmental organizations from Central and Eastern Europe as well as a special monitoring mission of Občianske Oko (Citizens' Eye) to Zakarpattya financed within the program of official assistance.² In November 2005, the Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yechanurov said that “the people around Yushchenko” highly appreciated the assistance Slovakia provided during the presidential election in 2004.³

In 2005, the political dialogue with Ukraine was coherent with the declared interest of the Slovak Republic in developing relations with its eastern neighbor. In terms of the number and level of official visits, 2005 was one of the most eventful years in modern history of the Slovak-Ukrainian relations. The presidents of both countries met twice, the Prime Ministers once, two ministers of the Slovak government paid a visit to Ukraine and three Ukrainian ministers visited Slovakia. In this matter, the most important event was the official visit of the Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yechanurov to Slovakia on 24 – 25 November 2005.⁴ In terms of approach, 2005 posed a qualitative change.

The Political Agenda of the Slovak-Ukrainian Relations

20 mil. SKK were allocated in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for democratization projects realized by Slovak NGOs in Ukraine and Belarus in 2004 and 2005 within the *Program of Official Assistance to Ukraine*. Moreover, in 2005, the Slovak Embassy in Kiev together with the Embassy in Sarajevo were chosen as pivotal for providing micro-grants for supporting democratization and reforms in the country of accreditation.⁵

In the first half of 2005, Slovakia proved the change in the approach and political will to build qualitatively new relations with Ukraine by change of approach towards the visa regime issue, which, until then, was the most sensitive issue in bilateral relations. Unlike Poland and Hungary, during the EU integration process Slovakia introduced a visa regime to Ukraine as of June 2000. The Ukrainians were obliged to

² J. Marušiak, A. Duleba, B. Gábelová-Jančiová, Z. Bates-Melišová, “Zahraničná politika SR, hlavné trendy, dvojstranné vzťahy, visegrádska spolupráca, regionálne iniciatívy”, M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov (eds): *Slovensko 2004. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 336 – 417; pp. 407 – 408.

³ *Sme*, 25 November 2005.

⁴ “Ukrajina i Slovakia dogovorilis aktivizirovať ekonomičeskoje sotrudničestvo”, *Ukrajinski novyny*, 24 November 2005.

⁵ *Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci na rok 2005*. (Bratislava: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR, 2005).

pay cca 40 USD (based on the dollar exchange rate) for a single entry visa allowing them a stay of 30 days.⁶ On 20 April 2005, the Slovak Government decided to issue visas free of charge. Thus, the government responded to the Ukrainian decision to abolish the visa obligation for EU members. Since May 2005, the so-called asymmetric visa regime has been applied i.e. Ukrainian citizens are obliged to be granted a visa when entering Slovakia but they do not pay the fee and Slovak citizens do not need a visa to enter Ukraine.⁷

The Proposal for Slovakia's Assistance to Ukraine in the Implementation of the Objectives of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan must be considered a key step towards fulfillment of the new foreign policy priorities of Slovakia vis-à-vis Ukraine in 2005. The proposal was submitted by Prime Minister Dzurinda to Prime Minister Yechanurov during his official visit to Slovakia on 24 November. The document was approved by the Slovak government on 26 October 2005. It consists of more than 40 activities through which Slovak governmental and non-governmental organizations will provide expert assistance to their Ukrainian partners while implementing the *EU-Ukraine Action Plan*. The Ukrainian government, eager to become an EU member, considers the fulfillment of the action plan goals their foreign policy priority. Considering the „best practices“ principle of the Slovak Republic in legislation and institutional reform during the integration process, Slovak institutions will share their know-how with their Ukrainian counterparts. The goal is to fulfill the *EU-Ukraine Action Plan*, which is supposed to result in the new EU – Ukraine Treaty in 2008. The treaty should replace the present *Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation* signed in 1994.⁸ At the meeting with the EU countries' ambassadors to Ukraine, Prime Minister Yechanurov appreciated the proposal of the Slovak Republic. He said: “Several countries offered assistance to Ukraine in implementing the action plan. The proposal of Slovakia is the best though.”⁹

On 24 November 2005, the international conference organized by the *Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association* in cooperation with MFA SR, *Friedrich Ebert Foundation* and *German Marshall Fund of the US* was held in Bratislava entitled *Ukraine on Its Path to the EU: Expectations, Possibilities and Limits*. At the conference, both Prime Ministers M. Dzurinda and Y. Yechanurov were present. The conference was attended by political representatives and experts from Ukraine and eight EU member states. They gathered to discuss the EU – Ukrainian relations, the

⁶ *Vyšehradské krajiny na ceste do Schengenu. Štúdie k medzinárodným otázkam D 02.* (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2005).

⁷ *SITA*, 20 April 2005.

⁸ *Návrh pomoci SR Ukrajine pri plnení cieľov Akčného plánu s EÚ.* Material adopted at the session of Government on 26 October 2005; “Slovensko chce pomôcť Ukrajine naplniť jej akčný plán s EÚ”, *SITA*, 26 October 2005.

⁹ H. Tretecký, “V Jevropu – razom iz Slovaččynoju”, *Deň* 18 February 2006.

political situation in Ukraine as well as the need to continue the political and economic reforms. The conference posed a significant contribution of Slovakia to the discussion on the European perspective of Ukraine and forming the EU policy towards the Ukraine.¹⁰

As mentioned above, 2005 was one of the most eventful years in modern history for the Slovak-Ukrainian relations. The president of the Slovak Republic Ivan Gašparovič was one out of the six presidents present at the inauguration of the Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko on 23 January 2005. More than 100 high-profile foreign representatives, including Prime Ministers and ministers, participated in the event. However, only Slovakia, together with Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Poland and Hungary, were represented by their Heads of State. Apart from the participation at the inauguration, in February 2005 I. Gašparovič bilaterally negotiated with the president V. Yushchenko in Brussels.¹¹

In late March and early April 2005, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit to Ukraine. Beside the talks with his counterpart Borys Tarasiuk, he held negotiations with the Ukrainian President V. Yushchenko and the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoschenko. At the meeting, the idea of the action plan assistance proposal, implemented later on in October 2005, came into being. The visit of E. Kukan also contributed to the decision of the Slovak Government to introduce the asymmetric visa regime with Ukraine on 20 April 2005.¹²

On 14 November 2005, Minister of Justice of the Slovak Republic Daniel Lipšic paid a visit to Ukraine. The talks with his counterpart Serhyi Holovaty focused on cooperation in the field of fight on corruption as well as cooperation in those chapters of the *EU-Ukraine Action Plan* related to justice and the judiciary system. The Ukrainian minister showed interest in the Slovak judiciary reform experience, especially the reform of the public prosecutor bodies combating organized crime and corruption. Lipšic also offered education for prosecutors and judges of Ukraine at the Judicial Academy of the Slovak Republic as well as visits for the employees of state prisons in Slovak Penitentiaries.¹³

On 14 November, the Ukrainian Minister of Defense Anatolyi Hrycenko took part in negotiations with the Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška. Minister Liška announced that in 2006 the Slovak defense ministry will provide the Ukrainian resort with 120,000 EUR to support preparation for the NATO accession. The ministers also signed the *Program on Development of Cooperation between the*

¹⁰ "Analytici odporučia Ukrajine, ako zlepšiť vzťahy s EÚ", *SITA*, 22 Novemeber 2005.

¹¹ "Kto prijedet na inauguraciju Viktora Juščenko", *Korrespondent*, 22 January 2005.

¹² *Korrespondent*, 31 March 2005; see also E. Kukan, "Dejstvujte ne speša", Interview for the Weekly *Zerkalo nedeli*, No. 12 (2005).

¹³ "Ministr justiciji Slovakiji posetit Ukrajinu 14 nojabria", *Interfaks-Ukrajina*, 14 November 2005; "Ukrajinci majú záujem o naše skúsenosti z reformy justície", *SITA*, 14 November 2005.

Ministries of Defense of the SR and Ukraine for 2006 – 2007. The program assumes that the joint military exercises of small units as well as consultations in the military-political and military-technical field will take place. Hrycenko also expressed special interest in the Slovak experience related to the transformation of the Slovak Armed Forces into professional ones. Both ministers agreed upon the need of more efficient use of the joint engineering battalion *Tisa* and positively evaluated the cooperation of Ukrainian and Slovak units in the peace missions in Sierra Leone, Iraq and Kosovo. Beside the meetings at the Ministry of Defense, Minister Hrycenko met the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR E. Kukan and the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and Security Róbert Kaliňák.¹⁴

The most important event, however, was the official visit of the Ukrainian Prime Minister Yuriy Yechanurov to Slovakia in Bratislava on 24 November 2005. The following day, Prime Minister Yechanurov participated in the *Central European Initiative* summit in Piešťany, held on the occasion of the end of the Slovak presidency in this organization. Prime Minister M. Dzurinda used the presence of Prime Minister Yechanurov to express once again that the relations with Ukraine belong to the Slovak foreign policy priorities. As mentioned before, the Ukrainian partner was given the *Proposal of Assistance to Ukraine with implementation of EU-Ukraine Action Plan*. Both Prime Ministers signed the Treaty on Opening of the New Cross-Border Crossing for Transport by Road in Veľké Selemence – Malé Selemence. It became the third road crossing on the Slovak-Ukrainian border as there were previously only two railroad crossings. The issue of economic cooperation was on the Prime Ministers' agenda, as well. Yuriy Yechanurov was also received by the President Ivan Gašparovič and the Chairman of the Parliament Pavol Hrušovský.¹⁵

The official visits of members of both governments in 2005 were concluded by the visit of Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Yuriy Lucenko on 8 December 2005. He held talks with his counterpart Vladimír Palko. The ministers signed a joint declaration in which they declared cooperation in the fields such as combating organized crime, especially the criminal activities concerning the joint border – illegal migration, smuggling, prostitution, drugs etc. At the same time, minister Lucenko presented the expectations of the Ukrainian part that EU member states will assist to Ukraine in building the infrastructure of the EU – Ukraine border protection as well as building the facilities for illegal migrants seized in Ukraine. He also showed interest in the multilateral format of cooperation with the *Visegrad Four* countries in the field of eastern border protection. Minister Palko pointed out that the fight on illegal migration was considered the main problem and appreciated the increasing level of cooperation

¹⁴ “Hrycenko otbyl v Slovakiu dľa vstreč s vlastami”, *Ukrajinski novyny*, 14 November 2005; “Slovakija vydelit Ukrainie 120 tysiač jevro dľa vstuplenija v NATO”, *UNIAN*, 15 November 2005.

¹⁵ “Vveden novyj propusknoj punkt meždu Slovakiiej i Ukrajinoj”, *Liga onlajn*, 24 Novemeber 2005; “Na oficiálnej návšteve SR premiér Jurij Jechanurov”, *SITA*, 24 Novemeber 2005.

with Ukraine. Cigarette smuggling was mentioned as another key problem of bilateral relations as it also poses a serious economic problem for the Slovak Republic. The ministers agreed upon the establishment of a permanent joint working group dealing with car theft, fight on organized crime and illegal migration. Minister Palko assured Minister Lucenko that Ukraine can count on Slovak assistance with the EU relations development, as well. They also agreed upon the elaboration of an interior ministries' cooperation program for 2006 – 2007. Minister Lucenko was also received by Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Pál Csáky.¹⁶

The Economic Agenda of Slovak-Ukrainian Relations

Since 1997, the Slovak Republic has been reaching a repeatedly passive balance in foreign trade with Ukraine. However, while in 1997 the balance posed 19.3 mil USD, in the first seven months of 2005 it reached the amount of 130 mil. USD.¹⁷ According to the Ministry of Economy of the SR data for 2004, the import of goods and services reached 413.8 mil. USD, while export only 296.3 mil. USD. For the first seven months of 2005 (January – July) the import reached the amount of 338.2 mil USD and export 206.9 mil USD. Ukraine, with the annual turnover of 700 mil. USD, does not belong to the most important foreign trade partners of Slovakia, the geographical proximity notwithstanding.¹⁸

On 24 November 2005, during their bilateral meeting, the Prime Ministers of Ukraine and Slovakia Yechanurov and Dzurinda stated that the economic cooperation was not sufficient. In their view, the joint projects in the fields of energy and goods transport from the third countries via Slovakia and Ukraine would pose a benefit for the development of economic cooperation. Prime Minister Dzurinda stated that “Slovakia endeavors to keep the transit of raw materials from Russia to European markets in the present form so that the new inefficient pipelines are not built and so that both states remain transit countries”.¹⁹ Thus, Slovakia indirectly supported Ukraine

¹⁶ “Ukrajina i Slovákija rešili usiliť spoluprácu v borbe s prestupnosťou”, *Ukrajinski novyny*, 8 December 2005; “Jurij Lucenko ta ministr vnútrišných sprav Slovackej Republiky planujú aktivizovať spoločnú boju za zločinnosť, zokrema – iz nelehajúcu migráciu ľudí”, Ministry of interior of Ukraine, 8 December 2005; “Ministr vnútrišných sprav Jurij Lucenko zustrivsia z vice-premier ministrom z jevropejských pytaň, prav ľudyny ta menšyn Slovackej Republiky Palom Čaki”, Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, 8 December 2005.

¹⁷ “Na oficiálnej návšteve SR premiér Jurij Jechanurov”, *SITA*, 24 November 2005.

¹⁸ *Development of the Foreign Trade of the SR for the period January – July 2005*. (Bratislava: Ministry of Economy of the SR, 2005).

¹⁹ “Ukrajina i Slovákija dogovorilis aktivizirovať ekonomické spoluprácu”, *Ukrajinski novyny*, 24 November 2005.

in her dispute with Russia regarding the price of natural gas supplies for Ukraine and also expressed a critical standpoint towards the Russian-German Agreement on Construction of the Northern Baltic Gas Line. The Prime Ministers also focused on the possibility of transit of light Caspian oil via *Družba* pipeline in the territories of Ukraine and Slovakia to the Czech Republic, which are of interest to the Česká rafinérská a. s. Slovakia showed interest in importing and the transit of electric power from Ukraine. According to the Slovak Prime Minister, after the nuclear plant in Jaslovské Bohunice is closed Slovakia will be interested in importing Ukrainian electric power. Slovakia is interested not only in developing cooperation in the fields of oil, natural gas and electric power transit but also in the development of the rail road transit.²⁰

The matter, having negatively influenced the Slovak-Ukrainian relations for a long time after completion of the *Krivoi Rog Mining and Concentration Combine (KMCC)*, marked good development, as well. During their visit in Bratislava, Prime Minister Yechanurov and Minister of Economy of Ukraine Arsenyi Jaceniuk informed the Slovak representatives that the Ukrainian Government adopted preliminary measures for KMCC privatization. Minister of Economy of the Slovak Republic Jirko Malchárek responded: "Today we agreed with our Ukrainian and Romanian partners upon further process. The Ukrainian partner will make an effort to find a partner in an international tender with our participation. The winner will be obliged to make agreement with the Slovak and Romanian partners, as well."²¹

As for further development of the bilateral economic cooperation, the Ukrainian membership in the *World Trade Organization (WTO)* is of crucial importance. The membership will pave the way for negotiations on trade liberalization between Ukraine and the EU and, thus, for trade liberalization between Ukraine and the Slovak Republic. The only EU body authorized to negotiate the terms and conditions of foreign trade with goods²² with a third country is, according to the *Treaty on EU*, the European Commission. It is also authorized to represent interests of the EU member states in WTO. The *Inter-Governmental Commission for Economic and Trade Cooperation* was considered a key tool of the present Slovak-Ukrainian relations. It was created based on the bilateral treaty signed in 1994. At the regular meetings of the intergovernmental commission, the negotiations focused on the crucial bilateral agenda including the terms and conditions of trade and economic cooperation, which shifted the realization of Slovak trade interests vis-à-vis third countries from a bilateral to the EU level. According to the expert estimation of the Ministry of Economy of the SR, the volume of bilateral trade with Ukraine can be doubled if both countries

²⁰ "Slovensko bude možno dovážať elektrinu z Ukrajiny", *SITA*, 24 November 2005.

²¹ "Ukrajinci sú pripravení predať KŤUK", *Sme*, 24 November 2005.

²² It does not include the trade with services, as the EU member states are allowed to apply a bilateral approach towards non-members in this field, i.e. they could conclude specific bilateral treaties and are allowed to act independently. Obviously, they mustn't threat functioning of the single market.

realize their business activities in same regime of the international liberalized trade.²³ Therefore, it is in Slovakia's interest to support the Ukrainian membership in WTO and the following negotiations on liberalization of trade between the EU and Ukraine. In other words: to support Ukraine on her path towards the EU.

Conclusion

While 2004 could be marked a year of identification of the post-integration foreign policy priorities, the year 2005 can be characterized as the first year of their implementation. The change of approach towards the Ukraine has been evident in the past two years.

Between 1993 – 1998, the relations with Ukraine were overshadowed by the relations with Russia. The then Government considered Ukraine to be merely a “gate to Russia”. After the parliamentary elections in 1998, an interesting situation occurred – on the one hand, Dzurinda's government declared change of approach towards the Ukraine as well as the eastern policy of the SR as such while, on the other hand, the reality did not follow the intentions. The period of 1998 – 2000 was a period of major misunderstandings in the Slovak-Ukrainian relations due to many conflict situations: competition in the UN for the elected membership in the Security Council, Slovakia's introduction of a visa regime, a threat of denouncing of the readmission treaty by Ukraine, Slovak support to the *Gazprom* project for building of the gas pipeline *Jamal II* by-passing the territory of Ukraine, etc. The relations were standardized only in December 2000 during the visit of the then Ukrainian Prime Minister and the current President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko in Bratislava. The period of 2001 – 2003 was one of a renewed regular dialogue compared to the previous period.²⁴

The years 2004 and 2005 meant a breakthrough in the approach towards the Ukraine, considering the development of Slovak-Ukraine relations. Only in 2005 did the outlines

²³ See *2004 European Union Accession: Implications for Ukraine's Relations with its Central European Neighbours*. (Kiev: EastWest Institute, EuroRegio Ukraine, 2004), p. 28; see also *Správa z 9. zasadnutia Medzivládnej komisie pre obchodno-hospodársku a vedecko-technickú spoluprácu medzi Slovenskou republikou a Ukrajinou*. (Bratislava: Ministry of Economy of the SR, 2002).

²⁴ On development of Slovak-Ukrainian Relations between 1993 – 2002 see: A. Duleba, “Slovakia's Policy towards Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”, K. Pelczynska-Nalecz, A. Duleba, L. Póti, V. Votápek (eds) *Eastern Policy of the Enlarged European Union. A Visegrad Perspective*. (Bratislava: Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Center for Eastern Studies, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, International Visegrad Fund, 2003), pp. 143 – 180.

of the Slovakia's post-integration eastern policy meet the interests of Slovakia, which could mean a significant contribution to the common EU and NATO policies.

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Eliška Sláviková

Slovakia's Policy towards the Western Balkans

Taking a closer look at Slovakia's activities in the region of the Western Balkans in 2005, one must admit that the Slovak Republic attempted to fulfil its aim to influence the whole region more consistently. It also activated its leverage in those countries of the region where it had been more or less absent until quite recently. Although the paper reflects changes that occurred recently in relations to Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Macedonia and Albania, the Slovak attention remains focused on Serbia and Montenegro and, partly, on Croatia. Aware of the motivation potential of the European Union, the SR became one of the loudest and most persistent advocates of the integration of the Western Balkans countries into the EU and of enforcing particular mechanisms for materialization of such an event. Despite this fact, there are only very few visible initiatives developed at the bilateral level which would more significantly contribute to democratization and transformation of the region (except for Serbia and Montenegro and, eventually, Croatia). The recommendations offered at the end of the article are based on the belief that Slovakia definitely possesses the internal capacity and, at the same time, the duty, given its historical experience, to influence positive processes in all countries of this region. The EU initiatives as well as a great variety of initiatives in the countries of the Western Balkans also leave space for Slovak performance. A precondition for successful fulfilling of our foreign political commitments in the region still remains to be better knowledge of the internal situation and processes in each of the countries in the region as well as the existence of aimed strategies for individual societies based on this knowledge about the internal situation and processes with the common denominator of eventual integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU.

Slovakia has actively taken part in the processes in the countries of the Western Balkans since 1990s when, during 1999-2001, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan held the position of a special envoy of the UN Secretary

General for the area of the Western Balkans. The so called “*Bratislava Process*” remains a highlight, having combined diplomatic activities with activities of non-profit organizations (NGO) in the effort to help the unification of the Serbian opposition in 2000. In the following years, this model allowed successful complementarity of engagement at both the governmental and non-profit levels. The implementation of Slovak integration efforts and a full-fledged participation in the Euro-Atlantic structures allowed Slovakia actively to present its foreign political visions within the EU and, thus, Slovakia could look for topics in the framework of which it would be able to use its comparative advantages in some areas, influence the EU decision-making and, at the same time, to build an image of a mature country able to play an active role on the foreign political scene. Realizing the potential that different actors in the society gained in the past, Slovakia slowly started to profile itself as an EU member state with an imminent interest in developing the Western Balkans and the ambition to continue to play an important and active role in the countries of the region. The incentive to concentrate on the Western Balkans in particular is based on several basic postulates:

- sound knowledge of the region and its problems;
- traditional ties with some of the nations in the region;
- a numerous Slovak minority in the Serbian Vojvodina;
- a Slovak minority in North-East Croatia counting several thousands;
- the prospects of developing economic relations.

However, the focus on this region also stems from the specific post-communist development in Slovakia itself. The division of Czechoslovakia is valuable experience as well as the experience of building a new state and its institutions, guaranteeing their functioning and fighting for their democratic character against nationalism and populism, which are all processes that, to a large extent, started in the countries of the Western Balkans but which have not yet been decided, let alone completed.

In the 1990s, the citizens of Slovakia, protesting against the government of Vladimír Mečiar, managed to reverse the direction in which the country was heading thanks to activation of the non-profit sector as well as unification of all the democratic parts of the society. At the same time, this effort was supported by the vision of joining the EU and by strict conditionality, namely the EU requirement of fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. Thanks to this, after the change of government, Slovakia was very quickly able to catch up with its neighbours in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, to join the EU with them and, at the same time, to launch important reform processes. The successful opposition to a government not respecting the values that the EU is based on is the background for better understanding of the processes taking place in the countries of the Western Balkans (despite the many added problems caused by armed conflicts) and to help them to find the functional means – external and internal – necessary to launch the key changes. Since the 90s, the non-profit

organizations still operate in Slovakia, which proves their viability after normalisation of the situation in the country and they play the role of the so-called “watchdog” exerting influence over the control and the political environment. The role that the non-governmental sector has been playing in Slovakia undoubtedly offers many parallels with the countries of the Western Balkans. At the same time, Slovakia is the only country in central Europe that has ethnically diverse population and experienced eight years of a government with representatives of the Hungarian minority.

Words versus Acts

Clearly, Slovakia correctly evaluated its potential and concentrated on the region to which it can be a contribution at several different levels. The determination to take part in shaping all the countries of the Western Balkans was also reflected in the official documents in which this region was defined as a foreign policy priority.¹ The aim to concentrate on such a region instead of concentrating only on some countries is a natural consequence of the link between the transformation and integration processes that all countries must go through, albeit with different intensity. As will result from other parts of this text dedicated to bilateral relations, these aims were not successfully implemented in practice (mainly until 2005), partly because of an unsuitable choice of means and tools but mainly because of the disproportionate focusing on Serbia and Montenegro (partly with the exception of Croatia), which prevented development of full-fledged initiatives in other countries. This excessive sensitivity to the Belgrade perspective is evident in the program of Slovak official development cooperation *SlovakAid*, successfully launched in 2004, in which the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (together with Kosovo) was defined as a program country where Slovak subjects can manage annual projects in the volume of 60 million SKK, while the majority of presented projects in four rounds taking place until present (until June 2006) were concentrating on Serbia alone.

The other countries of the region – Bosnia, Macedonia, Albania (Croatia is not defined as a developing country) – found itself in a group of another 13 countries for which Slovakia assigned as much as almost 90 million SKK, although no more visible activities broke through. So although there was a possibility for activities of Slovak subjects (though not equally in comparison to the assigned volume of finance) open in all the countries of the Western Balkans, the fact that the majority of them are active mainly in Serbia points at the helplessness of the Slovak subjects in looking for ways of engagement in other countries. It also proves the fact that non-profit organizations, companies and other institutions lack information about the situation in other countries

¹ See *Mid-Term Strategy of Foreign Policy of the SR until 2015* and *Zameranie zahraničnej politiky na rok 2005*. In: www.mfa.sk.

still unexplored and there is only a rough idea about the performance there, which to a certain extent is also a consequence of the fact that Slovakia diplomatically covered the whole region only from Belgrade and Zagreb. Therefore, a look at the situation in the region had to be narrowed only to focus on these two centers while any substantial knowledge about the situation and complicated processes in other countries was absent.

Although somewhat 'excessive' understanding for Belgrade has partly been present in Slovak diplomacy later, as well, in 2005, compared to the previous years, our performance set off in a significantly more balanced course. The year 2005 was a year of deepening of contacts, looking for partners, getting to know the field and searching for the most appropriate role while utilizing all the possibilities that SR gained by becoming an EU member state together with a two-year membership in the UN Security Council (the UN SC) from 2006 on, and, at the same time, Slovakia has been using bilateral and regional initiatives more effectively. Except for the rather numerous journeys of Slovak top politicians to the region or the journeys of the politicians from the region to Slovakia, the fact that considerably contributed to activation of the relations was the opening of the representative office in Sarajevo in the summer of 2004 and the decision to open a representative office in Pristina.²

Serbia and Croatia

After its accession into the EU, Slovakia was able to participate in the EU decision-making and its foreign political performance was closely observed, which made Slovakia fully realize the added value of this dimension for an even better utilization of its potential of forming the Western Balkans. In the summit in Solon in June 2003, the EU set up the European perspective for the whole region and, thus, decided to take responsibility for the future of the region. However, the internal problems of the past years regarding the acceptance of the Constitutional Treaty and the overall lack of vision of the current 25 states are reflected in the inability consistently to implement the European perspective for the Western Balkans. Slovakia, realizing the potential of the European vision for encouragement of the reformed processes in the region, currently belongs to the loudest advocates of the perspective outlined in Solon. In all the important milestones paving the way that the SAP drafted for the countries of the Western Balkans, Slovakia definitely defended the fastest possible integration of the region into European structures, but, at the same time, has always emphasized the conditionality of the whole process, which means fulfilling all the main conditions set for the individual countries. Officially, Slovakia required fulfilling one of the main conditions on the way outlined by the SAP, namely an unconditional cooperation with the tribunal in the Hague as one of the main tools for

² Decision was taken in summer 2005. Slovak diplomat has started performance there in June 2006.

reconciliation among the nations of the former Yugoslavia. Slovakia made itself visible by directly supporting commencing the accession negotiations with Croatia during the summit of the leaders of the EU member states in March in Brussels which took place shortly after the EU denied opening the accession negotiations with Croatia because of the suspicion about insufficient cooperation of Croatia with the *International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia* (ICTY) when handing out General Ante Gotovina. Mainly thanks to the initiative of Slovakia, Austria and Slovenia, an EU mission was sent to Croatia with the aim to explore the sincerity of the Croat efforts to arrest the general.

Slovakia unambiguously welcomed opening of the negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Pact with Serbia and Montenegro in October 2005. This gave Serbia a chance to focus on challenges that this new dimension of relations with the EU brings, but failing to hand out the war criminals Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić and the confession of Belgrade that until the end of last year the Serbian government assisted in hiding Mladić in Serbia resulted in suspension of the negotiations about the SAP in May 2006. This decision was taken only a few weeks before the referendum in Montenegro took place. After a three-year transition period, the referendum finally ended the weak and disfunctional Union of Serbia and Montenegro and resulted in 55,5% in favor of independence of Montenegro, which confirmed establishment of another state built on the ruins of the former Yugoslavia. The distinctiveness of the relation of SR with Serbia and Montenegro and the good reputation of the Slovak diplomacy in this country resulted in the fact that Slovak diplomats directed the whole referendum. Javier Solana, the *EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy*, entrusted negotiations of the conditions for the referendum and the supervision over the whole process of the referendum to Miroslav Lajčák, Director of the Political Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with František Lipka appointed chairman of the Montenegro referendum committee. Thanks to the successful performance of both diplomats and thanks to their consistent defending of the legitimacy of the whole process right after the result was contested by the opposition in Montenegro, the Slovak representatives became the EU “faces” in the region and, at the same time, boosted Slovakia’s international reputation. By guaranteeing smooth running of the referendum according to the European standards Slovakia contributed to implementation of the legacy of the conflict solutions according to the European standards for the whole region. The performance of Miroslav Lajčák in the position of the EU ambassador for the referendum in Montenegro proved the ideal utilization of distinctive bilateral relations at the European level when established bilateral relations help real implementation of the EU foreign policy. On the other hand, it also demonstrated that Slovakia was not ready for a situation when the role of the EU intermediary in the case of the referendum in Montenegro and linking its result with the Slovak performance in Serbia itself can paradoxically mean worsening of relations with the government in Belgrade. The experience that looking for consensus can also bring modification of bilateral relations, in this case, gives Slovakia a chance to utilize the cooling down of the relations with the current Serbian administration in favor of deepening the cooperation and trust of Slovakia in the democratic parts of the Serbian society.

Kosovo

After Montenegro gained its independence, the main challenge not only for Serbia and the wider region but also for the international community has been Kosovo and its internal organization so that after its current provisional state is finished, reforming and democratic processes in Serbia and Kosovo itself are initialized, which would, in the long term, contribute to stability of the whole region. In November 2005, the UN commenced negotiations about the status of Kosovo, which, according to all signals, should lead to defining the future of this international protectorate which will *de iure* remain a southern Serbian province until the end of 2006. The official position of Slovakia states that long-term security is the main criterion for the acceptance of any status resulting from the negotiations. This position is no different from the efforts of the main actors of the process: the UN negotiation team led by the former Finnish President Maarti Ahtisaari, the Contact Group and the EU. All the actors involved understand clearly that the hope that Belgrade and Pristina would be able to find a common solution is almost non-existent and that is why the final status will be dictated to both parties of the conflict. Generally, the result of the negotiations is likely to be an interim form of “*conditional (supervised) independence*” for Kosovo. Unlike the public statements of diplomats from the Contact Group, Slovakia still believes that the solution cannot be forced onto any of the parties and “it should be based on an agreement of the actors involved”, as Minister Kukan repeatedly emphasized when evaluating the foreign policy of the SR in 2005 in his speech on 9 February 2006.³

At the same time, Slovakia cannot get rid of the impression as one of the countries with the most hesitating position towards viability of the independent Kosovo, which is supported by the official statements presented by the Slovak representatives on the international ground.⁴

The activities of Slovakia in Kosovo in 2005 definitely confirmed the fact that Slovakia has the ambition to play a role in this process also regarding the performance in the UN SC where the issue of the final status of Kosovo is one of our priorities.⁵ This also influenced the intensity of travel to the region – in October 2005 the journey of Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan to Belgrade, Podgorica and Pristina

³ Statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan within the framework of the SFPA Modern Foreign Policy Program. In: <http://www.mfa.sk>.

⁴ In this sense was also a statement of Slovak representative Dušan Matulay in the UN SC on 20 June 2006 after the report evaluating the Sorenom Jessenom-Petersenom progress of Kosovo delivered by Sorenom Jessen-Petersen, leaving Chief of the Kosovo UN Mission.

⁵ See “Kukan verí, že budúcnosť Kosova sa vyrieši koncom roka 2007”, *SME*, 17 January 2006. The article informs about briefing of Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Kukan after meeting with chief of the UN mission in Kosovo. In: http://www.sme.sk/clanok_tlac.asp?cl=2550293; 24. 1. 2006.

took place and later in December Director of the Political Department of MFA SR and former ambassador to Belgrade Miroslav Lajčák held several meetings in Belgrade and Pristina where he even gave a short presentation during the meeting with the representatives of non-profit organizations from Kosovo. The opening of a diplomatic representative office in Pristina, where in June 2006 a Slovak diplomat started a mission, largely contributed to balancing Slovak views on the region. However, his performance as well as the performance of those in the MFA SR who realize our role in the area of activation and support of the viable parts of the Serbian society looking more into the future than the past still come against barriers of prejudice and bias towards the region of the Western Balkans which are still prevailing in our diplomacy. The Kosovo case shows the internal ambivalence of Slovak diplomacy in the region when some of the skilled diplomats with sufficient experience, knowledge of the situation in the whole region and, above all, with excellent knowledge of the international reality realize the speed with which the international community is reaching recognition of the limited independence of Kosovo and, at the same time, acknowledge a great need of viable initiatives from the Slovak side that could help Serbia – where Slovakia still enjoys deeper trust in comparison to other European countries – to accept this solution and focus on fulfilling the EU criteria after breaking out of the Kosovo trap. The concept of active politics, which brings about initiatives, comes against a passive politics focused on non-critical verbal advocacy of Belgrade and using its rhetoric.

A certain schizophrenia in relation to Kosovo – the declarations of efforts for activity and balance in this process⁶ on the one hand and the evident long-term failure to accept the reality of the international protectorate developing under international supervision independently from Serbia on the other hand – symptomatically proves obstinate refusing to recognize the official identification documents of the UNMIK issued by the international supervision (birth certificates, identification cards, identification car makes and the like) as SR is the only EU country that does not recognize these documents. Although the Slovak government coming into power in the summer of 2004 at least allowed issuing the visa to UNMIK travel documents (under a separate visa regime),⁷ it changes little in the message that Slovakia sends to Kosovo, mainly taking into consideration the fact that as a member of all organizations supervising Kosovo (the UN, NATO,⁸ OSCE, EU) Slovakia is a part of supervising administration that in fact issues these documents.

⁶ Ibid; article states „Slovakia offered Bratislava as a place for discreet talks when negotiating the future of Kosovo“.

⁷ General recognition of certificates was several times denied by the SR Ministry of Interior from the security reasons although unofficially there is always an argument that „we cannot recognize certificates that Serbia does not recognize“.

⁸ Slovakia is still actively present in Kosovo as a part of more than 100-member military contingent within the KFOR mission.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania

In comparison to Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia, in 2005, the bilateral relations of Slovakia with other countries of the region – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Albania – brought only barely noticeable results despite their increased intensity. Except for a few high level contacts such as the meeting of the Albanian Prime Minister with Minister Kukan within the framework of the Central European Initiative summit (November 2005), the visit of the Albanian Foreign Affairs Minister Besnik Mustafaj in Bratislava (December 2005), the journey of E. Kukan to Macedonia (October 2006) or the journeys of the Secretary of State of MFA Magda Vášáryová (September 2006) and President Ivan Gašparovič in Bosnia and Herzegovina (30 November – 1 December 2006), the relations with these countries were not defined by other more visible initiatives. In 2005, Slovakia started to cover Albania diplomatically from the representative office in Athens (until then it was covered from Belgrade). The system of distribution of micro grants to subjects in these countries in the annual amount of 1 million SKK launched last year and assigned by a newly opened representative mission in Sarajevo can be considered a contribution to the development of contacts between SR and Bosnia.

Until now, the only tangible result of these contacts and of the efforts to boost economic relations with Macedonia and Bosnia was the cancellation of the visa duty for Slovak citizens in these countries.⁹ However, the visa policy on the Slovak side can again illustrate different approaches to individual countries of the Western Balkans. In 2005, Slovakia moderated the visa duty for holders of Yugoslav passports, who can travel to Slovakia based on a mere invitation and the visa are issued free of charge and immediately. However, the citizens of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia or the Kosovo holders of UNMIK travel documents are also required to present an invitation verified by immigration police, which apart from the duty to submit a number of documents and confirmations also creates significant financial costs of both the invited and the inviting party. Although this unbalanced approach involves a significantly numerous Slovak minority living in the Serbian Vojvodina and SR is trying to facilitate contacts with the mother country, considering its own declaration of interest in the activities in the whole region, Slovakia should look further beyond this horizon. The visa policy predetermines the liveliness of relations with the countries towards which it is used, which is why the rigidity of the visa policy holds back development of personal, professional as well as economic relations. In November last year, *the International Crises Group* issued a report¹⁰ in which it points at the isolation of the countries of the Western Balkans as one of the very negative aspects of their slow

⁹ Slovak citizens travel to Albania on visa free regime since year 2002.

¹⁰ *ICG Europe Report N° 168: EU Visas and the Western Balkans*. 29 November 2005.

progress and democratisation. Slovakia, thanks to its own experience, should be able to know best how important it is to be able to travel mainly for the younger generation, to get to know people and to study abroad and then apply the experience in practice at home in order to contribute to the development of the country. It is therefore bewildering that instead of advocating gradual liberalization of visa regimes of the EU with countries of the Western Balkans, Slovakia, on the contrary, has one of the toughest visa issuing policies.¹¹

However, in relation to these three countries Slovakia has offered a wide range of possibilities for performance, from utilization of bilateral and development mechanisms similar to the ones in Serbia and Croatia, to expert assistance in EU negotiations, direct support of transformational processes from our experts, to encouragement of the economic ties. In Macedonia, Slovakia could support the implementation of the *Ohrid Agreement* into practice more clearly, which is one of the most important conditions for success in the EU accession process. In Bosnia, still suffering from division within the country according to ethnic lines which makes functioning of the institutions impossible and prevents the country from real progress, as a consistent advocate of the individual rights over the collective rights Slovakia could support the constitutional changes leading to applying the civic principle in practice at the cost of the nationalist principle, mainly in the light of the approaching parliamentary election in autumn 2006, which will have a key significance for the progress of the country.

SlovakAID

As already mentioned at the beginning of this part of the text, since 2003, the Official Development Aid (ODA) has been an important tool of Slovak performance in the Western Balkans, which also enables other than governmental agents to join in the development of the region. Until July 2005, the framework of the Fund Bratislava – Belgrade supported 53 projects in Serbia and Montenegro together with Kosovo in the total amount of 210, 994, 024 SKK, 107, 507, 927 SK out of which went to activities of non-profit organizations, which means a 50.95% share on the project of this fund. The activities of the Slovak subjects in the region and mainly the NGOs significantly contribute to the intensification of the relations of Slovakia with Serbia and, partly, also with Montenegro and Kosovo to which the launching of the Slovak ODA provided space for more systematic and more focused activities in the region and for participating in its development. Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo welcome the initiative concentrating on the transfer of the Slovak experience of transformation,

¹¹ Until today SR did not recognize Schengen visa in passport of countries of Western Balkans as transit visa for SR (Slovenia and the other three countries did so already long time ago).

accession and reformed processes. A great influence on development of relations is exerted through study trips, training programs and seminars organized in Slovakia by Slovak NGOs. Such events provide a new perspective because they allow getting to know the development which Slovakia went through and change of priorities in different areas.¹² These organizations, thanks to their knowledge of the environment and everyday problems as well as to contacts and practical experience of working in the field gained quite a successful position in the sphere of public diplomacy, as well, when taking part in forming of policies not only in the sphere of program focus of the ODA, but also trying to transfer their points of view to official diplomatic relations in the region.

The Slovak international *think-tanks* and organizations together with the MFA SR tried to join in the discussion about the future of the region also by organizing a conference about the future of the Western Balkans region on the ground of the Ministry.¹³ The conference brought a number of foreign experts on the region to Bratislava, as well as high-profile local politicians. However, when organizing this event or inviting advisors for Kosovo for the Serbian president and Prime Minister who explained the Serbian position in the process of defining the status of Kosovo to the expert public, Slovakia, again, failed to use the chance to allow speakers from the region who would present civic rather than nationalist positions. However, prevailing of the civic principle seems to be the main road to overcoming the heritage of the recent past. This should be the task in the coming period not only for Slovakia but also for all its subjects which, each in its own way and within its own possibilities, actively try to perform in the countries of the Western Balkans – the support of democratic and civic forces in Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo and within the whole region. It must be understood that only when the future of the Western Balkans countries is in a larger extent set by people who did not take any part in the atrocities of the 1990s, can the EU be open for these countries. When cooperating with individual forces in the region, one should realize that not only direct committers of crimes but also ideological leaders and politicians are responsible for the war crimes, many of whom still hold important public positions in the region even today. When looking for partners for systematic cooperation, the Slovak subjects should focus on the constructive rather than destructive partners, which means avoiding cooperation with people who are the cause of the problems. Democratic

¹² Research Center of Slovak Foreign Policy Association organizes study trips for young experts from Serbia; Civic Eye organizes educational trainings for observers in Montenegro; civic association People in Peril organized several trainings, study trips, conferences and seminars in Slovakia in which more than 60 journalists, NGO employees and young leaders took part.

¹³ International conference Assessing Developments in Western Balkans: Problems of Today, Ideas for the Future. 20. – 21. May 2005, Bratislava, organized by RC SFPA in cooperation with MFA SR, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Institute of Security Studies EU in Paris and German Marshall Fund of the US.

and civic voices should be directly supported in their countries, but there should also be created forums where they could defend their positions towards overcoming the heritage of the past also behind the borders of the given countries and to present them as an alternative in comparison to nationalist policies. This could be an important signal for the citizens of these countries as an alternative which has a future and the support of the democratic world.

Slovakia and its Potential

Slovakia should realize that the European perspective should be materialized and given a tangible form which would enable progressive elements in individual countries to gain support for essential changes in the wider public. The experience of the whole region of performance of the international community or of other , so to say, donor communities proved that qualitative changes will not happen when initiated from outside, i.e. if they remain so to speak *donor-driven*, dictated to and outlined from outside by the international community. Only if the citizens of the given countries take these changes for their own, will they become a driving force. As long as Slovakia believes that it understands the region better than its Western partners in the EU, it should prevent the collective mistakes of the international community and it should consistently address the problems that the peoples in the countries really face. However, this effort has not yet been materialized and the principles transferred to all levels and by all accessible means. Our performance in the region still has not reached the full and well-founded capacity which Slovakia has the potential as well as the duty to reach.

Although there are voices heard in Slovakia that want to focus their attention only on selected countries,¹⁴ the challenges open in the whole region, the linking of processes in individual countries and, at the same time, the voices of the partners in other countries are evidence that there is space for Slovakia for a full-fledged performance in the Western Balkans. Parallel activities in the region mean multiplication of forces rather than their splitting. On other hand, experience has shown that it is the different development in the countries as well as the individual approach of the EU to their individual progress paramount to the regional development (stabilization and association agreement is signed with each country separately based on the progress of country) that opens space for detailed analysis of the possibilities for Slovak performance in each country separately as it could improve more addressed choice of means and tools depending on local priorities and move our performance to another level (e.g. we could define relations with all countries in a separate treaty similar to the case of

¹⁴ Magda Vášáryová in conference *Priorities and Instruments of Foreign Policy of SR*, 4 April 2006, RC SFPF and *Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung*.

Serbia). Defining a detailed strategy for each country individually could help a situation where full utilization of our capacities in the region could focus on substantial problems and the region of the Western Balkans would remain a priority as a part of consistent support of integration of the region into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

The European values are explicitly the uniting element of the EU foreign policy, which is why spreading of these values should be reflected in bilateral policies of the EU member states so that their implication could serve as a uniting element of the bilateral performance of Slovakia in the region of the Western Balkans. Although consistent requiring of these values can, in the short term, mean deterioration of the relations with some of the countries or with a part of their societies, from the long-term perspective, this principle creates space for real democratisation of the Western Balkan states. The example of handing out general Ante Gotovina to the Hague also confirms the principle of conditionality as a catalyst of the processes where this principle is obeyed. Last but not least, SR should play an active role when influencing the EU from inside and to look for partners from new member states to create constructive pressure on redefining and accelerating the integration process.

The independence of Montenegro opened another field where Slovakia can use its experience from the past. Unlike the majority of the European countries, Slovakia can understand what it means to find itself in the position of an unwanted child and how long it takes until the others generally begin to accept the full value and right for a confident existence of each new state, as can similarly be applied to Kosovo after gaining independence. Therefore, it is essential to use our potential at the bilateral as well as multilateral level and try to support viability of Montenegro and prove its place within the EU. Consistent support of this country praises its establishment as an example of conflict-solving.

Regarding the intensity of relations of the SR institutions both at the state and the local level with NGOs, Slovakia could serve as a catalyst of public diplomacy in the Western Balkan countries (e.g. National Convention). Contacts in other parts of the regions prove demand for providing the Slovak *know-how* from the integration process and from accepting the reforms and space for support of local *grass-root* initiatives based on real needs and problems of the inhabitants.

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Slovakia's Foreign Policy Tools

Peter Hulényi

Assistance under the Brand Slovak Aid

Development assistance of the Slovak Republic has been receiving yet more and more attention of expert circles, media and broad public. The question is whether it is caused by the results in this field or by the generally favorable conditions and external circumstances. The answer is partially both.

In 2005, Slovak ODA already recorded measurable results. The first projects starting in 2004 under the brand *Slovak Aid* were brought to an end and new ones started. Thus, the number of projects financed by the Slovak Republic exceeded 100. The development projects have drawn the attention of broader sphere of businesses, non-governmental as well as governmental institutions. Moreover, the projects draw more attention of the media, as well.

On the other hand, Slovak development assistance became more popular due to the circumstances not related to the quantitative increase in Slovak development activities. The year of 2005 became “famous” for the amount of natural disasters such as the tsunami in Southeast Asia, famine in Africa or the earthquake in Pakistan. The Slovak public responded to the disasters and tragedies very sensitively and unprecedently thanks to the non-governmental sector, media and approach of the neighboring countries. The record amount of financial resources collected for the countries suffering from the tsunami indicated the shift to openness, empathy and sensitivity to problems exceeding the territory of Slovakia.

In addition, the new situation in the Slovak foreign policy after our accession to Euro-Atlantic structures played its role in making the Slovak development assistance more visible. Fulfilling the main integration goals opened the space for topics not very often discussed in the previous years. Development assistance proved to be a politically and practically smooth agenda. Furthermore, unlike foreign policy issues,

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the development assistance is more autonomous in terms of the EU membership and, thus, more flexible.

Finally, as for the Slovak ODA development in 2005, the preparation for the UN Security Council membership and synergic effect it caused concerning the development activities of Slovakia cannot be avoided, either. The majority of topics in UN SC deal with Africa and speaking about Africa, one has to speak about the development assistance. Logically, the Slovak membership in UN SC was very closely connected with the topic of development assistance

All in all, combination of the effort and favorable conditions brought the impulse, space and reputation for Slovak development activities. Therefore, let us have a look at the 2005 success of the Slovak ODA in more detail and, instead of talking about the failures, let us talk about the challenges *Slovak Aid* will face in 2006.

If the Success was Evaluated by the Amount of Money

The amount of money poses the easiest measurable indicator of the developed countries' success in development assistance. Hence, every donor's evaluation begins (and, unfortunately, ends) with the evaluation of the statistical indicators. If we take into account this simplified view, we can certainly say that the year 2005 was extremely successful as far as the development assistance is concerned. As a matter of fact, the amount of Slovakia's development assistance doubled in absolute numbers in comparison with 2004 and reached the amount of 1.7 billion Slovak crowns (for more details see Table 1). Comparing to the 2002 data (257 millions Slovak crowns), the growth increased sevenfold in last three years. The relative ODA indicators, i.e. ODA in percent of GDP, increased dramatically, as well.

In 2005, the ODA reached the 0.12% posing the quintuple increase in comparison to 2002 (0.02%), the fast GDP growth in the recent years notwithstanding. These results were also appreciated in Brussels (EU), New York (UN) as well as in Paris (OECD).

However, if analyzed in more detail, one can see the extreme growth as more realistic. Almost half of the amount (800 millions) poses the obligatory contribution to the EU budget and other international organizations. Moreover, Slovakia cancelled the debt of Sudan and other developing countries, which contributed to the dramatic growth, as well. In 2005, within the framework of the ODA Slovakia cancelled the debts in the total of approx. 500 million, which is almost one third of the overall assistance. On the other hand, for bilateral projects Slovakia earmarked only 160 million, i.e. less than one tenth of the overall 2005 ODA. Yet, the bilateral projects are the direct tool of the Slovak foreign policy as they use the Slovak *know-how* and experience, make Slovakia well-known, deepen the relations of Slovakia with the

Table 1: *Financing of the Slovak Development Assistance since 2002*

Year	ODA Amount	GDP %
2002	257 mil. SKK	0,024
2003	550 mil. SKK	0,046
2004	975 mil. SKK	0,072
2005	1,739 mil. SKK	0,12
target year 2010	3,200 mil. SKK	0,17
target year 2015	7,800 mil. SKK	0,33

Source: Štatistická správa slovenskej oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci, April 2006. (Statistical Report on Slovak ODA)

developing countries and effectively assist the Slovak subjects to start their activities in the developing world. Therefore, it would be logical gradually to increase the share of bilateral assistance in the overall ODA, as standard donors do. The matter is, if Slovakia has adequate implementation capacities, i.e. if the Slovak non-governmental organizations, businesses and state institutions are capable of realizing more and significantly bigger projects in the developing world.

The financial matter of the Slovak ODA cannot be concluded without the view on Slovakia's prospects and resources to fulfill the international commitments in the coming years. In June 2005, the European Council decided that the EU member states should attempt to reach the GDP share of 0.17% by 2010 or 0.33% by 2015 respectively. The increase in relative indicators would pose the absolute numbers increase to approximately 3,5 billion Slovak crowns or 7,8 billion respectively (the high increase in absolute numbers is due to the expected annual 5% GDP growth). Is such an increase realistic? The possibilities to forgive the debts are almost gone. Moreover, Slovakia will be committed between 2006 and 2008 to contribute 300 million per annum to the *European Development Fund* (EDF). Thus, the growth of the Slovak ODA amount will depend on the abilities of the Slovak Government and Ministry of Finance. Due to the difficult period of the fulfillment of the convergence criteria it does not seem like the best prospect.

From CIDA to ADA

In 2005, the most progressive field of Slovak ODA was the cooperation with traditional donors. Even though its influence on improvement of the established mechanism is

not always visible and appreciated, it is certainly irreplaceable. The donors' activities coordination poses the important assumption for successful work in developing countries. Concerning the limited financial and human resources as well as institutional deficits of Slovakia, this argument is even stronger. Three donors played an important role in 2005 – *Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)*, *United Nations Development Program (UNDP)* and *European Commission (EC)*.

The particular field progressing especially thanks to CIDA is the implementation of the common projects in the developing countries, i.e. trilateral cooperation. If this form of cooperation works properly, mechanisms lucrative for both donors will be created. While Slovakia possesses a unique comparative advantage stemming from the complicated transition process, it lacks the sophisticated mechanism of development assistance, which normally evolves throughout decades. The mechanism can be provided by an experienced donor. Since the latter half of the last century, *Canadian International Development Agency* has been working in tens of developing countries. More than one thousand employees work for the agency in Ottawa headquarters as well as in developing countries. It also cooperates with hundreds of consultants. Hence, the merger of the Slovak knowledge potential and development experience of the CIDA, the unique linkage was established being profitable not only for developing country, but for donors, as well.

Moreover, the involvement of CIDA and UNDP within the whole project cycle also increased the credibility of the selection as well as implementation process. Personal participation of experienced experts in the sessions of steering committee guaranteed objectivity and transparency. As for the control coordination and on-the-spot project evaluation, one cannot omit formation of common monitoring missions in Mongolia and Serbia. Trust of CIDA in the mechanism of the Slovak development assistance is important, as well. It is confirmed by the will of the Canadian partner to co-finance the Slovak project. The statistics on Canadian financial resources allocation among the eight new EU member states speaks for itself. Notwithstanding the fact that the amount was set indicatively, CIDA makes regular changes according to the receiving abilities. As for this view, the program for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR seems promising. Out of 3.5 mil. USD, Slovakia received more than 2.3. mil. and out of 53 trilateral projects as many as 31 projects are implemented via Slovak subjects (more details in Table 2).

In 2005, the group of Slovak development assistance's partners was joined by Austria. MFA SR concluded negotiations with the Austrian development agency (ADA) and signed a memorandum on cooperation. Based on the memorandum, Austria allocated 1.5 million Euros for trilateral activities. In 2006, the first Slovak-Austrian development projects should begin focusing on Serbia, Kenya and Mozambique. Such cooperation is also unique, for it is the first institutionalized cooperation in the field of development assistance between the old and new EU member states. However, Slovakia has not rejected the potential cooperation with other donors. Slovakia will continue in *ad hoc* development activities in cooperation with other EU and OECD

Table 2: *Scheme of Trilateral Projects financed by CIDA*

Countries receiving resources from Canadian program ODACE	Allocated Financial Resources in Canadian Dollars	Number of Trilateral Projects
Czech Republic	438 470	9
Estonia	0	0
Hungary	421 050	8
Latvia	87 526	3
Lithuania	107 350	2
Poland	0	0
Slovakia	2 379 480	31
Total	3 433 876	53

Source: CIDA Statistical Report, 1 April 2006.

member states. For example, Slovakia is interested in using the assistance of the Netherlands in preparing the development program for Kenya in November 2005.

The flexible and pragmatic approach of Slovakia in the field of trilateral cooperation is highly appreciated within the donors' community and showed as the example worth following by other new EU member states.

Vox populi...

The third field of development assistance characterized by the visible progress in 2005 is the development of education and public awareness. Even though the amount of financial resources used for the above-mentioned field did not reach the amount NGOs expected, Slovakia managed to make crucial steps necessary for the coming years. Three rounds of calls for proposals were announced and 21 projects received the resources. Also thanks to the cooperation with the Government of the Netherlands (via *North – South Center*), Slovakia started to perform more activities focused on work with the target group and the general public, as well. Pilot NGOs projects with the selected schools pointed out the sense and importance of presenting this topic at every level of education. At the same time, the projects confirmed that the field of development in education requires the system approach which the Ministry of Education should be responsible for. Allocation of financial resources in the budget of the Ministry

of Education as well as the interest of the resort to start the preparations of teachers and textbooks in cooperation with the NGOs are considered to be positive steps. Development education also attracted the attention of several universities. The project of the Faculty of International Relations at the University of Economics in Bratislava should, for the first time, result in complex long-term teaching of the subject development assistance at a Slovak university.

The work with the media and MPs was fruitful, as well. The news coverage on development assistance was improved. Moreover, there are more journalists in both printed and electronic media covering this issue on a regular basis. Communication with the National Council's Committees as well as with the individual MPs was also intensified. As a result, the mostly positive approach of Slovak MPs towards the development assistance was evident. Perhaps the most convincing evidence was the National Council's recommendation to the Slovak Government in December 2005 to "reassess the possibilities of the state budget and increase the budget item for ODA". Such a clear position of the parliament is very rare even in the countries with a long donor tradition.

As for the public, the first representative public poll was carried out in May 2005 by *the Institute for Public Affairs* and *Focus* agency using a sample of 1,254 respondents older than 18 years. The results are more favorable than generally expected. For example, it proved that the majority of population knows that Slovakia provides development assistance and they consider it right. 83% perceive development assistance positively. Amongst other reasons, they mentioned the sense of moral responsibility. According to 77%, Slovakia should assist more to the poor countries of Africa and 66% would like to see Slovakia assisting to Asia. Such results are obviously encouraging as it is impossible to improve Slovak development assistance as well as increase the resources without the general support.

Therefore, the field of development education and public awareness should receive more resources. In 2005, MFA SR with the cooperation of NGOs made an agreement with the European Commission to announce the special round for development education projects in the new EU member countries. The Commission allocated 10 million Euros, i.e. 1 million Euros per country. Taking into the account the level and preparedness of the NGO sector in Slovakia, it is assumed that Slovakia could gain more.

Increase in Project Activities

Bilateral projects are considered the most visible part of Slovakia's development assistance system. Those "photogenic" ones (e.g. construction of the schools, hospitals or wells) attracted the attention of the media and thus formed public opinion on

Slovak Aid. The year of 2005 can also be characterized by extensive increase in activities. While during the first projects the Steering Committees approved in January 2004, at the end of 2005, more than 100 projects were approved. The two-year experience of implementation and evaluation of the first activities brought information based on which the selection and implementation mechanisms should be gradually revised. It also showed that the territorial and sector priorities of the Slovak development assistance are too wide considering the limited financial resources. Thus, the activities' dispersion worked against the synergic effect. The projects resulting in the studies and analyses of the current status were not regarded as useful, either, as most of the results could not be used in the real life. Announcing the tenders on particular and specific activities agreed with the developing country in advance proved to be very sensible and effective. Vice versa, the general grant rounds open the space for activities not necessarily of the recipient country's priority.

In 2005, the highlight in the field of implementation was financing of the first humanitarian activities of the Slovak NGOs. Projects in Southeast Asia after the tsunami and in Pakistan after the destructive earthquake confirmed the potential and capability of the NGO sector to respond to humanitarian issues in the world quickly and flexibly.

In 2006, MFA SR will attempt to clarify sector and territorial priorities after the evaluation of the interest of the Slovak subjects, their success and efficiency of their activities. Hence, in 2006, the financial resources will be allocated to the projects in Serbia, Montenegro, Kenya, Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and Belarus. For these countries, the sectoral priorities will be more specific, as well. These steps should lead to more efficient bilateral assistance of Slovakia.

By extending the Slovak development assistance in 2005, the requirements on its implementation were increased, as well. Slovakia faces new tasks and needs in the field of institutionalization, legislative framework and human resources (for more details see Table 3.). The question how Slovakia will deal with the above-mentioned challenges will be answered in 2006.

Table 3: *Review of the Slovak Development Assistance Priorities for 2006*

1.	Take part in the formulation and implementation of development policy principles, using the Slovak Republic's non-permanent membership of Security Council and specialized agencies of the UN.
2.	Continue effectively to link Slovak bilateral assistance with development activities at the multilateral level.
3.	Reflect the European development strategy in the Slovak bilateral ODA.
4.	Continue supporting the Slovak entities that submit their projects under EC grant schemes and develop an instrument for their co-financing from Slovak ODA.
5.	Launch joint development projects with Austrian ADA agency.
6.	Make creative use of opportunities for <i>ad hoc</i> co-operation with other Member States of the EU and the OECD, and with multilateral donors.
7.	Formulate the Slovak development strategy for Africa based on the previously acquired experience and on EU Strategy for Africa.
8.	Take active part in the 2006 programming of financial means from the 10th EDF, the contributors to which will also include the Slovak Republic.
9.	Strive to increase the amount of Slovak ODA in conformity with the goals approved by the European Council in June 2005.
10.	To continue, in co-operation with the Ministry of Finance of the SR, gradually to increase the share of bilateral assistance carried out in the form of projects of Slovak entities in the overall assistance.
11.	Create conditions for setting up an independent development agency that will administer bilateral projects of Slovak development assistance.
12.	Continue drafting a law on ODA that will comprise provisions relating to particular and specific activities connected with Slovak development assistance abroad.
13.	Consistently address development education issues (mainly in mutual cooperation between the MFA SR, the ME SR and non-governmental organizations).
14.	Intensify the efforts at ensuring – through the ODA Coordination Committee – the coherence between development policy and other State policies.
15.	Take a more consistent approach to ODA reporting by individual sectors.
16.	Harmonize the activities and mechanisms of humanitarian aid and official development assistance with a view to ensuring a prompt, flexible and efficient humanitarian system. Define new procedures and competencies within the framework of the Mechanism of Slovak Humanitarian aid.
17.	Enhance the participation of Slovak entities in development projects also through the use of financial means other than those of the State budget.

Source: *National Official Development Assistance Program for 2006, MFA SR, April 2006.*

Tomáš Taraba

SARIO as a Subject to the Foreign Economic Policy of SR

The importance of the foreign economic policy of state grows with the importance assigned to the direct foreign investments (DFI) within it. Decreasing of the capital under-dimension within transforming economies significantly is realized mainly through the influx of the DFI, which is why the primary aim of the foreign economic policy of market economies is based on creation of an environment which is in favor of the investments and support of influx of the DFI to the economy. A country which does not assign sufficient importance to such investments usually does not have an outstanding foreign economic policy. An undeniably positive correlation between the influx of the DFI and a growth of production of gross domestic fixed capital as a precondition for stable and sustainable economic growth contributed to the situation when also the countries remarkable for their relation to the DFI as well as to the isolation tendencies in the 1990s left the given path. Together with Bulgaria and Romania, Slovakia is definitely one of them. A membership of the country in the World Trade Organization, in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, NATO and, primarily, in the European Union is the most basic precondition for competitiveness of Slovakia in the “struggle” for the DFI with neighboring countries. A cost structure of the production, level of wages, the infrastructure equipment, the qualification level of inhabitants, sufficient offer of completed industrial parks, an administratively flexible policy of providing the investors with individual state assistance and pro-investment macro-economic environment of the country belong to the main objective criteria positively affecting localization decisions of the investors about investments in the country and they can

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also be considered to be important determinants of execution of a successful pro-investment policy.

Similarly to the economically developed countries, in transforming countries of central and Eastern Europe, specialized government agencies were also established in order to deal with administration of the investment projects with the purpose to execute their realization in the given country. The government agencies differ in the individual countries in their positions within the institutional structure as well as in different levels of support. In our neighboring countries, mainly in the Czech Republic, we can generally see a trend towards strengthening the competencies and centralization of negotiations with investors within the framework of the *CzechInvest agency*.

The logical result of this trend is the fact that investment agencies are becoming an important tool of the state foreign economic policy. Among the most important pro-investment agencies in the institutional system of the Slovak Republic are the *Slovak Agency for Tourism (SACR)*, *National Agency for Development of Small and Medium Enterprises (NADSME)* and the *Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO)*, which have existed as subsidy organizations functionally subordinated to the Ministry of Economy of the SR. A subject of the activity of SARIO as an agency primarily responsible for leading negotiations with investors is highly diversified. Together with the already mentioned administration of projects, SARIO activities also include promotion of the Slovak business and investment environment in the world, organization of export-supporting activities, administration of programs of co-financing by the government of SR and the European Commission in sector operation program industry and services 1.2. and 1.5., providing consultation services in the area of acquiring investment stimuli, founding industrial parks and elaborating expert opinions on their projects. Based on the given description, it is possible to confront the formal expectations that SARIO should meet and the real availability of resources that this agency has at hand to reach its objectives. The recently executed comparison of the number and the volume of the investment projects annually carried out by SARIO and by the Czech agency *CzechInvest* legitimately raises questions regarding the success of the foreign economic policy of Slovakia in relation to the DFI influx.

Year 2005 – Change of Investments' Type

In the 2005 activity report, SARIO quoted realization of 48 investment projects in the total estimated amount of 692.4 million Euros with the estimated 7,219 working positions created with the possible increase to as many as 9,000. The released numbers initiated a sharp discussion in the media about the success of Slovakia in attracting foreign investors as they contrast predominantly with the data released for the year

2004. This, according to SARIO, constitutes the highest comparative basement mainly because of the investment of *KIA* and *Hyundai Mobis companies*. In the total number of 47 projects, in 2004, there were investments generated in the estimated amount of 1, 699 mil. Euros and 11, 778 newly created working places. A more detailed look at the structure of the acquired projects reveals the predominant position of investments from the car industry. Anchoring the car industry within sector structure of the Slovak economy was a natural step to take regarding the strong mechanical engineering tradition reaching back to the beginning of the industrialization of Slovakia as a country after the Second World War. From this aspect, SARIO correctly defined the car industry as a segment in which Slovakia compared to its neighboring countries provides the most relevant advantages mainly from point of view of availability of the qualified sector labor force and a relatively well-developed network of secondary technical schools and technical universities, considering the quality of the mechanical engineering faculties. It is necessary to emphasize that the growing importance of electronics for the car industry also represents a big future opportunity for gradual development of this industrial sector in Slovakia. A decision of the investors about localization of big investment projects largely depends on the general absorption ability of the country when it comes to localization of numerous networks of sub-suppliers in the same geographical space.¹ It is natural that one of the main preconditions for acquiring strategic investment project producing thousands of working places is the availability of qualified labor force in sufficient quantities with an acceptable cost structure. Regarding the low population density of Slovakia, meeting this criterion is often the most important disadvantage in comparison with the neighboring countries.

The traditionally high concentration of mechanical engineering professions, the developed metallurgy and rubber – producing industry as affiliated sectors of the car industry managed to minimize the demographic disadvantages of Slovakia and significantly helped to acquire big investment projects within the car industry concerns in the countries of central and Eastern Europe.

The acquisition of major car investors to given localities, often stigmatized by the industry conversion, was seen by SARIO as ideal for directing the investors to the areas that meet all the criteria for their successful implementation. However, what could become problematic is the extent of concentration of the investments influx into the western part of country, which is a logical consequence of the existing free capacities in this area with a developed industry and infrastructure from the late 1990s.

¹ When assessing the absorption ability, we take into consideration mainly the level of environmental disruption when establishing the sub-supplier network linked to the final production in a geographically acceptable distance, and this from the point of view of keeping comparative advantages of region and local labour market in extent that significantly does not disturb conditions for what final producer decided to invest in given region.

From the central-European point of view, the year 2005 can be characterized as the year indicating more significant changes in the character of the investment intentions, mainly when it comes to the growth of the investment activity of the electro-technical concerns. Slovakia preparedness to execute big investment projects producing thousands of highly qualified working places in the electro-technical sector is very questionable at the moment. The recent decision of the corporation *LG Phillips* and *Sharp* to invest tens of billions SKK in founding companies for production of LCD panels in Poland is an example of unique investment projects with the added value of producing thousands of highly qualified working places, which has an important secondary impact on the economic growth, the network of sub-suppliers and on the development of science and research. The immense importance of this investment project is emphasized by the fact that, at the moment, none of the EU countries has a similar production, which means that in the future we can expect the whole EU market to be supplied from central Europe.

Despite the fact that in the struggle for the LG Phillips investment, Slovakia was until the last moment considered to be a serious candidate for its acquisition, its disqualification in last round could be ascribed to several objective factors that undoubtedly indicate lack of preparedness. The rigid educational system, for a long time producing an unsuitable educational structure of inhabitants, is the cause of this situation where not only does the country lack university graduate experts but where the high school education is insufficient in terms of technically flexible qualified staff, as well. The fact that Slovakia shows one of the lowest rates of unemployment within the category of university graduates can, on the one hand, bring the risk of excessive growth of real wages among the qualified working force along with the decreasing advantage compared to the surrounding countries and, on the other hand, it increases the risk of structural unemployment. There are certain demands from strategic investors in the electro-technical industry, which are decisive for localization of the investment. One of them is the localization in a geographic area that, demographically, provides a minimum of half a million economically active inhabitants in the radius of 30 km. They also demand a presence of a big technical university, a complex infrastructure and a large industrial park of the minimum size of 100 hectares classified as a free customs area fully technically equipped with settled ownership relations. At the moment, Slovakia is not able to meet these conditions compared to the surrounding countries and one should clearly emphasize that mainly the least developed parts of Slovakia can not offer suitable conditions to potential investors. From this point of view, the higher territorial units of Prešov and Banská Bystrica belong to the least prepared areas. The fact in the last year, SR lost the battle for investments in the electro-technical industry in the total estimated amount of approx. 50 billion SKK is a warning that there are principal changes in the overall adaptability necessary for the country. In 2006, SARIO would like to attract at least one strategic project from the electro-technical industry, which is a basic precondition

for establishing a suitable electro-technical sub-supplying network in the country as well as an occasion to move Slovakia from construction to a more sophisticated production, mainly to research and development. Adjustment of the educational system to the real demands of the business sector in the spirit of the national project Minerva is, along with other factors, a fundamental demand if we wish to catch the investment wave in the IT sector with the direct impact on decreasing the economic fall in individual regions of the country and enforcing diversification of national economy.

The task of SARIO is not only to represent or act for Slovakia in relation to investors but also to articulate interests of the investors in relation to the central institutions of the state administration, local governments and professional organizations so that it should point out the problem areas which hinder improvement of the investment environment or the investment projects administration.

With this in mind, the agency has recently initiated a series of meetings with the representatives of local governments in the attempt to identify their development potential from the point of view of the DFI influx and to encourage dialogue about preparedness of the industrial zones and parks.

With the aim to improve transparency and the equality of offer of real estates, the first phase of the database is open to public by which SARIO would like to minimize subjective decision-making about real estates offer and, thus, to give the investor a chance to make an independent review of the most suitable *green field* or *brown field* objects offered following given criteria. SARIO has also initiated first negotiations with the *Association of Electro-Technical Industry SR*, aiming at establishing introductory educational centers in different regions of Slovakia and to integrate the high school apprentice network into the generally advantageous cooperation with businesses, which should result in harmonization of the demand and offer in education so that it would consider trends of market development from the point of view of investments influx.

The Strategy of the Investments Influx and the Position of the Regions

When analyzing the DFI influx, a beginning and repeated correlation between the socio-economic type of the region and the character of investment influx is evident. While the reduced absorption ability of the Western part of country makes it more difficult to obtain big investment projects with higher added value, the economically less developed parts of country are compared mainly to countries like Romania, Bulgaria or the Ukraine despite their more positive cost structure. Naturally, Slovakia is in a disadvantaged position given such a comparison.

The negative consequences of the late attempts at attracting the DFI process in the late 1990s is the reason why Slovakia, with the lasting dramatic socio-economic regional discrepancies, is often forced to acquire projects, which are already in the phase of de-localization in the surrounding countries because of their low added value. There are several regions in Slovakia where the access is very difficult due to sufficient infrastructure while, at the same time, the long-term unemployment rate is rather high and the education level of the inhabitants low. Despite the significantly lower average wages compared to the national average of the EU accessing countries, development of these regions still seems to be costly from the point of view of logistics and salaries. SR is trying to minimize the negative cost profile of these regions through providing state assistance. By means of example, while state support of such projects as the production of cable bundles is unimaginable for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, often mainly for social reasons, supports similar pro-active types of projects despite the fact that their maintenance is unrealistic from the mid-term perspective. In any case, it is necessary to declare that implementation of such projects is more financially demanding for the country compared to 10 years ago while the positive social effects will show later with a lower intensity. This fact demonstrates the fundamentally different socio-economic environment in which SARIO has to operate in comparison to *CzechInvest*. This does not allow SARIO to focus its activity primarily on acquiring projects with higher added value in the sector of biotechnologies, nanotechnologies and the *high-tech* sector.

From the point of view of the DFI attraction, combination of small and medium-sized investment projects is one Slovakia's strengths. Lately, SARIO agency has been trying to concentrate particularly on attraction of investment projects within the service sector where utilization of young graduates from schools with different majors with a good command of foreign languages is higher. These projects are predominantly from the area of providing tax assistance, sale and technical support as well as founding IT and software engineering centers. This strategy helps to develop the service sector, to bring investments with a higher added value and with positive secondary externalities to regions with lack of sufficient infrastructure. The investment of the German *T-Systems* producing hundreds of highly qualified working places with the possibility of their continuous increase in Kosice serves as an example. If the cooperation program between the Technical University in Košice, the high school apprentice network and the business community is implemented successfully, the geographic area between Košice and Prešov will in high probability produce more than 3, 000 working places in the next 5 years and Eastern Slovakia will become an important central European center for providing IT services. A potential for development in the long run is evident, along with the capital city, in the towns of Žilina, Trenčín and Trnava, as well.

New Rules and the Administration of Projects

SARIO has adopted the implementation of rules for providing individual state assistance to investors in the way specified in the resolution of the SR government no. 855. SARIO agency sees these implementation rules as a step in the positive direction. Although the primary aim of these rules was to get over the period until a new act on providing the investment stimuli is elaborated, their acceptance was a logical consequence of the uncoordinated process of negotiations with investors, SARIO and the Ministry of Economy SR as well as the problems linked with the process of approving state assistance by the Slovak government. The main purpose of these rules is to provide a transparent, coordinated mechanism for setting the limits to the possible amount of state assistance without unnecessary delays. The aim of the system is not only to provide the investor with more certainty regarding the amount and nature of the state assistance but it also helps SARIO to have a clearer idea of the generally acceptable amount of state assistance from the point of view of demands on the state budget. The administration of state assistance constitutes another important difference between Slovakia and the Czech Republic. While the Czech Republic follows a state scheme for providing state assistance approved by the EU, Slovakia must apply to Brussels for an approval of each investment project individually. The factor of time, administrative complexity and the following uncertainty on the side of the investor in the long term put Slovakia into a disadvantaged position, which disqualifies the country when trying to acquire mainly medium-sized investment projects. The importance of rules is emphasized by the fact that passing a new act on providing the investment stimuli is being elaborated, but its approval is yet to be reached. The eminent interest of SARIO is based on the knowledge gained so far about application of rules and it is to point out the problems emerging during negotiations with investors and to try to change or adjust them in the near future so that an undisturbed realization of the investment projects could be guaranteed.

Within the process of negotiations about providing the investment stimuli, the implementation rules defined SARIO's role of coordinator or mediator, as SARIO is to suggest state assistance and to guarantee its approval by particular ministries. In case of approval, SARIO in cooperation with the investor prepares an investment contract and cooperates with the Ministry of Economy SR. The rules are there to set a schedule for each phase so that the process is smooth and not too time-consuming. Because of its short practice, SARIO does not have sufficient tools to be used in case individual ministries do not meet the deadlines or if the process is constantly delayed by requests for additional information, which are often beyond the framework demanded by the valid rules. The second area of problems that emerged together with the application of rules is linked to setting additional limits to the newly produced jobs, which is not established by the rules, either. We are meeting only maximum proportional limits of regional assistance based on including the country into one of

the three types of zones and according to the project type. At the same time, there is a defined method of calculating the contribution to individual forms of investment stimuli. Despite the regional assistance based on set methods and respecting the set limits, ministries come with their own additional limits when assessing projects, which causes investors to perceive the new process of setting state assistance not only as unpredictable, but also uncertain because the basic philosophy of accepted rules – minimum subjectivity, transparency and predictability – is disturbed.

As a result of this, SARIO will be expected to negotiate investment stimuli with investors on the individual basis, which will bring the system back to the state where it was before accepting the rules mainly because the set limits create too big a space for setting a real amount of stimuli. Therefore, the whole process may not be perceived as transparent by investors. On the one hand, the system predictability is demanded to re-evaluate the amount of current maximum limits and their increasing, and, on the other hand, it should guarantee their respecting in case of all projects that fulfill the given criteria although there is no legitimate claim for state assistance in Slovakia. If Slovakia wishes to make the state assistance administratively more flexible and competitive compared to the Czech Republic, it will have to approve of a scheme in Brussels similar to the one of the Czech Republic, which will practically mean the introduction of a legitimate claim for state assistance if the given scheme is applied.

The third important problem area concerns categorization of the so-called strategic investments. The newly approved rules gave SARIO the right to assess investment intentions individually and not to apply any amount or form of state assistance to a project provided the following conditions are fulfilled:

- the project will be realized in the green or yellow zone;
- the amount of investment costs will be minimum 10 billion SKK;
- in affiliation to the project, there will be a minimum of 1, 000 new working places created;

Taking into consideration the running negotiations of SARIO with several strategic investors, there is no doubt that investments, mainly in the electro-technical industry, are realized in separated phases, which, at the same time, decreases the probability that each individual investment phase would exceed 10 billion SKK. Insisting on simultaneous fulfilling of all three criteria practically means that Slovakia competing for projects with higher added value compared to its neighbors finds itself in a disadvantaged position, especially now when it has to refuse individual negotiations with the investor without the possibility of considering the importance of the investment for the national economy.

Regarding the issues explained, it is not necessary to place particular emphasis on the fact that SARIO can not push strategic investors with projects of higher added value into less developed zones if it is not an attractive solution from the point of view of the investor himself. Using this approach comes across as if it is forgotten that no investor makes their decisions about investments in individual zones in Slovakia but he considers the attractiveness of all alternatives from the central European

perspective. Unfortunately, the current legislation indicates that if the investor does not invest in zones of our social interest, he is automatically unwelcome regardless the character of the project. SARIO considers it sensible for SR to maintain the possibility of individual assessment of each strategic project and to introduce a mechanism that will enable to run individual negotiations with investors in case that the given ministries agree if:

- the amount of the investment expenses will be minimum 10 billion SKK or;
- in affiliation with the project there will be more than 1, 000 working places created;

This change would give the Slovak Republic a chance to negotiate individually also about projects which will produce more than 1, 000 working places although the investment will be in an amount smaller than 10 billion SKK, as is often the case in the electronics industry.

This will also make Slovakia more competitive in the struggle for investments in long-term projects and in separated independent phases, each of which will produce a different type of product, such as notebooks, desktops, servers etc.

To prevent automatic individual negotiations with investors who offer simple production, demanding physical labor, it is possible to set a mechanism based on which there will be a decision of economic ministers necessary to put an investor into a separate negotiation regime in the first place and only then will SARIO be allowed to lead negotiations within this negotiation regime. This approach will enable better selection among projects while considering deeper secondary importance of the projects for the Slovak economy and its implementation, which will also strengthen SARIO's strategy to re-orient the structure of the DFI influx into an area with a high added value as a precondition for long-term stable progress of Slovak economy.

Olga Gyárfášová

Public Opinion on Selected Foreign Policy Issues

While in 2004 Slovakia achieved its integration aims in terms of European Union and NATO membership, the year 2005 brought about new challenging tasks for both political elites and the general public to be accomplished, i.e. taking action as a member country by implementing the policy effectively.

The position of Slovakia was strengthened not only by its EU and NATO membership but also by a number of events such as the Bush-Putin summit held in February 2005 in Bratislava, an increased activity of Slovak diplomacy and NGOs in maintaining stability and developing democracy in other countries as well as Slovakia's becoming an elected member of UN Security Council, which contributed to the process of gaining a better position internationally.

Perception of Slovakia's International Position


What role does Slovakia play within the international environment in the eyes of its citizens? According to *Transatlantic trends (TT) 2005*¹ research, almost two thirds (64%) of Slovak citizens hold the opinion that active participation in the world's affairs is

¹ Research of the German Marshall Fund and its European partners was conducted in July 2005 in the USA, in nine EU countries (in Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Slovakia) as well as in Turkey. Further information and results are available on <http://www.transatlantictrends.org> and <http://www.ivo.sk>

positive from the point of view of the country's future. The findings show that 25% of Slovaks tend to prefer a rather passive approach towards international affairs. Comparing Slovakia with the average figure representing nine EU countries involved in the research (Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Slovakia), the proportion of proactively thinking people is lower. For instance, 89% of French, 84% of Portuguese and 83% of Spanish people expressed their preference for an active way of influencing international matters, which appears reasonable since a number of factors have impact on proactive citizens rate such as the size of a country, its role in the field of foreign affairs in the past and its consequent international ambitions.

However, the fact that the proportion of citizens preferring an active approach of Slovakia towards international affairs rose from 59% to 64% (graph 1) last year seems significant. This shift along with numerous changes indicated by other research² suggest that Slovak society, previously primarily focused on internal issues, is gradually becoming more open to the world and aware of what membership within international organization means and realizes its being a part of larger entities.

Graph 1: *In your opinion, is it better for the future of Slovakia to participate in international affairs actively or passively?*
(responds supporting active participation in %)



Note: EU 9 = average in 9 EU member countries included in the TT research (Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Slovakia).

Source: TT 2004 and 2005

The ratio of proactive attitudes to isolationist ones is not regularly distributed within the society – as expected, younger and more educated people having voted for coalition parties, mainly SDKÚ and ANO, have expressed their wish for an active role of the country.


² A certain increase in political confidence in the international context is suggested for instance in *Eurobarometer* findings from the spring and autumn 2004 (see Gyárfášová, Bútorová, Velšic, 2005, p. 35).

Opinions on the UN

The research shows that the idea of cooperation, proclaiming alliance and multilateralism principles is widely spread in Slovakia (*TT 2004 and 2005*). Such attitudes are reflected in a fairly positive perception of the UN, which has long been occupying the position of a trustworthy international institution.

According to TT 2005 research, 63% of Slovak citizens are in favor of the UN whereas only 22% feel the opposite. The remaining 13% were unable to express their view. Although the Slovak citizens feeling positively still have to follow some path to reach the EU 9 average, it is likely that in 2006-2007, when Slovakia acts as an elected UN member, the citizens' UN awareness and the institution's reputation will be enhanced in the eyes of the general public.

Graph 2: Views on the UN in EU9 and in Slovakia (responses indicating very + more favorable attitude)



Source: *TT 2004 and 2005*

EU Membership

Feelings of satisfaction and optimism prevail in relation to EU membership in Slovakia, with 79% respondents supporting it in November 2004 (Bútorová, Gyárfášová, Veľšic, 2004, p. 322). During the oncoming months, the support even grew to some extent, reaching 83% at the time of the first anniversary, which represents the highest level among the *Visegrad Four* (V4) countries³. At the same time, 73% viewed the EU accession as a correct step⁴.

³ "Názory obyvateľov V4 na členstvo v EÚ" (Public Opinion of V4 Countries on EU membership), *FOCUS*. The press release of 27 April 2005. <http://www.focus-research.sk>

⁴ The survey of MVK agency for SME daily from 17 March to 23 March. Quoted according to *SME*, 4 April 2005, p. 4.

Satisfaction with the EU membership depends on several circumstances. Above all, pessimistic scenarios painting dramatic increase in food, service prices, etc. have proved false.

Moreover, the 2004 macroeconomic figures demonstrated a slight improvement in comparison with the previous year. Slovakia achieved the fastest GDP growth among the V4 countries, the real income grew modestly, the inflation reached a low level and some consumer prices (e.g. food or clothing) even dropped slightly. Although this positive macroeconomic development was not influenced only by the EU membership and took place under conditions of striking regional and social disparities, the fact, together with other advantages of a non-economic character, contributed to a positive evaluation of the Union membership. This trend continued in the latter half of the year 2005. According to the *Eurobarometer* survey in the autumn of 2005, 62% of citizens were of the opinion that the EU membership proved advantageous for Slovakia, whereas merely 52% of people in EU25 expressed the same opinion (*Eurobarometer 64*, the autumn of 2005).

Expectations before and after the EU Accession

A more structured view on positive and negative expectations in the period before the EU accession and in the period of one year after the accession has been suggested by the findings of *FOCUS* agency, which show that the citizens' beliefs about four out of five most significant membership advantages were reinforced after a year of being an EU member (table 1). On the other hand, three out of five most overriding concerns were not fulfilled to the extent estimated in the pre-accession stage (table 2). For example, 48% of respondents expressed an opportunity to work abroad as an expected advantage in April 2004, while in May 2005 the figure reached 59%. Using cheap labor force in Slovakia was the reason to worry for 52 % of the people while a year later it was 46%. Only the concern about a possible rise in bureaucracy increased significantly.

Opinions on Some European Agenda Issues

Compared to the previous year, the Slovak political debate on European topics became more intensive. There were three vital issues of the European agenda – next EU accession process (predominantly the potential acceptance of Turkey); *EU Constitution* and the process of its ratification; at the end of year the budget prospects for 2007 – 2013 and the EU budget rules themselves.

Political parties were actively shaping their opinion in relation to Turkey's acceptance as well as the *EU Constitution* proposal. Mainly KDĽ held the disapproving view, which did not manage to derive solid political support. Slovakia supported the

Table 1: *What advantages for Slovakia stemming from the EU membership do you expect? (April 2004, in %)**What advantages does Slovakia gain being a member of EU? (May 2005, in %)*

	April 2004	May 2005	Trend
opportunity to work abroad	48	59	↑
opportunity to travel without passport and visa	40	46	↑
more opportunities for the youth	44	40	↓
foreign investors in Slovakia, more job opportunities	28	34	↑
opportunity to use the EU funds	20	24	↑
Slovakia's acceptance in both Europe and world	12	14	
increased competitiveness	9	10	
increased living standards	19	8	↓
domestic producers can export their production to the EU states' markets	13	8	↓
increasing of Slovakia's security	8	8	
strengthening the democracy	7	7	
harmonization of legislation with the EU	7	3	↓

Note: Respondents had a choice of three most essential advantages, and therefore the percentage calculation in the table exceeds 100%.

Source: FOCUS 2004 and 2005

opening stage of accession negotiations with Turkey; *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe* was approved on 11 May 2005 in the National Council by the required constitutional majority. 116 MPs were in favor of this, 27 expressed the opposite view, all of them KDH and KSS representatives exclusively.

EU Enlargement

The idea of further EU enlargement has a majority support in Slovakia. In the spring 2005, 67% of participants stated the opinion that the Union should have accepted more countries as new members (*Eurobarometer 64*).⁵ However, the public (and not

⁵ According to *Eurobarometer* from the spring 2005, Slovakia (after Slovenia and Poland) was the third country with the greatest public support of further EU enlargement – 73% of Slovak citizens were in favor of this idea (see Kuhn, 2005, p. 7)

Table 2: What disadvantages for Slovakia stemming from the EU membership do you expect? (April 2004, in %)

What disadvantages does Slovakia have as a member of EU? (May 2005, in %)

	April 2004	May 2005	Trend
cheap labor force in Slovakia	52	46	↓
brain drain	43	37	↓
decreased living standards	39	33	↓
our market will be overwhelmed with the products from the other EU countries	27	29	
decreasing of Slovakia's security	21	23	
more bureaucracy	15	23	↑
arrival of foreigners form other EU member states	24	17	↓
copying the Western life style	13	16	↑
We will have to uphold the EU laws, regulations and directives	10	16	↑
loss of some decision powers – loss of independence	15	15	
increased unemployment	9	12	↑
increased competitiveness	7	6	


Note: Respondents had a choice of three most important disadvantages; therefore the percentage calculation in the table exceeds 100%.

Source: FOCUS 2004 and 2005

only Slovak) distinguishes carefully between potential member countries. According to the *ÚVVM* research, Bulgaria and Rumania gained 50% support and 28% participants completely refused to back these countries that are due to join the Union on 1 January 2007. (*Názory verejnosti 2005*) Croatia emerges as a firm favorite of further enlargement; its acceptance to the EU would be supported by 79% of Slovak citizens, while the EU average support figure is 52% (Kuhn, 2005, p.8).

On the other hand, the public demonstrates rejection of the idea of Turkey being a possible EU member more and more vividly. As shown in the *Transatlantic trends* research, in 2005, the growth in disapproving and not strong opinion of Slovak citizens towards the Turkish EU membership was much more considerable than in other Union countries (graph 3). Such dynamics might stem from the fact that in Slovakia the debate about European prospects of Turkey took place rather late i.e. at the end of 2004, which was later than in most old member countries of EU15 where the issue

Graph 3: What is your opinion on Turkey's accession into the EU? (the development of Slovak public opinion – in %)



Source: TT 2005

was tackled in the campaign before the elections to the European parliament in June 2004. Similarly to other countries, ambivalent and not strong/vague attitudes tend to persist in Slovakia.

The findings of *ÚVVM* from September 2005 show that Turkey's EU membership receives support mainly from Slovak citizens with an academic background and those living in towns with the population of above 100 000. At the same time, though, survey participants with a university degree disagree rather strongly over the acceptance of Turkey into the Union. Indifference towards this issue is characteristic predominantly of the youngest and the oldest participants; people with primary education and the citizens of smaller villages. Such distribution of views demonstrates that opinions both for and against are more likely to occur in the environment where deeper interest in foreign affairs is expressed.

Opinions on EU Constitution

The *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe* has been another topic. The Slovak public opinion on this issue falls into the category of the European average. According to autumn *Eurobarometer* research results, the document enjoyed a 64% support of Slovak citizens in comparison with the average 63% within the whole EU. Yet the proportion of people in Slovakia responding vaguely was slightly higher (20% as opposed to 15% – *Eurobarometer 64*, autumn 2005).

The research shows that despite the failure of referenda held in France and Holland, the European public associates acceptance of *EU Constitution* with optimistic expectations. The majority of EU25 citizens assume that the Union would be more democratic, more effective, more transparent, stronger in the world, economically more competitive and more social provided that all EU states accepted the *EU Constitution*. The optimistic expectations of Slovaks exceed the European average (*Eurobarometer 64*). However, only a fifth of the EU population wishes to continue the ratification process of the existing document, while a new version is preferred by the majority⁶ (table 3).

Table 3: Views of EU citizens on the future of EU Constitution after its refusal in two referenda (in %)

	Slovakia	EU25
EU member states should continue ratification of the existing proposal	27	22
EU member states should agree upon the new EU Constitution proposal	52	49
EU Constitution should be abolished	10	13
I do not know	11	15

Source: *Eurobarometer 64*

The Slovak Public and the Trans-Atlantic Cooperation

NATO Membership

In the year when Slovakia became a full member of NATO, this step had majority but still not dominant support among the citizens. In April 2004, 52% of population were in favor of the alliance membership. Newer surveys of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic show that the group of alliance membership supporters did not extend dramatically during the first year of membership; the number of opponents dropped significantly though (fall from 39% in April 2004 to 29% in April 2005)⁷.


⁶ When interpreting presented findings, it is advisable to bear in mind the fact that factual knowledge of the document is rather poor (see Gyárfášová, Bútorová, Velšic, 2005, p. 29 – 30)

⁷ The presentation of K. Čukan at the seminar of the Ministry of Defense of the SR *Membership of the SR in NATO and Security Issues of Slovakia in the Mirror of the Public Opinion*, Bratislava, 19 May 2005

According to *TT 2005* research, more than a half of the Slovak public (52%) find alliance vital for the country's security, whereas 28% hold the opposite opinion and 21% do not have a strong opinion on this. The average in 9 investigated EU countries reaches 57% (graph 4). The proportion of people who consider the alliance crucial is larger in the European countries that have been a long-term NATO members (e.g. in Holland, Portugal and in Great Britain the figure reaches 66%). On the other hand, in Poland, which has been a NATO member since 1999, the rate of favorable responses reached only 48%.

Nevertheless, it is enough to say that older NATO countries have recently been undergoing the process of decrease in perceiving relevance of the alliance. Germany and Italy have shown the most evident fall (from 74% in 2002 to current 59% in Germany and a drop from 68% to 52% in Italy). Yet, the proportion of those who feel NATO is essential rose slightly last year in Slovakia (from 47% to 52%). However, mainly the number of negative responses went down considerably (from 37% to 28%).

Graph 4: *Do we need NATO for the security of our country or not? (the development of positive responses in %)*



Source: *TT 2004 and 2005*


In the summer 2005, Slovak membership in NATO enjoyed the broadest support among ANO, SDKÚ and SMK voters and the weakest among the opposition parties supporters such as KSS and LS-HZDS but also among the coalition of KDH fans. It is not a high proportion of sharp disagreement which is characteristic of KDH but vague attitudes that appear typical. Support of NATO membership tends to be greater in more educated and younger environments.

Opinions on the Role of the USA

In the range of European views on the global role of the USA and transatlantic cooperation Slovakia with its citizens' beliefs occupies a position of a more reserved nature (graph 5). A differentiated view of people on the role of the USA in the world on one hand and the policy of its current president on the other hand appears interesting. In an overwhelming number of countries the view on the president George W. Bush is considerably more critical than the opinion on the role of the USA worldwide. Therefore, we may claim that the borderline between anti-Americanism and anti-Bushism is very clearly drawn in the minds of the European public regardless the amount of criticism (graph 5).

The conclusions point out one interesting finding of the research, namely in Slovakia and Poland as only in these two post-communist countries included in the research this rule does not apply. In Poland, Bush's policy has been viewed even in a more positive way than the role of the USA, in Slovakia the views remain well balanced. Does it mean that a "new Europe" identifying USA and its president is generally used to perceive politics and countries via personalities representing them? Or is this somehow related to historical memory – while the citizens of Western countries also remember the America lead by the leaders more positively seen and thus are capable of dividing these phenomena, does the new Europe see America as being equivalent to the president? Seeking more satisfactory explanations may serve as a subject for

Graph 5: *Global leadership of the USA is desirable/undesirable (in %)*
Approving/disapproving of the foreign policy presented by the president G. Bush (in %)



Source: TT 2005

other research. For Slovakia, further development is interesting, as well. Although in 2004 the country apparently belonged (at the public level) to the part of Europe demonstrating a more critical attitude towards the USA and the president, in the year 2005 the attitudes changed in the direction of a more positive evaluation and moved closer to the average of the 9 examined EU countries. The rise in positive views contrasts strikingly with the stagnation in other Union countries. We could only speculate whether this move was stimulated by Bush's visit in Bratislava or by other factors, as well.

Opinions on the Development Assistance and on the Promoting Democracy Policy


Joining the OECD in 2000 and the EU in 2004, Slovakia became one of the states providing other countries with assistance aid. The research conducted by the *Institute of Public Affairs* (IPA) in June 2005⁸ showed that the public strongly supports such aid – 83% of participants expressed a favorable opinion. The findings of previous IPA research from September 2004 showed that 77% of the adult population considered providing other countries with humanitarian and assistance aid right, tally with June 2005 figures.

As shown in the Graph 6, people in Slovakia perceive the assistance aid prevailing in relation to emergency, hunger, poverty, diseases and suffering mainly within the group of children. The reason in favor of the assistance aid given most frequently is the 'help to those in need' (60%). More or less similar frequency may be observed within four reasons falling into another category; i.e. 'it is our moral duty' (34%), 'it is a prevention of hunger and diseases' (34%), 'it is help aiming at children in developing countries' (33%) and 'we are fighting against poverty this way' (29%). The Slovak public places profound importance on humanitarian aid.⁹

⁸ Opinion poll of the Slovak public on the subject of providing assistance aid was carried out by IPA in June 2005 as an assignment ordered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR. The survey was co-financed by the Canadian government agency CIDA.

⁹ The poll conducted in June 2005 by IPA focused also on the nature of elements casting doubt on the assistance aid and its beneficial and helpful character. As a response to an open question, the participants offered prevailing two groups of arguments: „Can we afford it?” and „Do the allocated sources reach the given goals?” (Gyárfášová, 2005a, 13)


Graph 6: Most Important Reasons Why Slovakia Should Provide Development Aid (multiple response, up to 3)



The *Transatlantic trends* research has been carried out on the subject of more specific aid studying to what extent promoting democracy in the world is supported by Europeans and Americans. According to its findings (graph 7), such political goal

enjoys a majority support among the public. However, it does not achieve the average of the examined nine EU countries: 63% people are in favor of this idea compared with 74% in EU9. Milder opinions are much more common in Slovakia (12% as opposed to 4%) while the proportion of those objecting the promotion of democracy seems only slightly higher than in EU9 (25% as opposed to 22%).¹⁰

Graph 7: Promoting democracy in the world as the goal of the EU policy (in %)




Source: *TT 2005*

Promoting democracy in the world receives the most generous support within the group of SDKÚ voters (77%) and the least enthusiastic among the KSS fans (58%). Discrepancies from the point of view of age and education are statistically irrelevant.

As far as concrete tools of such a policy are concerned, when promoting democracy the Slovak public prefers the possibility of using the so-called soft power: 56% of the participants approve of election monitoring together with the support of independent groups (for instance the Unions, human rights, non-governmental or religious organizations, etc.); 38% calls for economic sanctions and 36% prefers political sanctions. Only 19% of the respondents suggested using military force with the aim to depose

¹⁰ In the research of SME daily in the spring 2005, 73% of participants expressed the opinion that Slovakia should help in the process of promoting democracy abroad. The survey was made for Sme daily by the *Markant* agency in the form of phone calls within the group of 500 people. (*Sme*, 21 May 2005) Greater support in comparison with *TT 2005* results may be connected with a number of facts. *TT 2005* asked about EU policy aims and not Slovakia's objectives which might have induced weaker identification of participants with the individual steps of the EU policy. Furthermore, *Markant* raised the question in a more general way which might have made the identification easier.

Graph 8: Imagine that in some country there is an authoritative regime in power, political and religious freedom does not exist. Should Europe support democracy by using the following methods? (approving responses of participants in EU9 and in Slovakia in %)



Source: *TT 2005*

a totalitarian regime. The support given to all these concrete steps is under the EU9 average (Graph 8). The facts pose something of a paradox. Although almost two thirds of population identify themselves with the generally formulated political goal of supporting democracy in countries that are not free, approving of specific forms of accomplishing such objectives is rather rare. This is the consequence of lacking a sufficiently structured public debate on particular forms of promoting democracy in the world as it is unclear for the general public what the actual tools are like.

The lower support for individual steps in promoting democracy is predominantly related to the fact that in Slovakia, the country that used to be a subject of interference from the outside in its history a number of times, the culture of non-interventionism is widely spread, which is reflected in the following outcome. Compared to other European countries (mainly Great Britain, Spain or Holland) as well as to the USA, the Slovak public tends to hold the opinion that intervening in internal affairs of other countries is never justified (64% of approving responses).

Conclusion

Since 2005, numerous positive changes and shifts have occurred in the public opinion in the field of foreign affairs and on the subject of Slovakia performing internationally, which signals a slow but sure opening of the Slovak society. Moreover, the public

gradually realizes the fact that Slovakia has become a part of international institutions, a transatlantic community and a wider community of democratic countries.

Meanwhile, the opinions on a number of complicated issues on the foreign affairs agenda are rather general, which indicates low awareness of the general public. Generally, the deficit which the country has moved into due to its previous unfavorable historic development is being reduced considerably.

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Annexes

Chronology of the Important Foreign Policy Issues in 2005

12 January The session of the ministers of foreign affairs of the Regional Partnership in Warsaw took place. Slovakia was represented by the State Secretary of MFA Slovak Republic József Berényi. The participants exchanged their views and opinions on the issues of humanitarian aid for countries of Southeast Asia, further development in Ukraine after the presidential elections and the development in the Western Balkans.

19 January Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Czech Republic for Human Rights Svatopluk Karásek met Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Government for Roma Community Klára Orgovánova in Bratislava. Both partners discussed the issue of participation of both states in the Decade of Roma Inclusion, Roma migration, the continuation of social fieldwork and further cooperation.

20 – 21 January Following the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovenian Republic Dimitrij Rupel, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit to Slovenia. Both partners exchanged the views on functioning and prospects of Central European Initiative under Slovak Presidency in 2005. The ministers also discussed the OSCE development and the current development in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, especially in Kosovo and Ukraine.

25 January Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda took part in the session of the Executive Committee of the Christian-Democratic International in

Elaborated by Daniela Richterová, assistant editor of the Zahraničná politika journal, based on the data of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic and official web site of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic (richterova@sfpa.sk)

Paris. Mikuláš Dzurinda is Vice-Chairman of the CDI for Central and Eastern Europe. CDI Executive Committee approved of the resolution on combating terrorism, on tsunami, Iraq, Cuba, Moldova, Romania and Mozambique.

31 January – 2 February Following the invitation of the State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Martin Fedor, Marshall Billingslea, the Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment and Mario Bartoli, the Assistant Secretary General for Armament paid official visit to the Slovak Republic. Billingslea gave a speech for the top management of the Ministry of Defense and other state administration representatives. During the meeting with the State Secretary Martin Fedor, Mr. Billingslea promised to assist Slovakia in modernizing selected military objects and infrastructure development.

2 February President of the Slovak Republic Ivan Gašparovič received the Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic Přemysl Sobotka, who paid an official visit to the Slovak Republic. At the meeting, they discussed the EU Treaty and agreed upon the necessity of amendment of this document. Přemysl Sobotka appreciated the reforms in the Slovak Republic and stressed the importance of the cooperation in the V4 format despite the membership of the V4 countries in the EU.

11 February Deputy Chief of the Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic Peter Gajdoš bid farewell to the future members of the Slovak contingent in the operation Iraqi Freedom. 101 members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic left for Iraq.

11 February Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška participated in the NATO informal summit in Nice. Participants focused on ways how to connect the peace mission ISAF under the NATO command with more numerous coalition powers under the leadership of the USA in Afghanistan. The ministers also informally agreed upon the necessity to expand NATO exercise missions in Iraq.

11 – 13 February Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan, together with the Minister of Defense Juraj Liška, took part in *41. Munich Conference on Security Policy*. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, US Senator Hillary Clinton and others participated, as well. The main topics of the conference were the peace process in the Middle East and the UN reform.

14 February During the meeting with the Croatian Minister for European Integration Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovičova, on the occasion of her visit to the Slovak Republic, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan expressed the

support of Slovakia of the Croatian EU integration effort. He also stressed that Slovakia is prepared to share the experience from its own accession process with Croatia.

17 February Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška met his Austrian counterpart Günther Platter in Bratislava. Both ministers agreed upon the fact that Kosovo has become one of the most serious problems in Europe and thus the numbers of military personnel in the area should not be decreasing. In Kosovo, 100 Slovak and more than 500 Austrian soldiers are present.

21 February Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan represented the Slovak Republic at the regular meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels. The ministers discussed the issues of the Middle East, Iraq, Ukraine, the Western Balkans, the Cotonou Agreement, and Sudan. They also concentrated on the issues of Trans-Atlantic Relations in the context of the meeting of the EU Head of States with the President of the USA George W. Bush held in Brussels.

22 February President of the Slovak Republic Ivan Gašparovič together with the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda took part in the North-Atlantic Council (NAC) Summit. The participants dealt with current issues of international security. They specially concentrated on the situation in the Middle East. Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic also participated in the meeting of the 25 EU member state representatives with the US President George W. Bush.

24 February In Bratislava *Bush – Putin Summit* took place as the 12th mutual meeting of the presidents. The issues such as cooperation in combating the terrorism, Iran and North Korea, accession of Russia into WTO as well as energy issues were on the agenda. Both presidents had meetings with the highest representatives of the Slovak Republic.

4 March Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda received the World Bank delegation led by the Vice-President Shige Katsuo. Topics of the negotiations were the activities of the World Bank developed in the cooperation with the Government of the Slovak Republic as well as the common interest of the World Bank and the Slovak Republic in assisting the raising democracies.

10 March Slovak delegation led by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic József Berényi took part in *5th Ministerial Meeting of ASEAN and EU* in Jakarta. The participants negotiated the possibilities of closer cooperation in the field of regional cooperation, to narrow the differences in the individual ASEAN countries development. They especially focused on coordination of the aid of the EU and international community to Indonesia.

11 March Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Pál Csáky officially asked the EU Commission member Vladimír Špidla to locate the European Institute for Gender Equality in Bratislava. The institute would focus on the expert issues concerning the support of gender equality, collecting and distributing information on the topic and coordinating the research.

11 – 12 March Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Ivo Sanader paid an official visit to the Slovak Republic. Talks with his counterpart Mikuláš Dzurinda focused on bilateral relations, Slovak-Croatian cooperation in international organizations and institutions as well as possibilities of the further development of tourism between the two states.

16 March Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan represented the Slovak Republic at the regular meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels. The ministers discussed the issues of the Croatian EU negotiation process, Middle East, Russia, General System of Preferences, European Neighborhood Policy and Sudan.

16 March Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan participated in *61st Session of the UN Commission for Human Rights*. During the visit Eduard Kukan met UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour. The talks focused on UN reform, Slovakia's candidacy for non-permanent membership in UN Security Council as well as proposals of the Slovak Republic to revitalization of the Conference on Disarmament.

21 March Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj took part in the meeting of the Ministers of Defense of the EU member states in Luxemburg. During the talks, Juraj Liška pointed out that the Slovak Republic supported integration of the Western Balkan countries to Euro-Atlantic political and security structures. The ministers also discussed the creation of small battle groups of the Union, the so-called *Battle groups*, as well as the agenda of European Security and Defense Policy in fighting terrorism.

22 – 23 March Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan participated in the summit of the Head of States and Governments of the EU member states in Brussels. The participants approved of the new strategy for revitalization of the European economy, the new budget rules and gave a chance to Croatia. Along with other countries, the Slovak Republic also called for the establishment of the special mission for evaluation of cooperation of Croatia with International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

31 March – 1 April Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit to Ukraine. Apart from the talks with the Minister of Foreign

Affairs of Ukraine Borys Tarasiuk, he was received by the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko. Eduard Kukan discussed primarily the activation of bilateral cooperation and the visa regime.

1 April In Washington, the Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to USA Rastislav Káčer and the World Bank Director for Central Europe and Baltic Countries Roger Grawe signed the Credit Treaty for the *Project of Technical Support for the Human Resources Development in the Slovak Republic* for the amount of 5 million Euro. The aim of the project is to assist the Government of the Slovak Republic in modernizing the system of employment, education and social cohesion as well as in creating effective infrastructure for realization, management and assessment of the reforms in the abovementioned fields within the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family, and Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic.

4 April Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan met Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of France Michel Barnier. Partners concentrated on the topics of European and Security agenda and exchanged the opinions on current development in international relations.

4 – 5 April Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Boris Gryzlov paid a working visit to the Slovak Republic. During his talks with the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda, they concentrated on bilateral relations, prospects for their further development in the fields of trade and economy, culture, education and science.

5 April In Bahrain, 15th EU Persian Gulf Cooperation Council Ministerial meeting took place. The Slovak Republic was represented by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic József Berényi. The partners agreed upon the solutions of the regional and global issues such as Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, Iran, violation of human rights, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

11 April The Annual session of the North Atlantic Council Ambassadors with the members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Standing Committee took place in Brussels. The Slovak Republic was represented by the Head of delegation of the National Council of the Slovak Republic and Vice-President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Jozef Banáš. The discussion focused on NATO transformation, NATO operation and missions as well as further development of the NATO relations, including the relations with the EU, the Mediterranean countries and Broader Middle East.

13 – 14 April State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová paid a working visit to the Czech Republic. She held bilateral consultations with the 1st Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic

Jan Winkler, which concentrated on bilateral relations as well as the current issues in international politics with the emphasis on the security policy.

18 April Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška held negotiations with his Czech counterpart Karl Kühnl on strengthening the military presence in the NATO mission in Kosovo.

19 April Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda received the President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Kaarina Halonena, paying an official visit to the Slovak Republic. The talks focused on the current bilateral agenda, possibilities for further development of the cooperation as well as the issues interconnected with the EU membership of both countries.

2 May VII. Review Conference to Non-Proliferation Treaty took place in New York. The delegation of the Slovak Republic was led by State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová. Within the conference, she negotiated the UN system reform and complex preparation of the Slovak Republic for the UN Security Council membership in 2006 – 2007 with the President of the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly Jean Ping and Under-Secretary-General Department of Political Affairs Kieran Prendergast.

4 May 5th informal meeting of the representatives of the EU member states which are the recipients of the cohesion fund took place in Lisbon. The meeting was aimed at issues of common interest in relation to the new financial framework for 2007 –2013.

The Slovak Republic was represented by the Director General of the Division for European Affairs of the MFA of the Slovak Republic Ján Kuderjavý and the Head of the EU Financial Relation Department of the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic Albert Németh.

5 – 6 May State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová participated in political consultations with the representatives of the US State Department in Washington. The main topics of their talks were the issues of multilateral cooperation and Slovakia's membership in UN Security Council.

6 May International conference of the chairmen of the parliaments of the EU 25 was held in Budapest. The discussion focused on inter-parliamentary cooperation, rationalization of the inter-parliamentary organizations and the EU financial framework for 2007 – 2013. The Slovak Republic was represented by the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Pavol Hrušovský.

6 May The meeting of foreign ministers of Asia-Europe Forum took place in Kyoto. Slovak Republic was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak

Republic Eduard Kukan. The ministers negotiated on the UN reforms, fighting the WMD proliferation, the issue of North Korean boycotting the 6 party talks, lifting the EU embargo on China, the violation of human rights and the domestic arrest of opposition leader Aung San Su Xio.

11 May National Council of the Slovak Republic ratified the *Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe*. 116 out of 147 deputies present voted in favor of the document.

12 May Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received Xavier Darcos, Delegated Foreign Minister for Development Assistance and Francophony of the Republic of France. The partners discussed the cooperation within the *International organization for Francophony*, the political, economic and cultural aspects of bilateral agenda as well as the issues of the development assistance.

16 – 17 May 3rd Summit of Head of States and Governments of the Council of Europe was held in Warsaw. Presidents, Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs from 46 member states together with the representatives of states with the status of observer as well as representatives of the international organizations participated in the event. They discussed the current situation in Europe referring to the human rights. The participants also opened three new conventions to be signed, dealing with people trafficking, the prevention and financing the terrorism.

18 May Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received Minister of European Affairs and Chief Negotiator with the EU of Bulgaria Meglena Kunev. Both partners discussed the standpoints of Slovakia concerning the current European agenda: the EU Constitution ratification process and the new financial framework for 2007 – 2013.

19 May UNECE Executive Secretary Brigita Schmögnerová paid a working visit to the Slovak Republic. At the meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Eduard Kukan she discussed the UN reform as well as the membership of Slovakia in the UN Security Council.

22 – 29 May Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda paid a working visit to Japan and Korea. Topic of Prime Minister's talks with Japan Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi were the issues of bilateral relations and possibilities for their further development in the field of economy. In Seoul, the Treaty on Mutual Support and Protection of the Investment between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Korea.

24 – 25 May State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová led the Slovak Delegation at the first Security Forum of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in Swedish Ľre. The aim of the new format of the

ministers of foreign affairs of the EAC sessions was to create space for informal and open dialogue among the representatives of the governments, NGOs, media and national parliaments on political and security issues.

26 – 27 May XII. Ministerial Meeting EU-Rio Group was held in Luxemburg. The Slovak Republic was represented by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová. At the meeting, democracy, human rights and social justice, fighting drugs trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, corruption etc, were discussed.

30 – 31 May Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan took part in the *VII. Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs* in Luxemburg. The conference of 25 member states and 10 partner states was aimed at reviewing the progress of various Euro-Mediterranean Partnership activities, also known as the Barcelona Process. During the conference, meetings with the representatives of Arabic countries and Israel were held as well.

7 June Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda received the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Jiří Paroubek who paid an official visit to the Slovak Republic. Talks focused on bilateral relations, prospects for mutual cooperation in various fields and cooperation with some international organizations.

7 – 9 June State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová participated in the *OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and on Other Forms of Intolerance* in Cordoba. At the conference, Magda Vášáryová gave a speech on the necessity and significance of the systematic effort of the international community in fighting intolerance and discrimination and informed about the activities of the Slovak Republic in the field of education and upbringing.

9 June EU Commissioner for Development Assistance and Humanitarian Aid Luis Michel paid an official visit to the Slovak Republic. The visit's goal was to support Slovakia together with other new WU member states to be more active in the European development policy. The discussion concentrated on the current problems of the European development policy, especially on financing the development, aid for Africa and priorities of the Slovak development cooperation.

10 June Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda participated in the V4 countries' Prime Ministers summit in Poland. The Prime Ministers negotiated the current cooperation and V4 future in the context of the enlarged EU and the issues related to the *Treaty establishing Constitution for Europe*. Prime Minister of Ukraine Yulia Tymoshenko participated at V4 summit as a guest.

13 June The European Union decided not to resume sanctions against Cuba, despite the strong criticism of Fidel Castro's regime in the field of human rights. In its statement, the Union committed to maintain "aimed" dialogue with the Cuban government and open the issue of human rights in Cuba during every high-level visit.

13 – 15 June State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová paid an official visit to the Russian Federation. The consultations with the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation contained the issues of bilateral cooperation, EU – Russia relations and NATO – Russia relations, including the current security issues and Slovakia's membership in UN Security Council in 2006 – 2007.

16 June Supreme Allied Commander, Europe general James L. Jones received the Chief of Staff of the Slovak Armed Forces general Ľubomír Bulík in Brussels. The meeting was held on the occasion of the replacement of the NATO Military Committee Chair general Harald Kujat by the general Raymond Henault. The NATO Military Committee special session was held, as well.

21 June Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received John P. Rose, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Director. Dr. Rose emphasized the interest of the Center and the necessity to pay more attention to the Balkans, the Mediterranean region and the post-soviet countries in its academic programs.

29 June Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received the UK Deputy Prime Minister John L. Prescott. The partners confirmed the high level of the bilateral relations and stressed the importance of further mutual cooperation, both bilaterally and within the EU.

11 July The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the V4 countries held a meeting in Budapest. Apart from talks on V4, they also met the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

19 August Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received the Japanese candidate for the position of the OECD Secretary General Sawako Takeuchi. Eduard Kukan pinpointed the role of the OECD as an important tool for sustainable economic growth.

20 – 23 August Following the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Director General Kođchiro Matsuura paid a visit to Slovakia. The visit

took part on the eve of the UN summit and the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the UN and UNESCO creation.

1 – 2 September Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan participated in an informal meeting of the EU Council. Within the agenda, the issues of foreign policy and European Affairs such as the integration process, the Western Balkans, Middle East etc were discussed.

6 – 8 September State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová paid an official visit to the Republic of Poland. She also took part in the *XV. Economic Forum – Krynica 2005* and gave a speech as a key note speaker on *V4 between the “Old” and “New” Europe – Reaching the Goal or New Prospects?* within the panel on V4.

7 September State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic József Berényi took part in the conference on the Helsinki Process, globalization and democracy in Helsinki. József Berényi gave a speech named *Eastern and Central Europe Experience with the Official Development Assistance*. Within the conference, he also held a bilateral meeting with his Finnish counterpart, the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Finland Arto Mansal.

13 – 14 September Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška took part in an informal meeting of the Ministers of Defense of the NATO member states in Berlin. Topics like NATO reform, Euro-Atlantic security and defense policy in fighting terrorism dominated during the talks. They also focused on the peace operation in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the mission in Iraq and the creation of the NATO Response Force.

13 – 20 September President of the Slovak Republic Ivan Gašparovič took part in the UN Summit and 60th UN General Assembly. The president was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan. Eduard Kukan also participated in the negotiation of the EU ministers of foreign affairs with the US State Secretary Condoleeza Rice as well as in joint working lunch of the EU and NATO ministers of foreign affairs.

22 September Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received the deputy of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Hanne Severinsen. The Vice-Chairperson of the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly paid an official visit to Slovakia on the occasion of the post-monitoring process the Slovak Republic finalization within the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. The partners stressed the significance of the progress of Slovakia since its entering the Council of Europe. They also discussed the Roma minority and the measures of the Slovak government concerning this issue.

26 September Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan and the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová received the delegation of Council of American Diplomats. They discussed the current issues of international politics, Slovak foreign and domestic policy, the development in the region of Central and Eastern Europe etc.

4 – 6 October Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In Belgrade, Eduard Kukan gave a speech as a key note speaker at the conference *Serbia – 5 years after*. In Belgrade and Podgorica, he had talks with the supreme constitutional representatives of Serbia and Montenegro and signed the inter-governmental treaty on economic cooperation.

6 – 7 October Following the invitation of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic general Lubomír Bulík, a session of the NATO Military Committee took place in Sliač and Liptovský Mikuláš. It was the first time that the Committee had met in Slovakia. One of the topics discussed was the *Slovak View on Multinationality in the NATO Missions*.

7 – 8 October Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of France Philippe Douste – Blazy paid an official visit to the Slovak Republic. The minister was accompanied by the delegated Minister for European Affairs Catherine Colonna and representatives of parliament, media, culture and business. During the meeting, Philippe Douste – Blazy held negotiations with his counterpart minister Eduard Kukan, he met the President of the Slovak Republic Ivan Gašparovič, the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Pavol Hrušovský and Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda.

10 October The Slovak Republic became an elected member of the United Nations Security Council for years 2006 – 2007. In secret elections, the Slovak Republic received the support of 185 countries out of 191 participating in elections.

16 – 17 October Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia. The talks with the high state officials focused on bilateral cooperation, the visa regime liberalization, Slovak development assistance, the intensification of the dialogue in parliamentary and military cooperation as well as current development in the region.

18 October Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan represented the Slovak Republic at the extraordinary meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Luxemburg. EU member states negotiated the current development of the situation before the WTO Council meeting and opened the issue of avian flu occurrence in Europe.

21 October State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic Martin Fedor participated in the Ministers of Defense of the European Nations' Cooperation in Peace Support meeting CENCOOP. Martin Fedor supported the idea of the regional cooperation within the CENCOOP.

24 October Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda received the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Cyril Svoboda paying an official visit to the Slovak Republic. The talks concentrated mainly on bilateral issues in different fields and the current issues stemming from the membership in the EU, the UN and V4.

24 October Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda received the Chairman of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Cyprus Demetris Christofias. The talks focused on bilateral cooperation between Slovakia and Cyprus as well as the cooperation of both countries with the EU.

24 – 25 October Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit of the Russian Federation. During his visit he met his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov as well as Minister of the Government and Co-Chairman of the Inter-governmental Commission for Economic and Science-Technological Cooperation between the Slovak Republic Sergey Naryshkin.

24 – 25 October A meeting of EU Ministers for Development Assistance took place in Leeds. The meeting was aimed at the preparation of the new development assistance strategy of the EU, the aid for Africa as well as interlinking of the trade and development. The Slovak Republic was represented by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic József Berényi.

27 – 28 October Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid a working visit to the USA. During his visit, he met the US State Secretary Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and Congressmen. The negotiations focused on bilateral agenda as well as the current foreign policy issues of common interest.

3 November Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit to the Republic of Finland. During his visit, he gave a speech on *Slovak Contribution to European Neighborhood Policy*. Eduard Kukan also met the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Finland Erkki Tuomioja and Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Maria Kiviniemi. They discussed bilateral issues as well as European and international issues.

4 November Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda met the President of Croatia Stjepan Mesić paying a visit to Slovakia. The topics of the negotiations were bilateral agenda, current European issues and the situation in the Western Balkans.

7 November Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan represented the Slovak Republic at the regular meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels. Apart from the standard agenda, the ministers focused on financial framework for 2007 – 2013 and the avian influenza issue.

8 November Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda received the President of Romania Traian Băsescu paying an official visit to the Slovak Republic. Both partners discussed the cooperation in the field of culture and education. Mikuláš Dzurinda and Traian Băsescu also discussed the topics connected with the membership of both countries in NATO and the current European issues.

9 – 10 November High Representative for EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana paid a visit to Slovakia. He negotiated with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan, Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška, Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic Pavol Hrušovský and Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda. The discussion covered the topics of the Western Balkans, the Kosovo status and the role of the EU as well as the European Neighborhood Policy, European Defense and Security Policy and the future of the EU enlargement.

21 November Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan represented the Slovak Republic at the regular meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels. Apart from the standard agenda, the ministers focused on financial framework for 2007 – 2013 and preparation for the next European Council Session.

23 November State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Magda Vášáryová received the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Said Jalili. The meeting focused on the Iranian nuclear program and was held on the eve of the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors.

21 November Ministers of Defense of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic Juraj Liška and Karel Kuhl signed Communiqué on Establishing the Joint Czech-Slovak European Battle Group in Bratislava. The Joint Battle Group would be employable in the second half of 2009.

1 December State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic Martin Fedor paid a visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina where he met his counterpart Emes Becirbasis. Martin Fedor also delivered the proposal of *Memorandum on Understanding between the Ministries in Military Field*. Both parties declared their interest in intensifying mutual cooperation.

1 – 3 December Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan paid an official visit to the UN seat in New York. He was received by the UN Secretary

General Kofi Annan. They discussed the state of preparedness of Slovakia for UN Security Council membership for 2006 – 2007. As for priorities of our membership, Eduard Kukan mentioned the Western Balkans (especially the Status of Kosovo), Eastern Europe, Cyprus and Middle East.

8 December Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda met the President of the Republic of Hungary László Sólyomi in Bratislava. The talks focused on bilateral issues, the cooperation of both countries in V4 and the possibilities for development of infrastructure between border areas of both countries.

9 December Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany Frank Walter Steinmeir. The ministers discussed the issues of bilateral cooperation, the European and security policy as well as current developments in international politics.

9 December Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Eduard Kukan received the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania. During the meeting, the partners discussed the current issues of bilateral cooperation and the development in the region of the Western Balkans with specific emphasis put to Kosovo. They also signed the *Protocol on Revision of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic Treaty Framework*.

21 December Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic Juraj Liška and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic general Lubomír Bulík awarded the Slovak soldiers serving in peace mission KFOR in Kosovo the medals of the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

List of Treaties Concluded between Slovakia and Other Countries in 2005

Presidential Treaties

1. Amendment to the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the International Visegrad Fund
(Bratislava, January 18, 2005)
2. Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Anguilla on the Taxation of Savings Income in the form of Interest Payments
(Bratislava, February 18, 2005, Anguilla, March 17, 2005)
3. Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Montserrat on the Taxation of Savings Income in the form of Interest Payments
(Bratislava, February 18, 2005, Montserrat April 7, 2005)
4. Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the islands of Turks and Caicos on the Taxation of Savings Income in the form of Interest Payments
(Bratislava, February 18, 2005, Grand Turk, April 1, 2005)
5. Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Cayman Islands on the Taxation of Savings Income in the form of Interest Payments
(Bratislava, February 18, 2005, Grand Caymon, April 12, 2005)

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

6. Agreement in the form of an Exchange of Letters between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the British Virgin Islands on the Taxation of Savings Income in the form of Interest Payments
(Bratislava, February 18, 2005, Tortola, April 11, 2005)
7. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Governments of the Czech Republic and the Republic of Poland Concerning the Dissolution of the Multinational Brigade
(Bratislava, May 30, 2005)

Intergovernmental Treaties

1. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Latvia on Mutual Protection of Classified Information
(Bratislava, February 2, 2005)
2. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic on Mutual Protection of Classified Information
(Bratislava, February 3, 2005)
3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the United States of America concerning the J. William Fulbright Commission for Educational Exchange in the Slovak Republic
(Bratislava, February 22, 2005)
4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation on Co-operation in Economy and Science and Technology
(Bratislava, February 25, 2005)
5. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters
(Plovdiv, March 2, 2005)
6. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Readmission of Persons
(Bratislava, March 15, 2005)
7. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of France on Junior Experts Exchange
(Paris, March 31, 2005)

8. Security Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Italian Republic on Mutual Protection of Classified Information (Rome, April 14, 2005)
9. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Poland on the Amendment and Supplementation of the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning the Border Crossings, Crossing the State Border on Tourist Trails and the Principles for Crossing the State Border at Places other than Border Crossing Points signed in Trstená on July 1, 1999 in the form of the Exchange of Notes (exchange of notes, December 2, 2004 and February 3, 2005)
10. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Poland on the Amendment of the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the People Republic of Poland on the Activities of the Cultural and Information Centers Concluded on December 10, 1982 by the exchange of notes (exchange of notes April 16, 2003 and March 14, 2005)
11. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Poland on Amendment of Annex No. 1-to the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland on Small-scale Cross-border Traffic signed in Zakopane on 6-December 1996 as Amended by the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland concluded in Bratislava on 24 January 2000 by the exchange of notes
12. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand on Economic Cooperation (Bangkok, May 4, 2005)
13. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Singapore on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to income Tax (Singapore, May 9, 2005)
14. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Korea on Support and Mutual Protection of the Investments (Seoul, May 27, 2005)
15. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic and the Government of the Republic of France on Property Settlement in France stemming from the Dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Paris, June 23, 2005)

16. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Canada on the Employment of Family Members of Employees of Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts
(exchange of notes, June 10, 2005 and June 23, 2005)
17. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Hellenic Republic on Mutual Protection of Classified Information
(Bratislava, June 27, 2005)
18. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Romania on Readmission of Persons
(Bratislava, June 30, 2005)
19. Amendment to the Agreement Concerning the Establishment of the International Visegrad Fund
(Budapest, July 11, 2005)
20. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Poland on the Mutual Recognition of Parts of Studies and Equality of Professional Qualifications, Academic Degrees and Titles Issued in the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Poland
(Warsaw, July 18, 2005)
21. Security Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway
(Bratislava, August 9, 2005)
22. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic on the Amendment and Supplementation of the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic Concerning Border Crossings on the Common State Border
(exchange of notes, May 11, 2003 and August 9, 2005)
23. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on Mutual Protection of Investments
(Minsk, August 26, 2005)
24. Administrative Agreement between UNIDO and the Government of the Slovak Republic Concerning the Special-Purpose Contribution to the Industrial Development Fund
(Bratislava, September 23, 2005)

25. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro on Economic Co-operation (Belgrade, October 5, 2005)
26. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic Temporarily Regulating the Use of Land Owned by the Slovak Republic Located in the Territory of the Town of Hodonín in the Czech Republic (Bratislava, October 31, 2005)
27. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Readmission of Persons (Bratislava, October 17, 2005)
28. Additional Protocol between the Slovak Republic and Romania to the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Romania on Mutual Protection of the Investments signed on March 3, 1994 (Bratislava, November 8, 2005)
28. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the State of Israel on Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters (Jerusalem, November 9, 2005)
29. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro on Cooperation in the field of Defense (Belgrade, November 24, 2005)
30. Additional Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Mutual Protection of the Investments signed on July 21, 1994. (Sofia, November 24, 2005)
31. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Scientific and Technological Cooperation (Sofia, December 1, 2005)
32. Additional Protocol between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Agreement between the Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Government of the People's Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment signed on December 4-1991 in Peking (Bratislava, December 7, 2005)

Ministerial Treaties

1. Agreement between the Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunication of the Slovak Republic and the Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs of Germany on Execution of the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on Facilitation of the Civil Cross-Border Transports
(Berlin, June 2, 2005)
2. Agreement between the Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunication of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Economy and Transport of the Republic of Hungary on Reconstruction of the Bridge over the Danube River between the Towns of Komárno and Komárom
(Szekefehervár, July 15, 2005)
3. Agreement between the Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunication of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Information Industry of the People's Republic of China on Cooperation in the field of Information and Communication
(Bratislava, December 7, 2005)
4. Cooperation Program between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine in the field of Education for years 2005 —2008
(Bratislava, December 12, 2005)

Multilateral Treaties

1. Additional Protocol to the Anti-Doping Convention
(Warsaw, September 12, 2002)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
the Slovak Republic accession document deposited on January 11, 2005
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on May 1, 2005
Document No. 188
2. Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
(Strasbourg, May 15, 2003)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on January 12, 2005
Document No. 191

3. Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
(Strasbourg, November 8, 2001)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on May 12, 2004
instruments of ratification deposited on January 11, 2005
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on May 1, 2005
Document No. 182
4. European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees
(Strasbourg, April 20, 1959)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on June 3, 2005
instruments of ratification deposited on January 27, 2005
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on February 28, 2005
Document No. 31
5. Convention on Cybercrime
(Budapest, November 23, 2001)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on February 4, 2005
not valid for the Slovak Republic
Document No. 185
6. Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding Supervisory Authorities and Transborder Data Flows
(Strasbourg, November 8, 2001)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on November 8, 2001
instruments of ratification deposited on July 24, 2002
Document No. 181
Published under No. 20/2005 Z.z.
7. Protocol Against the Smuggling of migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(New York, November 15, 2000)
deposited with: UN SG
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on November 15, 2001
instruments of ratification deposited on September 21, 2004
published under No. 33/2005 Z.z.

8. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
(New York, November 15, 2000)
deposited with: UN SG
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on November 15, 2001
instruments of ratification deposited on September 21, 2004
published under No. 34/2005 Z.z.
9. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(Geneva, May 21, 2003)
deposited with: UN SG
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on December 19, 2003
instruments of ratification deposited on May 4, 2004
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on February 27, 2005
published under No. 84/2005 Z.z.
10. Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations
(Tampere, June 18, 1998)
deposited with: UN SG
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on February 16, 2000
instruments of ratification deposited on February 7, 2001
published under No. 92/2005 Z.z.
11. Agreement on the Status of Missions and Representatives of Third States to the North Atlantic Treaty
(Brussels, September 14, 1994)
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on July 29, 2004
instruments of ratification deposited on December 22, 2004
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on December 22, 2004
published under No. 96/2005 Z. z.
12. Agreement on the Status of North Atlantic Treaty, National Representatives and International Staff
(Ottawa, September 20, 1951)
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on August 13, 2004
instruments of ratification deposited on December 16, 2004
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on December 16, 2004
published under No. 95/2005 Z.z.

13. Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism
(Strasbourg, May 15, 2003)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on April 7, 2005
Document No. 190

14. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, amending the Control System of the Convention
(Strasbourg, May 13, 2004)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on October 22, 2004
instruments of ratification deposited on May 16, 2005
Document No. 194
Not valid

15. European Landscape Convention
(Florence, October 20, 2000)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on May 13, 2005
instruments of ratification deposited on August 9, 2005
Document no. 176
published under No. 515/2005 Z.z.

16. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(Washington, December 2, 1946)
deposited with: USA Government
the Slovak Republic accession document deposited on March 22, 2005
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on March 22, 2005
published under No. 263/2005 Z.z.

17. Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(Washington, November 19, 1959)
deposited with: USA Government
the Slovak Republic accession document deposited on March 22, 2005
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on March 22, 2005
published under No. 264/2005 Z.z.

18. Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all
Circumstances
(Vilnius, May 3, 2002)

deposited with: SG Council of Europe
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on July 24, 2002
instruments of ratification deposited on August 18, 2005
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on December 1, 2005

19. UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property
(New York, December 2, 2004)
deposited with: UN SG
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on September 15, 2005
not valid

20. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
(New York, April 13, 2005)
deposited with: UN SG
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on September 15, 2005
not valid

21. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
Concerning Biomedical Research
(Strasbourg, January 25, 2005)
deposited with: SG Council of Europe
instruments of ratification deposited on September 23, 2005
not valid

Select Documents and Materials of the Government of the SR in 2005

I. Strategies and Programs

1.1. Basic Framework Documents of Slovakia's Foreign Policy

Orientation of Slovakia's Foreign Policy for 2006

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F3B70AF94A9C45FEC12570D5003E3E65?OpenDocument>

Draft Security Strategy of the SR

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/25EE0E111893509BC1257034003C3161?OpenDocument>

Draft Defense Strategy of the SR

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/07934884E18441EBC12570380033E95F?OpenDocument>

1.2. Knowledge Based Society

Strategy for the Competitiveness of the SR until 2010 – Action Plans

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/78E1018474DCCB25C1257038003E2E62?OpenDocument>

Draft Strategy for the Competitiveness of the SR until 2010

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/BEB7D15266C4758EC1256FA50031AD36?OpenDocument>

Draft Institutional Framework for the Coordination of the Lisbon Strategy in the SR

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/32184600D33E3728C1256FA8003F53E1?OpenDocument>

National Program of Reforms in the SR for 2006 – 2008

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A35BA410DD17C130C12570930032546F?OpenDocument>

Elaborated by Tomáš Sivíček, Assistant to the Prime Minister's Adviser for the Foreign Policy SR
(Tomas.Sivicek@vlada.gov.sk) All documents are available in Slovak language only

1.3. EU

National Convention on the EU for 2006 – 2008

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C58754878229B4EFC1257085002D5EE5?OpenDocument>

Concept for Slovakia's Participation in the EU's Civil Crisis Management

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8FD3B9DCAFCDE156C12570300031141A?OpenDocument>

Draft Principles of the SR's Personnel Policy with Respect to EU institutions

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F484B2290AFCD38FC1257030004434F4?OpenDocument>

Proposal for the SR's Strategic Objective and Priorities Connected with the EU's Cohesion Policy for the Next Programming Period of 2007 – 2013

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/>

[B4D168D4E4F6B47FC1257029003CFC57?OpenDocument](http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/B4D168D4E4F6B47FC1257029003CFC57?OpenDocument)

1.4. Euro

Convergence Program of Slovakia for the 2005 – 2010

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/5043B4EC354A8FB5C12570C3003976E9?OpenDocument>

Resolution Concerning the Proposal to Supplement Governmental Resolution No. 949 of 30 November 2005 Concerning the Convergence Program of the SR for 2005-2010

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A503F86A7D8A4C53C12570D1003A5EF7?OpenDocument>

Concept for the Elaboration of the National Plan for the Introduction of the Euro in the SR

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/38571BDCA32A0A0EC1256F860032CD68?OpenDocument>

National Plan for the Introduction of the Euro in the SR

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D38FE39CD9BF05E5C125702F002FABD0?OpenDocument>

1.5. UN

Basic Framework for the Operation of the SR in the UN Security Council in 2006 – 2007

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A5CE3B202A75DC32C12570D60035005E?OpenDocument>

National Program of Official Development Assistance for 2005

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/6FBF94E5376F3034C1256FF5003F7636?OpenDocument>

Report on the Implementation of the Tasks under the National Strategy for the Sustainable Development of the SR in 2004

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A326299CCCF46AE6C1256FE7003B2D6A?OpenDocument>

Basis of the Action Plan for Sustainable Development

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/ACFFD6C81D15CDCBC1256FC00044D181?OpenDocument>

Action Plan for Sustainable Development in the SR for 2005 – 2010

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/171BAC19741F61DBC125703B003A01AE?OpenDocument>

Draft Concept for Cooperation between the SR and the UN Industrial Development Organisation for 2005 – 2007 and the Draft Administrative Agreement between UNIDO and the Slovak Government Concerning the Special-Purpose Contribution to the Industrial Development Fund

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D8B7A106597ACB88C1257081003CDE7F?OpenDocument>

II. Standpoints and Positions of the SR

2.1. Knowledge Based Society

Draft Position of the SR on the Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon Strategy to the Spring Session of the European Council

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/48D15CE4F1C1936BC1256FB90044D705?OpenDocument>

Draft Position of the SR on Wim Kok's Report Concerning the Preparation of the Mid-Term Assessment of the Lisbon Strategy

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D13809AAFC193DD5C1256F82002F63A6?OpenDocument>

2.2. EU

Draft Initial Position of the SR on the EU's Financial Perspective for 2007-2013

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/426BF5AA7BDA5F59C1256F9C0030DD68?OpenDocument>

Proposal for the National Council to Approve the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3C5F2CAC19791500C1256FE800373C8F?OpenDocument>

Monitoring of the Developments in the SR's Positions on Draft Legal Acts of the EU

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/43CE780C858F4093C12570DD003FB9B6?OpenDocument>

Information on the Developments in the Negotiations and Positions of the SR in COREPER and Councils of Ministers

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/13FF68B9EDDF07A6C1256F87004A7C64?OpenDocument>

Initial Position of the SR on the European Commission's Legislative Proposals on Structural and the Cohesion Funds

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/74D4AB1E1FFD93D5C1256FCC0039CB66?OpenDocument>

2.3. Others

Proposal to Conclude the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/AE96667DE53F90A0C125705400347775?OpenDocument>

III. Other Reports, Assessments and Proposals

3.1. Reports on Basic Framework Documents

Report on the Fulfilment of Slovak Foreign Policy Tasks in 2004

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D52ABCCF273CFFADC1256FA3003FDDBA4?OpenDocument>

Report on Security of the SR in 2004

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A04A99311D1472B1C1257034003AE14A?OpenDocument>

3.2. Knowledge Based Society

Assesment of the Fulfilment of Measures to Implement the Lisbon Strategy in the SR – situation as of 28 February 2005

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/6309C71A2E4CB85FC1256FDA0035038B?OpenDocument>

Information on Preparation of the National Reform Program of the SR for 2005 – 2008

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4EC565A5AC4D410DC125703B003AC9A5?OpenDocument>

Information on the Specific Projects to Use the Resources from the 2006 Minerva Program and the Expected Results of These Projects

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4A6C8684BEE7DECEC12570C9004E5374?OpenDocument>

3.3. Euro

Proposal to Appoint the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the SR for the introduction of the euro

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F229392D5C8E68A0C12570D6003ECB6B?OpenDocument>

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9B706F5A1F5C59CFC12570DD00435253?OpenDocument>

3.4. EU

Report on the SR's Participation in EU Community Program in 2004

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C5F9A2F55BE25E91C12570820031FEC9?OpenDocument>

Summary Report on the First Year of the SR's Membership in the EU

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C227668605897910C1257088003112D5?OpenDocument>

Information on the EU Preliminary Draft Budget for 2006

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F425921390B3E28BC125702A00357142?OpenDocument>

Information for the National Council of the SR: the European Commission's Legislative and Work Program for 2006 and the Resulting Priorities for the SR

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/5011B79EC56463FEC12570DC004DD8E7?OpenDocument>

3.5. EU – Others

New Wording of the Statute of the Commission for European Union Affairs

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/227DF7942E33A5F3C125700E003A1500?OpenDocument>

Draft Statute of the Ministerial Council of the Government of the SR for European Union Affairs

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/41ACA08056EA2BD6C12570CA003E34B4?OpenDocument>

2004 Report on the Activities of the SR's Agent in Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights

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3.6. NATO

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3.7. EU Legislation – approximation, transposition

Report on the SR's Participation on the EU Legislative Process in 2004

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3.8. Financial Mechanisms / Euro Funds

Concept for the Financing of Projects Supported from Structural Funds for the 2004-2006 Period

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3.9. Slovak Expatriates

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4.11. Others

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V. Development Assistance and Other Forms of assistance

5.1. Afghanistan

Contribution of the SR within the Framework of the HIPC initiative and ODA – Proposal to Cancel the Debt of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

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5.2. Iraq

Proposal for the SR's Assistance in the Training of Iraqi Security Forces

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5.3. Ukraine

Proposal for a Voluntary Contribution from the SR to Firearms and Ammunition Disposal Funds in Ukraine

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5.4. Others

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VI. Security Dimension

Harmonisation of SR's Contributions for the Building of Military Capabilities of NATO and the EU

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Source: The Slovak Republic Government Office

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László Pomothy, tel. 02/ 4333 1944

Section for European Affairs

Director General: Ján Ježo, tel. 02/ 4854 2204, jezo@economy.gov.sk

Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic

Kutuzovova 8, 832 47 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 4425 0320

www.mod.gov.sk

Minister

Juraj Liška

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Peter Plučinský, tel.: 02/ 4425 8790, plucinskyp@mod.gov.sk

State Secretary

Martin Fedor, tel.: 02/ 4425 9946

Defence Policy, International Affairs and Legislation Department

Director General: Vladimír Jakabčín, tel.: 02/ 4425 8781,

Vladimir.Jakabcin@mod.gov.sk

Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic

Pribinova 2, 812 72 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5094 1111

www.minv.sk

Minister

Vladimír Palko

Office of the Minister

Director General: Vladimír Pčolinský, tel. 02/ 5094 4225, pcolinsk@minv.sk

State Secretary

Martin Pado, tel.: 02/ 5292 1237

Department for European Integration and Foreign Affairs

Head of the Department: Marian Hujo, tel. 02/ 5094 4452, hujo@minv.sk

Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic

Štefanovičova 5, 817 82 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5958 1111

www.finance.gov.sk

Minister

Ivan Mikloš

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Eva Štricová, tel. 02/ 5958 2210, estricova@mfsr.sk

State Secretary

Vladimír Tvaroška, tel.: 02/ 5958 2300

State Secretary

Vladimír Podstránsky, tel.: 02/ 2958 2100

Section for European Integration and International Relations

Director General: Mária Kompišová, tel.: 02/ 5958 2314, mkompisova@mfsr.sk

Department for EU Relations Coordination

Head of the Department: Jaroslav Náhlik, tel.: 02/ 5958 2136, jnahlik@mfsr.sk

Department of Paying Authority for the Structural Funds

Head of the Department: Marcela Zubrická, tel. 02/ 5958 2429,

mzubricka@mfsr.sk

Department of Budgetary Relations to the EC Budget

Head of the Department: Marcela Havranová, tel. 02/ 5958 2327,

mhavranova@mfsr.sk

Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic

Námestie SNP č. 33, 813 31 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5939 1111

www.culture.gov.sk

Minister

Rudolf Chmel

František Tóth (since 15 June 2005)

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Magdaléna Fučeková, tel.: 02/ 5939 1101, km@culture.gov.sk

State Secretary

Ágnes Biró, tel.: 02/ 5939 1101

Section of International Relations

Director General: Igor Otčenáš, tel.: 02/ 5939 1332, igor_otcenas@culture.gov.sk

Department for European Integration and Multilateral Relations

Head of the Department: Božena Krížiková, tel. 02/ 5939 1323, oei@culture.gov.sk

Section for Minorities Cultures

Director General: Róbert Dohányos, tel.: 02/ 5939 1444, smk@culture.gov.sk

House of Foreign Slovaks

Director: Karol Palkovič, tel. 02/ 5293 1559, palkovic@dzs.sk

Jakubovo nám. 12, 811 09 Bratislava 1

www.dzs.sk

Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic

Limbová 2, 837 52 Bratislava 37

tel.: 02/ 5937 3111

www.health.gov.sk

Minister

Rudolf Zajac

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Dagmar Uvačeková, tel. 02/ 5937 3228, dagmar.uvacekova@health.gov.sk

Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic

Špitálska 4-6, 816 43 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5975 1111

www.employment.gov.sk

Minister

Ludovít Kaník

Iveta Radičová (since 17 October 2005)

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Stanislav Šotník, tel. 02/ 5975 1710,

sotnik@employment.gov.sk

State Secretary

Miroslav Beblavý, tel.: 02/ 5975 2713

Section for International Affairs

Director General: Igor Kosír, tel. 02/ 5975 2215, kosir@employment.gov.sk

Department of European Integration and Foreign Relations

Head of the Department: Ľubica Gajdošová, tel. 02/ 5975 2210,

gajdos@employment.gov.sk

Department of Managing Unit of European Social Fund and Other Foreign Assistance

Head of the Department: Jarmila Tomšová, tel. 02/ 5975 2916,

tomsova@employment.gov.sk

Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic

Stromová 1, 813 30 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5937 4111

www.education.gov.sk

Minister

Martin Fronc

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Mária Blahová, tel. 02/ 54774252, blahova@education.gov.sk

State Secretary

László Szigeti, tel.: 02/ 5937 4355

Section for European Integration

Director General: Ivan Hromada, tel.: 02/ 6920 2216, sei@education.gov.sk

Section for International Cooperation

Director General: Dagmar Hupková, tel. 02/ 6920 2218,

dhupkova@education.gov.sk

Section of Science and Technology

Director General: Stanislav Sipko, tel.: 02/ 6920 2202, svt@education.gov.sk

Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic

Župné námestie 13, 813 11 Bratislava

tel.: 02 59 35 3111

www.justice.gov.sk

Minister

Daniel Lipšic

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Anton Chromík, tel. 59353254, anton.chromik@justice.sk

State Secretary

Lucia Žitňanská, tel.: 02/ 5935 3229

Section for International Law and European Integration

Director General: Peter Bášas, tel.: 02/ 5935 3381, peter.banas@justice.sk

Department of International Law

Head of the Department: Miloš Haťapka, tel.: 02/ 5935 3349,

milos.hatapka@justice.sk

Department of Foreign Relations and Human Rights

Head of the Department: Jana Vnuková, tel.: 02/ 5935 3111,

jana.vnukova@justice.sk

Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic

Nám. Ľ. Štúra 1, 812 35 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5956 1111

www.enviro.gov.sk

Minister

László Miklós

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Katarína Haramiaová – Kubiková, tel. 02/ 5956 2415,

hovorca@enviro.gov.sk

State Secretary

Peter Stanko, tel.: 02/ 5956 2490

Section for Foreign Assistance and International Relations

Director General: Katarína Nováková, tel.: 02/ 5956 2350,

novakova.katarina@enviro.gov.sk

Department of European Affairs

Head of the Department: Kamil Vilinovič, tel. 02/ 5956 2015,

vilinovic.kamil@enviro.gov.sk

Ministry of Agriculture of the Slovak Republic

Dobrovičova 12, 812 66 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5926 6111

www.mpsr.sk

Minister

Zsolt Simon

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Ingrid Slimáková, tel.: 02/ 5926 6308, slimak@land.gov.sk

State Secretary

Ján Golian, tel.: 02/ 5296 4042

Section for European Integration, Structural Policy and Countryside Development

Director General: Karol Zimmer, tel. 02/ 5926 6275, opalkova@land.gov.sk

Department of European Integration

Head of the Department: Ján Husárik, tel. 02/ 5296 6299, husarikj@land.gov.sk

Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic

Námestie slobody č. 6, 810 05 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5949 4111

www.telecom.gov.sk

Minister

Pavol Prokopovič

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Eva Benešová, tel. 52498756, eva.benesova@telecom.gov.sk

State Secretary

Ján Kotuľa, tel.: 02/ 5273 1462

State Secretary

Peter Jesenský, tel.: 02/ 5244 2301

Section for European Integration and Foreign Affairs

Director General: Dušan Rizek, tel. 02/ 5273 1446, dusan.rizek@telecom.gov.sk

Ministry of Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic

Preievozská 2/B 8, 825 25 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5831 7111

www.build.gov.sk

Minister

László Gyurovszky

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: László Juhász, tel.: 02/ 5831 7251, krasnanska@build.gov.sk

State Secretary

Zsolt Lukáč, tel.: 02/ 5831 7250

State Secretary

Štefan Kužma, tel.: 02/ 5244 2301

Supreme Control Office of the Slovak Republic

Priemyselná 2, 824 73 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5542 3069

www.controll.gov.sk

Head

Ján Jasovský, tel.: 02/ 5542 4189

Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic

Drieňová 24, 826 03 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 4333 7305

www.antimon.gov.sk

Head

Danica Paroulková, tel.: 02/ 4333 7305

Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic

Miletičova 3, 824 67 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5023 6111

www.statistics.sk

Head

Peter Mach, tel.: 02/ 5542 5802

List of the Embassies of the EU, NATO countries and Some Other Countries

The Embassies in the Slovak Republic and their Heads as of February 2006

Country	Start of Diplomatic Relations	Address of Embassy	In charge of Embassy (LoC - Letter of Credence)
Bosnia a Herzegovina	1.1.1993	Tivoligasse 54 1120 Viedeň	Mirza Pinjo <i>chargé d'affaires a. i.</i>
Canada	1.1.1993	Muchova 6 160 00 Praha 6	Bruce Jutzi <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 9 September 2003
Delegation of the European Commission		Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	Andrea Elscheková-Matisová <i>ambassador of EC to SR</i>
Information Bureau, European Parliament		Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	Jana Kučeravá <i>executive director</i>
Ireland	1.1.1993	Carlton Savoy Building Mostová 2 811 02 Bratislava	Declan Connolly <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 28 October 2004
Japan	1.1.1993	Hlavné nám. 2 813 27 Bratislava	Makato Washizu <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 15 November 2005
Romania	1.1.1993	Fraňa Kráľa 11 811 05 Bratislava 1	Valerica Epure <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 3 September 2002
Russian Federation	1.1.1993	Godrova 4 811 06 Bratislava 1	Alexander Udaltsov <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 23 August 2005

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

continued

Serbia and Montenegro	1.1.1993	Búdkova 38 811 04 Bratislava 1	Vojislav Milenković <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 14 June 2005
Swiss Confederation	1.1.1993	Tolstého 9 811 06 Bratislava 1	Josef Aregger <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 14 February 2005
The Arab Republic of Egypt	1.1.1993	Ferienčíková 14 P.O. Box 322 814 99 Bratislava	Elsayed Ramzy Ezzeldin <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 9 September 2004
The Czech Republic	1.1.1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 8 811 02 Bratislava 1	Vladimír Galuška <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 4 October 2004
The Federal Republic of Germany	1.1.1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 10 811 02 Bratislava 1	Jochen Trebesch <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 23 August 2005
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	1.1.1993	Sternwartestrasse 81 A-1180 Viedeň	Béatrice Kirsch <i>chargé d'affaires a.i.</i>
The Hellenic Republic	1.1.1993	Hlavné námestie 4 811 01 Bratislava 1	Constantin Karabetis <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 4 October 2005
The Holy See	1.1.1993	Nekrasovova 17 811 04 Bratislava 1	Henryk Józef Nowacki <i>apostolic nuncius</i> LoC: 10 May 2001
The Kingdom of Belgium	1.1.1993	Fraňa Kráľa 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	Olivier Belle <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 30 September 2003
The Kingdom of Denmark	1.1.1993	Panská 27 816 06 Bratislava	Jorgen Munk Rasmussen <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 15 November 2005

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The Kingdom of Netherlands	1.1.1993	Fraňa Kráľa 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	Laurent Louis Stokvis <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 3. September 2002
The Kingdom of Norway	1.1.1993	Reisnerstrasse 55/57 A-1030 Viedeň	Brit Lovseth <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 22 July 2004
The Kingdom of Spain	1.1.1993	Prepoštská 10 811 01 Bratislava 1	Miguel Aguirre de Cárcer <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 14 June 2005
The Kingdom of Sweden	1.1.1993	Úvoz 13 P.O.Box 35 160 12 Praha 612	Cecilia Julin <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 8 October 2003
The Peoples Republic of China	1.1.1993	Jančova 8 811 02 Bratislava 1	Zhogpo Huang <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 23 September 2003
The Republic of Angola	30.9.1993	Mudroňova 47 811 03 Bratislava 1	Domingos Culolo <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 18 September 2002
The Republic of Austria	1.1.1993	Ventúrska 10 811 01 Bratislava 1	Martin Bolldorf <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 18. January 2002
The Republic of Belarus	1.1.1993	Kuzmányho 3/A 811 06 Bratislava 1	Valery Voronetsky <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 20 February 2002
The Republic of Bulgaria	1.1.1993	Kuzmányho 1 811 06 Bratislava 1	Yaroslav Assenov Golev <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 12 March 2002

Annexes

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The Republic of Croatia	1.1.1993	Mišikova 21 811 06 Bratislava 1	Andrea Gustović-Ercegovac <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 26. June 2002
The Republic of Cuba	1.1.1993	Somolického 1/A 811 05 Bratislava 1	Caridad Yamira Cueto Milian <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 18 September 2002
The Republic of Cyprus	1.1.1993	Parkring 20 A - 1010 Viedeň	Spyros Attas <i>chargé d'affaires a. i.</i>
The Republic of Estonia	1.1.1993	Wohlebengasse 9/13 A - 1040 Viedeň	Katrin Saarsalu <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 30 October 2003
The Republic of Finland	1.1.1993	Gonzagagasse 16 A-1010 Vienna	Ravno Tapio Viemerö <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 4 April 2004
The Republic of France	1.1.1993	Hlavné námestie 7 P.O.Box 152, 810 00 Bratislava 1 812 83 Bratislava 1	Jacques Faure <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 23 October 2003
The Republic of Hungary	1.1.1993	Sedlárska 3 814 25 Bratislava 1	Csaba Györfy <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 18 December 2002
The Republic of India	1.1.1993	Radlinského 2 811 02 Bratislava 1	Mysore Kapanaiah Lokesh <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 23 June 2003
The Republic of Indonesia	1.1.1993	Mudroňova 51 811 03 Bratislava 1	Emeria W. A. Siregar <i>chargé d'affaires a. i.</i>
The Republic of Italy	1.1.1993	Červeňova 19 811 03 Bratislava 1	Antonino Provenzano <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 22 July 2004

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The Republic of Korea	1.1.1993	Ostravská 17 811 04 Bratislava	Juheon Jeong <i>chargé d'affaires</i>
The Republic of Latvia	1.1.1993	Stefan Esders Platz 4 A - 1190 Viedeň	Ruta Baltause <i>chargé d'affaires a.i.</i>
The Republic of Lithuania	1.1.1993	Löwengasse 47/4 A - 1030 Viedeň	Jonas Rudalevičius <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 4 July 2002
The Republic of Macedonia	1.1.1993	Maderstrasse 1/10 A - 1040 Viedeň	Vukica Krtolica Popovska <i>chargé d'affaires</i>
The Republic of Malta	1.1.1993	Opernring 5/1 A - 1010 Viedeň	Francis Cachia <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 31 May 2004
The Republic of Moldova	1.1.1993	Budafoki ut. 9-11 1111 Budapešť	Vladimir Rusnac <i>chargé d'affaires a.i.</i>
The Republic of Poland	1.1.1993	Hummelova 4 811 03 Bratislava 1	Zenon Kosiniak-Kamysz <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 26 August 2003
The Republic of Portugal	1.1.1993	Opernring 3/1/1 A-1010 Vienna	José Ernst Henzler Viera Branco <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 14 Februar 2005
The Republic of Slovenia	1.1.1993	Moyzesova 4 813 15 Bratislava 1	Maja Marija Lovrenčič Svetek <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 4 October 2004
The Republic of Turkey	1.1.1993	Holubyho 11 811 03 Bratislava 1	Suna Çokgür Ilicak <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 10 January 2006
The Sovereign Military Order of Malta	1.1.1993	Na Vršku 8 811 01 Bratislava 1	Mariano Hugo princ Windisch-Graetz <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 23 October 2003

Annexes

continued

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1.1.1993	Panská 16 811 01 Bratislava 1	Judith Anne MacGregor <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 3 June 2004
The United States of America	1.1.1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 5 811 02 Bratislava 1	Rodolphe Vallee <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 23 August 2005
Ukraine	1.1.1993	Radvanská 35 811 01 Bratislava 1	Inna Ohnivec <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: 10 January 2006

List of Consulates in the Slovak Republic

The Heads of the Consulates as of February 2006

Country	Address of the Consulate in the SR	Consul
The Republic of Albania	Púpavová 61 841 04 Bratislava	Juraj Kolesár <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Botanická 27 841 01 Bratislava	Štefan Ižold <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Bangladesh	Juraja Hronca 44 841 01 Bratislava	Štefan Petkanič <i>honorary consul</i>
The Czech Republic	Rázusová 13 P.O. BOX E-10 040 40 Košice	Vítězslav Pivoňka <i>general consul</i>
The Republic of Chile	Laurinská 2 815 08 Bratislava 1	Jaroslav Šoltys <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Denmark	Ventúrska 12 815 16 Bratislava	Michal Lörincz <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Finland	Moyzesova 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	Karol Kállay <i>honorary general consul</i>
Grenada	Priemyselná 6 824 90 Bratislava 2	Juraj Široký <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Guinea	Devínska cesta 108/A 841 04 Bratislava	Lubomír Schweighofer <i>honorary viceconsul</i>
The Republic of Iceland	Mlynské nivy 42 821 09 Bratislava 2	Otto Halás <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of South Africa	Révova 27 811 02 Bratislava	Milan Lopašovský <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Kirgizstan	Miletičova 1 821 08 Bratislava	Tibor Podoba <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Colombia	Nadácia Slovak Gold Dostojevského rad 3 814 99 Bratislava	Miroslav Behúň <i>honorary consul</i>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

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The Republic of Korea	Hviezdoslavovo nám. 20 811 02 Bratislava 1	Marián Mojžiš <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Costa Rica	Prepoštská 6 811 01 Bratislava	Tomáš Chrenek <i>honorary consul</i>
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	Bajkalská 25 827 18 Bratislava 2	František Fitoš <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Hungary	Hlavná 67 040 01 Košice	Imre Czékemán <i>general consul</i>
The Kingdom of Morocco	Krajná 86 821 04 Bratislava 2	Ľubomír Šídala <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Nicaragua	Fedinova 6 851 01 Bratislava	Vladimír Kašták <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Peru	Tuhovská 5 831 07 Bratislava	Andrej Glatz <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Nám. osloboditeľov 1 031 01 Liptovský Mikuláš	Tadeusz Frackowiak <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Kongo	Na Hrebienku 30 811 02 Bratislava	Soňa Klimeková <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Sierra Leone	Partizánska 16 A 811 03 Bratislava	Branislav Hronec <i>honorary consul</i>
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	Grösslingova 53 814 14 Bratislava	Štefan Žiak <i>honorary consul</i>
Salvador	Bratislava	Igor Moravčík <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Senegal	Na kopci 24 010 01 Žilina - Trnové	Souleymane Seck <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Seychelles	Šalviova 1 830 00 Bratislava 3	Andrej Hryc <i>honorary consul</i>
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	Podunajská 24 821 04 Bratislava	Ľubomíra Károlyiová <i>honorary consul</i>
The Syrian Arab Republic	Vysoká 15 811 06 Bratislava	Mustafa Lutfi Al Sabouni <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Hutnícka 1 040 01 Košice	Daniel Lučkanič <i>honorary consul</i>

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The Kingdom of Sweden	Lermontovova 15 811 05 Bratislava	Ruben Kemény <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Kingdom of Thailand	Viedenská cesta 3 851 01 Bratislava	Alexander Rozin <i>honorary general consul</i>
Ukraine	Budovateľská 29 0903 01 Vranov nad Topľou	Stanislav Obický <i>honorary consul</i>
Ukraine	Plzeňská 11 080 01 Prešov	Inna Ohnivets <i>honorary consul</i>

List of the Embassies of the Slovak Republic, Permanent Missions, Consulates General, Slovak Institutes Abroad

The Embassies of the Slovak Republic, Permanent Missions, Consulates General, Slovak Institutes and their Heads as of February 2006

Embassy	Country	In charge of the embassy
Abuja	Abuja Nigeria	Igor Hajdušek <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Ankara	Atatürk Bulvari 06692 Ankara Turkey	Viktor Bauer <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Astana	Sary-Arka, Karatöke 5 010000 Astana Kazakhstan	Dušan Podhorský <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Athens	Paleo Psychiko 154 52 Athens The Hellenic Republic	Jaroslav Chlebo <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Baghdad	Street 37 P.O.Box 2038 Bagdad Iraq	
Bangkok	No. 21/144, South Sathorn Road Bangkok 101 20 Thailand	Vasil Pytel' <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Belgrade	Bulevar umetnosti 18 New Belgrade 110 70 Serbia and Montenegro	Igor Furdík <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Berlin	Friedrichstrasse 60 10117 Berlin Germany	Ivan Korčok <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Bern	Thunstrasse 3006 Bern Switzerland	Štefan Schill <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

continued

Brasilia	Caixa postal 70359-970 Brasilia Brazil	Marián Masarik <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Brussels	Avenue Moliere Brusel-Ixelles Belgium	Peter Sopko <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Budapest	Stefánia út. 1 143 Budapest XIV Hungary	Juraj Migaš <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Buenos Aires	Figueroa Alcorta 1425 Buenos Aires Argentina	Vladimír Grác <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Bucharest	Strada Otetari 702 06 , Bucuresti Romania	Ján Šoth <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Canberra	Culgoa Circuit, O' Malley 2606 Canberra Australia	Peter Procházka <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Damascus	East Villas - Mezzeh 331 15 Damascus Syria	Oldrich Hlaváček <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Delhi	New Delhi 110021 New Delhi India	Alexander Il'aščik <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Dublin	Clyde Road, Ballsbridge Dublin Ireland	Ján Gábor <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Haag	Parkweg 2585 Haag The Netherlands	Ján Kvapil <i>chargé d' affaires</i>
Havana	Calle No. 521 Havana Cuba	Ivo Hlaváček <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Helsinki	Annankatu 00100 Helsinki Finland	Viera Štupáková <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Jakarta	Jalan Profesor Mohammad Yamin 29 1368 Jakarta 103 10 Indonesia	Peter Holásek <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>

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Cairo	3, Adel Hosein Rostom 450/11794 Cairo Egypt	Jozef Cibula <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Copenhagen	Vesterled 2100 Copenhagen Denmark	Anna Juríková <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Kuwait	Block No.2, Street No.16, Villa No 22 26222 Kuwait	Ján Lišuch <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Kiev	Jaroslavov val č. 34 010 34 Kiev Ukraine	Urban Rusnák <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Lisbon	Avenida Fontes Pereira de Melo 19, 7. Dto 1050-116 Lisbon Portugal	Radomír Boháč <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
London	Kensington Palace Gardens W8 4QY, London The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	František Dlhopolček <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Ljubljana	Tivolská cesta 4, P.P.395 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia	Roman Paldan <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Madrid	del Pinar 28006 Madrid Spain	Ján Valko <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Mexico City	México 11 560 Julio Verne 35 Mexico	Jozef Adamec <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Minsk	Vostočnaja 220113 Minsk Belarus	Jozef Mačišák <i>chargé d' affaires</i>
Moscow	J. Fučíka 17/19 Moscow Russia	Augustín Čisár, <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Nairobi	Milimani Road 30204 Nairobi Kenya	Igor Líška <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>

continued

Nicosia	4, Kalamatas St., Acropolis, Strovolos 2002 1165 Nicosia Cyprus	Ján Varšo <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Oslo	Thomas Heftyes gate NO-0244 Oslo Norway	Dušan Rozbora, ambassador <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Ottawa	Rideau Terrace K1M 2A1 Ottawa Canada	Stanislav Opiela <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Paris	rue du Ranelagh 75016 Paris France	Mária Krasnohorská <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Beijing	Jianguomenwai, Ritan Lu 100 600 Peking China	Žigmund Bertók <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Prague	Pod Hradbami 1 160 00 Prague Czech Republic	Ladislav Ballek <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Pretoria	930 ARCADIA Street 12736 Pretoria The Republic of South Afrika	Pavol Ivan <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Roma	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 00194 Roma Italy	Vladimír Urban <i>chargé d'affaires</i>
Sarajevo	Skopljanska br.7 710 00 Sarajevo Bosnia and Herzegovina	Miroslav Mojžita <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Sofia	Blv. Janko Sakazov 1504 Sofia Bulgaria	Michal Kottman, ambassador <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Seoul	389-1 Hannam-dong, Yongsam-gu 140-210 Seoul South Korea	Pavol Hrmo, ambassador <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Stockholm	Arsenalsgaten 2/3 TR P.O.Box 7183 Stockholm Sweden	Lubomír Čaňo <i>chargé d'affaires</i>

Annexes

continued

Tashkent	18 Yakkasaroy Street 700121 Tashkent Uzbekistan	Karen Chačarjan <i>chargé d'affaires</i>
Tehran	No.38, Sarlashgar Fallahi Street P.O.Box. 11365-4451 Tehran Iran	Ján Jursa <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Tel Aviv	Jabotinsky 37 P.O.Box 6459 Tel Aviv Israel	Milan Dubček <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Tokyo	2-11-33, Motoazabu, Minato- ku 106-0046 Tokyo Japan	Peter Vršanský <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Tripoli	Hay Al-Andalus, Gargaresh Street, 3 km P.O.BOX 5721 Tripoli Libya	Ján Bóry <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Warsaw	ul. Litewska 6 00-581 Warszawa Poland	František Ružička <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Vatikan	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 144 00 194 Roma Italy	Dagmar Babčanová <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Vienna	Armbrustergasse 24 A-1190 Wien Austria	Jozef Klimko <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Washington	3523 International Court, NW 20008 Washington D.C. United States of America	Rastislav Káčer <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Zagreb	Prilaz Gjüre Deželica br. 10 10000 Zagreb Croatia	Ján Báňas <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>

Permanent Missions

Permanent Mission	Address	Head of the Mission
PM EU Brussels	Avenue de Cortenbergh 79 1110 Brussels Belgium	Maroš Šefčovič
PM NATO Brussels	Boulevard Leopold III, NATO HQ 1110 Brussels Belgium	Igor Slobodník
PM UN New York	Second Avenue 10017 New York USA	Peter Burian
PM UN Geneve	9, chemin de l'Ancienne Route 1218 Grand Saconnex Switzerland	Kálmán Petöcz
PM Council of Europe Strasbourg	Rue Ehrmann 67000 Štrasburg France	Anna Lampérová
PM OECD Paris	28, avenue d' Eylau 750 16 Paris France	Dušan Bella
PM OSCE Vienna	Blaasstraße 34 A-1190 Vienna Austria	Peter Lizák
PM UN Vienna	Blaasstraße 34 A-1190 Vienna Austria	Juraj Macháč

Consulates General

Country	Name and address of the Consulate General of the SR	Consul General
The Czech Republic	Vodová ul. 10 612 00 Brno	Ivan Nejeschleba
The People's Republic of China	Shanghai, Qi Hua Tower 1375 Huai Hai Yhong Lu 200031 Shanghai	Katarína Stehlíková

continued

The Federal Republic of Germany	Vollmannstrasse 25 d. 819 25 Munich	Peter Mišík
The Republic of Hungary	Derkovits sor 7 5600 Bekescsaba	Štefan Daňo
The Republic of Poland	sw. Tomasza 34 31 027 Cracow	Janka Burianová
The Russian Federation	ul. Orbeli č. 21/2 194 223 Sankt Peterburg	Ivan Horvat
The Republic of Turkey	Aci Su Sokak, Arzu Ap. No. 15/3,7 806 80 Macka Istanbul	Milan Zachar
The United States of America	10 940 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2030 CA 90024 California, Los Angeles	
The United States of America	801 Second Avenue, 12th Floor New York, N.Y. 10017	Ivan Surkoš
Ukraine	Lokoty 4 880 17 Uzhhorod	Michal Biganič

Slovak Institutes

Name	Country	Address
Slovak Institute Berlin	The Federal Republic of Germany	Zimmerstrasse 27D-10117 Berlin
Slovak Institute Budapest	The Republic of Hungary	Rákóczi út. 15, H-1088 Budapešť
Slovak Institute Prague	The Czech Republic	Purkyňova 4/53, P.O. Box 635, 111 21 Praha 1
Slovak Institute Moscow	The Russian Federation	ul. J. Fučíka 17/19RF-123 056 Moskva D-47
Slovak Institute Paris	The Republic of France	125, rue de RanelaghF-75016 Paris
Slovak Institute Roma	The Italian Republic	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 144I-00194 Roma
Slovak Institute Vienna	The Republic of Austria	Wipplingerstrasse 24-26A-1010 Wien
Slovak Institute Warsaw	The Republic of Poland	ul. Krzywe Kolo 12/14a, PL-00 270 Warszawa

List of the Consulates of the Slovak Republic headed by the Honorary Consuls

The Heads of the Consulates as of February 2006

Country	Consulate	Consul
The Republic of Albania	Tirana	Faik Dizdari <i>honorary consul</i>
The Argentine Republic	La Plata	Eduardo Kabát <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Commonwealth of Australia	Melbourne	Vojtech Michael Markuš <i>honorary consul</i>
The People's Republic of Bangladesh	Dhaka	Reza Ali <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Antverpy	Gunar Riebs <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Gent	Arnold Vanhaecke <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Namur	Fernand Halbart <i>honorary consul</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Medjugorje	Rajko Zelinka <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Belo Horizonte	Gécio Cardoso de Britto <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Joinville	Ernesto Heinzelmann <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Recife	Joao Alixandre Net <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Sao Paulo	Peter Pulíček <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Cyprus	Limassol	George Vassos Hadjitheodossiou <i>honorary general consul</i>
The People's Republic of China	Hongkong	Willy Sun Mo Lin <i>honorary consul</i>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Annexes

continued

The Kingdom of Denmark	Aarhus	Štefan Peto <i>honorary consul</i>
The Arab Republic of Egypt	Alexandria, Port Said	Ibrahim Ahmed Gomma El Zeiny <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Finland	Teerijärvi	Mikael Albäck <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Philippines	Cebu City	Antonio N. Chiu <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Philippines	Manila	Robert Chin Siy <i>honorary consul</i>
The French Republic	Lyon	Kathy Bayoud-Vidal <i>honorary consul</i>
The French Republic	Nantes	Philippe Pouquet <i>honorary consul</i>
The French Republic	Saint Pol De León	Yan Méllenec <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Guinea	Conakry	Boubakar Lombonna Diallo <i>honorary konzul</i>
The Hellenic Republic	Thessaloniki	Konstantinos Mavridis <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Amsterdam	Marc Jan Bolland <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Rotterdam	Jacob Ten Hoop <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of India	Calcutta	Patra Sadham Bosé <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Iceland	Reykjavik	Runolfur Oddsson <i>honorary consul</i>
The State of Israel	Beer Sheva	Samuel David Sax <i>honorary consul</i>
The State of Israel	Ha Sharon	Karol Nathan Steiner <i>honorary consul</i>
The State of Israel	Haifa	Dan Mandel <i>honorary consul</i>

continued

The State of Israel	Jerusalem	Dr. Martin Rodan <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Yemen	Saná	Adel Mohamed Al Huraibi <i>honorary consul</i>
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	Amman	Khaldun A. Abuhassan <i>generálny honorárny konzul</i>
Canada	Calgary	Ľudovít Zanzotto <i>honorary general consul</i>
Canada	Montreal	Mark Kmec <i>honorary consul</i>
Canada	Toronto	John Vojtech Stephens <i>honorary consul</i>
Canada	Vancouver	Stanislav Lišiak <i>honorary consul</i>
Canada	Winnipeg	Jozef Kiška <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Kenya	Mombasa	Christoph Modigell <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Korea	Pusan	Bok Soon Ha (Seung Hee, Ha) <i>honorary consul</i>
The Lebanese Republic	Beirut	Roy Antoine Samaha <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Blanche Mourtrier <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Macedonia	Skopje	Vlade Tome Stojanovski <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Malawi	Blantyre	Salim David Bapu <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Moldova	Kishinev	Iurie Grigore Popovič <i>honorary consul</i>
The Principality of Monaco	Monaco	Cristine Noghés-Ménio <i>honorary consul</i>
Mongolia	Ulanbaatar	Munchijn Enchtajvan <i>honorary consul</i>

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The Republic of Mozambique	Maputo	Ismael Mussá Mangueira <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Nepal	Kathmandu	Chatur Dhoj Karki <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Nicaragua	Managua	Francisco Cifuentes Navas <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Bergen	Morten L. Gjesdahl <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Drammen	Zuzana Opavská Wahl <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Trondheim	Erik Frederiksen <i>honorary consul</i>
New Zealand	Auckland	Peter Kiely <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Bad Homburg	Imrich Donath <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Hamburg	Ursula Meyer-Waarden <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Hannover	Dirk Bettels <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Leipzig	Wolfgang Fritz Eschment <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Stuttgart	Christoph Goeser <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Wuppertal	Ivan Koval <i>honorary consul</i>
The Islamic republic of Pakistan	Karachi	Abdula Sikander Ghulamali <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Panama	Panama	Julio César Benedetti <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Paraguay	Asunción	Ricardo Moreno Azorero <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Paraguay	Cuidad del Este	Charif Hammoud <i>honorary consul</i>

continued

The Republic of Poland	Katowice	Marian Czerny <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Poznań	Piotr Stanislaw Styczinski <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Rzeszow	Adam Góral <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Sopot	Jerzy Leśniak <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Szczecin	Roman Pomianowski <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Portugal	Porto	Manuel de Sá Bastos <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Innsbruck	Jurgen Bodenseer <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Linz	Ernst Papesch <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Vienna	Walter Hildebrand <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of El Salvador	San Salvador	Nicolas Antonio Salume Babun <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Senegal	Dakar	Mapathé Ndiouck <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Seychelles	Victoria	<i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Singapore	Singapore	Chio Kiat Ow <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Cleveland	Edward George Keshock <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Denver	Gregor James Fasing <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Detroit	Edward Zelenak <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Chicago	Thomas Kenneth Klimek Ward <i>honorary consul</i>

continued

The United States of America	Indianapolis	Steve Zlatos <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Kansas City	Ross Marine <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Miami	Robert J. Petrik <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Minneapolis	John J. Luknic <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Pittsburgh	Joseph T. Senko <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	San Francisco	Barbara M. Pivnicka <i>honorary consul</i>
The United Mexican States	Guadalajara	Jorge Gutiérrez Orvañanos <i>honorary consul</i>
The United Mexican States	Monterrey	Dr. Atalo Luévano Bueno <i>honorary consul</i>
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	Colombo	Mahen Roshan Andrew Kariyawasan <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Sudan	Khartoum	Nasreldin Ibrahim Shulgami <i>honorary consul</i>
The Syrian Arab Republic	Lattakia	Anas Dib Joud <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Barcelona	Joan Ignacio Torredemer <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Zaragoza	Jean-Pol Jules Marie Bastiaanas <i>honorary consul</i>
The Swiss Confederation	Zürich	Michal Čierny <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Göteborg	Carl Henric Kuylenstiern <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Malmö	Pavol Miklian <i>honorary consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Florenca	Massimo Sani <i>honorary consul</i>

continued

The Italian Republic	Milan	Luigi Cuzzolin <i>honorárny konzul</i>
The Italian Republic	Palermo	Roberto Helg <i>honorary consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Terst	Miljan Todorovič <i>honorary consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Torino	Giuseppe Pellegrino <i>honorárny konzul</i>
Togolese republic	Lomé	Vivoto James Victor Sossou <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Edirne	Coskun Molla <i>honorary consul</i>
Ukraine	Uzhhorod	Ivan Julievič Šufrič <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Uruguay	Montevideo	Carlos Alberto Tellería López <i>honorárny konzul</i>
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	Caracas	Dušan Poloni <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Zambia	Lusaka	Jaroslav Kulich <i>honorary consul</i>

Numbers of the members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in Peace Missions

As of January 2006

Mission	Country	Number of the SR Armed Forces Members
UN		
UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) – UN	Syria, Golan Heights	95
UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) – UN	Cyprus	196
UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) – UN	Syria, Israel	2
NATO		
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)	Afghanistan	56
KFOR (Kosovo Force) – NATO	Kosovo	111
NATO Headquarters (Sarajevo)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
NTM I (NATO)	Iraq	4
EU		
ALTHEA	Bosnia and Herzegovina	35
ALTHEA (Headquarters)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
EUMM (EU Monitoring Mission) - EU	area of former Yugoslavia	2
OSCE		
OSCE	Georgia	2
Others		
Iraqi Freedom	Iraq	104

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic (www.mosr.sk)

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