



**YEARBOOK
OF SLOVAKIA'S
FOREIGN POLICY
2010**

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OF THE SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION

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FOREWORD

This is only for the second time in the history of this edition, that the Yearbook assesses a year which saw a complete political power shift and thus an exchange of those who make and decide on foreign policy. It was an election year, a year of foreign policy accent shift, and a year of institutional and personnel changes (not only) at the Foreign Ministry.

For the first time, the leader of the strongest coalition party became the Foreign Minister; a person with the real political power to move our foreign policy (and not only in the institutional or financial sense) a step (leap) forward. One can only hope that the current Government will also have the political will to do so. The first few post-election months have, however, already provided some indications. First of all, the integration of the diplomatic service, discussed often since 1993, became reality in 2010 and represents an important milestone in the future realization of our foreign policy.

Progress was also achieved in strained neighborhood relations. Despite a complicated bilateral agenda, many open issues and rather different approaches, an open confrontation with Hungary was replaced with an unemotional and calm (sometimes even too calm) dialogue supplemented by European solutions. Slovakia's new "leadership" also changed its stance toward our only neighbor being in a different international regime. It is very positive that our Government came to the understanding that irrespective of the political leadership, supporting the integration process of Ukraine into the EU is a part of our own policy of overcoming regional disparities within Slovakia and thus it is in our state's interest.

Progress was also made in regional cooperation in the field of natural gas supply security (sadly, once again we only resolved to risk-prevention measures after it had happened, but better late than never). It is a new and positive phenomenon in our

cooperation with V4 partners and Austria. From Slovakia's perspective, regional cooperation in energy mainly solves our problem.

The loan to Greece along with the European Financial Stability Mechanism, were important issues before as well as after the elections. As of yet, we do not know the answers to gradually emerging questions, but we know that it is in our interest to have a stable currency and a stable euro zone with satisfied citizens. It is therefore crucial to answer the following question first: "Which decisions will contribute to the long-term stability of our currency, the euro."

A significant improvement was also achieved under the former leadership in relations between NGOs and the Ministry, when the NGDO Platform chair and the Foreign Minister signed a Memorandum of understanding in May 2010. It is only good that continuity is clearly visible in this direction after the elections.

A positive signal was sent – not only to Europe, but to the entire world – by the determination of our representatives not to celebrate the anniversaries of totalitarian/authoritarian regimes which violate basic human rights. We must also appreciate the principal position of our diplomacy on awarding the Nobel Prize to a Chinese dissident, on the release of Myanmar's political prisoners, and the clear position on the Belarusian regime's repression of its own citizens.

These (and many other) events of the (entire) year 2010 are addressed in what is now the 12th Yearbook – whether in an assessment of our performance and promotion of our goals or interests in the international environment, an analysis of the realization of priority foreign policy goals, or in an evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of instruments for their realization. Obviously, the book only offers an analytical assessment within the natural limits of the publication of this kind, covering not all the fields and regions in which our foreign policy was visible or active.

Slovakia's President is the first to assess the year 2010 in this year's edition. Even though the Yearbook is primarily meant for analytical assessments, the editorial board considers an opening address and position of the only supreme official to be in office for all of 2010 to be a positive contribution. Traditionally, the views and opinions of the Foreign Minister are present in the Yearbook. In his contribution, he presents and assesses the issues and aspects of Slovakia's foreign policy, which are thoroughly examined by other authors in the book, as well as his opinions on the future of our foreign policy under the new leadership. Both texts give the reader a unique opportunity of seeing the same issue from different (this time also politically) angles in one publication.

The expert section is opened by the evaluation of Slovakia's operation in the international environment. The contribution of Vladimír Bilčík from the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (RC SFPA) assessing Slovakia's performance within the EU is, as always, the introductory text of this section. He addresses issues related to the practical implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the consequences of the financial and economic crises. He also analyzes how the election campaign prior to the June 2011 parliamentary elections in Slovakia influenced the positions of Slovakia's politicians in the EU, i.e. the loan to Greece issue, the creation of the European Financial Stability Mechanism, as well as changes in the competences of

individual governmental departments. Security and defense policy, or an analysis of our capacities and capabilities to participate on international security respectively, is offered by Ivo Samson, head of the International Security research program at the RC SFPA. He analyzes it through the prism of three key events of 2010: parliamentary elections in Slovakia, the new NATO Strategic Concept, and Slovakia's strategic review of defense policy process. The ever more serious and urgent issue of climate change is addressed in the text of Juraj Mesík, an independent analyst. He takes a detailed look at developments between the Copenhagen and Cancun summits, including the summit conclusions, and maps the main climate events of 2010 – both in the global perspective and from Slovakia's point of view – while outlining what the population will have to face in the future. The part focusing on Slovakia's operation in the international environment concludes with the text of Irina Mattová, from the University of Prešov, characterizing global governance, mapping the agenda of non-formal groups (G8, G20), and indicating the driving forces that will determine the future agenda of these groups in relation to Slovakia.

The second part of the Yearbook, focused on the priorities of our foreign policy, is opened by the article of Juraj Marušiak, from the Institute of Political Science of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. He analyzes the issue being rich for developments every year – Slovak–Hungarian relations. Relations with Hungary represented a specific problem encompassing both a foreign and a domestic policy dimension. The domestic policy dimension not only concerned ethnical cleavages on Slovakia's political scene but also relations between “Slovak” and “Hungarian” political parties within Slovakia respectively. Tomáš Strážay, head of the RC SFPA Central and Southeastern Europe research program, analyzes Slovakia's Central European activities. Due to the Visegrad 2010 jubilees his analysis is split into two parts: an outline of the key factors that characterized Visegrad cooperation throughout the years and an analysis of V4 priorities in 2010 with an emphasis on the preparation and realization of Slovakia's V4 Presidency. Director and head of the RC SFPA Eastern Europe research program, Alexander Duleba, gives an analytical “picture” of Slovakia's relations with both, EU Eastern Partnership countries and Russia, while comparing the policies toward individual countries under the governments of Robert Fico and Iveta Radičová. Slovak activities in the Western Balkans which still belong to the regional priorities of Slovakia's foreign policy and being a region where Slovakia has a good reputation and trustworthy political positions, were assessed by an independent journalist, Július Lőrincz.

The third part of the book, devoted to the foreign policy instruments, is opened by a text from Nora Beňáková, Chairman of the NGDO Platform, Ján Mihálik, from PDCS, and Peter Brezáni, from RC SFPA, who focus their attention on the functioning of our most visible bilateral foreign policy tool – development cooperation. The authors evaluate the practical fulfillment of goals set in documents and attempt to provide an overview of Slovakia's development assistance activities in 2010. The article offers a set of proposals and recommendations to improve the ODA quality and efficiency. The section dedicated to foreign policy instruments closes with a text by Ondrej Gažovič, from the Institute of European Studies and International Relations of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Comenius University in Bratislava,

who assesses the changes in Slovakia's public diplomacy in 2010. He also offers an overview of the practical activities of this policy, the opportunities that were seized and squandered, and a reflection on the future perspective of public diplomacy in the context of Slovakia's foreign policy.

The expert section is concluded with another new thing, the regularly irregular section: The history of Slovak foreign policy. Its inclusion will be conditioned by the commemoration of a significant anniversary related either to an important person or event in Slovak foreign policy. Since 2010 we commemorated the 130th anniversary of the birth of a prominent Slovak diplomat – Milan Rastislav Štefánik, we decided to begin with a study on his diplomatic and strategic successes written by the experienced diplomat and historian, Miroslav Musil.

The expert section is traditionally supplemented by annexes, such as the chronology of the most important foreign policy events, a list of international treaties, information on the structure and representatives of state administrative bodies operating in foreign policy, a list of diplomatic missions and representatives of the SR abroad, the diplomatic corps of the SR, information on military missions abroad etc.

We firmly believe that this Yearbook will once again find its readers and serve all those who are interested in the past, present, and future of Slovakia and her foreign policy. In conclusion, we would like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic for its cooperation in this project and its support, and for the fact that thanks to this cooperation we are able to continue building this much needed tradition.

Peter Brezáni
editor



SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY IN 2010 AS SEEN BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

IVAN GAŠPAROVIČ

The hectic international development in the first months of 2011 created an impression that 2010 was not very dynamic or even indistinct from the foreign policy perspective. However, we should not succumb to this delusion. Since the outbreak of the 2008–2009 global financial and economic crisis, the international development commenced its long journey of global or local turbulences that follow in the international events of 2010 and have continued with dramatic changes in the Arab world in 2011. As for Slovak foreign policy, it was also a year of changes in the government, the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the emphasis on specific aspects of foreign policy.

The President's foreign policy activities in 2010 focused on reinforcing the friendships with the allies and partners, on contributing to securing the favorable international conditions in order to enhance security and welfare of the state and on improving the standards of living of the Slovak citizens. At the same time, the President made effort to ensure a smooth change of the governments as well as continuity in consistent assertion of the Slovak national interests in international environment. The imperative of his deeds was to strengthen the position of Slovakia as a respected member of the international community who responsibly fulfills its international commitments. For a country like Slovakia, it is vital to be a part of international communities who respect their partners and the international law, who abide their own rules and commitments; communities really supporting their partners in tense situations. It is the only way Slovakia can stand up for its interests, increase its political earnestness, importance and the guarantees of its own security.

It is therefore quite natural that the foreign policy activities of the Head of State in 2010 aimed at developing good and pragmatic relations with our neighbors as well as other partners in global politics and economy as well as at strengthening of our friendly relations with the allies in the EU and NATO. The talks with the partners fo-

cused especially on the mitigation of the global economic crisis impacts on the Slovak citizens, the protection of economic security of the country, the expansion of Slovak export opportunities and the inflow of foreign investments as well as searching for and supporting the joint international policy. The President strived to fulfill these intentions in coordination with other senior constitutional officials and/or the ministries. He created a room for mutual communication, which, however, was not used to its full extent. One of the positive exceptions was the coordination of the approaches and activities of the President with the Foreign Ministry.

SECURITY POLICY

As for national and international security, indisputable continuity can be seen in Slovak foreign policy in 2010. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the main guarantor of our security. Slovakia actively joined NATO operations of the international crisis management and participated in building of the NATO Response Force. Slovakia increased the quantity as well as the quality of its participation in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. The President personally verified this fact during his visit to the military contingent at the NATO base in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 2010. The US commander of the military base in Kandahar Gen. Jeffrey B. Kendall told him during their meeting: "You box here in a higher weight class than you are predestined to."

Slovakia promoted reinforcement of transatlantic relations and the cooperation between the Alliance and the EU and actively participated in the preparation of NATO's new Strategic Concept. We kept promoting the NATO enlargement process, too.

The October 2010 NATO Lisbon summit was very important for the medium-term prospects of the North Atlantic Alliance. Its results are in compliance with the long-term priorities of Slovakia in the Alliance. Important tasks were identified during the summit, e.g. the construction of an antiballistic missile defense system for the European member states (and cooperation with Russia in this field) and the reform of the command structure and NATO agencies. Slovakia plans to increase the number of her troops in the ISAF operation by 10 per cent and to expand their deployment in training of the Afghan forces. In Lisbon, the President stressed that the key to a success of the international community in Afghanistan will be, above all, the actions of the Afghan leaders. At the Lisbon summit Slovakia supported the adoption of NATO's new Strategic Concept as the key program document of the Alliance and welcomed the beginning of a new era in relations with the strategic partners (especially with the EU and Russia), and specification of the NATO strategy in Afghanistan.

The so-called "domestic policy paradox of the Slovak NATO membership" deepened throughout the 2010. On one hand, membership provided Slovakia with a feeling of security, but on the other hand, caused marginalization of security issues in the political dialogue within the country. The will to fulfill the goals and tasks of the defense and

security policy of Slovakia remained largely at the declaratory level. Slovak Armed Forces face new tasks, there are new threats emerging, but various Slovak governments keep reducing the defense budget. If Slovakia is to act in order to be considered a reliable partner and a committed ally also in the future, it is essential to change fundamentally the approach to the issues of enhancing the quality of the Slovak Armed Forces.

The OSCE summit in Astana (Kazakhstan) at the beginning of December 2010, where a final political declaration was adopted, was of great importance for security and cooperation in Europe. One has to appreciate the facts that the summit took place after 11 years of stagnation in the OSCE activities as well as that 56 high representatives of the participating states managed to meet there and despite many differences in opinions showed their will to seek the ways to revive the OSCE activities. Negotiations must be considered much more acceptable than military confrontation, violence and lack of communication. At the Astana summit, the President supported preservation of this European security framework, because its structure is unique – it represents a regional forum of all the European countries plus the USA, Canada, and several Asian countries, which are able to communicate through the three main dimensions of the organization's activities – the political-military, the economic, environmental and the human dimension – the responses to the new challenges of the era: international terrorism, aggressive nationalism and intolerance, illegal immigration and drug spreading, the consequences of the financial, economic and energy crises etc. The summit accomplished what it could. It created a room for seeking new frameworks for negotiations on controlling conventional arms in Europe as well as on the overall security architecture of Europe.

The OSCE summit in Astana at the beginning of December 2010, where a final political declaration was adopted, was of great importance for security and cooperation in Europe.

The most urgent issue of the Astana summit was to achieve a general agreement on future negotiations on modernization of the armament and disarmament control. The new model might become the cornerstone of our security organization again. Intensive negotiations on this issue took place in Astana, and they continue also in 2011. This was also the result of Slovakia's presidency of the Joint Consultative Group of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe which held negotiations also during the summit. At the summit, the President also stated:

Let us not waste time and energy on discussing who contributed more and who less to undermining the basic attributes of the Helsinki Process – that is, solidarity and trust. Polemic is not a way to find solutions. Let us focus our dialogue on the future, on finding and defining the basic life interests in our geopolitical region, on developing a complex approach to security. That is what I consider the main point of the efforts to revive the OSCE. We have a unique and what is maybe the last chance to definitely close the period of confrontation and dividing lines.

He called upon the partners to develop the soft security tools of the organization. The Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security architecture would not be complete without them.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

We gradually get used to the fact that we should approach European matters as domestic policy issues rather than a foreign policy agenda. Internal development and adoption of any measures within the EU imminently affect also the domestic functioning of our state and economy. That was the reason why we paid so much attention to the EU, which faced and still faces one of the most difficult periods in its history. The Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009; however, so far it does not meet the expectations of the member states to increase the efficiency of administration and the prestige of the EU in the world.

We have always somewhat automatically linked the EU with success and welfare. Many people in Slovakia were taken by surprise that some of the members of the groupings – the membership cost Slovakia so much domestic effort and social patience – suddenly face existential problems. Many were taken by surprise also by the fact that Slovakia also has to make a contribution within respecting the principle of solidarity, mutual aid and responsibility of the nation and the community for the development of the Union. At the time of

At the time of a legitimate discussion on aid to Greece, the President tried to assert the perception of the Union's solidarity as a key value of European integration.

a legitimate discussion on aid to Greece, the President tried to assert the perception of the Union's solidarity as a key value of European integration. He has not changed his position in present days, either. He is convinced that urgent problems in the Union always need to be solved at first and then it is necessary to look for long-term sustainable solutions in consensus within the Union. There is no doubt that overcoming the consequences of the continuing crisis will be easier through intensive communication and cooperation of large and small EU countries, close coordination of the national governments in larger groupings, and at the same time respecting the democratic principle of equality of the countries. The President therefore did not support the ones who doubted the meaningfulness of the common European currency, the euro, and called to common action of the euro zone members in order to sustain it. The adoption of the European Stability Mechanism and the "Europe 2020 Strategy" are following exactly this direction.

Slovakia in 2010 consistently supported continual EU enlargement. The Slovak Republic strongly supported Croatian accession into the EU during an official visit of the Croatian President Ivo Josipović paid to Slovakia. In the bilateral negotiations with the President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, in New York in September 2010 Slovakia also supported Serbia's EU ambitions, just as it supported Bosnia and Herzegovina on the path to the EU during the discussion with the member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina's Presidency Nebojša Radmanović. However, Slovakia kept stressing that a condition of the accession of the new members is to meet the same criteria Slovakia had to meet.

2010 was also a year of the new European Commission and the year of launching the European External Action Service. To date, there have been insufficient or convincing results proving that the path took in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is the right one. However, the good news for Slovakia was that a Slovak diplomat became the Managing Director for Russia, the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans.

Slovakia strategically links its future with the future of a unified Europe. We feel political co-responsibility for our European project and we will very systematically try to prevent the weakening of the EU's emphasis on the common European action on the internal as well as external matters. It is essential, since there is no other, more sensible, viable or more peaceful alternative for European integration.

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

We believe that the universal mission of the UN is to guarantee peace and security in the world, based on collective participation of the countries that is in compliance with international law including disarmament. In September 2010 the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mikuláš Dzurinda, took part in the 65th UN General Assembly session in New York. The President made an address based on the general discussion in the General Assembly and at the Millennium Development Goals Summit. He had talks with the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and with the 65th General Assembly President Joseph Deiss.

Most of the speeches in the UN discussed the global crisis. The President agreed that if the UN is to be able to respond efficiently to the current challenges of the twenty-first century, it requires synergic action of all the UN agencies, programs, funds and expert organizations of the UN system. He stressed that 2010 accentuated ruptures in the mutual coordination in relation to the fulfillment of the UN goals. In practice, the individual UN authorities' conclusions even collide, and sometimes they do not abide by their own decisions. He pinpointed that establishing conditions for just and sustainable development should go hand in hand with the respect for nature and its rules. He also emphasized the importance of the role that the UN and its agencies play in guaranteeing human rights protection. The President also supported the enhancement of institutional cooperation of the UN with the EU and NATO.

At the extraordinary Millennium Summit in New York, the President expressed his dissatisfaction with the progress of fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals. The MDGs were adopted by the international community at the beginning of this millennium, with the ambition to eliminate poverty, to improve healthcare and to promote education by means of sustainable development. He informed the audience of Slovak development assistance, which focuses on the poorest and the most vulnerable. This

concerns especially the educational project in the South Sudan, where the Slovaks educate children and adults. In Kenya, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Uganda, Zambia and Haiti, Slovakia provides complex healthcare and social care for people with the HIV/AIDS disease through development projects. In 2010, the President visited such a workplace in Cambodia in person. Slovakia will promote development and humanitarian activities also in the future.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

After the V4 countries joined the Schengen Area, mutual contacts became more intensive in the region among the countries. Nevertheless, Slovakia has traditionally paid special attention to the bilateral relations with its neighbors and 2010 was not any different. The emphasis was laid on deepening the high-standard relations with the Czech Republic and Poland in all areas of cooperation. A positive turn

was visible in contacts with Hungarian high representatives, also on the presidential level. During the V4 summit in Karlovy Vary, the first meeting with the Hungarian President Pál Schmitt took place; the Slovak President also held bilateral negotiations with the Czech President Václav Klaus and with the new Polish President Bronisław Komorowski.

In 2010, Slovak–Hungarian relations were a matter of exceptional interest of Slovakia’s foreign partners.

They have difficulties understanding why the two countries, allies and partners in NATO and the EU, who successfully cooperate within the V4, with the total annual business turnover of 4,5 billion euro, who declare that they share the same democratic values and who are both looking with a great hope towards their common European future, why these two countries are unable to understand each other in the issue of national minorities. Slovakia also tries to find the answer to this question. We keep explaining to foreign partners that Slovakia consistently follows the international law, that it is the country that is primarily responsible for taking care of its minorities. Slovakia has created the necessary legal framework for exerting the minority members’ rights. However, throughout 2010 it was impossible to eliminate the impression that our Hungarian neighbors think exactly on the contrary – that the Hungarian national minority along the Slovak–Hungarian borders is in the center of their attention, while their own national minorities are in the final stage of assimilation and do not enjoy the European legal standards on minority protection as is the case of the national minorities in Slovakia. The articles 33 and 34 of the Slovak Constitution formulate the laws of the national minorities and ethnic groups precisely, in a human and social manner. The legal, economic and social system established such conditions as to provide

It is difficult to understand when a neighbor unilaterally attempts to establish non-standard legal bounds with the citizens of a neighboring state instead of strengthening the respect and trust between the neighbors.

a real homeland for all the national minorities and ethnic groups in Slovakia. That is Slovakia's fundamental interest.

It is difficult to understand when a neighbor unilaterally attempts to establish non-standard legal bounds with the citizens of a neighboring state instead of strengthening the respect and trust between the neighbors. The Slovak political scene might have reacted to these attempts too sensibly and with certain distrust. Nevertheless, that is quite understandable. Although Slovak statehood is relatively young, the nation has its centuries-long historical memory and experience. They teach the nation not to perceive facts as isolated from the historical and political context. That is the reason why Slovakia is concerned. That is why it wants to and will talk about these issues with its Hungarian partners and try to find rational solutions in a political dialogue. The solutions that will be understood also by all our friends abroad.

The negotiations of the Slovak President with his partners from Southeastern Europe represent a part of the long list of the Slovak bilateral activities in relation to the Western Balkans in 2010. The President officially visited Slovenia; the Croatian President Ivo Josipović visited Slovakia; there was a meeting with the President of Serbia, Boris Tadić, in New York as well as with the member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina's Presidency Nebojša Radmanović in Astana. During the talks, Slovakia supported the EU integration efforts of the Western Balkan countries by supporting the EU and NATO's open-door policy and involvement in searching for the solutions to complex local problems.

The President of the Republic of Cyprus Demetris Christofias visited Slovakia in November 2010 and expressed his appreciation to Slovakia in relation to its long-term engagement and support of the bi-communal dialogue in Cyprus, as well as in relation to the activities of the Slovak contingent in the UN peacemaking mission – UNFICYP.

The official visit of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev to Slovakia in April 2010 is considered an important event in the bilateral relations between Slovakia and Russia. During his visit, eight intergovernmental and business agreements were signed between the two countries. The talks focused mainly on enhancing dynamics of business and economic cooperation. The visit confirmed the necessity to build a pragmatic partnership by means of regular political dialogue with emphasis on economic cooperation.

The Slovak President paid also an official visit to Ukraine in October 2010. The talks with the new Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych confirmed the emphasis on economic and cross-boarder cooperation, on security of energy supplies and support of the EU integration processes also through the program of the Eastern Partnership. The dialogue with the partners from Russia and Ukraine reinforced the energy and raw materials security of the Slovak Republic and of Europe.

The Norwegian Royal Couple, H.M. King Harald V and H.M. Queen Sonja visited Slovakia in October 2010. It was an exceptional and, in the end, successful visit which increased the credibility of Slovakia in Norway. It was the only visit the Norwegian Royal Couple made in 2010. During the visit a Memorandum of Understanding on the implementation of the EEA financial mechanism and the Memorandum of Understanding on the implementation of the Norwegian financial mechanism were signed for the

period of the next five years. We also commemorated the 100th anniversary of the death of the outstanding Norwegian defender of the Slovak rights in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Nobel Prize winner, writer and journalist Björnstjerne Börnson.

Slovakia as an export-oriented economy relies on intensive business contacts with Europe and the world. All the official visits of the President abroad and the visits of the partners in Slovakia therefore had a significant economic dimension and they were accompanied with business delegations and preparation of business and economic forums. Having this in mind, the President prepared his visits to the regions of the world with rapid economic growth or having at their disposal sources of investment or raw materials.

The President visited two Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – in March 2010. From the economic perspective, the visit to Shanghai was very interesting. The President opened the National day of the Slovak Republic at the global exhibition EXPO 2010 – a spectacular show of the contemporary cultural life of the planet. He opened the world's premiere of the documentary movie on life and work of the most outstanding architect in Southeast Asia and the Far East of the first half of the twentieth century – Ladislav Hudec. The President visited the special administration divisions of China, Hong Kong and Macau, where he presented Slovakia's interest in foreign investments and development of business and economic contacts with these economically strong enclaves. He also paid the first official presidential visit to the Kingdom of Cambodia, whose king, Norodom Sihamoni, has especially positive relations with Slovakia.

In the course of 2010, the President paid thirteen visits abroad having talks with more than forty partners. In Slovakia he received almost thirty prime ministers, speakers of the parliament, foreign ministers and international dignitaries and more than forty foreign ambassadors.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

After taking over the presidency in the Visegrad Group in the summer of 2010, Slovakia became one of the driving forces of the regional cooperation. The V4 presidents' summit took place in Karlovy Vary, focusing on the issue of the common V4 countries' interest. Slovakia confirmed at the summit that the two decades of cooperation were useful and contributed to the fulfillment of the original strategic goals – integration of the V4 countries into the EU and NATO. The participants agreed on the fact that even in the new conditions, the V4 still represents a useful tool for leading a dialogue and a suitable mechanism of coordination and more efficient assertion of the common interests of the V4 region and our countries in the EU. Factual assessment of future initiatives and assertion of common interests in the area of foreign policy as well as the sectors are objects of interest. The V4 heads of state agreed on the priority areas of enhancing their cooperation and common action, i.e. energy security, maintaining

the principle of cohesion in preparation works for the EU New Financial Perspective, social integration of the Roma people, removing the barriers or regional differences and supporting the EU enlargement. The summit pinpointed the interest in supporting the successful implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy, especially in relation to the neighbors and friends in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership regions, who perceive the example of the Visegrad cooperation as inspiration and encouragement.

In Karlovy Vary, the Slovak President expressed his support for the Hungarian and Polish priorities during their presidencies of the Council of the European Union. The partners from Hungary and Poland expressed their will for coordination with other V4 countries.

COMPATRIOTS AGENDA

There is a constitutional obligation in the politics of Slovakia "to support national awareness and cultural identity of the Slovaks living abroad, to support their institutions established in order to achieve this objective and their relations to their maternal country." The President made efforts to fulfill the disposition provided in the Constitution and he committed himself to reinforcing the spiritual bond of Slovakia with the Slovaks living abroad. His meetings with the compatriots were a part of the program during several of his visits abroad.

In 2010, the President received the Slovaks from abroad during the permanent conference: The Slovak Republic and the Slovaks Living Abroad 2010. He appreciated the ability of the expatriates to preserve their love for the homeland of their ancestors and at the same time their respect and loyalty to the countries they live in. This reflects the essence of the Slovak approach to the compatriots abroad. He pointed out that despite the limited resources, Slovakia will support the compatriotic activities also by means of grants provided by the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad.

CONCLUSION

Slovak foreign policy, being built on the basic values of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance, continually participated on preserving European and global security and stability, reviving European economic development and establishing new frameworks and mechanisms for EU integration also in 2010. It was not a very straightforward or transparent process because of the election campaign and the consequent change of the government in the country. Slovakia has not emerged from the process without a scratch. However, it is encouraging to know that the Slovak political scene is gradually becoming aware of the necessity of more intensive communication and

closer coordination of the foreign policy attitudes among the constitutional officials in order to be more efficient in asserting and protecting the national interests of Slovakia and its citizens. The President calls for such cooperation and he is always ready to provide it.

2010: NEW CHALLENGES WITH NEW ANSWERS

MIKULÁŠ DZURINDA

At the beginning of the 2010–2014 term of the Government, we considered it inevitable to introduce and bring new quality and new dimension to our foreign policy; a value-based approach to formulate our clear positions on particular issues.

The first essential dimension of our foreign policy is accountability. Accountability towards the citizens, our partners, as well as the next generation.

The second one is transparency. Our foreign policy must be clear and possess only one “face.” The same one for voters as well as for international partners on the highest level.

The third dimension of our foreign policy is fundamental values. Values such as human rights and freedoms – the right to life, freedom of speech, religion and many others, being the pillar of the modern democratic society. These are the values we can agree upon despite religious or political differences.

Thus, a value-based foreign policy, accountability and credibility have been the three key pillars for definition of our priorities of our foreign policy program in 2010, symbolically denominated “the foreign policy decalogue.”

A STRONGER EUROPEAN UNION

The above-mentioned pillars of our foreign policy have led us to list the protection of the euro currency and economic and political reinforcement of the EU on the top of our priorities.

We perceive the European Union as a grouping created not only for economic interests, but also for respecting common values and principles. It is the respect to values and principles that motivate us to deal with the current issues.

I would like to stress the crucial points within the 2010 agenda – the effort to mitigate and deal with the consequences of the economic crisis and to agree upon effective prevention mechanisms. We may call it a success that Slovakia, to a considerable point, managed to put ahead her idea on the consolidation of the euro zone.

Even at the beginning of the term, the government was confronted with the issue of the loan for Greece. Slovakia did not choose to follow the opinion of the majority intentionally and did not support the proposal. Despite the initial criticism, our attitudes proved legitimate – rational, responsible and transparent.

Naturally, Slovakia welcomed the decision made in Brussels on May 22, 2010 that the Slovak contribution to the European Stabilization Mechanism will be lowered by 800 million euro. It was not, however, only a matter of defending our own interest. It is far more important that the course of events – including the refusal of the loan to Greece – would lead to searching for a principal solution.

We insist that the banking sector shares the responsibility for economic development in individual states, including its participation on paying off the debts for eventual insolvency of the country.

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country. We consider it essential to toughen the Stability and Growth Pact criteria, and above all, to increase their enforceability. It is necessary to keep fulfilling the criteria constantly and systematically. It is also obvious that one cannot fight the consequences of the crisis with the same means that led to it.

INTEREST IN HAVING A GOOD NEIGHBORHOOD

Good neighborhood relations is another one of our main priorities. After all, our grandparents knew well that if they are to prosper, it is in their own interest that their neighbors prosper as well.

Besides very intensive relations with Poland and Austria, active cooperation with Ukraine and the traditionally above-standard relations with the Czech Republic, the situation took a positive turn in relation to communication with our partners in Hungary. We managed to revive the interrupted dialogue between the two countries and agreed upon mechanisms to deal with the issues in which our opinions differ. We also launched the activities of the mixed committees. The current development implies that the controversial political issues in relations between our countries have not disappeared. We found, however, a way to discuss them and to search for the answers.

Moreover, our mutual relations include a great deal on the agenda imminently affecting the everyday life of our citizens. In other words, there is an unequivocal prevalence of moments and issues that connect us.

The regional cooperation within the Visegrad Four is one of the strongest. Slovakia took over the V4 Presidency on July 1, 2010. The weight of this alliance is visible also in the European Union – for instance within the above-mentioned process of its enlargement.

The V4 potential enables us to resolve problems exceeding the size of individual countries – e.g. the issues of energy security or diversification of the sources of raw materials.

The key issue in relation to problems like these is the construction of the North-South gas network interconnection between the Baltic and the Adriatic Seas. There is a future possibility to connect to the planned European gas projects Nabucco or South Stream by the construction of the gas network interconnection Veľký Krtíš-Vecsés, Slovakia agreed upon with Hungarian partners. The agreement was signed by prime ministers Iveta Radičová and Viktor Orbán in January 2011.

Good neighborhood relations have helped us to make another important step on the path towards the improving our energy security: we launched the gas network interconnection in Baumgarten (Austria) enabling reverse gas flow to Slovakia and also connection to the Nabucco pipeline.

ENLARGEMENT IN THE AREA OF STABILITY

Our engagement in further EU enlargement – having in mind primarily countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe – could be seen in the light of our value-based foreign policy approach. By enlarging the area of stability and prosperity we enlarged the prospects for quality of citizens' life in integrating countries. It is, however, also a matter of a strategic interest for the whole European continent and its security.

Slovakia has supported Croatia's accession from the very beginning; at present this process is coming to its completion. Besides the support we offered Zagreb also the know-how from our own accession process and the harmonization of our legislation with the EU legal norms. On October 15, 2010, Slovakia organized, with the Croatian partners, the conference: Communicating Europe. Thus, Croatia can be now perceived as a prospective 28th EU member.

We also support Montenegro and Serbia, who are yet standing on the "scratch line."

In the case of Serbia, we especially made efforts to remove the obstacles which prevented Serbia from starting the integration process. In June, the Council of the EU unblocked the ratification process of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. It was also thanks to the activities of our diplomacy that the UN General Assembly adopted the compromise resolution on Kosovo, a version of which Serbia agreed

on with the EU. The resolution, calling upon Serbia and Kosovo to continue negotiations, confirms the verdict of the International Court of Justice in The Hague that the declaration of Kosovo's independence did not represent an act being in contradiction with international law. In October 2010, the Council of the EU – actively supported by the Slovak Republic – asked the European Commission to submit its opinion on Serbia's EU membership application.

I do admit that my perception of the fate of Serbia is rather personal. In 1999, I had to face an extremely difficult decision, when I was asked to agree on opening the Slovak airspace to NATO operations against the authoritative Milošević's regime during the conflict in Kosovo. Today, I feel greater responsibility as well as satisfaction that the country has gone through such substantial and positive change over recent years. Its domestic political situation has changed to an extent that the door of the EU is opening to Serbia, nowadays. I consider Serbia's EU membership and establishment of constructive dialogue with Pristina an important condition for the stability in the Balkans as well as in the whole European continent.

We welcomed the December decision of the European Council to grant Montenegro the status of candidate country. I visited Montenegro just during this crucial period, in November 2010. Our experts and the EU and NATO Ambassadors addressed their speeches there as well. Open public discussions reinforced the conviction of the citizens of Montenegro on how important the European and Euro-Atlantic perspective is for them. A positive perception of Slovakia remains as an added value in the country.

Good neighborhood relations have helped us to make another important step on the path towards the improving our energy security: we launched the gas network interconnection in Baumgarten enabling reverse gas flow to Slovakia and also connection to the Nabucco pipeline.

The Visegrad Four became an important accelerator in the EU enlargement process. Our joint activities were underlined by the meetings of the V4 representatives with the representatives of the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe – on October 22, 2010 within a framework of an unof-

official meeting of the foreign ministers of the V4 and the Western Balkan countries and the representatives of the Belgian EU Presidency as well as the European Commission, represented by the European Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle.

A similar event – in 2011 – was the summit of the V4 and the Eastern Partnership foreign ministers, with the presence of the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, European Commissioner Štefan Füle and the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. The meeting sent a clear signal to the countries of the Eastern Partnership that the EU is interested in an active cooperation with them, but it will apply an individual approach – i.e. the EU will support, to a greater extent, the countries more effectively reforming and approximating their political and economic reality to the EU.

The V4 countries consider their strategic interest to enlarge the area of stability and prosperity in the region in their direct neighborhood. They offer their own experience from the transition and integration process, but also more: inspiration and an example that good neighborhood relations and cooperation is the only viable alternative.

The institutional platform for our assistance to the integrating countries is represented by the Center for transfer of integration and reform experience, established at the Foreign Ministry in 2010. Launching of the well-known projects – National convention – in Ukraine and Moldova, which has the ambition to become a positive example for Eastern Europe, could be seen as our contribution to the pro-European orientation of the Eastern Partnership countries.

The value-based dimension of foreign policy led us also to the substantial denouncement of the unacceptable practices of Lukashenko's regime in Belarus. Bratislava sent him an unequivocal and clear message that political prisoners or manipulation of elections do not belong to the Europe of the twenty-first century.

SLOVAKIA IN THE SAFE WORLD

The emphasis on common values and principles is also a fundamental pillar of NATO, which represents the main security guarantee for Slovakia. The development of Alliance in the next years will be determined by the Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Its final version reflects also Slovakia's positions.

Slovakia's participation in the peacemaking missions is a pebble of our efforts in a mosaic of the safe world.

The most important of them is the ISAF operation in Afghanistan with 313 Slovak troops deployed. The NATO mission is aimed at fighting international terrorism as well as at gradual establishment of democratic institutions in the country. Apart from the appreciation from the partners in the Alliance, thanks to our participation in the mission, we gained valuable experience with the comprehensive approach to crisis management. In such cases, military operations must be accompanied with the establishment of the statehood, economic cooperation and development assistance.

The UNFICYP mission in Cyprus, where 198 Slovak troops do their job right, is also of great importance. The Slovak unit has already been deployed there for 10 years and it is the only Unit operating on both sides of the green line dividing the two Cypriot communities. The fact that these are valuable foreign policy assets of Slovakia strengthened my belief that we should continue our presence in the mission.

Finally, 46 troops of the Slovak Armed Forces participate in the ALTHEA mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a part of the EU strategy to ensure stability of the country in the fields of security as well as politics, social affairs and economy.

Among the events that verified our ability of joint respond are, beyond any doubt, the sudden movements in several Arab countries and the continuing conflict in Libya. EU and NATO member states agree that Muammar Gaddafi's regime lost its legitimacy through the ongoing violence inflicted upon the Libyan people. We demand these people to be the ones to decide the future of their country. Our fundamental position that the local inhabitants have to decide on a future government and how they will administrate their public affairs applies not only in relation to Libya, but also generally

in the region. Slovakia will definitely support all the political forces that will promote principles of democracy and respect for fundamental human rights.

We are bound by our value-based policy to help the regions in crisis. In 2010, the Foreign Ministry signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Non-Governmental Development Organizations Platform. During 2010 the Ministry supported development projects in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, Serbia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the total amount of 4,3 million euro. Slovakia also provided humanitarian assistance for the regions affected by natural or environmental disasters, e.g. the assistance with overcoming the consequences of the devastating earthquake in Haiti or the intervention of the Slovak rescue team in the industrial accident near the town of Ajka in Hungary.

ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

2010 induced us to list among our priorities also reinforcement of the economic dimension of diplomacy: the efforts to transform the active international cooperation into actual

We will not be able to achieve significant development of economy if we are in the tail of Europe in the sphere of innovation performance or investments in science and technology.

benefits for our companies, to provide them with export and business opportunities, and, in the end, to help create job opportunities. The Slovak economy is relatively small and open, dependent on foreign investments and export. As a result, it is vulnerable to external influences interconnected with the countries we have close business connections with (especially the EU countries).

As a consequence of these facts, the activity of the economic diplomacy has to be of even greater importance. Its inclusion in the sphere of activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a significant step. Thanks to this fact, the political and economic activities of our Foreign Service will be harmonized and effective. However, it is true that Slovakia has an insufficient number of economic diplomats – comparable to countries which have from six to fifteen times more. Therefore it is necessary to eliminate this deficiency – especially through education, motivation and increasing the efficiency of the consulate network.

The Foreign Ministry established the Information Center of Economic Diplomacy with the aim to provide important information, contacts and advice in relation to business or investment opportunities.

I find investments in education, innovation and technologies, as well as contacts with innovation leaders of a great consequence. We will not be able to achieve significant development of economy if we are in the tail of Europe in the sphere of innovation performance or investments in science and technology.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

The image of a self-confident and successful Slovakia cannot be painted at a clerk's desk. The world will perceive us as successful and credible only if we really have these attributes. On the path to this goal, we defined the three key notions – accountability, credibility and value-based dimension of our foreign policy. The reality convinced us that it is essential for foreign policy to be firmly based on values and that it should above all reflect our own inner beliefs. It has to take into consideration the fact that the subject and the object of our activities is a human being, people – people in Slovakia or Afghanistan, Libya, Serbia or Kosovo – people with their indisputable rights and freedoms. This knowledge remains a reliable indicator and a guide when seeking the answers to the issues and challenges to come.

I.

THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

SLOVAKIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

VLADIMÍR BILČÍK

In 2010 Slovakia's performance in the European Union was dominated by themes relating to the practical implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the impacts of the financial and economic crises. Attitudes of Slovak politicians were significantly influenced by pre-election campaign in June 2010. The election year also affected domestic decisions on a bilateral loan to Greece and on the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility. At the end of 2010, the changes in powers of individual ministries were initiated including the transfer of competences in the area of European affairs from the Government Office of the Slovak Republic to the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

LIFE WITH THE TREATY OF LISBON

European political events in the first months of 2010 were marked by changes arising out of the Lisbon Treaty¹ which came into force in November 2009. On February 9, 2010, the European Parliament approved a new European Commission (EC) led by J.M. Barroso for a five-year term. The new Commission took office in the time of ongoing recession and imminent crisis of the euro area. Even after the adoption of the

¹ "Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007," *Official Journal of the European Union*, 2007. Available online: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:SK:HTML> (accessed on February 20, 2010).

Lisbon Treaty, the Commission only has limited direct instruments in economic policy, and therefore the resolution of Europe's currency crisis, or the fulfillment of the new strategy for economic recovery "Europe 2020," depends on member states.

The Lisbon Treaty increased powers of the European Parliament (EP). The Parliament made use of its new co-decision powers in negotiations over the SWIFT agreement on the exchange of information between the EU and the US (the first draft agreement was rejected by MEPs in February 2010 and the new version was approved in July 2010²), the rules of the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS),³ or the EU's 2011 budget,⁴ when the Union faced real threat of the application of the "provisional twelfth." With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council gained a new political dimension. It comprises heads of governments of a new generation that is only very slightly influenced by the experience of WWII. The activities of the Council are coordinated by its President, Herman Van Rompuy, which makes possible

As for the appointment of new heads of EU diplomatic missions, Slovak candidates have not succeeded so far.

long-term planning and more effective adoption of conclusions. In case of the Council of Ministers, the Lisbon Treaty expanded the use of qualified majority voting that makes large demands on argumentation skills and coalition potential of individual member states. The functioning of a rotating EU presidency has not seen any significant

changes. Apart from the summits of the European Council and EU foreign policy, the tasks of the presidency have remained basically the same, which means that Slovakia will soon have to start preparing for the EU presidency in 2016.

A special challenge for Slovak foreign policy relates to the creation and functioning of the new European diplomatic institution, the European External Action Service (EEAS). In the area of EU foreign policy the debate has focused primarily on the position and personnel issues concerning the new EEAS while discussion of the contents of the EU external policy has been lacking.

Ivan Korčok, head of Slovakia's Permanent Representation to the EU, argues that the nascent EU diplomacy should function as an executive service for the benefit of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, however, it should not become an independent institution or EU political body. According to I. Korčok, Slovakia wants to preserve the Council, an institution comprising all member states, as the main source of EU foreign

² See "Parliament gives green light for SWIFT II," *European Parliament. Press release*, July 8, 2010. Available online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IMPRES-S&reference=20100707IPR78054> (accessed on August 15, 2010).

³ See "EU Foreign Service: EP links budget approval to agreement on EEAS organisation," *European Parliament. Press release*, April 16, 2010. Available online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=en&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20100416IPR72928> (accessed on September 25, 2010).

⁴ See a summary of the negotiations over the EU budget: K. Klaus, "EU Budget 2011 - Parliament votes on new draft budget," EPP, 2010. Available online: http://www.eppgroup.eu/infocus/budget2011_101213_en.asp (accessed on December 14, 2010).

policy-making.⁵ In February 2010, Slovakia, together with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, circulated an informal paper in Brussels in which the four Visegrad countries (V4) argued that the eventual lack of member states' involvement in shaping and implementing policies could lead to "the loss of their interest in EU foreign policy and could even result in a widening gap between EU and national policies." According to this paper, V4 countries consider necessary to ensure that the future EU diplomatic service "ensures an adequate geographical balance and a meaningful presence of nationals from all EU member states."⁶ The European institutions finally reached a compromise on the creation of the European External Action Service on June 21, 2010 in Madrid.⁷ For Slovakia it is important that the adopted document includes the requirement of a geographical balance and an adequate representation of all member states.

The EEAS became operational on January 1, 2011. As for the appointment of new heads of EU diplomatic missions, Slovak candidates have not so far. On the other hand, in December 2010 the head of EU diplomacy Catherine Ashton appointed former Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák as the Managing Director of the EEAS for Russia, Eastern Neighborhood and the Western Balkans. His portfolio also includes diplomatic relations with the countries of Central Asia or Turkey.⁸ Lajčák has thus become one of the highest-ranking diplomats in the EEAS structure who are directly responsible to C. Ashton. In early 2011 Lajčák and Maciej Popowski (Poland) were the highest-ranking EU diplomats from among the post-communist member states.

COORDINATION OF EU POLICY

The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty opened the domestic debate on EU policy-making and coordination in Slovakia. At an annual conference on Slovak foreign policy, held in April 2010, EC Vice-president Maroš Šefčovič suggested that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be renamed as the "Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs." He also called for an audit of EU policy-making across individual ministries in order to identify strong and weak points of EU policy-making and coordination of national policy in

⁵ I. Korčok, "Východná Európa žiada férové zastúpenie v Európskej zahraničnej službe," *euractiv.sk*, March 25, 2010. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/obrana-a-bezpecnost/interview/vychodna-europa-ziada-ferove-zastupenie-v-europskej-zahranicnej-sluzbe-014799> (accessed on March 25, 2010).

⁶ A. Rettman, "New EU states make bid for more diplomatic clout," *EUObserver*, March 10, 2010. Available online: <http://euobserver.com/9/29651> (accessed on March 10, 2010).

⁷ See "External Action Service takes form in Madrid," *NewEurope online*, June 22, 2010. Available online: <http://www.neurope.eu/articles/External-Action-Service-takes-form-in-Madrid-/101618.php> (accessed on June 22, 2010).

⁸ "Lajčák získal prestížne miesto v novej diplomatickej službe EÚ," *euractiv.sk*, December 15, 2010. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/obrana-a-bezpecnost/clanok/lajcak-ziskal-prestizne-miesto-v-novej-diplomatickej-sluzbe-eu-016395> (accessed on December 15, 2010).

the EU. MEP Eduard Kukan called for adjustments to stronger powers of the EP in the decision-making on EU legislation as well as to new powers of national parliaments in assessing Commission's legislative proposals.⁹

In order to improve the EU policy-making and coordination of national policies in the Union, the National Council of the Slovak Republic adopted on October 13, 2010 the Law No. 403/2010 Coll. amending and supplementing Law No. 575/2001 Coll. on organization of activities of the Government and organizations of the central public administration, as amended.¹⁰ The law introduced many shifts of powers in the area of foreign and EU policies. First, with effect from January 2011 the competences of the Economy Ministry in the area of foreign trade concerning the management and administration of Slovak commercial and economic departments abroad were transferred to the Foreign Ministry. The change represents an eventual move towards integrated economic diplomacy of Slovakia. Second, with effect from January 1, 2011 the coordination of the use of EU funds was transferred from the Government Office to the Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development. The change will strengthen the competences and notably the instruments of the first Deputy Prime Minister Ján Figel', for instance in connection with the implementation of transport projects. And third, with effect from November 1, 2010, the coordination of EU policy implementation was transferred from the Government Office to the Foreign Ministry.

The Government argued that the aim of these changes is to reach maximum effectiveness in the performance of activities in the area of foreign and EU policies. In practice, however, the transfer of powers was marked by problems. At the end of December 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted the proposal for adjustments to the functioning of the Ministerial Council of the Slovak Government for European Affairs and sent it for comments to other ministries. The Foreign Ministry suggested that the Ministerial Council of the Slovak Government for European Affairs should be chaired by the Foreign Minister, while in the past it was chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs. The Ministerial Council should comprise individual ministers except for the Prime Minister and should serve for the exchange of information, discussion and coordination of Slovakia's positions in the European Council.

The proposal met with opposition of the Government Office that raised an essential objection to the exclusion of the Prime Minister from the meetings of the Government Council for coordination of EU policies chaired by the Foreign Minister. The Government Office suggested that the SR should create two-level model of coordination of Slovakia's positions in the EU with a prime minister chairing the Council at the level of ministers and the foreign minister chairing the Council at

⁹ "Slovensko bilancuje svoju zahraničnú politiku," *euractiv.sk*, April 12, 2010. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/obrana-a-bezpecnost/clanok/slovensko-bilancuje-svoju-zahranicnu-politiku-014900> (accessed on April 12, 2010).

¹⁰ The full wording of the Law is available online: <http://www.zbierka.sk/zz/predpisy/default.aspx?PredpisID=209904&FileName=zz2010-00403-0209904&Rocnik=2010&#xml=http://www.zbierka.sk/zz/predpisy/default.aspx?HitFile=True&FileID=418&Flags=160&IndexFile=zz2010&Text=403/2010> (accessed on January 15, 2011).

the working level.¹¹ This is despite the fact that the Prime Minister has never been included in the structure of the Ministerial Council of the Slovak Government for European Affairs.

As indicates the dispute between the Government Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the shift of powers in the area of Slovakia's performance in European affairs will be far from simple. In a broader political level it reflects the problem of mutual trust between the Prime Minister Iveta Radicova and the Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda. The prime minister's principal role is to represent Slovakia at the level of the European Council. Prime minister also has the possibility to take an active part in the formulation of Slovakia's preferences in the EU at the level of the Slovak government. The Ministerial Council should help the individual ministers and ministries to make Slovakia's voice in the EU clearer, more coordinated and, if possible, united, while the "coordination of Slovakia's positions in the EU" falls under the competence of the Foreign Ministry.

LOAN TO GREECE

In 2010 the Slovak Republic attracted the attention of the Union by its domestic debate on the country's position toward anti-crisis measures proposed by the EU. Attitudes of Slovak politicians were influenced by the upcoming parliamentary elections (June 2010) as well as by concerns about the adoption of new financial and political obligations.

The former Prime Minister, Robert Fico, agreed to the framework decision on the financial package for Greece, but left the final decision on country's bilateral loan to Slovakia's new parliament. Representatives of three ruling parties – the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ–DS), Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) and Bridge (Most–Híd) – have either rejected or been skeptical about the loan to Greece. They argued that this loan would undermine the already unhealthy state of public finance in Slovakia and that it is not responsible to lend money to notoriously irresponsible Greece. Only some representatives of the Christian and Democratic Movement (KDH) were willing to support the bilateral loan as a necessary solution to the financial crisis.¹²

On August 11, 2010, the Slovak Parliament rejected participation in a loan to Greece drawn up by the International Monetary Fund and the European Union to help the debt-laden country avoid default, heeding recommendations of a new coalition government led by Prime Minister I. Radičová. Of the 79 MPs from the ruling coalition parties, only Anton Marcinič (KDH), former World Bank economist, voted in favor of the bilateral

¹¹ "Európske záležitosti: Radičová sa s Dzurindom dohodla," *euractiv.sk*, January 4, 2011. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/buducnost-eu/clanok/europske-zalezitosti-radicova-sa-dzurindom-dohodla-016454> (accessed on January 4, 2011).

¹² See, for example, "Slovensko zatiaľ nemá jasné stanovisko k pôžičke Grécku," *euractiv.sk*, June 17, 2010. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/buducnost-eu/clanok/slovensko-zatial-nema-jasne-stanovisko-k-pozicke-grecku-015338> (accessed on June 17, 2010).

loan.¹³ MPs from the largest opposition party, Smer-SD, did not take part in voting. Slovakia's share in the 110 billion euro "Greek loan" package was to amount to 817 million euro. If Greece uses up the rescue package, Slovakia's planned contribution to the loan will probably be spread across other euro-area member states.

After the parliamentary elections in June 2010, the arguments used by the opponents of the Greek loan were motivated by the domestic political situation, stressed the nation state's sovereignty in international relations and indicated skepticism towards EU partners. The politicians argued that it is the Greek Government whose irresponsible fiscal policy and misinterpretation of the actual economic situation have led to the current trouble. When commenting on the refusal to provide a loan to Greece, the Finance Minister Ivan Mikloš stated that "the account is going to be paid by taxpayers of other countries who have nothing to do with that". According to Mikloš, it is immoral, and besides, there is also a threat of giving a signal: do not implement reforms, do not act in a responsible manner, cover all debts with the new ones, when the problems occur, other countries will club together to get you out of trouble.¹⁴

After the parliamentary elections in June 2010, the arguments used by the opponents of the Greek loan were motivated by the domestic political situation, stressed the nation state's sovereignty in international relations and indicated skepticism towards EU partners.

The results of the June parliamentary elections have not change the attitude of SDKÚ-DS, SaS and Most-Híd. The Finance Minister I. Mikloš stated that politicians were divided between those "who had courage to call a spade a spade and those bowing down to Brussels".¹⁵ The emphasis on legitimacy of a decision made by the democratically elected parliament was also evident in the Prime Minister I. Radičová's response to the criticism of Slovakia's position from Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for economic and monetary policy. Slovakia's position was backed up by domestic economic and financial limits. The politicians argued that Greeks are richer than Slovaks. Given the bad state of its public finance, I. Mikloš underlined, "Slovakia would have to borrow money to be able to help Greece."¹⁶ In general, the Slovak Republic backed up its position by the government's primary obligation towards the citizens. Country's attitude only reflected the inner motivations as if the problems of the euro-area had nothing to do with Slovakia. The decision on the loan to Greece was made without a wider political reflection of the existing experience with the integration, on the importance of the mutual trust in the euro zone, or on implications of such a decision for Slovakia's position in the EU.

¹³ "Záznam hlasovania ku gréckej pôžičke: Národná rada Slovenskej republiky – hlasovanie poslancov. Schôdza č. 4," August 11, 2010. Available online: <http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Default.aspx?sid=schodze/hlasovanie/hlasklub&ID=27084> (accessed on August 12, 2010).

¹⁴ "The speech by Ivan Mikloš," August 11, 2010. Available online: <http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Default.aspx?sid=schodze/percent2frozprava> (accessed on August 12, 2010).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

In general, the arguments of the opponents of a Greek loan were based on the theory of intergovernmentalism that perceives the state as a crucial actor of integration process, while the international institutions and liabilities have only limited impact on national political preferences. The ruling parties referred to the legitimacy of the parliament (decision taken by the Slovak parliament is good and irrevocable), relative strength or limits of the nation state (Greeks are richer than Slovaks) and to the calculation of short-term costs and benefits based on the current financial possibilities of the country (we do not have money for Greece).

The discussion about a loan to Greece, however, lacked a wider political reflection on the political project of the euro zone. A modern existence of independent Slovakia has been strongly interconnected with the process of European integration. The country considerably benefited from EU membership in the consolidation of its public finance or financial stabilization in the context of the current economic crisis. Political debates on the project at the level of short-term calculations raise questions about Slovakia's long-time participation in the integration project. From the very beginning, the adoption of the euro has been associated with benefits and risks, but the ruling politicians failed to accept the present costs following from the membership in the euro zone. Attitude of the Slovak government and parliament was backed up by national legitimacy and reflected the state of domestic politics. Yet, it surprised the European partners.

Until now, the argumentation based on an individual action of member states has been rather exceptional in the case of Slovakia. Slovakia had been viewed as a good student of European integration that successfully joined the euro zone and the Schengen zone, and focused on the adoption of EU regulations and drawing of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds. Jean Claude Juncker, chairman of the Eurogroup, the official forum of finance ministers of the euro zone, referred to the Slovakia's position on the Greek loan as totally unacceptable.¹⁷ According to Reuters, Jean Claude Trichet, the European Central Bank (ECB) President, said at the meeting of the Eurogroup that the ECB would not have backed Slovakia's euro entry, had it known Slovakia would behave like that.¹⁸ Formally Slovakia does not face any legal penalty for its Greek u-turn, but its decision may weaken the country's position in bilateral or intergovernmental negotiations in the EU. EU partners might remind Slovakia of the issue during negotiations over the EU budget or the reform of the cohesion and agricultural policies. The approval of some future projects and transfers of funds to Slovakia might also be judged through the prism of Slovakia's attitude. Negative consequences might also be reflected in decisions about diplomatic posts for nominees from Slovakia, or the placement of some future EU agencies in Slovakia.

¹⁷ "Slovenská pôžička Aténom nie je mŕtva téma," *euractiv.sk*, September 8, 2010. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/verzia-pre-tlac/clanok/slovenska-pozicka-atenam-nie-je-mrtva-tema-015838> (accessed on September 8, 2010).

¹⁸ "Trichet: Krajínu ako Slovensko už do eurozóny neprijmeme," *Sme*, September 10, 2010. Available online: <http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5544023/trichet-krajinu-ako-slovensko-uz-do-eurozony-neprijmeme.html> (accessed on September 10, 2010).

Besides, the statement of ECB President also refers to possible measures taken to toughen the criteria for euro adoption. The experience with Slovakia can make the path of other EU member states to the euro zone more difficult. In this connection, the attention of the European Union was attracted by Poland whose leading representatives offered the country's participation in European projects relating to the membership in the euro area. In theory, Warsaw could provide a loan to Greece instead of Slovakia.¹⁹ Poland is afraid that Slovakia's rejection of the loan to Greece could have a negative impact on future willingness of wealthier EU member states and European institutions to support the principle of solidarity as well as on the essential debate on a new financial perspective of the Union, nature of the cohesion and common agricultural policies, or national preferences in large joint European projects, such as pan-European transport corridors or interconnections of energy networks. The willingness of wealthier countries to take into account the interests of less developed areas of the EU is likely to be significantly lower.

THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL STABILITY FACILITY

Unlike the loan to Greece, Slovakia finally supported the establishment of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which is set to secure the financial liquidity of the euro zone countries. The former Prime Minister, R. Fico, articulated his support for the creation of the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, but his government did not sign the document necessary for the activation of the EFSF. Like in

At the end of 2010, the future of the euro did not look very promising.

the case of the Greek loan, SDKÚ–DS, SaS and Most–Híd initially rejected to support the EFSF. Only the representatives of KDH indicated lukewarm support for the new mechanism, though arguing that they would need time to study its implications.²⁰

In late June 2010, many representatives of the nascent coalition government changed their opinion, arguing that they are not against the EFSF in principle, but they do not like the expected amount of Slovakia's contribution.²¹ Slovakia's share in the costs of establishing the EFSF represents 6.5 per cent of country's GDP, compared to 2.8 per cent of GDP of the wealthiest euro zone country, Luxembourg. The government of I. Radičová argued that the previous Government had failed to negotiate a fair deal

¹⁹ "Poliaci možno požičajú Grékom miesto Slovákov," *euractiv.sk*, September 2, 2010. Available on <http://www.euractiv.sk/ekonomika-a-euro/clanok/poliaci-mozno-pozicaju-grekom-miesto-slovakov-015803> (accessed on September 2, 2010).

²⁰ M. Kern, K. Ragáčová, "Fico a pravica bojujú o podpis," *Sme*, June 18, 2010. Available online: <http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5428915/fico-a-pravica-bojuju-o-podpis.html> (accessed on June 18, 2010).

²¹ "Slovensko zatiaľ nemá jasné stanovisko k pôžičke Grécku," *euractiv.sk*, June 17, 2010. Available, online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/buducnost-eu/clanok/slovensko-zatial-nema-jasne-stanovisko-k-pozicke-grecku-015338> (accessed on June 17, 2010).

for Slovakia, and when the new government was sworn in, there was no room left for negotiations.²² The Government finally signed the EFSF agreement and took legislative steps necessary to prepare the country for the participation in the mechanism. The Finance Minister explained that the difference between Slovakia's attitude towards the Greek loan and the creation of the EFSF consists in the nature of a financial obligation. As he summarized in the parliamentary debate, "the fundamental difference is that in case of the loan to Greece we were supposed to lend real money, while in case of the EFSF we only grant a guarantee."²³

While rejecting a bilateral loan to Greece (August 11, 2010), the Parliament nevertheless supported the adoption of the EFSF framework agreement. A total of 140 MPs voted in favor of the program, the only ruling coalition deputy who voted against the proposal was Ondrej Dostál (OKS). The European Financial Stability Facility resulted from the conclusions of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) of May 9, 2010. Under the EFSF framework agreement, Slovakia agreed to grant guarantees that amount to 4,37 billion euro, which corresponds to Slovakia's share in the ECB's capital (0.99 per cent).

The EFSF enables to provide a financial support for euro zone member states in difficulties caused by exceptional circumstances beyond such member state's control. With the guarantees of euro zone member states, the EFSF is able to provide financial support of up to 500 billion euro. Decisions on the eventual financial support for euro zone member state will be made by the EFSF shareholders, i.e. individual member states including Slovakia. The financial support from EFSF will also include an economic recovery plan.

The EFSF agreement does not represent an immediate financial obligation. During the adoption of the framework agreement, the Slovak Government issued a communiqué pointing out three priorities for the negotiations over the future of the euro zone: temporary nature of the EFSF, a strict assessment of meeting the Maastricht criteria and establishment of a mechanism of controlled bankruptcy for the euro area member countries.²⁴

The end of 2010 was marked by the debate on the future of the euro zone, in particular on the adoption of other instruments necessary for securing financial stability. At the meeting of the European Council, held in December 2010, the heads of state or government agreed that the Lisbon Treaty should be amended in order for a permanent mechanism to be established to safeguard the finance stability of the euro area as a whole (European Stability Mechanism). This mechanism will replace the

²² "Výška slovenského podielu vo vale sa otvárať nebude," *rannspravy.sk*, July 13, 2010. Available online: <http://www.rannspravy.sk/clanok/vyska-slovenskeho-podielu-vo-vale-sa-otvarat-nebude.html> (accessed on July 13, 2010).

²³ For more information see the transcription of a parliamentary debate from the 4th meeting of the Slovak Parliament, August 11, 2010. Available online: http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Default.aspx?sid=schodze_per_cent2frozprava (accessed on August 12, 2010).

²⁴ M. Onnuferová, "Radičovej vláda povie eurovalu áno," *Sme*, July 14, 2010. Available online: <http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5465265/radicovej-vlada-povie-eurovalu-ano.html> (accessed on July 14, 2010).

European Financial Stability Facility, which will remain in force until 2013. The European Council agreed that the permanent crisis mechanism will also include private sector involvement and the future of the euro will be based on the political and economic responsibility of individual euro zone member states.²⁵

It is expected that the Union will markedly toughen up budgetary and economic policy surveillance under the Stability and Growth Pact. The European Union expects the permanent crisis mechanism to soothe the jittering financial markets. However the future of the euro at the end of 2010 was far from positive. The ESFS has already granted a loan to Ireland and Portugal's financial situation is very bad too.

Many Slovak representatives originally disapproved of the permanent crisis mechanism, but the Prime Minister I. Radičová accepted the vision of the European Stability Mechanism with the participation of private sector. After the December summit, the Prime Minister was also satisfied with the formulation that is to ensure that costs relating to the pension scheme reform will not be included in the total amount of EU member state's deficit. Otherwise it would be very difficult for Slovakia to meet political agreement on the EU's fiscal responsibility. European discussions in 2011 will be dominated by the future of the euro zone. The current situation indicates that scenarios of the future development of the euro zone remain open and the attitude of Slovak political leaders towards the rescue plan for the European single currency has not been firm. The ratification of other agreements proposed to save the euro area by the Slovak parliament is questionable. However it will test the cohesion of a ruling coalition as well as of a broader domestic strategic consensus on Slovakia's performance in the EU and on the country's participation in the project of the euro zone.

CONCLUSION

The events in 2010 indicate that there has not been such a univocal consensus on Slovakia's preferences in the EU like before the EU accession or during the first years of the EU membership. And this is not a recent trend. In 2008 SDKÚ-DS and other then opposition parties interrupted the period of a wide domestic consensus on the strategic European issues, when they refused to support the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty until concerns about the coalition's Press Code were addressed.

Debates on the Greek loan and the EFSF have shown that Slovakia is less predictable than before. Short-term domestic political disputes and interests have played increasingly important role in debates on EU policy. Politicians who significantly contributed to Slovakia's entry to the euro-area are more likely to oversee medium- and long-term political and economic benefits of the EU membership. Moreover, one of four coalition parties, SaS, does not have immediate experience with the importance of EU

²⁵ See the "Conclusions of the European Council of December 2010." Available online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118578.pdf (accessed on January 26, 2011).

accession process, looking at the EU almost solely through the prism of quantifiable financial benefits.

The debate on Slovakia's performance in the EU seems to lack conceptual reflections that would help the country to look upon the current problems in a historical context of its performance in the EU as a new, post-communist country significantly benefiting from the membership in the prestigious club of politically and economically developed European countries. The privileges of the membership should not be taken for granted; especially in case of small countries they can be very unstable. In

Short-term domestic political disputes and interests have played increasingly important role in debates on EU policy.

the next couple of months Slovakia should focus on searching possible solutions to improve the effectiveness of coordination of EU policy and on the adoption of political decisions concerning the EFSF or financial support for euro zone member states. The country also needs a strategy for filling up positions in EU institutions. It is the ability to think about these issues in different time horizons and political areas that will significantly influence Slovakia's position in the EU in the near future.

SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

IVO SAMSON

The year 2010 (and the beginning of 2011) was characterized by three basic events in the field of security and defense policy.

The first one was the elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2010 after which the “center-right” parties formed a government. Traditionally, these parties have been credited with a more balanced approach to defense including a stronger inclination toward the transatlantic alliance as well as with the support of crisis management operation under NATO command.

The second important event that influenced the security in both, Slovakia, and the whole transatlantic region, should be seen in the process of finalization of NATO’s new Strategic Concept and its adoption – together with other documents – at the NATO summit in November 2010.¹ Due to the fact that the Slovak Republic – represented by the President as the supreme commander of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic (AF SR) – approved NATO’s new Strategic Concept, it automatically became part of the declared strategy and its goals for the next years.

The post-election change of Slovakia’s Government, a change in the position of the Defense Minister and the preparatory work on NATO’s Strategic Concept (NSC) and its adoption in Lisbon are interconnected with the third crucial event in the Slovak security and defense policy, which is the work on the new strategic document critically assessing the Slovak defense capabilities. This document, whose aspiration is to be an incentive for future defense planning was named the Strategic Defense Review and should form the basis for the White Book, which should become an official government publication trying to map crucial issues linked to Slovak defense and to the

¹ “Summit guide. Lisbon Summit – 19-20 November 2010,” NATO, 2010. Available online: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_67814.htm (accessed on December 12, 2010).

Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic. In a broader context, the development in the southern neighborhood of EU/NATO just exposed the vulnerability of Europe in the consequence of social, political and security instability of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Any evaluation of the threats produced by this region persuaded NATO to intervene militarily in another Muslim country following the intervention in Afghanistan. This all in spite of the fact that the military operation – based on the mandate of the UNSC of March 17, 2011² – was entitled only to ensure a no-fly zone over Libya and to undertake adequate measures in this respect. It is necessary to add, however, that the UNSC resolution did not specify either the duration of the mandate, or a precisely defined military implementation of the resolution. Here, many issues of the so-called international law are left open, as before.³ Chances and possibilities of Slovakia to join the Libya NATO-led operation remained, therefore, very limited also owing to a deficit in the field of military (be it air or maritime) capacities. Anyway, vis-à-vis a large number of interchangeable factors in the development of the conflict in the near NATO/EU neighborhood, the efficiency of NATO's political influence based on deterrence seems to be in the national interest of Slovakia.

SECURITY AND DEFENSE ISSUES FOLLOWING THE 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION

The responsibility of Slovakia and its Government for security and defense of the country within the most important world and regional organizations (besides of NATO especially EU, UN and OSCE should be mentioned) can be measured by both, official declarations and a real contribution.

If one takes a look at the declarative output of Slovak security in favor of regional and global security, one cannot neglect the Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the 2010–2014 (August 2010). It concerns especially the subchapter 4.3 (Security policy and defense) and partly also the subchapter 4.4 (Foreign policy).⁴

Obviously, the Manifesto, like political declamations and declarations generally, cannot be regarded as a real contribution to security and defense of the country. Nevertheless, this document represents an obligation and one can judge the reliability of the country more according to a real implementation of the obligations expressed. In the part on security and defense issues NATO was explicitly mentioned as part of

² “Resolution 1973 (2011). Adopted by the Security Council at its 6498th meeting on 17 March 2011,” UN Security Council, 2011. Available online: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/268/39/PDF/N1126839.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on March 20, 2011).

³ M.N. Schmitt, “Wings over Libya: the no-fly zone in legal perspective,” *The Yale Journal of International Law*, Spring 2011. Available online: <http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-schmitt-wings-over-libya.pdf> (accessed on April 3, 2011).

⁴ “Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca. Programové vyhlásenie vlády na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014,” Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, 2010.

key security guarantees. Other international organizations, such as the EU, were not mentioned, but they also – according to the wording of the Manifesto – represent primary agents for enforcement and defense of Slovak interests. The Government takes over the obligation to react adequately and on time to situations which put – among others – the security of allies under threat. Theoretically, such an obligation should automatically include a positive reaction to long-term declarations of the government concerning the feeble financial efforts of some NATO member countries (including Slovakia) to contribute to defense of common NATO borders. The appeal like this was made repeatedly by the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in May 2011 in Bratislava.⁵ Any concrete obligation to increase Slovakia's defense budget, however, cannot be found in the Government Manifesto. However, deficits in financing of the Slovak defense were several times criticized by both, the Slovak Defense Minister as well as the President.⁶

In the 2010 Government Manifesto the new administration refers not only to the (at that time still under preparation) new NSC but also pledges to let prepare the Strategic Defense Review aimed at describing and analyzing a strategic political framework for a long-term defense potential of Slovakia and its defense forces including a guarantee for a stable "source basis" (corresponding to the subchapter 4.3. of the Manifesto). As mentioned in the Manifesto, the final product, i.e. the Strategic Defense Review, should help the Government to assess the current international environment and to, based on the results, re-evaluate "basic security and defense documents to correspond to contemporary realities in global relations and international security environment."

In the Government Manifesto NATO was explicitly mentioned as part of key security guarantees, while other groupings, such as the EU, were not mentioned, but they also represent primary agents for enforcement and defense of Slovak interests.

The Government's obligations, however, do not entail any firm obligations toward the AF SR. The text of the Manifesto concerning the AF SR was formulated in a very general language and, thus, one cannot use it when arguing in favor of either an increase of the state's subsidies for defense or a serious pledge of the Government to improve technical and personal quality of the AF SR. The Manifesto does not represent any obligation to stop the continually diminishing volume of financial means for the purposes of the Defense Ministry.

According to the Manifesto, the Strategic Defense Review process and a reform of AF SR should be consulted with the public and the Slovak expert community (the Manifesto does not, however, use the term "Slovak security community," which has become usual in

⁵ "V 17 krajinách NATO sa obranné rozpočty prepádajú," May 15, 2011. Available online: <http://www.ata-sac.org/article-88-568-Rasmussen-V-17-krajinach-NATO-sa-obranne-rozpocty-prepadaju>. (accessed on May 5, 2011).

⁶ "Prezident: Rasmussenovi sa sťažoval na škrtý v rozpočte armády," SITA, May 19, 2011. Available online: <http://udalosti.noviny.sk/politika/19-05-2011/prezident-rasmussenovi-sa-stazoval-na-skrty-v-rozpocte-armady.html> (accessed May 19, 2011).

the several past years) in order to reach the consensus in issues of security and defense policies. The Manifesto also suggests that conclusions and recommendations of the Strategic Defense Review will be open to public debate until the end of 2012 and that they would constitute part of the basic strategic and conceptual documents of the Slovak legislation.

Moreover, in the Manifesto, the administration also promises to uphold the engagement of AF SR in international crisis management operations at the high level. The formulation in the text can be read as using the mandate of international organizations for the creation of forces for the high readiness of the EU and NATO" (see the subchapter 4.3). The new Government continued to support the previous government's activities and strategy of engaging AF SR in international missions. Anyway, the current Government preferred the idea of a reduction of the number of missions and crisis management operations in favor of "engaging compact contingents built at the basis of organic units." The activities of AF SR in Afghanistan should be preferred. In other words, the aim of the present Government in the field of foreign military missions should be seen in the reduction of quantity in favor of a smaller and quantitatively increased number of operations.

In the Manifesto, the new administration also refers to the V4 as an instrument of strengthening the cooperation in Central Europe in issues of security policy as well as a possibility to push through the interests of Slovakia in both, the EU and NATO. Even though, the V4 security dimension was completely denied up to now, the other than security forms of cooperation always stood in the foreground. *Vis- -vis* the character of the document (Manifesto) it was not realistic to expect that the new government would specify how it intends to increase the role of the V4 in defending the common security and defense of EU and NATO countries.

By analyzing the subchapter on foreign policy in the Manifesto, one can notice the similar general declamatory rhetoric. The highest compatibility with security and defense policy can be discovered in the parts on good neighborhood relations, regional security cooperation and dynamic European policy as well as on security guarantees and transatlantic relations. In addition to NATO and the EU, the UN and OSCE were also mentioned as institutions being active in security policy. The obligation to strengthen the transatlantic link might appear as a usual standard, but the formulation differs here from the 2006 Manifesto. In 2006, it only stated that Slovakia is part of the Euro-Atlantic region. The outspoken obligation to strengthen the transatlantic link, however, is missing in the concrete section of the text (part 8 of the 2006–2010 Manifesto).⁷

NATO AND THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The annual summit of NATO in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2006 committed the NATO Secretary-General to elaborate a new Strategic Concept. Due to this, a certain resist-

⁷ "Programové vyhlásenie vlády 2006," Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, August 2006. Available online: www.zbierka.sk/Dokumenty/Download/33/Default.aspx (accessed on March 20, 2011).

ance against the elaboration of a new strategic key document was overcome in some NATO countries. The basic objection of opponents of the new document had been formulated as a fear that by the preparation of the new strategy the hidden undesirable differences in opinion among some NATO members would become apparent.

Other arguments against the new strategic document, still heard in 2010 included also the criticism of some experts of the very character of NATO strategic concepts. They claimed that these documents were not oriented at the future prospects and were used only to codify previous political and military steps of NATO. As an example they presented the case of the 1999 NSC, which appeared to be only a revision of 1991 NSC, as the theory only copied practical events and its concept was based on previous development.

Supporters of the new strategic document (concept) of NATO argued that the existing concept, i.e. the 1999 NSC could not reflect such crucial events like September 11, 2001, the following military operation of NATO in Afghanistan, the participation of most NATO countries in the operation Iraqi Freedom, development of the European security and defense policy or new aspects of the Russian military activity as demonstrated in the Russian–Georgian war of 2008.

The discussion on the adoption of the new NSC followed several goals: redefinition of the sense of existence of NATO; creation of optimal balance between the collective defense and the operations going beyond the article 5; bringing more harmony between global and regional ambitions; improvement of communication between the EU and NATO; corrections of relationship

with the Russian Federation in the consequence of the continuing drift of Russia away from the former Yeltsin policy and due to an assertive security and military policy of Russia in its close neighborhood (Georgia); preservation of the position of a credible partner for both sides of the Arab–Israeli conflict; assuming a position to the problem of the Iranian nuclear program; proposal of a policy dealing with the issue of terrorism, attack by chemical and biological weapons, dealing with the problem of organized crime, piracy and maritime security; relation between climate change and food security; clarification of issues linked to ballistic missile defense of NATO member countries; cooperation between UN and other international organizations; reflection of existence and activities of private security and military organizations and institutions; setting the principles for acting in crisis management operations; problem of new partnerships; further NATO enlargement.

The NATO's new Strategic Concept was set to meet a complicated task being not only related to the declaration of political will in the complex sphere of the questions enumerated above. NATO also needed to solve internal tensions which have existed in between since the adoption of the Strategic Concept of 1999. Basically different positions remained often unresolved and their solution was postponed only with the help of declarations issued during regular meetings (summits of head of states and

NATO's new Strategic Concept was set to meet a complicated task being not only related to the declaration of political will in the complex sphere of the questions. NATO also needed to solve internal tensions which have existed in between since the adoption of the Strategic Concept of 1999.

governments and/or the so-called ministerials). In the new NSC a number of other tasks had to be approached – openly or by a tacit procedure; setting the tasks Alliance could manage and also tasks and problems NATO could not or did not want to resolve at that moment. To be concrete, the intention was to stop a trend, according to which the Alliance started to be used as an organization of military and police character for each type of international crisis or international armed conflict.

The preparatory work – still before the elaboration of the final text of the strategy – was performed by the international expert team led by the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.⁸ This preparatory report became the source of the new NSC.

Changes in the international security environment since 1999, a new character of security threats and the existence of new challenges including the concretization of some specific security threats and risks (the document did not differentiate between the categories “security threats” and “security risks”) were added as the main reason for the elaboration of the new concept.

The document “NATO 2020” announced that the new NSC could not avoid a certain continuity either with the Harmel Report (1967) or with the second NSC (1999).

The new NSC⁹ was – as expected – adopted during the NATO summit in Lisbon on November 19–20, 2010.¹⁰ The new strategic concept is the first program-oriented complex and conceptual security document of the Alliance in the twenty-first century and it presents the prospects of NATO for the next several years. The adoption of the new NSC was definitely the most important issue on the agenda of the 2010 Lisbon NATO summit.

As for Slovakia, it is clear that all 38 chapters of the new NSC have a direct relation to our country, too. Slovakia, as a NATO member approved the document at the highest level (represented by the President as the highest commander of the AF SR).

The new strategic document can be analyzed point by point but one can also select some crucial themes which are important for the future of the Alliance and its defense capacity such as:¹¹ permanent validity of the article 5 of the Washington Treaty; dependence of the security of the Alliance both on the defense of NATO’s territory, and on activities going “beyond article 5;” the necessity of NATO’s approach securing a more balanced sharing of defense costs; continuing the NATO enlargement process; emphasis put on threats produced by cyber attacks.

⁸ “NATO 2020: assured security; dynamic engagement. Analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new Strategic Concept for NATO,” NATO, May 2010. Available online: <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

⁹ “Strategic Concept. For the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” NATO. Available online: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

¹⁰ The authorized Slovak translation of the NATO’s new Strategic Concept is available online at <http://www.ata-sac.org/article-289-501-Slovensky-preklad-novej-Strategickej-koncepcie-NATO> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

¹¹ S. McNamara, “NATO summit 2010: time to turn words into action,” Heritage Foundation, *Backgrounder* No. 2498, December 10, 2010. Available online: <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/12/nato-summit-2010-time-to-turn-words-into-action> (accessed on December 15, 2011).

The new NSC presented – partly in a shortened and simplified form – the results of earlier studies and analyses which served as the basis for the elaboration of the new strategy.¹² The most authoritative material for the NSC was provided by the analysis NATO 2020¹³ – a product of experts created directly thanks to the initiative of the NATO Secretary-General with the explicit goal to prepare material for the new strategic concept of the Alliance.

The decisive text for the elaboration of new NSC of November 2010 put emphasis on the principle of collective defense based on article 5 of the Washington Treaty. One can continue with other sacred principles, which appeared in the strategic docu-

As for Slovakia, it is clear that all 38 chapters of the new Security Concept have a direct relation to our country, too. Slovakia, as a NATO member approved the document at the highest level.

ment of November 2010 either in a direct or in a changed form: defense against a conventional attack; setting down principles for operations beyond NATO's territory; creation of conditions for a successful termination of the operation in Afghanistan;¹⁴ consultation following the goal to act preventively against crises; the need of a renewal, re-formulation and deepening of existing partnerships and creation of new ones; a "complex" approach to problems in the sense of combining military and civilian elements; a constructive approach to Russia by preserving or developing the preceding arrangements (Founding Act, Council NATO–Russia); open door policy concerning a further NATO enlargement; building up of new capabilities; a stable position on nuclear weapons as an instrument for the preservation of peace (the preparatory document NATO 2020 avoids the term "deterrence"); the possibility of flexibility by the geographic deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe under the condition that the decisions about these steps will be done by the Alliance as a whole; support of proliferation of nuclear weapons; a new mission of the ballistic anti-missile defense providing for full competences of NATO by deciding about this type of defense in Europe and about the necessity to reach a consensus with Russia on this issue; an adequate response to cyber-attacks; launching of administrative and "other" reforms (military

¹² D. Hamilton, Ch. Barry, H. Binnendijk, S. Flanagan, J. Smith, J. Townsend, "Alliance reborn: an Atlantic compact for the 21st century," Atlantic Council; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Center for Technology and National Security Policy; Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University 2009. Available online: <http://www.acus.org/publication/alliance-reborn-atlantic-compact-21st-century> (accessed on January 19, 2011); K. Naumann, J. Shalikhvili, The Lord Inge, J. Lanxade, H. van den Breement, "Towards a grand strategy for an uncertain world. Renewing transatlantic partnership," Lunteren 2007. Available online: http://csis.org/files/media/CSIS/events/080110_grand_strategy.pdf (accessed on January 19, 2011); "Allied command transformation, multiple futures project: navigating towards 2030, Final Report," May 2009. Available online: http://www.iris-france.org/docs/pdf/up_docs_bdd/20090511-112315.pdf (accessed on January 19, 2011).

¹³ "NATO 2020: assured security; dynamic engagement," NATO, 2010. Available online: <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

¹⁴ Generally, official documents of NATO do not like to use the term "exit strategy," as the translation into other languages produced semantic problems.

reforms are not mentioned explicitly) with the goal to build up a “slimmer” and more effective Alliance; public diplomacy, which means the efforts to popularize the Alliance not only in the NATO member countries, but also elsewhere in the world; rejection of the trend (in 2010–2020) of transforming the Alliance into a world policeman.

The new NSC, Slovakia approved, too, is the result of previous intensive efforts of the whole international transatlantic community and the implementation of the strategic concept has become the obligation for each member state.

STRATEGIC REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE

Following the 2010 Manifesto of the Government, in the fall of 2010 the Strategic Defense Review of the Slovak Republic (SDR) started. In accordance with the idea expressed in the Manifesto, the SDR should present a complex analysis of the situation in the Defense Ministry and provide a long-term vision of development in AF SR and in the field of defense and security of Slovakia at the same time. It should be mentioned that whereas in NATO member states similar strategic review processes are usual, in Slovakia it happened for the first time that such an expert initiative was launched.¹⁵

For this reason, the Defense Ministry established an ad hoc steering committee and working groups, which elaborated on basic tasks of the SDR together with external consultants representing the Slovak security community (consultation council). The Defense Ministry State Secretary became chairman of the Steering Committee and other members are leading representatives of the AF SR. In September 2010, four working groups were established. They were put in charge of reviewing the current situation and various scenarios of future development in four fields: security and defense policy, security environment and threats; defense planning and management of sources; capabilities and tasks of AF SR; other specific fields included: military school system, military health system, military sports, social security and military industry.¹⁶

According to official information published by the Defense Ministry¹⁷ the goal of the working groups consists in the task, among others, to use the instrument of the SDR for a complex review of the current situation in the AF SR and thus meet the obligations stemming from the Government Manifesto. The SDR is also regarded as a chance to enter into dialogue with society and inform it about the needs of the AF SR and of the corresponding sphere of sources. The complex analysis, together with the

¹⁵ R. Ondrejcsák, “Strategické hodnotenie obrany. Kde sme a kam smerujeme,” Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/20076/?mnu=518> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

¹⁶ The composition of the working groups is available online at: <http://www.mosr.sk/20082/zlozenie-expertnych-skupin.php?mnu=531> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

¹⁷ “Čo je Strategické hodnotenie obrany?,” Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/20077/co-je-strategicke-hodnotenie-obrany.php?mnu=526> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

fulfillment of the tasks to be found in the Manifesto becomes also a tool of civil and democratic control exercised by the public over the AF SR.¹⁸

The schedule of implementation of the SDR might appear too ambitious at first sight. It suggests a process of four years and at the end of this term the implementation of legislation adopted meanwhile by the parliament should begin. The time schedule of activities¹⁹ suggests the following steps:

- Phase I: Preparatory phase, August–September 2010 (building up of four working groups, meeting with representatives of academic institutions, NGOs and professional associations as well as with diplomatic representatives of NATO and EU countries).
- Phase II: Analytical phase, October–December 2010 (commenting the first proposals of the documents, expert meetings, briefings on the SDR for MPs and for the President).

The first two phases, as the Defense Ministry informed,²⁰ were very successful. Currently (since January 2011), the following phases are in progress:

- Phase III: Projection phase of the SDR (elaboration of the White Book and its presentation to the public. This phase also includes presentation to the expert community of a medium-term plan of the development in the Ministry of Defense and of development of conceptual and legislative documents dealing with the defense of the state.
- Phase IV: Implementation phase of the SDR (launching the legislative norms into practice).²¹

In the first phases, the experts were able to publish only partial results of the SDR and the impression these results left was not very positive. The official, even if preliminary, version of the SDR has not been published yet, however, one could use the internal “conclusions” of the analytical phase of the SDR.²² The conclusions have been open to expert public only.

The preliminary conclusions, first of all, make the appeal that Slovakia confirms the political will to implement the declared goals of its security and defense policy and meets its international obligations towards its allies. The document gave an overview of recent historical context (since 1993) and then proceeds to compare the tasks the Ministry of Defense has to fulfill and the insufficient sources it has at its disposal.

- The document mentions concretely formulated obligations made by the government at the time of Slovakia's NATO accession talks, namely the promise that 2 per cent of the GDP will be allocated for defense. At that time it was said to be

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ “Časový plán aktivít,” Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/20081/casovy-plan-aktivit.php?mnu=530> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Here, the author used preliminary results of the SDR open to members of the Consultation Council. See “Konzultačná rada,” Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/20319/konzultacna-rada.php?mnu=534> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

an inevitable precondition for the realization of long-term transformation plans of the Defense Ministry.²³ Anyway, step by step, individual Slovak governments were withdrawing from these obligations.

- The required and guaranteed sources were slowly disappearing from strategic documents of the Defense Ministry. In the document Model 2010²⁴ the spending on defense in 2002–2005 still ranked between 1.89–2 per cent of the GDP. In the document Model 2015 the percentage spending on defense was reduced to 1.85 per cent of the GDP for 2006–2010. In the proposal of the prepared Model 2020 (from 2009), only 1.53 per cent of the GDP was considered for defense.

The partial results of the SDR did not mention that in 2011 the defense budget was further reduced to 1.13 per cent of the GDP. Preliminary trends for the next two years indicate that another reduction of the defense budget is to appear, what contradicts with the Government Manifesto and with its declared will to support development and modernization of the AF SR or the future role of Slovakia in international crisis

management operations. Unofficially, 0.98 per cent of the GDP is to be allocated in 2012 while only 0.92 per cent in 2013.²⁵

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The reduction of the defense budget is interconnected with quality and stability of military personnel. The document “Conclusions” of the analytical phase of the SDR speaks about the problem by winning highly qualified specialists for the service in the AF SR and calls it an “intolerable situation.” The modernization in the armed forces came to a halt as well. The document admits that

in the long time after 1993 no single modernization project in the field of land and air military technology has been successfully implemented. According to the document, 70 per cent of the land military technology already passed the stage of service life. Technical components of air forces as well as the basic battle technology generally are also coming closer to the limit of its technical service life.

The SDR document, although not finalized, suggested three strategic options: preservation of the status quo and removal of the imbalance between the tasks to be realized and the allocated sources, or a resignation to declared international obligations of Slovakia (what must be read as a clear challenge to the authors of the Government Manifesto) as well as increasing the financial resources allocated for defense, which

²³ See the Resolutions of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 604/2002, 2403/2002, 133/2003 and 607/2004, Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic.

²⁴ In case of Model 2010 as well as in cases of other “Models” (2015, 2020) author has in mind official strategic documents regarding the “updated reform of AF SR.” The wording of the documents is available at the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic www.mosr.sk.

²⁵ “Armáda sa mení na „odzbrojenú silu”,“ *Hospodárske noviny*, May 24, 2011. Available online: <http://hnonline.sk/c1-51916340-armada-sa-meni-na-odzbrojene-sily> (accessed on May 24, 2011).

represents a realistic compromise between the limited source possibilities of the country and its security and defense needs.

It is necessary to state that the first appeal to Government did not produce any positive response. It means that the Government did not assume the third strategic option proposed in the partial conclusions of the SDR. The Finance Minister practically favored a continuing reduction of sources for the AF SR in his speech in Parliament.²⁶

Already at the beginning of the process of the SDR one could see that the authors of the document did not reach an understanding of the Government. No doubt, it is necessary to await further reaction of the Government and its final evaluation of this unique strategic document.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

International peace missions and operations (a general term for various types of missions and operations according to UN classification or, as the case may be, operations of international crisis management) formed an important part of the contribution of Slovakia to global security stability.

Official statistics of the Defense Ministry state that since the formation of the Slovak Republic in 1993, almost 10,000 Slovak soldiers took part in operations of international crisis management (headed by the UN, NATO, EU or OSCE).²⁷ All these operations took place under the mandate of the UN, although one discerns the so-called direct mandate, i.e. the participation at a mission or operation under a direct flag of this organization.

Under the "colors of the UN," in 2010–2011 Slovakia continued its presence in the operation UNFICYP in Cyprus with 198 soldiers. This makes the UNFICYP the second-largest military mission of Slovakia.²⁸ Besides Cyprus, Slovakia symbolically – with two soldiers – participates at the observation mission of the UN (UNTSO) in the Middle East at the Lebanon–Syrian borders (Golan Heights).

Under the EU headings, Slovakia participated in the operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina with 41 soldiers²⁹ and upheld also four soldiers in the command of EUFOR³⁰ (both operations have the base in Sarajevo).

²⁶ "Mikloš uvažuje, či Slovensko naozaj potrebuje nadzvukové letectvo," *Hospodárske noviny*, May 26, 2011. Available online: <http://hnonline.sk/c1-51916340-armada-sa-meni-na-odzbrojene-sily> (accessed on May 26, 2011).

²⁷ "Operácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/313/operacie-medzinarodneho-krizoveho-manazmentu.php?mnu=171> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

²⁸ "Operácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu – Operácia UNFICYP, Cyprus," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/index.php?ID=319> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

²⁹ "Operácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu – Operácia ALTHEA, Bosna a Hercegovina, LOT," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/321/operacia-althea-bosna-a-hercegovina-lot.php?mnu=184> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

³⁰ "Operácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu – Operácia ALTHEA, Bosna a Hercegovina,

Within the OSCE, Slovakia keeps only one observer in the OSCE observation mission in Georgia.³¹

Both, qualitatively and quantitatively, one regards the operations under NATO command as the most important. In 2010–2011 Slovakia participated at the most critical current NATO operation, i.e. at the ISAF in Afghanistan with 314 soldiers (data as of December 2010).³² Besides, Slovakia is also symbolically represented in the Headquarters of NATO in Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) with one soldier.³³

THE FUTURE OF SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN SLOVAKIA FROM THE 2010–2011 PERSPECTIVE

One has to emphasize that in the 2010 Manifesto of the Government the new administration devoted a relatively respectable space to issues of security and defense. At the same time, it avoided any specification of concrete steps it wants to make in the interest of the Defense Ministry, which became the biggest victim of budget cuts among all ministries in the last several years. In spite of the expressed interest of the new administration in security and defense issues in the future, in the next fiscal year drastic budget cuts in defense will continue. In 2011, about 86 per cent of the allocated budget for the defense will be spent on salaries, respective deliveries and energy supplies and only 14 per cent will be left for development and military missions abroad. If this trend continues, as the Defense Minister emphasized, the percentage relation is going to deteriorate further from the present 86:14 ratio to 90:10.³⁴

It is necessary to wait for assessment of both the final results of the SDR as well as the reactions of the Slovak Government and Parliament.

HQ EUFOR," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?ID=13854> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

³¹ "Pozorovateľská misia OBSE, Gruzínsko," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/322/pozorovatelaska-operacia-obse-gruzinsko.php?mnu=185> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

³² "Operácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu – Operácia ISAF, Afganistan," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/330/operacia-isaf-afganistan.php?mnu=181> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

³³ "Operácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu – Veliteľstvo v Sarajeve, Bosna a Hercegovina," Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mod.gov.sk/index.php?ID=329> (accessed on January 19, 2011).

³⁴ "Rozpočet ministerstva obrany môže byť likvidačný," *TASR*, March 24, 2001. Available online: <http://dnes.atlas.sk/slovensko/vlada-a-parlament/737311/rozpocet-ministerstva-obrany-moze-byt-likvidacny> (accessed on March 24, 2011).

CLIMATE CHANGE IN 2010

JURAJ MESIK

THE POLITICAL PROCESS FROM COPENHAGEN TO CANCUN

In December 2009, after a distressful and for the European Commission and the EU member states' governments' frustrating developments, The United Nations Copenhagen conference on climate change concluded with a document, whose essential purpose was to conceal from the world a global political fiasco. The result of negotiations was not a binding agreement, which would commit parties to clearly defined and measurable goals in reducing their CO₂ emissions and other greenhouse gases. It was neither an agreement on a regime that would replace the Kyoto Protocol regulating trade in greenhouse gas emissions after 2012. From a diplomatic standpoint, for Europe it was quite humiliating, that the final document – albeit toothless – was drafted behind closed doors under the direction of the United States of America, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. It is not surprising that the drafted and later on adopted document from a global warming perspective, was completely ineffective and, moreover, non-binding.

The mere fact that the EU's humiliation was done¹ by an ally, who preferred to agree on doing nothing with communist China² and several developing countries, however disappointing, is but an unpleasant curiosity on the background of an incomparably more serious reality. This reality is the acknowledgment, in clear daylight, of

¹ "Copenhagen climate summit held to ransom – Gordon Brown," *BBC*, December 22, 2009. Available online: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8423831.stm (accessed on December 22, 2009).

² "How do I know China wrecked Copenhagen deal? I was in the room," *The Guardian*, December 22, 2009. Available online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas> (accessed on December 22, 2009).

the helpless situation the global community faces with regard to understanding what is really happening with the climate and what will be inevitable consequences of the current climate trends. Without such understanding global leaders are left unable to act intelligently. A thin fig leaf on the failure of the world leaders in Copenhagen is at least some progress in preventing deforestation and promises of financial assistance to developing countries in adapting to climate change that were made a year after Copenhagen at the low profile UN climate summit in Cancun. The EU Commissioner for climate change Connie Hedegaard commenting on Copenhagen laconically noted: "If the negotiations moved anywhere, then it was backward."³

EUROPE AFTER THE COPENHAGEN FIASCO

The United States and China, the two largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, clearly demonstrated by their approach in Copenhagen, that they have no political will (China) or political power (Democratic administration of Barack Obama in the face of the Republicans in the House) to push on the domestic political arena binding emission reduction targets. In 2009, China produced 25 per cent (7.7 billion tons)⁴ of global CO₂ emissions. A year earlier, in 2008, it was "only" 6.8 billion tons and in 2007 "only" 6.3 billion tons. US production in 2009 declined due to the economic crisis to 5.4 billion tons representing 18 per cent of global emissions. It is absolutely clear that without the cooperation of these two main polluters, it is unrealistic to stop the growth in global CO₂ emissions and to start reducing them. The third largest CO₂ producer – the European Union with her 500 million people – emits "only" 14 per cent, followed by India and Russia with 5.2 per cent share each and Japan with 3.6 per cent. Just to add the V4 perspective, let us remember, that Poland's share in global CO₂ emissions in 2009 amounted to 0.94 per cent (21st on the list of top CO₂ polluters), Czech Republic's 0.31 per cent (40th), Hungary's 0.16 per cent (61st) and Slovakia's 0.11 per cent (73rd place). The cumulative share of the V4 CO₂ emissions is 1.52 per cent – almost reaching the UK share of 1.68 per cent, making the UK the tenth largest CO₂ polluter in the world. Thus as a block, the V4 countries are not irrelevant accomplices in global warming. And as climate-indifference and the EU's progress affords retarding EU members, the V4 countries actually are disproportionately important international players in the efforts to tackle climate change. This important position of the V4 is unfortunately not matched by the knowledge and value base of their political elites, whom are still mentally stuck in the post-communist times and topics.

Even more extreme is the difference between the per capita contributions of individual countries to global CO₂ emissions. Among the major world economies, the US is

³ "Faith in U.N. climate talks hinges on Cancun: Hedegaard," *Reuters*, October 13, 2010. Available online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/13/us-climate-summit-hedegaard-idUSTRE69C3UP20101013> (accessed on October 13, 2010).

⁴ All emission data are from the United States Energy Information Agency. Data available in March 2011 were those from 2009. Available online: <http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8> (accessed on March 11, 2011).

clearly dominating by 17.7 tons of CO₂ per capita (2009). From 1990 to 2007, this figure hardly changed, decreasing only slightly due to the 2008–2009 crisis. To compare with other major polluters, Russian per capita CO₂ emissions amounted 11.2 tons, Japanese 8.6 tons, German 9.3 tons (declined from 12 tons in 1990), British 8.35 tons, Italian 7.0 tons and French 6.3 tons – or about one-third of the specific CO₂ emissions in the US. Per capita emissions of China reached 5.83 tons in 2009 and their volume rose more than two and half times from 2.2 tons in 1990. Indian emissions are only 1.4 tons per capita – they amounted only about 0.8 tons back in 1990. A look at this parameter in the V4 countries is also interesting: Czech per capita CO₂ emissions in 2009 were 9.33 tons, Polish 7.43 tons, Slovak 6.54 tons and Hungarian 5.0 tons. These figures allow us to understand better origins of especially Czech and Polish opposition – inside the V4 as well as the EU – against any more ambitious targets for reducing CO₂ emissions. Their cause is primarily driven by their energy dependence on mining and burning coal, which is, per unit of energy produced, an extremely potent CO₂ source. The worse position of the Czech Republic relative to Poland is, in addition to the structure of Czech industry, largely the result of lower quality coal burned by Czech power plants. Conversion to burning higher quality Polish hard coal in the Czech power plans as a part of hypothetical V4 climate cooperation, could lead to a significant reduction in Czech CO₂ emissions – at the price of dismissal by Czech miners (and pleasing Polish ones).

Despite a significantly smaller EU contribution to global CO₂ emissions in comparison to those of China and the US, the European Commission already proposed in March 2010 a joint EU strategy for future international climate negotiations at the UN. On May 26, 2010 the Commission presented an economic assessment of the effects of an increased greenhouse gas reduction target for 2020 from the originally proposed 20 per cent to 30 per cent. An ambitious target of reducing emissions proposed by the European Commission is justified by both growing scientific knowledge about the dynamics of global warming, and by the recognition of the need to lead global efforts to combat climate change by the EU's own example. The 30 per cent CO₂ reduction goal is however, for the time being, conditional on the other rich countries commitment to similar reductions.

Nothing suggests, however, that neither the US nor Chinese intention to move in that direction. The Chinese government refuses to take any specific international commitments, although it has announced its intention to reduce the amount of CO₂ produced per unit of economic product. As for Americans, the US administration abandoned any efforts on legislative changes that would have developed more effective pressure to reduce US CO₂ emissions or lead to the explicit support of renewable energy in the summer of 2010. The reason for this failure is essentially a democratic administration's resignation on climate change, combined with the enormous economic difficulties of the US and internal political realities of the country. Denial of

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the very reality of global warming has become a defining feature of the Republican Party and integral part of Republican ideology. Democrats themselves gave up on the language itself and even when proposing changes in the right direction, avoid using the expression “climate change” and instead use the Republican language speaking about “energy security” or “energy independence.”

Despite frozen discourse in the US, Commissioner Connie Hedegaard keeps reminding the Europeans that radical reduction in CO₂ emissions is in the very best interests of Europeans themselves, while professionals reminds the public, that as a result of financial and economic crisis a significant reduction in emissions became reality and that a 20 per cent target is now completely inadequately low.⁵ Hedegaard argues that by adopting the 30 per cent target the EU will strengthen her competitiveness, improve her energy security, stimulate innovations and create new jobs.

The commissioner’s position has support among the more advanced EU members such as Great Britain, Holland, Sweden or Denmark.⁶ Proposal to increase unilaterally the CO₂ target in the EU to 30 per cent by 2020 was endorsed by a joint statement of the ministers of the three key EU countries, Germany, France and Great Britain in July 2010.⁷ From a diplomatic point of view, the unilateral adoption of the 30 per cent emissions reduction target is necessary for the EU to return to the position of global leader in climate change after losing this important position to an “unholy” US–Chinese alliance in Copenhagen. A unilateral increase in the EU target of 30 per cent – and later even more – could be balanced by introducing European carbon duties on products imported from countries whose unregulated polluting industries would be theoretically able to obtain competitive advantage over the European producers. Such an approach to the protection of global climate as well as Europe’s economy has a lot of support in France. Germany, as the world largest exporter, has concerns about this approach, since it could lead to the trade war and threaten export positions and interests of the German economy. The French argue that carbon duty could be introduced in a way compatible with WTO rules and point towards growing support for this idea among EU countries.⁸ However, the Commission itself so far failed to support this possibly very effective proposal.

⁵ “Emise CO₂ klesly v EU díky hospodářské recesi o 7,2%,” *euractiv.cz*, April 22, 2011. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.cz/zivotni-prostredie/clanek/emise-co2-klesly-v-eu-diky-hospodarske-recesi-o-72--008699> (accessed on April 22, 2011).

⁶ “France, UK, Sweden want deep CO₂ cut, Italy opposed,” *Reuters*, June 11, 2010. Available online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/11/us-eu-climate-france-idUSTRE65A4XM20100611> (accessed on June 11, 2010)

⁷ “Velká trojka“ žiada zníženie emisií o 30%,” *euractiv.cz*, July 19, 2010. Available online: <http://www.euractiv.sk/zivotne-prostredie/clanok/velka-trojka-ziada-znizenie-emisii-o-30-015553> (accessed on July 19, 2010).

⁸ “France, Italy demand EU consider carbon tax on imports,” *EUbusiness*, April 15, 2010. Available online: <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/france-italy-tax.459/> (accessed on April 15, 2010).

CANCUN AND THE FUTURE OF THE “HOT AIR TRADE”

The year 2010 left without an answer to the question about the future of the Kyoto protocol expiring in 2012. Let us remember that the United States, long time the largest greenhouse gasses emitter, never joined the protocol and its coming to life was enabled only after its ratification by Russia resulting to a great degree from the EU's diplomatic effort.⁹ The global emission trading scheme introduced by the Kyoto Protocol proved to be a completely ineffective tool for reducing global greenhouse gases emissions and climate change mitigation, moreover it became overly complicated.

The system however has also its winners and therefore supporters. Among the winners are companies, that thanks to its abuse in the conditions of corrupt states became, without work and in complete impunity, fabulously rich as flagrantly illustrates the sad story of Interblue company in Slovakia,¹⁰ but also some developing countries that got access to financing for introducing clean technologies. And, of course, among the winners are post-communistic countries – Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, but also big players such as Russia and Ukraine among them – that were given emissions quotas high above their post-transformation emission levels.

They were then allowed to sell for billions huge volumes of emissions quotas on the “hot air” markets without needing to lift a finger.

While rich countries are currently pushing for new post-Kyoto regimes with specific greenhouse gas limits obliged also for developing countries, G77 countries would like to continue according to its original regime, requiring nothing from them. Developing countries, including China and India, argue by pinpointing the fact, that the rich countries became rich thanks to two centuries of unlimited burning of fossil fuels and therefore are now obliged to reduce their emissions unilaterally, without asking for obligatory reductions from countries whose accumulated contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions is historically miniature. Obviously, this argument can be opposed by arguing that during most of modern history, people and governments did not have scientific knowledge about the relations between burning fossil fuels and climate change. Such an argument however only explains history and does not

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⁹ “Russia backs Kyoto climate treaty,” *BBC*, September 30, 2004. Available online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3702640.stm> (accessed on September 30, 2004).

¹⁰ In 2008 Slovakia's Ministry for Environment led by Slovak National Party nominee Ján Chrebet sold to Interblue Group, a “garage company” registered in USA 15 million of emission permits given to Slovak Republic within Kyoto mechanism for 5.05 euro per ton. Around the same time Czech Republic sold her permits for twice that price. Slovakia was thus robbed of approximately 75 million euro. Shortly after the transaction the, American company ceased to exist. As of March 2011 no formal charge on 75 million euro robbery of Slovak Republic, nor for abuse of powers of public actor and violation of obligations while managing public property was raised against any person.

change the fundamental fact that rich countries have responsibilities. Moreover, it is easy to argue, that current political elites of the USA, EU, Canada, Australia and other rich countries know enough about climate change at least for three decades, yet from purely economic reasons continued in their high CO₂ emissions regardless of consequences for the rest of the world

The European Commission appears to be ready to negotiate a new protocol, which would only include rich countries. Prior to the Cancun conference, the Commission adopted the position according which it prefers

a post-2012 global climate framework to take the form of a single, new, legally binding instrument that includes the essential elements of the Kyoto Protocol. However, the EU stands ready to accept an outcome based on separate legal instruments for each of the two negotiating “tracks“ as long as the instruments contain consistent, comparable and legally binding rules,¹¹

but is also ready to adopt a set of individual agreements. The differences between the blocks were not overcome in Cancun and parties only “agreed to agree.” The Achilles heel of the whole process remains general understanding, that just as USA did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the past, the ratification of new post-Kyoto agreement is most likely a political no go. Its eventual ratification is not guaranteed in Russia, Canada and even in Japan. For this reason many countries in 2010 started to increasingly focus on bilateral partnerships.

Alongside the greenhouse gas emissions, another part of the UN climate agenda concerns land use and forestry. Agriculture and deforestation are now responsible for about one third of climate change. The Copenhagen agreement called for the creation of a mechanism that would support efforts to prevent deforestation, especially destruction of tropical forests. In Cancun such a scheme was included in the reached agreement. The main financial supporters of efforts against logging of forests and rainforests are the Scandinavian countries. Furthermore some questions about financing of the developing countries’ assistance in adapting to climate change impacts were clarified in Cancun. Developed countries have committed themselves to provide 30 billion euro by the end of 2012 to developing countries in assistance of achieving their targets. Out of 30 billion, 7,2 billion euro was pledged by the EU.¹² These are supposed to be “new money,” not re-allocation of resources promised previously for development aid. Of its commitment, the EU provided 2,2 billion euro in 2010. For

¹¹ “Climate change: questions and answers on the UN climate conference in Cancun,” Europa, Press Releases Rapid, November 29, 2010. Available online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/627&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (accessed on December 15, 2010).

¹² “From Copenhagen to Cancun: climate finance,” World Resources Institute, November 30, 2010. Available online: <http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/11/copenhagen-cancun-climate-finance> (accessed on November 30, 2010). Slovak Republic has promised in Copenhagen to contribute to this start up mechanism by 9 million euro – 1 million in 2010, 4 million in 2011 and 4 million in 2012.

domestic Slovak sceptics, it is good to compare these resources allocated to help the developing world with billions of inhabitants with the assistance of a much richer Slovakia with only 5 million people. After 2020, rich countries committed themselves to provide annually to the climate fund to support developing countries as much as 100 billion US dollars.¹³ A fundamental question of who will provide how much – and especially where from to squeeze these resources – remained unanswered in Cancun.¹⁴ Feasibility of these declarative promises remains highly questionable especially when we remember the fate of another of the declared commitments of rich countries, which is to provide 0.7 per cent of their GDP annually for development assistance. The proposal for the mechanism of distribution of these hypothetical contributions should be submitted to the next UN climate conference in Durban in December 2011.

In connection with the UN conference on global warming – Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban and others in the future – it is worth noting one of the many seemingly small, but non-negligible absurdities of global climate negotiations. This absurdity is the timing of major climate conferences during the winter periods on the northern hemisphere, where the vast majority of rich countries in the world is located. This absurd timing perfectly captures the disconnect of political elites from the real world. One can reasonably assume that if negotiations were conducted in the summer, when most of the climatic extremes such as heat waves, hurricanes, typhoons or floods manifest themselves, the atmosphere of negotiations in 2010 would be significantly different and more constructive. For those who have no honest interest in the successful negotiations, the timing of conferences in December is unfortunately optimal. Failure of the conferences in Copenhagen as well as in Cancun – from which informed people did not expect more than cosmetic solutions aimed to save the face of global diplomacy – led to many speculations about moving the essential climate negotiations outside the UN framework, for instance to G8 or G20 summits. Such considerations are an expression of the frustration of being trapped in the stalemate of the negotiations and their base is perfectly logical: 80 per cent of global CO₂ emissions are produced by only 17 countries and to reach an agreement between them could be much easier. Opponents argue that such an agreement would not have global legitimacy. The real question is what the world needs more – real agreements aimed at stabilizing climate or at least slowing down global warming, or delayed and probably inadequate agreements legitimized by dozens of governments, whose contributions to the solution of the problem can be only minimal and symbolic?

One can reasonably assume that if negotiations were conducted in the summer, when most of the climatic extremes such as heat waves, hurricanes, typhoons or floods manifest themselves, the atmosphere of negotiations in 2010 would be significantly different and more constructive.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ According to various methods of calculating, the EU contribution could be 27 to 40 per cent of the total – that is 27 to 40 billion dollars annually. For comparison, EU member states are currently providing approximately 60 per cent of all rich countries' development aid.

MAJOR CLIMATE EVENTS OF 2010

Despite the fact that global climate diplomacy in 2010 failed to achieve any progress that would constitute a real and effective response to the unprecedentedly rapid warming of the planet, 2010 was particularly rich in climatic events. In terms of climatic events of global importance, 2010 was particularly interesting. According to the authoritative National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)¹⁵ and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),¹⁶ the year 2010, along with 2005, was the warmest since the beginning of systematic measurements. The record temperature was achieved despite the fact that recent years have been years of deep minimum in solar activity within the small 11-year solar cycle. Nine out of the ten warmest years globally were in the first decade of the twenty-first century, which, of course, became the warmest decade since the beginning of the measurements.¹⁷ The speed of sea ice melting in the Arctic documented live by satellites, increased in the number and intensity of extreme weather events and resulting economic losses, temperature measurements on land and in oceans all around the earth as well as a growing number of scientific studies document well the situation. Even the most pessimistic scenarios of the CO₂ emissions growth suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) were outperformed by reality.¹⁸

An arbitrarily set “acceptable” global warming measurement of 2°C by 2100 seems increasingly an unrealistic underestimate. On top of that the thesis of “acceptability” 2-degree warming is very illusory, because – as is flagrantly illustrated by developments in 2010 – our farming systems, on which the global civilization is inherently dependent on and sensitive to, are dangerously vulnerable to a much lower increase in average temperature. The European part of Russia, especially its southern and central part, was hit by an extreme heat wave in the summer of 2010. Russian meteorologists say that this was the longest and most extreme heat wave for at least the last 1000 years.¹⁹ July temperatures in some parts of Russia were 8–9°C above the long-term average and led to a significant increase in mortality of inhabitants of Russia. 56,000 Russians died prematurely during the summer of 2010 compared to figures from previous years.²⁰

¹⁵ “NASA research finds last decade was warmest on record,” NASA. Available online: http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2010/jan/HQ_10-017_Warmest_temps.html (accessed on February 15, 2011).

¹⁶ “NOAA: 2010 tied for warmest year on record,” NOAA. Available online: http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20110112_globalstats.html (accessed on February 15, 2011).

¹⁷ “NASA research finds last decade was warmest on record,” *op. cit.*

¹⁸ M.R. Raupach, G. Marland, P. Ciais, C. Le Quére, J.G. Canadell, G. Klepper, C.B. Field, “Global and regional drivers of accelerated CO₂ emissions,” *PNAS*, Vol. 104, No. 24, 2007, pp. 10288–10293. Available online: <http://www.pnas.org/content/104/24/10288.full> (accessed on February 15, 2011).

¹⁹ “Deadly Russian heat wave gravest over millennium,” *Ria Novosti*, August 9, 2010. Available online: <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100809/160128496.htm> (accessed on August 9, 2010).

²⁰ “Russia confirms death rate rose by quarter in heatwave,” *BBC*, October 8, 2010. Available online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11503550> (accessed on October 8, 2010).

Much more significant than the "Russian only" tragedy however showed up to be the global effects of the Russian heat wave. Drought and fires reduced the wheat harvest in Russia almost 40 per cent and forced the Russian government to declare an embargo on the export of cereals:²¹

Russia was the second largest exporter of wheat in the world after the US in 2009. Russian ban on exports of wheat accelerated soaring prices of cereals and other food commodities on global stock markets, where prices in early 2011 overcome all previous records.²²

High food prices quickly politically destabilized those countries that are highly dependent on their imports. In early 2011, after self-immolation of citizens protesting against poverty and high food prices, a wave of bloody riots and revolutions led to the downfall of four decades of autocratic regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, war and Western military intervention in Libya and bloody conflicts and repressions in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain and other countries in the MENA region. Mass poverty and hunger spread also in other countries, but due to their small political significance remained outside the attention of Western media, the public and politicians.

At the same time when Russia was on fire, Pakistan was struck by extreme monsoon rains causing extensive flooding on the Indus and its tributaries. Floods directly affected 20 million people out of the 180 million population of the country, destroyed 1,2 million homes, crops and infrastructure.²³ To help devastated Pakistan, development agencies managed to raise about 1 billion US dollars, but economic losses are of an order of a magnitude higher. Even before the flood hit, Pakistan, a country armed with nuclear weapons, belonged among the top ten failed states in the world.²⁴ Catastrophic floods further aggravated the risk of its complete failure.

Third among the many climatic events of global reach that happened in 2010 is yet another "century" drought in the Amazon region. "Another" because the previous one declared as the draught of the century hit Amazonia in 2005. The drought of 2010 was even larger and dryer than the one in 2005, resulting in dying Amazon forests releasing into the atmosphere about 5 billion tons of CO₂. It is almost as much as are

²¹ "Russia extends grain exports embargo," *Xinhuanet*, October 23, 2010. Available online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-10/23/c_13571254.htm (accessed on October 23, 2010).

²² "FAO food price index, 03 February 2011," FAO. Available online: <http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex/en/> (accessed on February 15, 2011).

²³ "Pakistan floods: damage and challenges," *BBC*, August 26, 2010. Available online: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11104310> (accessed on August 26, 2010); "Pakistan floods 2010 damage and needs assessment," World Bank, November 15, 2010. Available online: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PAKISTANEXTN/Resources/DNAbyadb-worldbankPresentation.pdf> (accessed on November 15, 2010).

²⁴ "The Failed States Index, Foreign Policy." Available online: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/2010_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings (accessed on November 15, 2010).

current annual CO₂ emissions of the United States.²⁵ The forests that absorb CO₂ as they grow and bind carbon in the timber thus due to the drought become a significant source of emissions further reinforcing global warming leading to more droughts. In addition to climatic events and policy failures in the field of the Earth's climate, 2010 also brought a large number of fundamental scientific works that push our understanding of what is happening to the planet's atmosphere, how the situation may further evolve and what may be climate change implications for humans and earth ecosystems on which humankind fundamentally depends.

One of the most prestigious scientific journals, *Nature*, has published a study documenting how global warming is responsible for a 40 per cent decrease in phytoplankton in the oceans.²⁶ Phytoplankton is the basis of the ocean's food chain, but is also a huge producer of oxygen and CO₂ absorber.

A no less prestigious journal, *Science*, published a paper documenting the accelerated release of methane from the extensive shelf seas of Eastern Siberia.²⁷ "The

From Slovakia's small perspective, 2010 brought widespread floods that resulted from the record-high rainfall especially during the spring and the summer.

release of even part of the vast quantities of methane stored in the shelf seas could trigger abrupt warming of the climate," note the authors, and demonstrate that destabilization of the submarine permafrost has already started in the Eastern Siberia Sea and methane is being released into the atmosphere. During its first 20 years in the atmosphere methane is a 72 times stronger

greenhouse gas than CO₂, over one hundred years methane is 25 times more effective (CH₄ in the atmosphere slowly oxidized to less effective CO₂ and thus gradually loses its effectiveness).

A paper by the National Center for Atmospheric Research has come to the conclusion that devastating global droughts like the catastrophic Dust Bowl period in American prairies in the early 1930s of the twentieth century, may accompany even moderate growth scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions. "Dust bowlification" – the conversion of vast agricultural areas into arid deserts enveloped by deadly dust storms – may in coming decades, according to NCAR projections, affect not only the Midwest of the USA, but

²⁵ "Two severe Amazon droughts in five years alarms scientists," *Science Daily*, February 3, 2011. Available online: <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/02/110203141820.htm> (accessed on February 3, 2011); J. Romm, "Science: second '100 years' Amazon drought in 5 years caused huge CO2 emissions," *Climate Progress*, February 8, 2011. Available online: <http://climateprogress.org/2011/02/08/science-amazon-drought-co2-emissions-source-sink-simon-lewis/> (accessed on February 8, 2011).

²⁶ J. Romm, "Nature Stunner: 'Global warming blamed for 40 per cent decline in the ocean's phytoplankton,'" *Climate Progress*, July 29, 2010. Available online: <http://climateprogress.org/2010/07/29/nature-decline-ocean-phytoplankton-global-warming-boris-worm/> (accessed on July 29, 2010).

²⁷ J. Romm, "Science stunner: vast East Siberian Arctic shelf methane stores destabilizing and venting," *Climate Progress*, March 4, 2010. Available online: <http://climateprogress.org/2010/03/04/science-nsf-tundra-permafrost-methane-east-siberian-arctic-shelf-venting/> (accessed on March 4, 2010).

also vast areas of North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey, the Balkans and the Apennine and Iberian Peninsulas in Europe.²⁸

From Slovakia's small perspective, 2010 brought widespread floods that resulted from the record-high rainfall especially during the spring and the summer. Given the nature of the 2010 rains, floods, fortunately, did not cause a large number of casualties, nor did they have devastating effects on large infrastructure projects. They however did cause considerable economic losses to people of tens of affected villages and towns.

Floods hit Slovakia in the election year and have therefore become a political issue. Dissatisfaction with the flood response of the former Government probably contributed to tipping the tight election results in favor of the former opposition. The new Government discovered floods to be a politically significant phenomenon and shortly after taking power responded by establishing the formal position of Government plenipotentiary for flood protection. The new Prime Minister, Iveta Radičová even included flood protection among her top personal priorities.²⁹ Establishment of the above mentioned Government position in charge of floods protection is, however, clearly a lost opportunity. A climate literate government would respond to the flooding by the appointing Government Plenipotentiary for climate change. Such a position within the government structure could become an institutional partner for the EU's Commissioner for climate change. To put it figuratively, Connie Hedegaard, has no one "to answer a phone call" in the new Government either. If, of course, Government does not mean to pretend that the one to call is traditionally a very weak Minister of the Environment. Obviously, floods are only one of many aspects of climate change, others are equally significant and potentially devastating such as heat waves, droughts, fires, violent storms and other weather phenomena to which Slovakia will be increasingly exposed. This should be nothing new or unknown to authorities – in January 2010 the Slovak Ministry of Environment published the document Fifth national report of the Slovak Republic on climate change, which contains many of the relevant information needed to guide rationale response by the government. Unfortunately, this report, just as its predecessors, apparently did not find the path from the drawers of officials and academics to the desks of the prime minister, ministers of finance, agriculture, economy, heads of political parties and other decision makers.

Fully consistent with the lack of government climate literacy, are the subsidies that the government Iveta Radičová continues to provide for the brown coal mines and thus subsidize CO₂ emissions from tax payers money, despite all the rhetoric about economic responsibility and saving public resources. The position of each Slovak coal miner was in 2010 subsidized by about 1,800 euro per month, an amount which is 700 euro above average miner's salary.³⁰ Moreover, establishment of a plenipotentiary for floods position and associated rhetoric presents the current government and the prime minister person-

²⁸ D. Aiguo, "Drought under global warming: a review," Wiley Online library, October 19, 2010. Available online: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wcc.81/full> (accessed on October 19, 2010).

²⁹ For more see the official web site of the Slovak Prime Minister: <http://www.premierkasr.sk/23960/priority-predsednicky-vlady-sr.php> (accessed February 15, 2011).

³⁰ "Banikom dotujeme viac ako celú mzdu," *Sme*, March 3, 2011. Available online: <http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/5790318/banikom-dotujeme-viac-ako-celu-mzdu.html> (accessed on March 3, 2011).

ally with enormous political risk, because it creates totally unrealistic expectations of flood protection among rural people, that may be potentially life threatening. The government started to promote and build low cost measures to increase water retention capacity of the small upper watersheds that have no real capacity to absorb extremely large rains brought by torrential storms, but among the people living in the catchment areas downstream may create a false and dangerous sense of security. In addition to all this, the Government continues to neglect many environmental risks such as the possibility of floods overtaking toxic waste dumps (such as in Dubová and many others). Failure to address these risks can lead to toxic contamination of large parts of the river basins, as it happened with a major sludge spill near an aluminum plant in Hungary in 2010.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS

Mankind does not lack sufficient scientific knowledge to start taking global warming as one of the most serious, if not absolutely the most serious, challenge humans will face in the twenty-first century. It is an illusion to believe that global processes set into motion by climate change can be managed by a „fortress Europe“ approach and that Europe will be able to overcome them without extremely severe distress. A small wave of migrants from North Africa to Italy – a miniature event compared to massive migrations that will be triggered by climate change - succeeded in shaking the Shengen system, one of the greatest achievements of the European integration over the last half a century. What may happen to the EU process in cases of 100 times larger events is not so difficult to imagine. How quickly such scenarios of global destabilization due to the climate change materialize is to a large degree in the hands of politicians and depends on their climate literacy and ability to anticipate. With all humility and fully understanding relatively minor significance of Slovakia in the world as well as the relatively small contribution of Slovakia to climate change, the problem of low climate literacy and low capability to anticipate concerns of Slovak political elites as it translates into their international and domestic policies.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

IRINA MATTOVÁ

The term global governance appeared at the end of the 1980s, however, the frequency of its use increased almost a decade later.¹ The coining of the term and its application by the expert public were connected with the growing awareness of the changes which had occurred in international relations since the end of the World War II. Attempting to prevent another world-wide conflict and driven by the need to solve selected problems at a global scale, countries began to establish different multilateral institutions (the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and others). These institutions provided a platform for collective decision-making on global matters, though they did not form a global government. The operation of these institutions was based on the regulation of mutual relations, setting binding norms, discussions on problematic issues in multilateral forums, and presence of international authorities in the implementation and overseeing of mutual agreements.² However, in further developments this mechanism proved to be ineffective in many situations. As a result, the international community began to search for new cooperation platforms which would be more flexible in handling global problems. Apart from multilateral organizations, informal groupings of leading countries (such as G8,³

¹ M. Bevir, I. Hall, "Global governance," *The Sage handbook of governance*, Sage Publications, 2010. Available online: http://www.sage-e-reference.com/hdbk_governance/Article_n23.html (accessed on March 9, 2011).

² "Global governance 2025: at a critical juncture," National Intelligence Council, USA; Institute of Security Studies, EU, September 2010, p. 18.

³ The G8 (the Group of 8) comprises seven major industrialized countries of the world (France, Germany, the USA, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Canada) and Russia. It started to be formed in 1970s from secret informal meetings of finance ministers (Library Group, later the G5). Since 1975 the ministerial meetings were complemented by the regular summits of heads of states and governments (at first G6, from 1976 after the accession of Canada G7, from 1998 after joining of

G20,⁴ BRIC⁵), regional groupings of countries (the EU and other), and non-state actors to international cooperation (NGOs, networks of experts, transnational corporations, etc) started to participate in solving global problems to a greater extent. At present the participation of these actors in the decision-making process is predominantly based on mutual consultations, the formulation of non-binding codes of conduct and regional initiatives; whereas in the process of implementing and overseeing mutual agreements national interests prevail to be taken in consideration rather than interests of international authorities.⁶ It is the change in quantity and quality of actors participating in the decision-making at a global scale which has been generalized into the concept of global governance. Nevertheless, no definite consensus concerning an exact definition of the concept has been reached amongst global governance theorists.⁷ Considering this fact the article is based on the most general understanding of the given term. Within this framework the term global governance is referred to "all the institutions, regimes, processes, partnerships, and networks that contribute to collective action and problem solving at the international level."⁸

The Slovak Republic participates in global governance either *directly* as a member state of different multilateral institutions (the UN, etc) or *indirectly* as a member state of the EU, which as an interstate organization participates in meetings of informal groupings of states, such as the G8 or the G20. In 2010 at the G8/G20 forums the EU was (for the first time under the Lisbon Treaty) represented by one single delegation:

Russia G8; in 1977 the EEC attained a status of an associate member. For the origin and development of the G8 see: P.I. Hajnal, *The G8 system and the G20: evolution, role and documentation*, Hampshire, England; Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 11–35. In the following years the G8 became a significant international forum, which addressed wide range of issues and presented "a collective framework for regulating globalization." In 2009 after the international community had decided to shift the premier international economic forum to the G20, G8 was forced to redefine its role. At present the so called "new G8" focuses mainly on "geopolitical and security issues," "the partnership with Africa," and "on the subjects of common interest" to its member states. See: "What is the G8?" Available online: <http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/root/bank/print/847.htm> (accessed on June 4, 2010).

⁴ G20 (the Group of 20) is a group of 19 major economies of the world (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, Canada, South Korea, Mexico, Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Turkey, Great Britain, the USA) and the EU. It was established in 1999 on the initiative of the G7 countries, which arose from the need to solve the financial crisis from the end of 1990s in close cooperation with developing countries. See: "What is the G-20." Available online: http://www.g20.org/about_faqs.aspx (accessed on June 4, 2010). The number of issues the G20 tackled during its development gradually increased, however it predominately focuses on economic issues. Its significance grew with the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, when the G20 was recognized as the premier international economic forum.

⁵ BRIC is an acronym coined by the Goldman Sachs investment bank in order to refer to the economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, which are considered to become the strongest economies in the world by 2025. In 2011 South Africa officially joined the group, which changed its official name to BRICS.

⁶ M. Bevir, I. Hall, op. cit., p. 18.

⁷ For different understandings of global governance see: R. Mariusová, *Transformace světového řádu: Aktéři a globální vládnutí*, Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk, 2010, p. 59.

⁸ M. Bevir, I. Hall, op. cit., p. 1.

the European Council President, Herman Van Rompuy, and the European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso. Nevertheless, the procedure for preparing the EU position for G8 and/or G20 summits has not been adopted yet; at present the EU positions have been conducted on the basis of informal practices.

Currently, there are only rare occasions for Slovakia to participate in the preparation of a common EU position for a G8 summit. The Slovak Republic as a part of the so called EU-23 (i.e. the EU member states which are non-members of the G8 or the G20) has just been reported on the preparations and outcomes of the G8 summits through its representatives in COREPER (the Committee of Permanent Representatives), without any real participation in the process.⁹

Regarding the preparation of the EU positions for G20 summits, the extent of participation of Slovakia in the process is much wider, especially through the following institutions: the Ministry of Finance (the State Secretary discusses a draft EU position for G20 summit prepared by the Presidency of the Council of the EU in its Economic and Financial Committee; the Finance Minister approves the proposal of the EU G20 position, which is to be discussed at a G20 finance ministers and G20 central bank governors meeting), the National Bank (the bank deputy debates a draft EU position for the G20 prepared by the Presidency of the Council of the EU in its Economic and Financial Committee), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in cooperation with the Finance Ministry and the National Bank the Ministry is qualified to prepare Slovakia's position prior to a G20 summit), members of the European Parliament (they are qualified to participate in the discussion on G20 summit preparation), the Prime Minister (approves the EU position on the G20 summit in the European Council).¹⁰

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AGENDA

The issues addressed by particular global governance actors considerably vary from one another and affect different areas of social life. This agenda constantly changes and develops in accordance with the gravity of problems to be solved in a given period of time. The development of a G8 and G20 agenda from their establishment to 2010 is shown in the following tables.

⁹ See: J. Huigens, A. Nieman, "The EU within the G8: A case of ambiguous and contested actor-ness," *EU Diplomacy Papers*, No. 5, 2009, pp. 17, 22. Available online: http://www.coleurope.eu/file/content/studyprogrammes/ird/research/pdf/EDP2009/EDP_5_2009_HuigensNiemann.pdf (accessed on June 12, 2010).

¹⁰ Concerning the involvement of the EU and its member states in the process of preparation for G8 and G20 summits see: "The output and input dimension of the European representation in the G20," *Studia Diplomatica* Vol. LXIII, No. 2, 2010, pp. 141–154; S. Nasra et al., "The EU in the G8 system: assessing EU member states' involvement," *EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2009/45*, 2009.

Table 1. The development of G8 agenda from 1975 to 2010

main topics	1975 France	1976 USA	1977 Great Britain	1978 West Germany	1979 Japan	1980 Italy	1981 Canada	1982 France	1983 USA	1984 Great Britain	1985 West Germany	1986 Japan	1987 Italy	1988 Canada	1989 France	1990 USA	1991 Great Britain	1992 Germany	1993 Japan	1994 Italy	1995 Canada	1996 Russia	1996 France	1997 USA	1998 Great Britain	1999 Germany	2000 Japan	2001 Italy	2002 Canada	2003 France	2004 USA	2005 Great Britain	2006 Russia	2007 Germany	2008 Japan	2009 Italy	2010 Canada											
financial crises	X																																															
international financial institution reform	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								
development	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							
food and agriculture	X																																															
energy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							
nuclear energy																																																
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						
education			X							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						
children																																																
health			X								X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					
migration											X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
climate change											X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
China													X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			
demographics						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
Iran						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
natural disasters										X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Balkans																																																
Egypt																																																

Data based on "G8 conclusions: Compiled by the G8 research group," University of Toronto, G8 Research Group, February 2, 2011. Available online: <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/conclusions/index.html> (accessed on March 3, 2011), and/or "G7/G8 Summits," University of Toronto, G8 Research Group, January 24, 2011. Available online: <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/index.htm> (accessed on March 3, 2011).

Table 2. The development of G20 agenda from 1999 to 2010

main topics	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2008	2009	2009	2009	2010	2010
	Germany	Canada	Canada	India	Mexico	Germany	China	Australia	South Africa	Brazil	2008	USA	Great Britain	USA	Canada	South Korea
crisis prevention	X	X	X	X	X	X				X		X	X	X	X	X
globalization challenges		X	X	X	X	X										
combating terror financing			X	X	X	X										
development and aid				X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
financial crime					X	X	X									
financial sector					X	X	X									
population ageing						X	X	X								
regional economic integration						X	X	X								
surveillance / domestic policies						X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Bretton-Woods institution reform							X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
commodities and economic impact								X	X	X						
fiscal policies									X	X			X		X	X
monetary policies										X					X	X
Doha and trade barriers										X			X		X	X
energy security															X	X
climate change															X	X
fighting corruption															X	X

Adopted from E. Čihelková, et al., *Regionalizmus a multilateralizmus*, Prague: C.H. Beck, 2010, p. 292, amended and updated according to the G20 communiques. See: "The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26-27, 2010." Available online: http://www.g20.toronto.ca/2010/g20_declaration_en.pdf (accessed on March 3, 2011); and "The G20 Seoul summit leader's declaration. November 11-12, 2010." Available online: http://media.seoulsummit.kr/contents/dlobo/E1_Seoul_Summit_Leaders_Declaration.pdf (accessed on March 3, 2011).

This overview demonstrates that most of the issues discussed at the G8/G20 forums in 2010 had been addressed by these informal groupings at their previous summits. The 2010 summits focused especially on economic, military–security, social, and environmental issues.

ECONOMIC AGENDA

The reaction of the international community to the state of the world economy after the outbreak of the global economic crisis in 2008 became the central point of the 2010 global governance agenda. This issue was debated at several international forums (World Economic Forum in Davos, G8 in Canadian Muskoka, BRIC in Brazilian Brasilia and other). However, the international community designed G20 summits as the premier forum for international economic cooperation; the summits held in Toronto, Canada (June 26–27, 2010) and in Seoul, South Korea (November 11–12, 2010) were the first ones to have this status.¹¹

At both summits the representatives of G20 countries continued in mutual cooperation which was intensified during the crisis.

At the same time they restated their intention to stabilize the world economy, recover its growth in the post-crisis period and introduce reforms which would prevent a recurrence of the crisis in the global scale.¹² In an attempt to bolster the world economy growth, the G20 countries reaffirmed their commitments made at the 2009 Pittsburgh summit, summarized in the document *A framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth*. It aimed at “initiating a new process of mutual assessment to evaluate whether the G-20’s policies are consistent with a more sustainable and balanced pattern and distribution of global growth.”¹³ The cooperation in this issue was enhanced by launching the Seoul action plan at the G20 summit held in November 2010. In the plan each member country committed to implement concrete policy fostering strong, sustainable and balanced growth. This Action plan concerns five areas: monetary and exchange rate policy, trade and development policy,

¹¹ The decision to recognize the G20 as the premier forum of the international economic cooperation was reached by 19 most developed economies of the world and the EU at the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009. This new status of G20 was approved by the UN, the G8, and the BRIC countries. See: K.M. Ban, “Remarks to the G-20 summit,” Pittsburgh, September 25, 2009. Available online: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=598 (accessed on March 20, 2011); “G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings,” Muskoka, June 25–26, 2010. Available online: http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/assets/pdfs/2010-declaration_eng.pdf (accessed on March 20, 2011); “Joint statement of the BRIC countries’ leaders,” Jekaterinburg, June 16, 2009. Available online: <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/06/217963.shtml> (accessed on March 20, 2011).

¹² See: “The Seoul summit leader’s declaration. November 11–12, 2010,” paragraphs 2 and 3. Available online: http://media.seoulsummit.kr/contents/dlobo/E1_Seoul_Summit_Leaders_Declaration.pdf (accessed on February 21, 2010).

¹³ “A framework for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth,” paragraph 6. Pittsburgh, September 24–25, 2009. Available online: <http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm> (accessed on March 25, 2011).

fiscal policy, financial reforms and structural reform. As a result of adopting this action plan by the EU, Slovakia has to implement its part of the obligations.¹⁴

In 2010 the G20 countries committed to continue in reforms they initiated at previous summits in order to prevent financial and economic crises. The G20 members decided to implement the international financial institution reform (IFI reform) and the financial sector reform as well as to focus on fighting protectionism and promoting trade and investments.

The IFI reform aims at the modernization of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the improvement of IFI surveillance, the capital strengthening of multilateral development banks, and the strengthening of global financial safety nets.¹⁵

In comparison to other reforms the IMF modernization will have the highest and direct impact on Slovakia; this modernization consists of IMF quota and voice reforms, and IMF governance reform.¹⁶ These reforms aim at involvement of the dynamic emerging market and developing countries (with respect to their strengthening position in the world economy) and the under-represented countries in the IMF decision-making process. In this context, the year 2010 was a period in which, on the one hand, the preparation for implementation of the 2008 IMF quota and voice reform¹⁷ was com-

¹⁴ For the EU commitments see: "Table: Policy commitments by G20 members." Available online: http://www.seoulsummit.kr/filedown.g20?boardDTO.boardfile_seq=201011120000003813 (accessed on March 30, 2010).

¹⁵ See: "The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010." Available online: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20_declaration_en.pdf (accessed on March 3, 2011); "The G20 Seoul summit leader's declaration. November 11–12, 2010," op. cit.

¹⁶ For the details of the reform see: J. Maskal, "Nové riadenie s novými kvótami (o aktuálnej reforme v Medzinárodnom menovom fonde)," *Biatic: odborný bankový časopis* Vol. 19, No. 3, 2011, pp. 12–16; The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010," op. cit.; "The Seoul summit leader's declaration. November 11–12, 2010," op. cit.

¹⁷ The 2008 reform came into force on March 3, 2011 after the ratification of the amendment to the IMF's Articles of Agreement; its ratification by "the three fifths of all IMF member states representing 85 per cent of total voting power" was a precondition for the reform implementation. V. Martvoň, "Reforma členských kvót v MMF," *Biatic: odborný bankový časopis* Vol. 18, No. 1, 2010, p. 13. The Government of the Slovak Republic has approved the increase in the Slovak member quota in the IMF on April 1, 2009 and on September 30, 2009 the Government has approved the draft of the amendment to the IMF's Articles of Agreement in order to increase the voting power and the participation of Slovakia in the IMF. The National Council of the Slovak Republic passed the amendment to the IMF's Articles of Agreement on December 1, 2009. See: "Uznesenie Vlády Slovenskej republiky č. 261 z 1. apríla 2009 k návrhu na zvýšenie členskej kvóty Slovenskej republiky v Medzinárodnom menovom fonde." Available online: http://www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/ViewDocumentHtml/Uznesenie-5216?prefixFile=u_ (accessed on March 3, 2011); "Uznesenie Vlády Slovenskej republiky č. 639 z 30. septembra 2009 k návrhu na uzavretie Dodatku k Dohode o Medzinárodnom menovom fonde s cieľom zvýšiť počet hlasov a mieru účasti v Medzinárodnom menovom fonde a Dodatku k Dohode o Medzinárodnom menovom fonde s cieľom rozšíriť právomoci Medzinárodného menového fondu pri investovaní." Available online: http://www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/ViewDocumentHtml/Uznesenie-4924?prefixFile=u_ (March 3, 2011); "Detaily medzinárodnej zmluvy." Available online: <http://www.nrsr.sk/Default.aspx?sid=zakony/zakon&ZakZborID=13&CisObdobia=4&CPT=1264> (accessed March 3, 2011)

pleted, and, on the other hand, there was taken a decision on a new IMF reform that should be put into practice in October 2012.

The reform adopted by the IMF Board of Governors in 2008 embraced a new quota formula, ad hoc quota increases for 54 member states (including Slovakia), a tripling of the basic votes, the introduction of regular quota reviews, which shall occur at least every five years, and the establishment of an additional alternate executive director position in the IMF Executive Board for African constituencies.¹⁸ In reference

According to the G20 countries the financial sector is another area requiring reform. This reform shall aim to eliminate one of the main causes of the crisis, which these countries impute to a reckless and irresponsible risk tak[en] by banks and other financial institutions, combined with major failures of regulation and supervision.

to Slovakia this reform implies the increase of the member quota from SDR 357.5 million (0.16 per cent of total IMF quotas) to SDR 427.5 million (0.17 per cent).¹⁹

In 2010 the international community initiated a new IMF reform due to long-lasting discontent of the dynamic emerging market and developing countries with the results of the 2008 IMF reform. The decision to make a new reform was reached at the November G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting in Gyeongju, South Korea, and it was approved by the IMF Board of Governors

in December 2010. The agreement included the shift of more than 6 per cent of the voting power to developing countries, a doubling of the member quotas, a reduction of European Executive Board members in favor of the emerging market and developing countries representation, an overall review of the quota formula, and an all-elected IMF

¹⁸ Pozri E. Cihelková, *Regionalismus a multilateralismus: Základy nového světového obchodního řádu?* Prague: C. H. Beck, 2010, p. 288.

¹⁹ As the increase in the IMF member quota corresponds not only to the increase in voting power in the IMF but also to the amount of financial resources the member country is obliged to provide to the IMF, the position of the Slovak republic to the reform was cautious. The Slovak republic reacted to the reform in its position before the G20 London summit in April 2009 as follows: "In principle, we support an increase of IMF resources, but this motion currently represents a problem for Slovak Republic, for respective required volumes are not available for us and at the same time, conditions based on which this can materialize are not known. Under current SDR interest rates providing would result in large losses, with the difference to be off-set by public resources on the cost of budgetary deficit increase." "Position of the Slovak Republic with regard to the G20 London summit," April 2, 2009. Available online: [http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_07A24395D84B8E93C12576670052B101_SK/\\$File/Position_of_SR_G20.pdf](http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_07A24395D84B8E93C12576670052B101_SK/$File/Position_of_SR_G20.pdf) (accessed on 5, 2011). The similar position by the Slovak republic was taken before the G20 summit held in September 2009 in Pittsburgh: "A clear definition of roles and position of the IMF in this process, its new mandate including an explicit definition of its powers, and keeping the principle of transparency could be a significant contribution. Nevertheless, it is inevitable to ensure an effective supervision over the whole process of the reform and to guarantee that the reform of the IMF governance will not result in building ineffective organizational structures." "Stanovisko SR pred samitom G20 v Pittsburghu." Available online: [http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_82A1E69C36C04D15C12576670052DFBA_SK/\\$File/Stanovisko_ku_G20_Pittsburgh.pdf](http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_82A1E69C36C04D15C12576670052DFBA_SK/$File/Stanovisko_ku_G20_Pittsburgh.pdf) (accessed on April 5, 2011).

Executive Board.²⁰ On the basis of this reform the member quota of Slovakia shall increase to SDR 1001 million, which comprises 0.22 per cent of the total IMF quota.²¹

In 2010 Slovakia also participated in the capital increases for the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), which was in compliance with conclusions of the G20 summits. The G20 countries have committed themselves to increasing the capital base of MDBs by 85 per cent, which amounts to approx. 350 billion US dollars, aiming at increasing total annual lending to developing countries from 37 billion US dollars to 71 billion US dollars.²² Slovakia contributed in the process of MDB capital increase through the International Development Association (IDA) 15 Replenishment in the amount of 680,000 euro and through the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in the amount of 30,000 euro. Slovakia declared its interest to participate in the IDA 16 Replenishment in the future.²³

According to the G20 countries the financial sector is another area requiring reform. This reform shall aim to eliminate one of the main causes of the crisis, which these countries impute to a "reckless and irresponsible risk tak[en] by banks and other financial institutions, combined with major failures of regulation and supervision."²⁴ The issues of financial sector reform have started to be more intensely debated by the G20 since the November 2008 Washington summit. Further steps to accomplish this goal were undertaken also in 2010. Four pillars which should constitute the basis of the reform were underlined in the G20 Toronto summit declaration as follows:

1. strong regulation framework;
2. effective supervision;
3. building systemic institutions;
4. transparent international assessment and the mechanism of *peer review* (a framework of mutual assessment amongst member states).²⁵

In the November 2010 Seoul summit the G20 has succeeded to make progress with the first pillar implementation as they approved a new international regulatory framework for bank capital and liquidity known as Basel III.²⁶

²⁰ "The Seoul summit document," paragraph 16. Available online: http://media.seoulsummit.kr/contents/dlobo/E2_Seoul_Summit_Document.pdf (accessed on March 3, 2011).

²¹ J. Maskal, Ľ. Országhová, op. cit., p. 13.

²² "ANNEX III: Enhancing the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the IFIs and further supporting the needs of the most vulnerable," paragraph 5. Available online: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20_declaration_en.pdf (accessed on March 3, 2011).

²³ "Výročná správa 2010," National Bank of Slovakia, 2011, p. 65. Available online: http://www.nbs.sk/_img/Documents/_Publikacie/VyrocnnaSprava/VSNBS10.PDF (accessed on March 3, 2011).

²⁴ "The Seoul summit document," op. cit., paragraph 27.

²⁵ See: "The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010," op. cit., paragraphs 17–22.

²⁶ At this summit the G20 countries also set a future agenda they will have to pursue in relation to the regulation of financial sector: oversight of macro-prudential policy framework, regulatory reform, regulation and supervision of the shadow banking, regulation and supervision of commodity derivative market, market integrity and efficiency, and consumer protection. "The Seoul summit document," op. cit., paragraph 41.

The regulatory framework Basel III²⁷ will also have an impact on the bank sector in the Slovak Republic.²⁸ Basel III is to replace the existing, however, nowadays insufficient framework Basel II (Slovakia ratified Basel II in 2007). The implementation of the new regulatory framework starts in 2013 and has to be completed by 2019.

At the Washington summit the G20 countries have committed themselves to maintain their markets open in order to support economic growth and to avoid overregulation of the world economy in an effort to face the financial and economic crisis.²⁹ At the 2010 Toronto summit the countries concurred that their decision made in 2008 was right and they reaffirmed their commitment until 2013.³⁰ Likewise, they reiterated their commitment to fight protectionism in all its forms at the Seoul summit.³¹ At both of the 2010 summits the G20 countries expressed their willingness to promptly and successfully conclude an actual WTO round of negotiations (opened in 2001).

The G20 decision not to raise trade barriers is in accordance with the Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the period of 2010–2014.³² Slovakia is represented in the process of WTO negotiations partly through the Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic in Geneva and partly as a member state

²⁷ The main objective of the Basel III is to “enable banks to withstand – without extraordinary government support – stresses of a magnitude associated with the recent financial crisis.” “The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010,” op. cit., paragraph 18. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which is responsible for preparing the new regulatory framework, it is inevitable to improve “quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base for measuring capital adequacy,” to adopt “a new approach to leverage in commercial banks aiming at introducing additional safeguards against model risk and measurement error,” to introduce “counter-cyclical buffers” and “a global minimum liquidity for internationally active banks that includes a 30-day liquidity coverage ratio requirement underpinned by a longer-term structural liquidity ratio” and to review “the need for additional capital, liquidity and other supervisory measures to reduce the externalities created by systemically important institutions.” J. Belás, M. Lambovska, “Niekoľko poznámok k bankovej regulácii,” *Biatec: odborný bankový časopis* Vol. 19, No. 3, 2011, p. 28.

²⁸ For possible impact of the Basel III framework on Slovakia see: E. Zimková, “Basel III – Pomalé kroky správnym smerom.” Available online: <http://www.derivat.sk/files/fsn%202011/Zimkova.pdf> (accessed on March 23, 2011).

²⁹ See “Declaration of the summit on financial markets and the world economy,” Washington DC, November 15, 2008. Available online: <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2008/2008declaration1115.html> (accessed on April 15, 2011).

³⁰ “The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010,” op. cit., paragraph 35. The same commitment was taken by the G8 countries at their Muskoka summit (June 25–26, 2011). Market openness was one of few economic issues the G8 debated in 2010. See: “G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings,” op. cit.

³¹ “The Seoul summit document,” op. cit., paragraph 42.

³² In the Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic it is stated that “it is necessary for this [Slovak] type of economy to promote further liberalisation of world trade, to remove barriers to trade, in order to enhance the access of Slovak exporters to markets in third countries.” “Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca: Programové vyhlásenie Vlády Slovenskej republiky na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014,” Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic 2010. Available online: <http://www.government.gov.sk/data/files/6257.pdf> (accessed on April 20, 2011).

of the EU. The Slovak position on these negotiations is based on the following assumptions:

1. the negotiations shall result in balanced commitments in particular areas and as a complex;
2. the outcome is to support an economic growth in all the countries, with an emphasis on the needs of developing and less developed countries;
3. the outcomes of the new round of negotiations have to be accepted by all WTO members (a consensus principle).³³

Making the interconnection between the issues of economic growth and of development was another result of the G20 negotiations in Seoul. Being aware of the fact that the narrowing of the development gap and reducing poverty is possible only through maximization of the growth potential of the developing countries, the G20 countries adopted the Seoul development consensus for shared growth and the Multi-year action plan on development. The latter document comprises of nine areas that have to be improved over the medium term in order to achieve the stated goals: infrastructure, human resource development, trade, private investment and job creation, food security, growth with resilience, financial inclusion, domestic resource mobilization, and knowledge sharing.³⁴ This agenda will be the subject of further G20 negotiations.

DEVELOPMENT AID AGENDA

Development aid is on an agenda of many global governance actors (multilateral institutions, informal groupings of countries, regional groupings, as well as various non-state actors). In 2010 the G8 was one of the informal groupings of countries that debated this issue most intensively.³⁵ At the Muskoka summit in Canada (June 25–26, 2010) the G8 countries focused especially on the issues of food security,³⁶

³³ For the positions of Slovakia towards the particular point of the Doha agenda see: "Rozvojová agenda z Dohy," Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic. Available online: <http://www.economy.gov.sk/rokovanie-rozvojovej-agendy-z-dohy-6598/128283s> (accessed on April 20, 2011)

³⁴ For more information see: "Annex II: Multi-year action plan on development." Available online: http://media.seoulsummit.kr/contents/dlobo/E5._ANNEX3.pdf (accessed on April 15, 2011).

³⁵ The G20 countries considered the development aid issues only marginally, the BRIC countries in general supported work towards Millennium Development Goals achievement by 2015 in their Joint statement. See "The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010," op. cit.; "The Seoul summit document," op. cit.; "II BRIC summit – joint statement," April 16, 2010. Available online: <http://www.unaoc.org/docs/II-BRIC-Summit.pdf> (accessed on March 3, 2011).

³⁶ Regarding the issue of food security the G8 countries picked up the threads of their work done at the previous summit in Italian L'Aquila (July 8–10, 2009). At this summit they launched the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative, in which they committed to "mobilize 20 billion US dollars over three years" in order to achieve "sustainable agriculture development, while keeping a strong commitment to ensure adequate emergency food aid assistance." "L'Aquila joint statement on global food security L'Aquila food security initiative (AFSI)," paragraph 12. Available online: http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security-

maternal health improvement, reducing child mortality, and reducing the occurrence of several diseases (such as HIV/AIDS, polio, tropical diseases). They directed their attention mainly to Africa.

The effort to achieve progress in the Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 aiming at maternal health improvement and reducing child mortality was a dominant issue on the

The impact of G8 decisions in the development assistance on Slovakia is only indirect as Slovakia provides G8 development aid only through its membership in the EU or other multilateral institutions which support G8 conclusions on the issue

G8 Muskoka summit agenda. For this purpose and in cooperation with expert community the G8 countries endorsed the Muskoka initiative on maternal, newborn and under-five child health in which they committed themselves to mobilize 5 billion US dollars within five years.³⁷

The impact of G8 decisions in the aforementioned issues on Slovakia is only indirect. Ensuring development aid is in accordance with the Manifesto of the Government for 2010–2014,³⁸

however, Slovakia provides development aid mostly through cooperation with multilateral institutions such as the UN, the World Bank Group, the IMF, the OECD etc. Slovakia is engaged in providing G8 development aid only through its membership in the EU or other multilateral institutions which support G8 conclusions on the issue.³⁹

%5B1%5D,0.pdf (accessed on April 15, 2011). At the 2010 summit in Canada the G8 countries stated that for this initiative they allocated USD 6.5 billion as of April 30, 2010. "G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings," op. cit., paragraph 16.

³⁷ "G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings," op. cit., paragraph 10. Italy and the EU committed to provide 525 million US dollars. However, the WHO estimated that it will be necessary to provide totally 30 billion US dollars between 2009 and 2015 in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 by 2015. J. Guebert, P. Tanna, "Canada's leadership at the G8 Muskoka summit," November 10, 2010. Available online: <http://sciencepolicy.ca/news/canada%E2%80%99s-leadership-g8-muskoka-summit> (accessed on April 20, 2011). In accordance to the estimates of the WHO and the World Bank the implementation of these commitments should save live of 1,3 million under-five children and 64,000 mothers and improve access to modern method of family planning for 12 million couples. "G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings," op. cit., paragraph 12.

³⁸ "Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca: Programové vyhlásenie Vlády Slovenskej republiky na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014," op. cit., p. 53.

³⁹ The Muskoka initiative was supported by e.g. the UN Human Rights Council (Slovakia has been its member since 2008) in its resolution "Preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights," which is "welcoming the recent initiatives relevant to preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights, including... the Group of Eight Muskoka initiative on maternal, newborn and under-five child health." See: "Preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights: follow-up to Council resolution 11/8," UN Human Rights Council, UN General Assembly, October 7, 2010. Available online: http://www.wunrn.com/news/2010/11_10/11_08_10/110810_maternal_files/Maternal%20Mortality,%20Morbidity,%20Human%20Rights-UN%20HRC%202015%20Resolution.pdf (accessed on April 20, 2011).

MILITARY–SECURITY AGENDA

The military–security agenda is a subject of negotiations predominately in multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO, or the OSCE. The lack of flexibility in reaching a joint resolution in these organizations caused a gradual, but only partial, shift of military–security issues into informal groupings of countries' agendas (G7/G8, BRIC and others). In 2010 the G8 military–security agenda was dominated by the issues relating to nuclear security and global security threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, transnational organized crime, piracy, and political or ethnic conflicts.

In the question of nuclear security the G8 countries continued in their existing cooperation and supported the results of other organizations and institutions that make an effort to ensure nuclear security. The G8 supported the conclusions of the 8th Review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (May 3–28, 2010, New York),⁴⁰ the signing of a new START treaty between Russia and the USA (April 8, 2010),⁴¹ and have called on other countries to join the nuclear disarmament process. They have also urged other countries to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Slovakia is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Slovakia succeeded to the treaty in 1993) and signed an IAEA safeguard agreement and its additional protocol (a trilateral treaty INFRIC/193 among IAEA, Euratom and the Slovak Republic in force since December 1, 2005).⁴² In compliance to the Information on the implementation of international treaties in 2010 published by the Foreign Ministry “there were international treaties neither signed nor violated while fulfilling international obligations in the area of disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”⁴³

In relation to the issue of nuclear security the G8 countries agreed on the completion of a safety and stabilization project in Chernobyl and urged the countries building

⁴⁰ Slovakia was represented at the 8th Review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry O. Algayerová, who read her statement on May 5, 2010. For O. Algayerová's statement see: “Statement by H.E. Oľga Algayerová: State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia at the general debate of the 2010 Review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” New York, October 5, 2010. Available online: [https://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/vw_BylD/ID_8A25D6580BC8E7D2C125771B002C1120_SK/\\$File/2585_NYp3.doc](https://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/vw_BylD/ID_8A25D6580BC8E7D2C125771B002C1120_SK/$File/2585_NYp3.doc) (accessed on April 20, 2011).

⁴¹ In 2010 the Slovak Republic supported the international effort to disarmament and welcomed signing of the new treaty START. See: “Správa o bezpečnosti Slovenskej republiky za rok 2010.” Available online: <https://lt.justice.gov.sk/Attachment/spr%C3%A1va%20-%20fin%C3%A1l%20PS%20-%2012APR2011.doc?instEID=-1&attEID=33629&docEID=169847&matEID=3836&langEID=1&tStamp=20110413092810903> (accessed on March 20, 2011).

⁴² For more details see: “Záruky na jadrové materiály.” Available online: <http://www.ujd.gov.sk/ujd/web.nsf/viewByKeyMenu/Sk-04-02> (accessed on March 3, 2011).

⁴³ “Informácia o vykonávaní medzinárodných zmlúv za rok 2010.” Available online: www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/Index/Mater-Dokum-130291 (accessed on March 20, 2011).

new nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes to maintain the highest security measures.⁴⁴ At the same time they reaffirmed their commitment to complete priority projects in Russia within the framework of the Global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction,⁴⁵ which was launched at the G8 Kananaskis Summit in Canada (June 25–26, 2002). Slovakia also drew on these initiative funds.⁴⁶

In compliance with the conclusions of the Nuclear security summit (April 12–13, 2010, Washington)⁴⁷ the G8 countries recognized nuclear terrorism as one of the present most dangerous security threats and committed themselves to cooperate in securing all vulnerable nuclear material within four years in order to prevent its misuse by terrorist groups.⁴⁸ At the Muskoka summit they also released the mutual statement G8 leaders statement on countering terrorism, in which they recognized that terrorism would not be defeated by force itself but it is inevitable to focus on conditions deteriorating its spreading.⁴⁹ In this statement the G8 countries also recognized the central role of the UN in the fight against terrorism and supported the implementation of the UN global counter-terrorism strategy and the respective UN Security Council resolutions. The G8 has also urged other countries to join the international fight against terrorism.

The fight against terrorism is in compliance with the Manifesto of the Government for 2010–2014 as well as with the security strategy of the Foreign Ministry entitled, A successful Slovakia in a safe world. Slovakia has participated in addressing this issue mostly in cooperation with multilateral institutions (such as the UN, the EU, NATO and the OECD).⁵⁰ However, in 2010 Slovakia participated in the G8 activities entitled

⁴⁴ “G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings,” *op. cit.*, paragraph 29.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, paragraph 31.

⁴⁶ See: “Global partnership working group – GPWG Annual report 2010: consolidated report data: ANNEX A.” Available online: http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/assets/pdfs/FINAL%20-%20GPWG%20Report%202010%20-%20Annex%20A%20-%20June%2017%20_2_.pdf (accessed on March 20, 2011); “Nuclear safety program,” December 2009. Available online: http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/what%20we%20do/uk%20energy%20supply/energy%20mix/nuclear/nonproliferation/global_threat/annual_report/1_20100105102651_e_@@_deccnspreportukfinal.pdf (accessed on March 20, 2011).

⁴⁷ Slovakia did not participate at the summit directly however it was represented as a member state of the EU. See: “World leaders and heads of delegation attending the nuclear security summit,” The White House, Printing Office, April 10, 2010. Available online: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/world-leaders-and-heads-delegation-attending-nuclear-security-summit> (accessed on March 20, 2011).

⁴⁸ “G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings,” *op. cit.*, paragraph 30.

⁴⁹ The G8 countries emphasized in their declaration that “full respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law is critical to an effective counter-terrorism strategy” and that “all of our actions against terrorism must be consistent with the UN Charter and applicable international law.” “G-8 leaders statement on countering terrorism,” p. 1. Available online: <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/summit-sommet/2010/muskoka-statementterrorism-muskoka.aspx?lang=eng> (accessed on March 20, 2011).

⁵⁰ For the participation of the Slovak republic against international terrorism see: “Terorizmus,” Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic. Available online: <http://www.minv.sk/?teror> (accessed on March 20, 2011).

The global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism (GICNT),⁵¹ which was introduced by the USA and Russia in the 2006 St. Petersburg summit and was approved by other member states.⁵² Slovakia has participated in this initiative since 2007.⁵³

In 2010 the G8 countries have committed themselves to launch three initiatives in order to fight against other global threats:

1. *Civilian reinforcements for stabilization, peace building and rule of law* to strengthen the role of civilian experts in the processes of stabilization, peace building and rule of law;
2. *Maritime security capacity* to secure coastlines in an effort to fight against piracy;
3. *International police peace operations* to improve the quality and availability of all military and police forces for international peace operations.⁵⁴

In 2010 the Government of Slovakia included the issue of new global challenges into its manifesto; the government intends to address these new issues mostly in cooperation with multilateral institutions such as the EU and NATO. The Government recognized climate changes, poverty, a lack of drinking water, migration, failing states, and cyber attacks as the most serious threats which may directly impact Slovakia.⁵⁵

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA

The issues of energy security and environmental protection did not dominate in the 2010 G8 and G20 agendas. Nevertheless, they were the items on both agendas, especially their economic aspects. Within this context the countries of both informal groupings focused mostly on these challenges: illicit exploitation of and trade in natural

⁵¹ The goal of GICNT is "to create a dynamically expanding network of volunteering partner states supporting systematic and effective measures aiming at building a defence system against nuclear terrorism threats." "Vyhodnotenie plnenia Aktualizovaného harmonogramu úloh k programu ďalšieho rozvoja ochrany obyvateľov Slovenskej republiky proti chemickým zbraňam na roky 2008 – 2010 a návrh na predĺženie úloh na roky 2011 – 2015," Office of the Slovak Government, 2010. Available online: http://www.rokovania.sk/File.aspx/ViewDocumentHtml/Mater-Dokum-128391?prefixFile=m_ (accessed on March 20, 2011).

⁵² "The global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism," November 24, 2010. Available online: <http://www.international.gc.ca/arms-armes/nuclear-nucleaire/gicnt.aspx?lang=en> (accessed on March 20, 2011).

⁵³ "Slovensko v rámci boja proti terorizmu," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Available online: http://www.mzv.sk/sk/zahranicna__politika/bezpecnostna_politika-slovensko_v_ramci_boja_proti_terorizmu (accessed on March 20, 2011). The participation of the Slovak Republic in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in 2001 see: "Správa o bezpečnosti Slovenskej republiky za rok 2010," op. cit.

⁵⁴ "Annex II: Strengthening civilian security systems Muskoka," June 26, 2010. Available online: http://canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/assets/pdfs/2010-declaration_eng.pdf (accessed on March 20, 2011).

⁵⁵ "Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca: Programové vyhlásenie Vlády Slovenskej republiky na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014," op. cit., p. 13.

resources (G8), the need for reducing fossil fuel subsidies (G20), volatility of fossil fuel price (G20), the need for a well functioning and transparent oil market to enhance the growth of the world economy (G20), global marine environmental protection in relation to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill (G20), climate change, green recovery, and maintenance of sustainable growth (G8, G20), biodiversity (G8).⁵⁶ The G8 and G20 countries welcomed and supported the activities in the energy and environmental areas conducted by other multilateral organizations and institutions (the UN, the World Bank Group, the OECD, the OPEC and others⁵⁷), however, they have neither taken any commitment nor launched any own initiative or program relating to this agenda, which could influence the activities of the international community.

SOCIAL AGENDA

In 2010 the G20 countries raised and considered the issue of corruption as a new problem on their agenda, which they agreed to tackle collectively. At the 2009 Pittsburgh summit⁵⁸ and at the 2010 Toronto summit the G20 called on their members to ratify the United Nations convention against corruption.⁵⁹ In Toronto they established a working group, which should formulate recommendations concerning this issue until the following summit. In the 2010 November Seoul summit they approved the G20 anti-corruption action plan.⁶⁰ At the same time the countries agreed to further develop this agenda on the upcoming summit in Paris.

Slovakia ratified the UN convention against corruption in 2003 (the convention came into force in 2006). The fight against corruption is a priority of the current Slovak government, which was confirmed in the government manifesto.⁶¹ In 2010 Slovakia participated in the fight against corruption on an international scale as one of the founding members of the International anti-corruption academy (IACA).⁶² The agreement on the establishment of this organization entered into force on May 23, 2011.⁶³

⁵⁶ Pozri "G8 Muskoka declaration: recovery and new beginnings," op. cit., paragraph 10; "The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010," op. cit.; "The Seoul summit document," op. cit.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ "Leaders' statement: The Pittsburgh summit: September 24–25, 2009," paragraph 42. Available online: <http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm> (accessed on March 3, 2011).

⁵⁹ See: "The G-20 Toronto summit declaration. June 26–27, 2010," op. cit., paragraph 40.

⁶⁰ See: "G20 anti-corruption action plan: G20 agenda for action on combating corruption, promoting market integrity, and supporting a clean business environment," pp. 1–3. Available online: http://media.seoulsummit.kr/contents/dlobo/E5_ANNEX3.pdf (accessed on March 3, 2011).

⁶¹ "Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca: Programové vyhlásenie Vlády Slovenskej republiky na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014," op. cit., p. 44.

⁶² See: "IACA - Medzinárodná protikorupčná academia," Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, 2007–2010. Available online: <http://bojprotikorupcii.vlada.gov.sk/24067/iaca.php> (accessed on April 20, 2011).

⁶³ "Stav legislatívneho procesu," Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic. Available online: <http://bojprotikorupcii.vlada.gov.sk/24077/stav-legislativneho-procesu.php> (accessed April 20, 2011).

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENDA

At the G8 and G20 forums held in 2010 there was also a discussion on the working and coordination methods of the respective informal groupings of states. In G8 context the discussion was held on the methodology of accountability reporting. This issue was at first raised at Hokkaido Toyako summit in 2008. This effort to report on the implementation of the G8 commitments resulted into releasing a first accountability report in 2010. The 2010 Muskoka accountability report focused on the implementation of the commitments in the development agenda.⁶⁴ The follow-up report on health and food security shall be completed in 2011.

The discussion on administrative agenda in G20 was related to the quality of consultations among the G20 and the wider international community. At the Seoul summit the G20 countries approved "to conduct G20 consultation activities in a more systematic way," and to "[build] on constructive partnerships with international organizations, in particular the UN, regional bodies, civil society, trade unions and academia."⁶⁵ In an effort to increase its representativeness and effectiveness the G20 countries will seek to formulate principles for inviting non-member countries to the summits. So far they have agreed that the number of the invited non-member states shall not exceed five whereas two of them shall be from Africa.⁶⁶

CONCLUSION

In 2010 Slovakia participated in the G8/G20 global governance mostly indirectly as a member state of the EU. Slovakia was directly involved only in the G20 agenda on capitalization of MDBs and in the G8 agenda by participating in The global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism. Most of the solutions to global problems proposed by the G8/G20 countries correspond to the interests of the Slovak republic. The impact of the decisions taken by the analyzed informal groupings on Slovakia was significant especially in the economic area (the IMF reform, Basel III). The Slovak Republic participated in pursuing a comparable agenda, however, mainly through being involved in the activities of the multilateral institutions such as the UN, NATO, the OECD, the OSCE and others.

Global problems dynamically change therefore the reaction of international community to these problems modifies as well. Both content (agenda) and form of global governance develop. Slovakia should critically reflect on these changes so that it is

⁶⁴ "Muskoka accountability report: assessing action and results against development-related commitments." Available online: http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2010muskoka/accountability/muskoka_accountability_report.pdf (accessed on April 20, 2011).

⁶⁵ "The Seoul summit document," op. cit., paragraph 75.

⁶⁶ Ibid, paragraph 75.

capable to react to them in a more flexible way and to participate in the decision-making process of global governance in its various forms.

Informal groupings of countries are a relatively new form of global governance, which changes very dynamically. In the period of financial and economic crisis it has shown that there is a need for wider cooperation of the international community; which in 2010 resulted into a shift of the economic agenda to a larger forum (from the G8 to the G20). Only in practice it will be shown whether this platform of a wider cooperation will endure. The international community tends to cooperate only when there is a strong need to tackle serious global problems (e.g. during the 2008 financial and economic

Informal groupings of countries are a relatively new form of global governance, which changes very dynamically. Only in practice it will be shown whether this platform of a wider cooperation will endure.

crisis) otherwise countries predominately advance their particular interests.

As long as the countries will be driven by a need for mutual cooperation, multilateralism may be strengthened. The impact of informal groupings of countries may increase; a tendency towards designing more effective forms of international cooperation may also occur. When countries will be driven by their particular interest, regionalism may be strengthened; some countries may even establish new independent groupings or other parallel structures. Both of these tendencies may be complementary and may reinforce each other if they will be driven by objective and subjective forces which are progressive towards human survival and environment. However, the clash of these tendencies may cause a decline of governance at a global level if the driving forces regress towards the further development of mankind and environment will prevail.

II.

**PRIORITIES OF SLOVAKIA'S
FOREIGN POLICY**

SLOVAK–HUNGARIAN RELATIONS – CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?

JURAJ MARUŠIAK

In 2010 and in the first months of 2011¹ as well as in the past, the Slovak–Hungarian relations posed a specific issue by having its foreign as well as domestic policy dimension. The latter did not include only an ethnic cleavage of the Slovak political scene but also the relations between “Slovak” and “Hungarian” (i.e. ethnically speaking) political parties in Slovakia.

The bilateral relations’ focus was determined with regard to a majority–minority discourse in Slovakia or to parliamentary elections in both states respectively. For the first time since 1989, the issue of relations with Hungary divided not only the already ethnically divided Slovak political parties, but also both parties representing the Hungarian minority in Slovakia (after the Party of Hungarian coalition (SMK) split, the Most–Híd party was created). Despite the fact that mutual relations played a considerable voters’ mobilization role in the 2010 election campaign, compared to the 2009 presidential election it had not the impact expected by a number of actors. Thus, the Slovak–Hungarian relations were an important part of the domestic political agenda and a number one topic for particular political parties.

Parliamentary elections brought about government change both in Slovakia and in Hungary. In Hungary, elections resulted in the absolute victory of the Fidesz–Christian Democratic People’s Party (Fidesz–KDNP) bloc. The new ruling majority took a path of radicalization and nationalization of foreign policy towards neighboring states. This had to do primarily with the tendency to build institutional links between Hungary and ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries.

On the other hand, the Slovak parties promoting confrontational tendencies in Slovak–Hungarian relations were not successful in the 2010 parliamentary elections.

¹ The study is focused on the January 2010–March 2011 period.

The newly elected coalition focused mainly on the mitigation of tensions both, domestically – i.e. in relations between the Slovak majority and the Hungarian minority – as well as internationally. Participation of representatives of Hungarian minority, represented by the Most–Híd political party, in the coalition was one of the reasons of this policy approach.

Besides the bilateral part, the Slovak–Hungarian relations were framed by Slovakia’s V4 presidency, which started in June 2010 and which in many aspects followed up on the previous Hungarian presidency and was in line with the Hungarian presidency of the EU Council in the first half of 2011. These multilateral aspects contributed to the mitigation of the tension being present in mutual relations.

SLOVAK–HUNGARIAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN BOTH STATES

The so-called “Hungarian card” was an important element of the political agenda of the previous government coalition, consisting of Smer–SD, SNS (Slovak National Party) and the ĽS–HZDS (People’s Party Movement for a Democratic Slovakia), and overshadowed also the achievements attained between Robert Fico and Gordon

The SNS’s efforts to escalate the confrontation were not supported by other parties in the Parliament.

Bajnai at the prime minister level dialogue in 2009. It further represented a mobilization factor of coalition parties’ electorate. To illustrate, the chairman of Smer–SD designated the strongest opposition party in Hungary and the expected winner of parliamentary elections, Fidesz, as

a “chauvinistic and nationalistic party.”² At the same time, the SNS used problematic moments to present requests that anticipated the strengthening of the repressive state instruments, such as the amending of the criminal code with the clause on protecting a republic.³ The SNS’s efforts to escalate the confrontation – such as its request that the Slovak parliament adopts the special resolution in March 2010 on the statement of Csanád Szegedi, the ultra-national Jobbik party member of the European Parliament who requested Slovakia to recognize Hungarian as the second official language and to exclude Slovakia from the EU if it refuses to change the controversial state language

² For further information on Orbán’s statements, see “Vyhlásenie NR SR k opakovaným nacionalistickým výrokom Viktora Orbána, predsedu FIDESZ-MPP, a niektorých ďalších predstaviteľov počas volebnej kampane do Európskeho parlamentu, ktoré smerovali k etnickej separácii, popieraníu suverenity susedných krajín, ako aj k spochybnovaniu územnej celistvosti Slovenskej republiky a podnecovaniu nestability v strednej Európe,” *Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic*, No. 1454, Bratislava, June 3, 2009.

³ “O pět minut dvanáct,” *STV1*, January 31, 2010.

law adopted in 2009,⁴ or re-launching the Beneš Decrees debate – were not supported by other parties in the Parliament.⁵

Public statements of the representatives of the then Hungarian opposition parties Fidesz and Jobbik, as well as activities of official representatives of Hungary, related to a number of bilateral issues, were carried out in the spirit of political mobilization of domestic electorate on the eve of parliamentary elections in Hungary. As a result, the dialogue between the high representatives of both states in the period prior to the elections froze. This is why the 15th anniversary of the signing of the so-called Basic treaty between Slovakia and Hungary signed in 1995, was absolutely ignored by official Hungarian representatives. At the conference, organized on March 15, 2010 on this occasion by the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (RC SFPA), none of the representatives from Hungary, except for Lajos Varadi, the envoy at the Hungarian embassy in Bratislava, took part in this event while the Slovak Foreign Ministry was represented by Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák and the ambassador Miroslav Mojžita.⁶

The result of April 11 and April 25, 2010 parliamentary elections in Hungary⁷ is in history of modern democracy regarded as extraordinary in terms of the number of mandates for the strongest political grouping. The Fidesz–KDNP coalition has been thus able to realize its own foreign policy, including policy towards ethnic Hungarians living abroad, to the full extent and according to their own perception being far more radical than the concepts of the Hungarian Socialist Party searching for consensus with neighboring states.

Despite the rather confrontational nature of bilateral relations, Slovak Prime Minister R. Fico declared his readiness for a dialogue with the new Hungarian leadership and showed interest in meeting V. Orbán, the designated Hungarian Prime Minister.⁸ The right-wing opposition parties in Slovakia responded to the results of parliamentary elections calmly, as well. While the latter argued with the close political programs with Fidesz, with which they share the European Peoples' Party (EPP) membership, R. Fico warned of worsening international image of both states within the EU and NATO

⁴ P. Novotný, "Paľba Maďarov nás nepotopila," *Hospodárske noviny*, January 20, 2010.

⁵ See Rádiožurnál, *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, March 10, 2010; "Csanád Szegedi wants Hungarian to become one of the official languages of Slovakia," *Hungarian Ambiance*, April 9, 2010. Available online: <http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2010/04/csanad-szegedi-wants-hungarian-to.html> (accessed on April 9, 2010).

⁶ See the program of the international conference "Základná zmluva medzi Slovenskom a Maďarskom po pätnástich rokoch – pohľad do minulosti a budúcnosti," Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, March 25, 2010. Available online: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/podujatia/odborne-podujatia/968?rok=2010> (accessed on March 25, 2010).

⁷ Fidesz–KDNP coalition won the parliamentary elections with 52.73 per cent of votes in a combined proportional–majority system, gaining 263 out of 386 seats, i.e. the constitutional majority of 67.88 per cent. See *2010 Parliamentary Elections*, Budapest: National Elections Office, 2010. Available online: http://www.valasztas.hu/en/parval2010/298/298_0_index.html (accessed on November 12, 2010).

⁸ "Fico: Sme pripravení na dialóg s Maďarskom," *Euractiv.sk*, April 14, 2010.

in case the confrontation continued.⁹ However, no bilateral negotiations took place before the Slovak parliamentary elections. Quite the contrary, the first steps taken by the new Hungarian parliamentary majority increased tension and disagreement between the two states.

STATE LANGUAGE AND MINORITY LANGUAGE LAWS

The 2009 amendment to the Slovak official language law, criticized also by international organizations, e.g. OSCE, was an issue in mutual relations even in 2010.¹⁰ The law even became the object of interest of the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, whose members visited both Slovakia and Hungary in January 2010. They met the representatives of the Hungarian minority as well as the Deputy Prime Minister Dušan Čaplovič who spoke of the need to develop a complex law on national minorities.¹¹ The OSCE High Commissioner on national minorities Knut Vollebeak positively assessed the adop-

Although the Slovak official language law could legitimately call for doubts about the guarantees for the use of minority languages, the non-standard response of Hungarian representatives contributed to the escalation of the confrontation as well.

tion of executive protocols to the law based on his recommendations, he, however, warned of the possibility of unreasonable restriction of minority languages and of sanctions for not abiding with the official language law.¹² Even after adopting the aforementioned protocols, the minority policy in Slovakia was still criticized by the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK), which described the protocols as useless.¹³

Although the Slovak official language law could legitimately call for doubts about the guarantees for the use of minority languages, the non-standard response of Hungarian representatives, such as the creation of the so-called "Language fund" for financing the eventual fines for not abiding with the Slovak official language law, contributed to the escalation of the confrontation as well. K. Vollebeak criticized this particular step during his visit to Bratislava on February 8, 2010.¹⁴ The statements made on March 12–13, 2010 by Hungarian President László Sólyom in the Serbian towns of Novi Sad and Horgoš were equally counterproductive. According to Sólyom, the Hungarian

⁹ "Slovenská pravica sa neobáva Fideszu," *Új Szó*, April 16, 2010.

¹⁰ "Opinion of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities on amendments to the 'Law on the State Language of the Slovak Republic,'" Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Hague, July 22, 2009.

¹¹ "Jelentés csak hónapok," *Új Szó*, January 20, 2010.

¹² "OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities issues statement on Slovakia's language law," Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Hague, January 4, 2009.

¹³ *SITA*, December 16, 2009.

¹⁴ Rádióžurnál, *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, February 8, 2010.

minorities in Serbia, Romania and Slovakia should study the official language as a foreign language. At the same time, he requested to allow the use of textbooks published in Hungary in minority schools.¹⁵ Besides the official protest of the Slovak Foreign Ministry¹⁶ or the Slovak Prime Minister's statement addressed to voters in Slovakia in which he labeled the Sólyom's statements as a "felonious attack on Slovakia," as a manifestation of an attempt to tear Slovakia apart and as an interference in internal affairs of Slovakia, also the people who had long been engaged in improving the bilateral relations, such as Štefan Markuš, the former Slovak ambassador to Hungary criticized the statements, as well.¹⁷

The interest in improving Slovak–Hungarian bilateral relations and, primarily, the new Slovak government's effort to renew the consensus in relations between majority and minority population was significant impetus for changing and amending the state language law approved by Parliament on December 9, 2010. After being vetoed by President I. Gašparovič, it was repeatedly approved in February 2011 and entered into force on March 1, 2011.¹⁸ Although the changes to the law did not completely remove sanctions for not abiding by the language law, as required by the Venice Commission, it succeeded in easing them.¹⁹ The Most–Híd party accepted the amendment as a means to ease current status quo, given that the KDH (Christian Democratic Movement) MPs as well as representatives of the Culture Ministry insisted on sanctions. However, according to Zsuzsanna Répás, co-chair of the Joint Slovak–Hungarian Joint Commission on issues of national minorities and state undersecretary responsible for the minorities living abroad, it did cause some concerns in Hungary.²⁰ In 2010, the political negotiations on the governmental coalition level regarding the amendment of the minority language law, as requested by the Venice Commission regarding Slovakia's State language law, were under way as well.

DUAL CITIZENSHIP LAW AND DAY OF NATIONAL UNITY

One of the most significant priorities stressed by the new Hungarian government coalition which is directly related not only to Hungarian domestic policy but also to ethnic Hungarians living abroad, was the issue of dual citizenship. Fidesz party attempted for the first time to provide Hungarian citizenship to representatives of Hungarian minorities abroad without the necessity to have permanent residency in Hungary via

¹⁵ "Sólyom: Maďari v SR by sa mali slovenčinu učiť ako cudzí jazyk," *TASR*, March 14, 2010.

¹⁶ "Sólyomove vyjadrenia sú kontraproduktívne, tvrdí diplomacia," *TASR*, March 15, 2010.

¹⁷ "Z prvej ruky," *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, March 17, 2010.

¹⁸ "Zákon č. 35/2011 Z. z. z 2. februára 2011, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 270/1995 Z. z. o štátnom jazyku Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov," *Collection of Laws*, No. 35/2011, No. 16, pp. 388–389.

¹⁹ M. Kern, "Jazykový zákon zmiernili," *Sme*, December 9, 2010.

²⁰ "Slovensko-maďarská komisia rokuje o praktických otázkach života menšín," *TASR*, February 2, 2011.

referendum in 2004. Although the Fidesz party did not succeed in this attempt due to low participation in referendum.²¹ However, Fidesz did not throw the idea away and dual citizenship became a part of its election campaign. The new parliamentary majority announced its intention to adopt an amendment of law regarding state citizenship at a constitutive session of the new National Assembly. At the same time, through the designated Foreign Minister János Martonyi, the parliamentary majority refused to discuss this step with the Slovak government despite a strong disagreement of the Slovak Foreign Minister M. Lajčák as well as that of Prime Minister R. Fico, who labeled it a security risk for Slovakia.²²

The response of the political parties proved that there are rather different views of political elite on responding to the steps of the Hungarian Government that are not in line, such as was the case of the state citizenship law, with good neighborhood relations. Smer-SD party announced retaliations, the SNS opted for a confrontational approach suggesting to recall the Slovak ambassador to Hungary P. Weiss, and to renounce the agreement on good neighborly relations signed in 1995. Even the opposition was divided. Opposition members refused to use the amendment of Hungarian law for the mobilization of voters. However, while Mikuláš Dzurinda, the SDKÚ-DS chairman, indicated that the law amendment would be a political provocation which did not pose a reason for feeling any threat to Slovakia, the KDH strongly rejected the law under preparation. Ján Figel', chairman of KDH, stated it was "a unilateral, premeditated step, going against a common European spirit and good neighborhood," resembling revisionist politics from the past. Furthermore, he called upon the Hungarian parliament to refrain from the intended steps and for the representatives of the new Hungarian government to arrange bilateral negotiations with Slovakia regarding the above-mentioned issue. KDH even supported the intention to accept the law amendment suggested by R. Fico.²³

The law divided the Hungarian political representation in Slovakia based on their attitudes towards politics of the Fidesz party and V. Orbán. Even though the SMK was surprised with the proposed amendments and tried to persuade the Fidesz party not to present the law on state citizenship before the parliamentary elections in Slovakia, they did not, at the same time, disagree with its substance. On the contrary, Pal Csáky, the SMK chairman, rejected the possibility that Slovakia is put at a security risk because of the membership of both states in NATO and the EU. The Most-Híd MPs were critical of Martonyi's intentions and called for a mutual discussion on the announced law amendment: "We do not want the ethnic Hungarian minority living in Slovakia to bear

²¹ In Hungary, similarly to Slovakia, the referendum is valid only with minimal 50 per cent plus one voter turnout. In a December 5, 2004 referendum, the turnout was only 37.49 per cent. 65.01 per cent of those who participated supported granting dual citizenship to Hungarians extraterritorially. For more see "National Referendum 2004," National Election Office, 2004. Available online: http://www.valasztas.hu/en/onkval2010/197/197_0.html (accessed on January 1, 2011); M. Kovács, M. Mária, "The politics of non-resident dual citizenship in Hungary. *Regio - Minorities, Politics, Society* Vol 15, No.1, 2005, pp. 51-52.

²² L. Bariak, "Fico: Dvojité občianstvo je bezpečnostným rizikom," *Aktuálne.sk*, May 13, 2010.

²³ *Ibid*; "Orbánov zákon: Pobúrenie, aj zbytočná hystéria," *SITA*, May 13, 2010.

the consequences of this inconsiderate step.”²⁴ The response, mentioned above was just the beginning of the division of the Slovak political scene over the issue of “dual citizenship” in the upcoming months.

Despite opposing ideas on how to respond to the Hungarian move, Slovak political parties, with the exception of SMK, agreed on rejecting the law and on calling the Hungarian move as contrary to the principles of good neighborhood relations. While Prime Minister R. Fico sought to restrain the adoption of the law as well as Slovak retaliation by means of diplomatic talks and consultations, M. Dzurinda, chairman of the strongest opposition party, and the campaign leader of the party I. Radičová pursued the same goal by means of inter-party negotiations within EPP, suggested during her meeting with EPP's President Wilfried Martens.²⁵ Nevertheless, V. Orbán refused both, the proposal for a bilateral meeting with R. Fico²⁶ and round-table talks of Slovak and Hungarian EPP member parties.²⁷

During its extraordinary meeting on May 25, 2010, the National Council of the Slovak Republic stated that the Hungarian dual-citizenship law under preparation is “a unilateral step aimed at

Slovak MPs considered it unacceptable to adopt any law with extra-territorial impact on Slovak citizens without being preceded by consultations with representatives of the Slovak Republic.

a creation of institutional ties between Hungary and the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia by means of acquisition of a state alliance,” and put the conformity of the law under the preparation with the international law in question.²⁸ Recalling to the Agreement on good neighborhood relations between the two states, Slovak MPs considered it unacceptable to adopt any law with extraterritorial impact on Slovak citizens without being preceded by consultations with representatives of the Slovak Republic. They warned of questioning the Trianon Peace Treaty from 1920 as well as the territorial changes of the post-war Europe.

Nevertheless, a disapproving attitude of Slovak Parliament did not prevent the Hungarian National Assembly from adopting the controversial law on May 26, 2010. The amendment of law grants Hungarian citizenship to nationals of another state on an individual basis, provided that one can prove his Hungarian origins and demonstrate knowledge of Hungarian. At the same time, applicants can be granted Hungarian

²⁴ “Premiér varuje pred dvojakým občianstvom. Podľa Csákyho reaguje hystericky,” *SITA*, May 13, 2010

²⁵ “SDKÚ-DS: Sme radi, že slovenská vláda pochopila silu diplomacie,” *TASR*, May 18, 2010.

²⁶ “Fico: Arogantné Maďarsko. Chcem rokovať s Orbánom,” *Aktuálne.sk*, May 19, 2010.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ The resolution was unanimously approved by all MPs present. The SMK and Most-Híd MPs, members of the Conservative Democrats of Slovakia, and eight SDKU-DS MPs abstained from voting. KDH MPs voted together with the MPs of the ruling coalition; KDH vice-chairman Daniel Lipšic justified their decision by trying to protect national interests of Slovakia. “Uznesenie NR SR č. 2075 k návrhu novelizácie zákona o štátnom občianstve, o ktorom rokuje Národné zhromaždenie Maďarskej republiky” (Press 1543). 52nd meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, May 25, 2010.

citizenship even if they do not reside continuously in Hungary.²⁹ Thus, in May 2010, two fundamentally different and hardly compatible standpoints towards the issue of dual citizenship were formulated. The majority of Slovak political elites reject, with a certain level of intensity, the Hungarian move, while in Hungary its support became political consensus across the political parties. Besides Fidesz-KDNP and the Jobbik MPs, the law got support from the MPs that previously called for building of good neighborhood relations based on the principle of consensus. A total of 334 members of parliament out of 352 who were present, which represents 97.7 per cent, voted in favor, and no powerful political party stood against it.³⁰

During the citizenship law discourse in Hungary, two lines of diplomacy were formed from the institutional point of view. The first one was represented by the Foreign Ministry, headed by J. Martonyi; the second one by KDNP's Zsolt Semjén, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for national policy. As for the view of the coalition, that came to power after the April 2010 parliamentary elections, the issue of relations with the Hungarian diaspora does not only represent a part of the foreign policy but is very strongly linked to domestic policy. At the same time, it is important to point out the way the adoption of the law was justified. According to Semjén, the adoption of the law was clearly connected to efforts to overcome the consequences of the Trianon Peace Agreement. He also labeled the unsuccessful referendum as a "psychological Trianon for Hungarians living abroad." As he argued, the term "Hungarian origin," as the law states, is to be understood as the "historical Hungary," i.e. the current Hungarian Government considers Hungary to be the direct successor of the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Although the adopted amendment to the citizenship law did not guarantee the rights to vote to Hungarians living abroad, Zs. Semjén indicated in parliament that the issue will be dealt with later on: "There are no first and second class citizens; there is one Hungarian nation and a single Hungarian citizenship." Semjén also stated that Hungary is not willing to take EU's and neighboring states' suggestions into consideration, because, "the Hungarian Parliament is responsible for a universal *Hungarianship*." Moreover, Zs. Németh, State Secretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry indicated that the amendment of law would have even broader implications. He mentioned that dual citizenship is "part of building of a new Central Europe." Through the dual citizenship, the Hungarian state will become "a state of a 15 million *Hungarianship*." Németh also stated that "autonomy and dual citizenship do not weaken, but rather reinforce one another."³¹

As anticipated, on May 31, 2010 the majority of MPs (302 voted for, 55 against, and 12 abstained) also approved the law to introduce the Day of national unity (June 4th)

²⁹ "Maďarský parlament prijal návrh zákona o dvojakom občianstve," *TASR*, May 26, 2010.

³⁰ The law was approved also by 32 MPs of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), including its chairman Attila Mesterházy, and 11 MPs of the LMP group. Only three deputies of the Hungarian Socialist Party rejected the law, former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány among others. Three MSZP MPs and two LMP MPs abstained from voting. The remaining 34 deputies did not take part in voting. The information was provided by the Embassy of the Slovak Republic to Hungary, Budapest.

³¹ The information was provided by the Embassy of the Slovak Republic to Hungary, Budapest.

commemorating the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty. László Kövér, the speaker of parliament who proposed the law, called Trianon the biggest tragedy in Hungarian history. Kövér also claimed that Hungary reserved the right to allow Hungarian nationals to claim all the guarantees having to do with preservation of their own national identity as well as national identity of their community, including social self-determination, which is sufficiently fulfilled by various forms of autonomy, existing in Europe.³² Opposition Socialists' proposal to include a statement that "the Trianon wound cannot be healed by a borders revision," was rejected.³³ This law brought a negative reaction, too. All Slovak political parties rejected it, with the exception of SMK, which considered it to be a part of the "national unity over national borders" policy.³⁴

AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE OF SLOVAKIA TO THE HUNGARIAN CITIZENSHIP LAW

On the day following the approval of the new citizenship law, after a short legislative process, the Slovak Parliament passed the "counter law," i.e. an amendment to the citizenship law, according to which any Slovak citizen who willingly acquires a citizenship of another state loses its Slovak citizenship. The only exception to the law is acquiring a second citizenship by marriage and birth. According to the new wording of the law, the loss of citizenship will be linked to the loss of jobs in occupations for which Slovak citizenship is required such as: army, police, prosecutors, or fire department. The new wording of the law, that was criticized by a part of opposition for its impact on common people, was based on practice used in a number of European states which either do not permit dual citizenship at all or permit it in certain cases (such as the Czech Republic, Austria, Baltic states, Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, Netherlands, Spain as well as even Norway).³⁵

Similarly to the previous discussion on the Resolution of Parliament, the discussion on the law draft polarized the Slovak political scene. 90 MPs of the governing coalition and the KDH MPs approved the new law wording; seven MPs voted against. SMK and Most-Híd MPs boycotted the session and the strongest opposition party SDKÚ-DS abstained from the vote or were not present during the vote respectively, with the exception of Magdaléna Vášaryová and Alexander Slafkovský who voted against.³⁶ The change to the wording, proposed by the SDKÚ-DS chairman M. Dzurinda, ac-

³² The information was provided by the Embassy of the Slovak Republic to Hungary, Budapest.

³³ "Rádiožurnál," *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, May 31, 2010.

³⁴ "Ďalší maďarský zákon vyvolal u slovenských politikov obavy," *Pravda*, June 1, 2010.

³⁵ The information was provided by the Embassy of the Slovak Republic to Hungary, Budapest.

³⁶ "Vládny návrh zákona, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 40/1993 Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov (tlač 1545) – tretie čítanie. Hlasovanie o návrhu zákona ako o celku," 52nd meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Bratislava, May 26, 2010.

ording to which the National Council should declare that it would not recognize the laws approved contrary to the international law and, therefore, it would not recognize the Hungarian citizenship law, was rejected. The opposition SMK party labeled the new law as “a clear manifestation of anti-Hungarian sentiments of the current government coalition and a non-acceptable hysteria within the Slovak public life prior to parliamentary elections.”³⁷ Consequently, R. Fico raised a question of legitimacy of the SMK MPs in the National Council, in the case that they accept Hungarian citizenship, as they would swear the loyalty to Hungary.³⁸ The Smer-DS MPs argued that

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the Hungarian citizenship law follows the “Russian model,” for example, the Russian agreement with Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatists in Georgia.³⁹ This claim was, however, rejected by the SMK chairman P. Csáky stressing the Slovak and Hungarian membership in NATO as a part of a common security system. The Hungarian law on dual citizenship was criticized even by the president I. Gašparovič, according to whom the Hungarian political representation “ignores good European manners and denies principles of international law,” as well as bilateral and multilateral

agreements to which they agreed.⁴⁰ The adoption of the Slovak “counter-law” caused the negative reaction of Hungary.⁴¹ The revision of the “counter-law,” consequently, became the priority of Hungarian policy in bilateral relations.

The concerns of the Slovak political representation stemmed from the fact that the new Hungarian citizenship law posed a continuation of Hungarian policy of creating extraterritorial institutional ties between Hungary and ethnic Hungarians, members of Hungarian minorities, living abroad.

Citizenship creates a legal relationship between its provider, i.e. a state, and its bearer, i.e. citizen in which both parties have their own duties and obligations which can be in contradiction to the analogical legal relationship existing between a citizen and another state; for example in case of military service and taking part in the defense of the state. Statements of a number of Hungarian representatives, such as Zs. Semjén for example, in the context of the citizenship law and, eventually, the entering into force of the national unity day law discredited Europe as established after WW1 and WW2, including the Trianon Peace Treaty and the 1946 Paris Peace Treaties which are crucial for post-war European development. Last but not least, Hungarian

³⁷ “Gašparovič: Spájať občianstvo s Trianonom je riziko,” *Aktuálne.sk*, May 27, 2010.

³⁸ “Autorizovaná rozprava,” 52nd meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. Bratislava, May 26, 2010.

³⁹ “Dvojaké občianstvo sleduje ruský model, tvrdí Smer,” *Aktuálne.sk*, May 22, 2010.

⁴⁰ I. Gašparovič’s special appearance on TV, *STV1*, May 27, 2010.

⁴¹ G.M. Papucsek, “Martonyi: Budeme sa sťažovať,” *Pravda*, May 28, 2010.

refusal to take the Slovak and/or even EU stance in consideration on both laws only contributed to more tension.

THE ISSUE OF “DUAL CITIZENSHIP” AND HUNGARIAN POLITICS OF REMEMBRANCE AFTER THE JUNE 2010 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA

Even though the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia urged for change of the Slovak citizenship law with regard to cancelation of the wording prohibiting dual citizenship, they remained divided over their position towards the Hungarian citizenship law. The views of the SMK, which found itself outside of parliament after the elections, were close to the policies of V. Orbán, and, contrarily to its predecessor, the SMK new chairman Jozsef Berényi even identified himself with this policy and announced his intention to apply for Hungarian citizenship.⁴² His activities were criticized by Most Híd party chairman B. Bugár who saw a possible loss of partners in the Slovak political arena as the main risk of the SMK political stance.⁴³

The new administration of I. Radičová committed itself in the Government Manifesto to change the citizenship law in order to “eliminate the undesirable negative effects of the law for the citizens of the Slovak Republic.”⁴⁴ At the first informal meeting with Prime Minister V. Orbán during the V4 summit in Budapest on July 20, 2010, I. Radičová presented this intention as a step towards reaching an improvement in Slovak–Hungarian relations. She also announced an adoption of a law which would set that the Hungarian citizenship law could not be recognized on the territory of Slovakia.⁴⁵

There is no, however, consensus on the interpretation of this commitment within the governing coalition, while the dividing lines were outlined even prior to the elections. The majority of coalition parties (SDKÚ-DS, SaS (Freedom and Solidarity party), Most–Híd) pursued that the interest in acquiring citizenship of another state should not pose the reason for the loss of the Slovak one. They proposed to amend the law by the following statement, according to which Slovakia:

does not recognize the effects of acquiring a citizenship of another state on citizens of Slovakia, in case that a citizenship status was granted contrary to international law, international manners and universal principles of international law concerning citizenship matters especially those being in contradiction to a condition that citizenship is based on stronger

⁴² “Berényi: Chce maďarské občianstvo,” *Plus jeden deň*, January 3, 2011.

⁴³ “B. BUGÁR: J. Berényi žiadosťou o maďarské občianstvo zbytočne riskuje,” *TASR*, January 5, 2011.

⁴⁴ “Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca. Programové vyhlásenie vlády SR na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014,” Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, August 2010, p. 48.

⁴⁵ “Radičová after her meeting with Orbán: Vzťahy s Maďarskom sa zlepšili,” *TASR*, July 20, 2010.

existing ties between an individual and a state which is materialized in a permanent residency, center of interest, family ties and participation in public life.⁴⁶

This statement, however, does not change the reality of a potential creation of extraterritorial legal ties between Slovak citizens and other states. Arguments against the recent draft amendment to the citizenship law were presented even by the KDH MPs, Radoslav Procházka in particular. In May 2010, the Smer-SD MPs proposed such change that would enable a Slovak citizen to acquire dual citizenship provided that the citizen would have the permanent residency or would be registered in another country for at least six months.⁴⁷

At the 12th National Council session held on February 10, 2011, the opposition's proposal was not set forward to the second reading; at the same time, 76 MPs (Smer-SD, SNS, four MPs around Igor Matovič belonging to the club of SaS, and a KDH Radoslav Procházka) approved the proposal submitted by I. Matovič. According to the proposal, a Slovak citizen would be allowed to acquire a dual citizenship provided that it would be a citizenship of a state where a citizen had permanent residency, was registered or allowed to stay otherwise for at least 12 months, or was employed, ran his own business or studied for the minimum of 12 months prior to the acquisition of the citizenship. The proposal also assumed the granting of dual citizenship in case one of the parents or their parents was born on the territory of the respective state, and that the territory belonged to a different state at the time of the acquisition of citizenship.⁴⁸ Consequently, the proposal submitted by the coalition was taken back.⁴⁹ On March 24, 2011, the National Council of the Slovak Republic rejected during the first reading of another amendment to the citizenship law, proposed by Smer-SD having very similar wording to that of I. Matovič's one extending the possibility to have dual citizenship

⁴⁶ "Návrh poslancov Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky Gábora GÁLA, Pavla KUBOVIČA a Szilárda SOMOGYIHO na vydanie zákona, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 40/1993 Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov a zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 145/1995 Z. z. o správnych poplatkoch v znení neskorších predpisov," *Parlamentná tlač*, No. 149, National Council of the Slovak Republic, October 19, 2010.

⁴⁷ "Návrh poslancov Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky Roberta FICA, Vladimíra FAIČA a Dušana ČAPLOVIČA na vydanie zákona, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 40/1993 Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov a zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 145/1995 Z. z. o správnych poplatkoch v znení neskorších predpisov," *Parlamentná tlač*, No. 217, National Council of the Slovak Republic, January 13, 2011.

⁴⁸ "Pozmeňujúci návrh poslancov Igora Matoviča, Eriky Jurinovej, Martina Fecka a Jozefa Viskupiča k zákonu, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 40/1993 Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov a zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 145/1995 Z. z. o správnych poplatkoch v znení neskorších predpisov," *Parlamentná tlač*, No. 149, National Council of the Slovak Republic, February 10, 2011.

⁴⁹ National Council of the Slovak Republic, February 10, 2011. MP I. Matovič was expelled from the SaS faction as a result of an internal conflict of the ruling coalition.

for sportsmen, charity, or missionary workers.⁵⁰ Until March 2010, the coalition did not manage to reach a consensus on citizenship law and neither was reached an agreement regarding the issue across the political spectrum, as suggested by I. Matovič.⁵¹

On February 16, 2011 the Slovak Foreign Ministry put forth an agreement proposal to the Hungarian side to revise the conditions under which a citizenship of the respective country should be granted.⁵² However, Minister J. Martonyi rejected the proposal, considering it “clearly unacceptable and non-negotiable,” as, according to his words, is in contradiction to an agreement concluded on prime ministerial level which presumes the cancelation of the loss of citizenship of the Slovak Republic clause in case a person acquires a citizenship of another country. Eventually, State Secretary Zs. Németh and Minister J. Martonyi conditioned the resumption of further negotiations on a bilateral agreement with the change of citizenship law.⁵³ The absence of consensus on the content of the agreement proposal even within the governing coalition appeared to be another problem; the proposal was rejected primarily by the Most–Híd which absolutely refused the possibility of a loss of a Slovak citizenship in case of acquisition of another citizenship. On the other hand, on February 14, 2011, KDH MP R. Procházka suggested that loss of citizenship of the Slovak Republic be applied only to persons who willingly acquire citizenship of another country, without any relevant ties to the respective state, until Slovakia reaches a bilateral consensus with Hungary. The proposal was also rejected.⁵⁴ On May 12, 2011, J. Martonyi informed M. Dzurinda on official refusal of the proposal for an interstate agreement during his official visit to Slovakia.⁵⁵

The Hungarian citizenship law came into force on January 1, 2011. Between January and April 2011, more than 70,000 Hungarians living abroad applied for Hungarian citizenship, and around 1,000 already took an oath of allegiance.⁵⁶ The Hungarian administration spoke/expected at the end of 2010 about approximately 400,000 applications in the first half of 2011.⁵⁷ Even though the Hungarian Ministry of Public Administration and Justice representatives refuse to publish official statistical data concerning the number of applicants for the Hungarian citizenship from Slovakia, according to estimates published in Slovak and Hungarian media based on the information provided by the consulates in Bratislava and Košice, the interest of ethnic Hungarians is relatively low. In the past, the stance of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia towards the

⁵⁰ “Návrh poslancov Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky Roberta FICA, Vladimíra FAIČA, Dušana ČAPLOVIČA, Roberta KALINÁKA a Mareka MAĎARIČA na vydanie zákona, ktorým sa mení a dopĺňa zákon Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky č. 40/1993 Z. z. o štátnom občianstve Slovenskej republiky v znení neskorších predpisov,” *Parlamentná tlač*, No. 289, National Council of the Slovak Republic, March 3, 2011.

⁵¹ D. Jancová, “Budapešť odmietla rokovaf o občianstve,” *Pravda*, February 25, 2011.

⁵² “Rádiožurnál.” *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, February 16, 2011.

⁵³ “Maďarsko sa zmluvou o občianstve zatiaľ zaoberaf nebude,” *TASR*, February 17. 2. 2011; D. Jancová, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ “Televízne noviny,” *TV Markíza*, February 18, 2011; “Hlavné správy,” *TA3*, February 14, 2011.

⁵⁵ “Maďari neberú slovenský návrh medzištátnej dohody,” *SITA*, May 12, 2011.

⁵⁶ “Maďarsko prijalo 70-tisíc žiadostí o občianstvo,” *TASR*, April 30, 2011.

⁵⁷ “Berényi: Chce maďarské občianstvo,” *Plus jeden deň*, January 3, 2011.

building of the institutional ties between Hungarian state and minorities living abroad was rather similar, when out of 500,000 Hungarians living in Slovakia, only 120,000 applied for the “Hungarians living abroad” ID.⁵⁸

Regarding the “policy of remembrance,” a series of celebrations devoted to a commemoration of the count János Esterházy, organized by the Embassy of Hungary to Slovakia, as well as Esterházy commemorative days, organized as a part of the program of the Hungarian EU presidency, evoked rather negative feelings in Slovak society. These events commemorating János Esterházy, representative of the Hungarian Christian Socialist Party in Czechoslovak Republic between the two world wars and a MP of the Slovak Parliament, and was after WW2, a part of the so-called retribution process, imprisoned for life for betrayal of the Czechoslovak Republic, evoked the protest of the considerable part of Slovak historians. The Hungarian Embassy however rejected any objections and accused Slovak historians of double standards. At the unveiling of the Esterházy’s bust in Košice, however, young people with neo-nazi symbols were present, too.⁵⁹

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF SLOVAK–HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

The tension in Slovak–Hungarian relations was transferred from the bilateral level to the level of EU institutions. Apart from the above mentioned Szegedi’s statements,⁶⁰ József Szájér, European Parliament MP (Fidesz) questioned the diplomat Maroš Šefčovič, a Slovak candidate for European Commissioner, when he accused Šefčovič from making the racist remarks regarding Europe’s Roma people in 2005. The EPP parliamentary fraction in the European Parliament identified with Szájér’s accusations.⁶¹ Šefčovič’s nomination did however confirm certain consensus in understanding Slovakia’s national interests. Mikuláš Dzurinda, the chairman of the strongest opposition party SDKÚ–DS, did not identify with Fico’s statements who designated the campaign in EP as an “attack against Slovakia”⁶² and at the meeting with EPP leaders, the EP chairman Jerzy Buzek, and with the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, he advocated a need for a change of the strongest EP fraction’s position.

⁵⁸ “O maďarské občianstvo na Slovensku je malý záujem,” *TASR*, January 3, 2011.

⁵⁹ “Vyhlásenie Historického ústavu SAV k osobe Jánoša Esterházyho,” Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2011. Available online: <http://www.history.sav.sk/esterhazy.htm> (accessed on March 30, 2011); “Esterházy ide cez ambasádu,” *Sme*, March 29, 2011; *Správy STV, STV1*, March 14, 2011.

⁶⁰ P. Novotný, “Paľba Maďarov nás nepotopila,” *Hospodárske noviny*, January 20, 2010.

⁶¹ “Průběh „grilování“ potenciálních komisařů se vyostřil,” *EurActiv.cz*, January 14, 2010; “Ludovcom nestačí Šefčovičovo vysvetlenie,” *TASR*, January 19, 2010.

⁶² “Rádiožurnál,” *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, January 19, 2010.

A policy of national populism, advocated by the Fidesz party and its chairman, evoked the criticism of the western media⁶³ which also pointed to the possible negative international impacts of the so-called nationalist policy already in spring 2010. Nevertheless, aside from criticism towards some of the measures taken by the Hungarian governing coalition, in 2010, the EU political elite did not pay considerable attention to the foreign policy aspects of Orbán's policies. On one hand, this was mainly due to several steps taken by the Smer-SD – SNS – HZDS coalition, especially the 2009 controversial language law, and the SNS chairman, Slota's, anti-Hungarian statements as well as Orbán's relatively strong position within the EPP, where he holds the position of vice president. At the same time, the Fidesz party's success in 2009 EP elections and, consequently, its unprecedented victory in the Hungarian parliamentary elections, held in April 2010, strengthened Orbán's image of a successful conservative politician. This was yet another reason why the highest EU representatives' responds to laws adopted in Hungary, which the Slovak political representation considered to be a threat to its national security, were rather calm.

The EC President J. M. Barroso called upon V. Orbán to discuss the issue of dual citizenship with the countries concerned during his short visit to Brussels; he, however, refused to comment on the adoption of the day of national unity law, allegedly due to his close friendship with V. Orbán. The EP chairman Jerzy Buzek, who represents the EPP like Barroso and/or Orbán, refused to take a stand and considered the recent issues to be of bilateral character.⁶⁴ The position of Slovakia was perhaps supported the most by the President of the Czech Republic Václav Klaus, who "expressed his solidarity with the Slovak Republic and confirmed his long-term concern over such irresponsible tendencies."⁶⁵

EPP representatives were very careful when formulating reservations against unilateral steps of Hungary. Even the leaders of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP, the fraction of which the Smer-SD is a member, reacted rather indifferently to Slovak arguments. During the meeting with the Slovak Foreign Minister M. Lajčák, the Vice-president of the group in the EP Hannes Swoboda, who is also a member of the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ), stated that there is a need to create a Slovak Administration that would be "pro-European and non-extremist." According to Swoboda, Hungary "should think about its future European Presidency, which is supposed to build a bridge between European citizens and not the opposite."⁶⁶ The participation of SNS in a ruling coalition (2006–2010) discredited to a large extent the position of Slovakia in such crucial issues in Europe.

⁶³ See for example R. Swartz, "Phantomschmerz. Ungarn: Premierminister Viktor Orban," *Sueddeutsche.de*, May 1, 2010. Available online: <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ungarn-premierminister-viktor-orban-phantomschmerz-1.937380> (accessed on May 1, 2010).

⁶⁴ "Rádiožurnál," *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, June 3, 2010.

⁶⁵ "Klaus se zastal Slováků ve věci dvojího občanství," *První zprávy*, May 26, 2010. Available online: <http://www.prvnizpravy.cz/zpravy/style=default/zpravy/z-domova/klaus-se-zastal-slovaku-ve-veci-dvojho-obcanstvi/> (accessed on May 26, 2010).

⁶⁶ "Správy STV," *STV1*, June 9, 2010.

Slovak diplomats did not succeed in an effort to gain Serbian and Romanian support regarding the issue of dual citizenship, even though they were similarly affected by the Hungarian law. The Serbian reaction was based on its close relationship with Hungary, which advocated its quick integration into the EU, as well as on its particular system of dual citizenship regarding ethnic Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.⁶⁷ The stance of Romania was influenced by its interest in cooperating with Hungary in the field of regional EU policy as well as by mass granting of Romanian citizenship to Moldovans.⁶⁸

On the other hand, a considerable success of Slovak diplomacy was the position of the European Commission which did not support Hungary in its dispute with Slovakia over Slovakia's decision not to allow Hungarian President László Sólyom visit the country on August 21, 2009 when L. Sólyom was due to attend the celebrations of the Hungarian national holiday devoted to King Stephen in Komárno, without prior consultation with representatives of the Slovak Government. The European Commission did not agree with Hungarian accusations that Slovakia did not abide by the EU rules and confirmed that a president of one EU member state does not have a right to visit another EU member state without its prior approval, as this kind of visit is not considered a private one.⁶⁹

2010 SLOVAK PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND A QUEST FOR COOPERATION

In spite of escalated confrontation having to do with the pre-election atmosphere in both states and following an adoption of two controversial laws by the Hungarian Parliament, the Slovak elections, held on June 12, 2010, brought defeat to forces formed on the Slovak–Hungarian confrontation.⁷⁰ The new center–right administration set as one of its main priorities the improvement of bilateral relations with Hungary. The Treaty on good neighborhood relations and friendly cooperation as well as the EU and NATO membership of both countries are considered to be a basis for further improvement of bilateral relations. Within this framework, the new administration set to seek “the

⁶⁷ “Lajčák: Postoj Slovenska ku Kosovu sa nezmení,” *SITA*, June 3, 2010.

⁶⁸ M. Gniazdowski, J. Groszkowski, “Slovak–Hungarian dispute over double citizenship,” *Central Europe Weekly*, May 19, 2010. Available online: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ceweekly/2010-05-19/slovak-hungarian-dispute-over-double-citizenship> (accessed on May 19, 2010).

⁶⁹ “MZV k rozhodnutiu EK zamietnuť maďarský podnet ohľadom nevpustenia L. Sólyoma do SR,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, June 24, 2011.

⁷⁰ The SNS with its 5.07 per cent was slightly over the 5 per cent threshold, and voters of Hungarian minority parties opted for rather moderate Hungarian–Slovak Most–Híd Party (8.12 per cent) while SMK received only 4.33 per cent of votes and did not make it to the parliament at all. *Volby do NR SR 2010. Počet a podiel platných hlasov odovzdaných pre politické strany*. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2010. Available online: http://app.statistics.sk/nrsr_2010/sr/tab3.jsp?lang=sk (accessed on March 3, 2011).

intersection of common interests and promote a positive and perspective agenda in bilateral relations for the welfare of citizens of both states." The Government Manifesto also indicated that one of the possible fields of cooperation would be, for instance, an increase of cross-border transfer capacity of electricity framework with Hungary; it also mentioned change of the citizenship law in order to "eliminate the undesirable negative effects of the law for the citizens of the Slovak Republic."⁷¹ The outcome of elections was positively accepted in Hungary as well. Minister J. Martonyi considered the accession of Radičová's administration to power as a chance to improve relations between the two states. At the same time, he rejected claims that the amendment to the Hungarian citizenship law poses a threat to Slovakia's integrity.⁷² Thereby, to a considerable degree, Martonyi indicated a negotiation framework between Slovakia and Hungary for questions regarding dual citizenship. The new Slovak administration put, however, a lot of effort into improving the atmosphere in bilateral relations, what was materialized in more intensive contacts.

At the informal meeting of Slovak and Hungarian prime ministers in Budapest on July 20, 2010 the discussion focused on fields for possible cooperation, such as resolving the problems of the border regions with the support for regional development programs, including infrastructure development, resolving the impact of floods, and creation of job opportunities. At the same time, both prime ministers agreed to change the way the two countries communicate with each other and move towards a direct communication on a political level, instead of exchanging arguments via media.⁷³ While Orbán positively assessed the progress Slovakia had made after the elections, he also demonstrated a rather reserved attitude towards the new Prime Minister Radičová when he did not inform Hungarian media about the bilateral negotiations. An absence of a joint press conference along with the manner in which Orbán led talks with Radičová signaled a constrained character of their first joint meeting,⁷⁴ notwithstanding the fact it was held during a meeting of the V4 prime ministers. These might question Orbán's intention to strengthen cooperation of the V4 countries as well as his belief that "the goals of the Visegrad four are always more important than any bilateral conflicts," as he argued during his first official visit to Warsaw as Prime Minister, where he met his Polish counterpart Donald Tusk.⁷⁵

The outcome of elections was positively accepted in Hungary as well. Minister J. Martonyi considered the accession of Radičová's administration to power as a chance to improve relations between the two states.

⁷¹ "Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca. Programové vyhlásenie vlády SR na obdobie rokov 2010 - 2014," op. cit., pp. 51, 13, 48.

⁷² "Maďarský šéf diplomacie: Radičovej vláda je šanca na lepšie vzťahy," TASR, July 6, 2007.

⁷³ "Radičová po schôdzke s Orbánom: Vzťahy s Maďarskom sa zlepšili," TASR, July 20, 2010.

⁷⁴ A. Kósa, "Higgadt Magyar-Szlovák prábészéd," Új Szó, No. 166, July 21, 2010.

⁷⁵ "Spotkanie premierów Polski i Węgier. Warszawa, Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów - Centrum Prasowe," June 1, 2010. Available online: http://www.premier.gov.pl/centrum_prasowe/wydarzenia/spotkanie_premierow_polski_i_w,4868/ (accessed on June 1, 2010).

Minister Dzurinda's visit to Budapest on September 27, 2010 was of a more pragmatic character. It resulted in a renewal of the so-called *early warning system*, based on mutual informing about the problematic issues that would be dealt with in one of the two states. Joint bilateral commissions, defined by the Treaty from 1995, are an integral part.

Besides meeting with Hungarian counterpart J. Martonyi, M. Dzurinda met all three supreme officials: Prime Minister V. Orbán, President P. Schmitt, and Speaker of the Parliament L. Kövér. At bilateral meetings, Dzurinda presented three principles on which the Slovak–Hungarian relationships should be based: good will, future prospects and “policy for the people.” Negotiations also evolved around common infrastructure projects, e.g. building more bridges on the Ipoly/Ipeľ and Danube rivers, connecting the towns of Komárno and Komárom. Another considerable success was the signing of a bilateral agreement, following years of impasse, on consular cooperation, according to which Hungarian embassies would represent Slovakia in visa application procedures of the so-called Schengen visa in countries of Saudi Arabia, Albania and Moldova, where Slovakia has neither a permanent representation nor a consulate. Participation of M. Dzurinda in the Budapest Marathon that was started by the Hungarian President, symbolically demonstrated Slovakia's interest in improving Slovak–Hungarian relations.⁷⁶

The Slovak Foreign Minister showed willingness to undertake accommodating steps in the fields of minority policies criticized by the Hungarian political representation in 2009–2010. In Budapest, he announced the draft amendment to the state language law, approved by the government on September 24, 2010. He even declared his willingness to change the citizenship law, as he considered the May changes a bad solution. Dzurinda indirectly suggested that making an accommodating step regarding the issue of dual citizenship was expected from Hungary as well: “We will fix our bad solution not because we must, but because we want to. We will be not punishing our own citizens.”⁷⁷

The second prime ministers level meeting took place in Bratislava on December 14, 2010. V. Orbán's visit was a part of his European tour during which he paid visits to Sweden, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, Greece and Cyprus as well, and had to do with the the upcoming Hungarian EU presidency. Representatives of both states agreed on assistance and importance of the further EU enlargement. During his visit, V. Orbán announced his intention to close accession negotiations with Croatia and to conclude Bulgaria and Romania's accession into the Schengen area. Further negotiations, aimed at cooperation in enhancing energy security, resulted in the signature of an agreement on connecting natural gas pipelines of both states, as a part of the North–South gas corridor. A similar agreement could be observed in the area of regional cooperation, more specifically in the field of a creation of new job opportunities in the border areas; as Southern and Eastern Slovakia are among regions with the highest unemployment. I.

⁷⁶ “Slovenské víza budú Arabom, Albáncom a Moldavcom udeľovať Maďari,” *TASR*, September 28, 2010.

⁷⁷ “Dzurinda a Martonyi si v Budapešti rozumeli,” *Sme*, September 27, 2009; “SR – MR: Atmosféra vzťahov sa od základu zmenila,” *SITA*, September 27, 2010.

Radičová, however, continuously claimed that the two states held absolutely opposed opinions on the dual citizenship issue.⁷⁸

INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY SECURITY – COMMON INTERESTS OF HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA

An official visit of V. Orbán paid to Slovakia on January 28, 2011 could be seen as a positive shift in bilateral relations. It was the first bilateral meeting on the prime minister level after 10 years and the first official visit of a Hungarian Prime Minister in Slovakia in 12 years. (The last meeting of two prime ministers was held in 2001, when M. Dzurinda visited Budapest.⁷⁹) Prime ministers discussed primarily an already implemented project of the reconstruction of bridges over the Ipoly/Ipeľ River as a part of the Hungarian plan of the reconstruction of 84 roads, that used to cross the common borders in the past as well as the construction of the brand new bridge in Komárno.⁸⁰ The construction of a highway connecting Miskolc with Košice, which is to be a part of the R4 motorway providing a connection of Hungary and Poland across Eastern Slovakia, is another common infrastructure project.⁸¹

Following the signing of an agreement confirming the intention to cooperate on constructing a North–South gas interconnection from the Croatian Omisalj to the Polish Świnoujść, on the eve of Orbán's visit at the meeting of V4 agriculture ministers,⁸² Slovak and Hungarian prime ministers signed an agreement on political support of both countries to launch a construction of the gas interconnection pipeline between Slovakia and Hungary.⁸³ The construction of a 115 km long interconnector is to be carried out by Slovak gas transmission operator Eustream, a.s., and Hungary's FGSZ. The Memorandum of understanding between the two companies was signed in June 2009. However, the first *Open Season* procedure was declared unsuccessful by the Hungarian part. Currently, a renewed business interest poll regarding the use of the planned transmission line is under way. Even though the Hungarian part had not publicized the results yet, Danica Beharková, spokesperson of Eustream, sees the results of the second *Open Season* positively. As she mentioned, the project and technical design of the planned interconnection line are already prepared. Provided that the project would be carried out, the future energy security of the Central European region would

⁷⁸ "Predsedníčka vlády Iveta Radičová rokovala s maďarským premiérom Viktorom Orbánom," Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic, December 14, 2010. Available online: <http://www.vlada.gov.sk/23624/predsednicka-vlady-iveta-radicova-rokovala-s-madarskym-premierom-viktorom-orbanom.php> (accessed on December 14, 2010).

⁷⁹ P. Morvay, "Orbán a Radičová sa aspoň stretli," *Sme*, December 14, 2010.

⁸⁰ "Maďari neberú slovenský návrh medzištátnej dohody," *SITA*, May 12, 2011.

⁸¹ "Slovensko a Maďarsko majú viac spájať cesty," *SITA*, January 28, 2011.

⁸² "Rádiožurnál," *Rozhlasová stanica Slovensko*, January 25, 2011.

⁸³ "Slovensko a Maďarsko vybuduje plynovod," *RUVR.ru*, January 28, 2011.

be improved and dependence on Russian gas supplies would decrease, as planned LNG terminals in Croatia and Poland would enable a transmission of gas from further regions, such as the Middle East.⁸⁴ Even though V. Orbán had rejected any proposals for negotiations regarding the controversial citizenship law in the past, he admitted having considered Radičová's striking proposal to deal with the controversial issue of dual citizenship through an interstate agreement which would stipulate the conditions under which one would be granted a citizenship. I. Radičová committed herself to submit the draft agreement proposal in question for a joint Slovak-Hungarian commission meeting by February 14, 2011. Furthermore, I. Radičová and President I. Gašparovič expressed Slovakia's full support for the Hungary's EU presidency.⁸⁵

Following the parliamentary elections in both states, Slovakia and Hungary revived their contacts on the level of presidents as well. These were previously characterized by rather cool relations between I. Gašparovič and L. Sólyom. First bilateral meeting with a newly-elected Hungarian President P. Schmitt was held in November 2010 during a V4 presidents meeting in Karlovy Vary. P. Schmitt spoke of proximity of opinions on

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the majority of issues in the bilateral relationship as well as within the V4, even when compared to relations with other V4 members. According to P. Schmitt, "within the V4, Hungarian and Slovak ideas regarding the majority of national and international issues were the most identical or very close." P. Schmitt set his priority on the fulfillment of the objectives of the so-called Danube strategy. He also mentioned the positive dynamics of bilateral relations and mitigation of

tensions between the two countries.⁸⁶

The visit of the Hungarian President to Slovakia was held after more than 5 years.⁸⁷ The talks with his Slovak counterpart were aimed at controversial issues of a state language law and possible changes of the dual citizenship law. Slovakia's President stressed his request of an "absolute loyalty" of the Hungarian minority to the Slovak Republic; according to his words, minorities constitute a natural link between the two states which should not be "disturbed by any historical events, even if they are real, and young generations should not be educated in the spirit of superiority, revenge, and a need of reparations for historical wrongs." Regarding the citizenship issue, Gašparovič argued for a cancelation of both controversial laws. The Hungarian President argued, that the Slovak citizens who show interest in applying for the Hungarian citizenship should not lose their Slovak citizenship. Schmitt also defended the controversial media law, adopted by the Hungarian parliament, which had been under constant criticism

⁸⁴ "Orbán a Radičová podpíšu dohodu o plynovodnom prepojení v piatok," *Energia.sk*, January 26, 2011.

⁸⁵ P. Morvay, "Radičová chce o občianstve medzištátnu zmluvu," *Sme*, January 28, 2011.

⁸⁶ "Napätie so Slovenskom sa stráca, tvrdí maďarský prezident," *TASR*, November 6, 2011.

⁸⁷ Hungarian President László Sólyom paid his last official visit to Slovakia on December 6, 2008.

by journalists and politicians of the EU member states as it gives the right to use repressive methods against editors.⁸⁸ The Hungarian President also met I. Radičová and representatives of the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia.⁸⁹

Despite the rather pragmatic nature of dialogue at the level of prime ministers, the dialogue on the level of the political parties was not successfully launched after the parliamentary elections. The Fidesz maintained its close relationships with the SMK only, refused to communicate with the coalition party Most–Híd and its communication is more-or-less insignificant even with other EPP members from Slovakia. It was seen especially during Orbán's December 2010 visit to Bratislava, as well as during L. Kövér's visit on December 16–17, 2010, who refused to meet Most–Híd chairman B. Bugár. The Most–Híd was ignored by President P. Schmitt too, during his visit to Slovakia in January 2011.⁹⁰ A boycott of this most important party (at the time), representing the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which had, however, presented its reservations to the activities of the Forum of Hungarian Representatives of the Carpathian Basin as well as to the law granting the Hungarian citizenship extraterritorially, was criticized by a part of Hungarian political opposition, especially the Hungarian Socialist Party.⁹¹

JOINT BILATERAL COMMISSION AND COOPERATION OF MINISTRIES

The activities of the joint bilateral commission, established by an intergovernmental agreement from 1995, is a positive example of improved atmosphere in bilateral relations. The February 2, 2011 session of the Joint Slovak–Hungarian commission for minority issues resulted in the call to the both governments to co-finance the construction of the new Slovak House in the Hungarian village of Mlynky.⁹² The fight against organized crime and drug trafficking, cooperation between the Slovak Migration Office and Hungarian Immigration and Citizenship Bureau, the fight against corruption, prison guards bodies cooperation, customs offices cooperation, road security, the issue of cross-border pursuing of suspects, control of supplies, and witness protection were all addressed at negotiations of the Joint Slovak–Hungarian commission for cooperation on internal affairs held on February 14–15, 2011. Negotiations between interior ministers, held on December 6, 2010, were aimed at the coordination of water flow regulation of Hornád and Slaná rivers.⁹³ The Joint commission for European and Euro–Atlantic integration and other foreign policy issues, which met on February 17,

⁸⁸ "Maďarský prezident Pál Schmitt na jednodňovej návšteve Slovenska," *SITA*, January 21, 2011.

⁸⁹ "Zrušte Ficov zákon, vyzval nás maďarský prezident," *ČTK*, January 20, 2011.

⁹⁰ D. Vražda, "Most žiadal o stretnutie maďarského premiéra aj prezidenta," *Sme*, January 28, 2011.

⁹¹ "Továbbra is kerüli a Hídat," *Új Szó*, February 15, 2010.

⁹² "V Bratislave sa uskutočnilo 10. zasadnutie Zmiešanej slovensko-maďarskej komisie pre záležitosti menšín," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, February 2, 2011.

⁹³ "Zápisnica z 11. zasadnutia Zmiešanej slovensko-maďarskej komisie pre otázky spolupráce v oblasti vnútra," February 14–15, 2011.

2011, discussed common infrastructure projects, such as the establishment of a trans-shipment yard for a broad-gauge railway track Zahony–Chop.⁹⁴

Apart from bilateral projects and V4 cooperation, even the new EU's Danube region strategy, presented by the European Commission on December 9, 2010 along with a respective action plan, provided space for Slovak–Hungarian cooperation. Slovakia and Hungary were charged with a common coordination of the Danube's strategy priority area 4 – To restore and maintain the quality of waters.⁹⁵

OFFICIAL SUPPORT OF SLOVAK–HUNGARIAN COOPERATION

In 2008, foreign ministers Kinga Göncz and Ján Kubiš reached an agreement on the establishment of the Good Neighborhood and Understanding Award. In 2010, it was given to the Slovak Mountain Rescue Service of the High Tatras, for saving lives of three Hungarian tourists in January 2010, as well as Slovak–Hungarian Peacekeeping Unit dislocated in Cyprus.⁹⁶ The Most–Híd representatives decided to revive the idea to establish a Slovak–Hungarian Fund, which already appeared during negotiations between the former prime ministers R. Fico and G. Bajnai but which was never put into practice. Rudolf Chmel, Slovak Deputy Prime Minister, suggested that the Fund would be focused on supporting youth meetings and exchanges programs, bilingual schools, educational projects, cooperation in science, culture and art, as well as on foreign language education. The Fund should also finance the cooperation between cities and municipalities, restoration of historical buildings, as well as support activities of national minorities. According to R. Chmel, during the first years of its existence, Slovakia and Hungary should contribute with 1–2 million euro from their respective state budgets; later on, its financing could be supplemented by donations.⁹⁷

CONCLUSION

In 2010 and in the first half of 2011, Slovak–Hungarian relations experienced a complicated development. From the foreign policy view, there are only very few issues being

⁹⁴ "Maďarsko sa zmluvou o občianstve zatiaľ zaoberať nebude," *Sme*, February 17, 2011.

⁹⁵ General Affairs Council approved the conclusions about the Danube Region Strategy at a session held on April 13, 2011. The Danube Strategy was then approved at the EU Council meeting on June 24, 2011.

⁹⁶ "Péter Balázs and Miroslav Lajčák presented the 'Good neighbourly relations and understanding' awards," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, March 2, 2010. Available online: http://mfa.gov.hu/kum/en/bal/actualities/spokesman_statements/SK_dijak-eng_100302.htm (accessed on March 2, 2010).

⁹⁷ "Most–Híd navrhuje spoločný slovensko-maďarský fond," *SITA*, March 15, 2010.

as complex and including as many actors, values and interests as Slovak–Hungarian relations. The issue of Slovak–Hungarian relations remained in the center of interests of public and political elites. Besides the strong foreign policy aspect, the issue has a significant domestic dimension and is the reason for the Slovak political scene polarization. The Hungarian political scene is, however, similarly polarized and the controversial laws, such as the Hungarian citizenship law, day of national unity law, or the new Hungarian constitution, became also a part of a domestic political struggle in Hungary.

A change in administration of both states accounted for a change in the Slovak–Hungarian dialogue. Both sides are interested in less confrontational atmosphere. While in Slovakia, the motivation has its domestic dimension since the new government wishes to differ from the previous administration, and wants to reject any confrontational behavior of voters of either Slovak or Hungarian nationality, the motives of the Hungarian ruling coalition are of foreign policy character, given that the economic policy of Orbán's government as well as relations with the media and the character of a new Hungarian constitution are internationally criticized. Considering strong populist tendencies, which could result in supporting charismatic political leaders even in Slovakia, it is essential to pay attention to similar tendencies in neighboring countries. It is rather bewildering, that in case of Slovakia, given its negative experience with restrictions of independent media, the supreme officials did not present officially their stance on Hungary's new media law.⁹⁸

Despite the changed atmosphere in bilateral relations and an abandonment of the language of confrontation by Slovak officials, which was rather frequent prior to the 2010 elections primarily due to the SNS participation in government, a number of key issues remained unresolved. Nothing changed despite the symbolic Hungarian gestures, such as the case of Géza Farkas, Hungary's consul to Bratislava, who was recalled by Hungary's Foreign Ministry because of his inappropriate statements on Slovakia for which the Hungarian part apologized.⁹⁹ Slovakia also attempted to deal with the issue discreetly and it responded moderately to Esterházy commemorative days in an attempt not to provoke the feelings that would be destructive to bilateral relations.

The main problem lies in the tendencies of the Hungarian political elite to create extraterritorial institutional ties between Hungary and ethnic Hungarians living abroad. Hungary's new citizenship law adopted in May 2010 and being, at present, the most critical point of bilateral relations, is just one of the elements of such policy including also the 2001 Law on Hungarians living in neighboring countries, establishment of the Forum of Hungarian Representatives of the Carpathian Basin, formed as a consultative body of the Hungarian National Assembly, and, eventually, the adoption of a new constitution which, amongst others, grants voting rights to Hungarian minorities living abroad. While there are the fields in bilateral agenda characterized by a constructive atmosphere, in the field of national policy, which is specifically excluded from the institutional framework of the

⁹⁸ R. Krčmárik, "Orbánov mediálny zákon Slovensko nekritizuje," *Pravda*, January 7, 2011.

⁹⁹ "Maďarsko stiahlo svojho konzula za nevhodné výroky o Slovensku," *ČTK*, March 29, 2011.

foreign policy, Hungary's approach is unilateral. This type of policy is not only contrary to the principles of good neighborhood relations, to which the adherence is requested by the OSCE High Commissioner's Bolzano recommendations on national minorities in inter-state relations as well as by the 2001 Venice Commission's report on the preferential treatment of minorities by their Kin-state, but also to the principles of relations that should exist between allies, cooperating together within groupings such as the EU or NATO. The above-mentioned measures go far beyond the officially declared framework of spiritual and cultural unity of Hungarians living in various states and they create space for an extraterritorial expansion of a Hungarian political nation. It is true that a practice of granting dual citizenship based on ethnic or historical criteria is common in a number of European states. Almost in every case, a similar practice does not lead to a stabilization of neighborhood relations, but has contrary effects and contributes or contributed, sometimes, to even more tension.

Despite the changed atmosphere in bilateral relations a number of key issues remained unresolved.

The real improvement of the bilateral relations occurred only after the parliamentary elections in both states in 2010, primarily thanks to a constructive and accommodating approach of

the Slovak administration in the field of national minority policy. The improvement, however, cannot be overshadowed by the reality that official addresses of Hungarian representatives as well as adopted legislative acts challenge legitimacy of a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, which constitute a part of European policy and security architecture, or basis for good neighborhood relations between Slovakia and Hungary respectively. It includes the Trianon Peace Treaty as well as the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian bilateral agreement on prevention of citizenship signed in 1960, which *de facto* excludes the possibility of acquiring a dual citizenship, which is considered as invalid by representatives of Hungary.¹⁰⁰ Such rhetoric could create in the future the conditions for a support of solutions in bilateral relations that would differ from standards that are common between political allies.

The problem lies not only in the fact that bilateral meetings on the level of prime ministers are not of cordial character and that mutual communication is far from being diplomatic in some cases, as stated by a number of observers,¹⁰¹ but also in the development of public opinion which could be seen in growing popularity of the Jobbik Movement in Hungary, for example.¹⁰² This kind of development of political tendencies of the public can easily lead to a radicalization of national policies. In Slovakia, too, there is a tendency towards nationalization of public discourse; however, for now, society takes a rejective stance against any radical solutions, as the results of the parliamentary elections showed in 2010. It is also supported by a survey carried out in 2009 by the Institute for Sociology of Slovak Academy of Sciences, realized as a part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP): according to results of the survey,

¹⁰⁰ "Hlavné správy," *TA3*, June 3, 2010.

¹⁰¹ A. Kósa, "Higgadt Magyar-Szlovák prábeszéd," *Új Szó*, July 21, 2010; P. Morvay, "Radičová chce o občianstve medzištátnu zmluvu," *Sme*, January 28, 2011.

¹⁰² P. Novotný, "Orbán rýchlo stráca popularitu," *Hospodárske noviny*, May 20, 2011.

Slovak citizens consider ethnic issues to be of primary importance.¹⁰³ However, a survey carried out by the Institute for Public Affairs is not exactly consistent with the ISSP one. While the results signal an increased perception of ethnic tensions in a hierarchy of social problems, compared with 2007, the issues of foreign policy, or neighborhood relations respectively, have been marginalized for a long time.¹⁰⁴ Slovak citizens are not overly optimistic regarding the developments in the Slovak–Hungarian relations in the future. In November 2010, only a minority of respondents expected an improvement in the next year or two, even in case of the ruling coalition voters.¹⁰⁵

Therefore, in spite of some positive signs, we cannot state that there is an improvement in Slovak–Hungarian relations; especially because the Hungarian Government officials refuse to discuss the issues with their Slovak counterparts, and in the case of dual citizenship, for example, they present their requests. On the other hand, the Slovak Government officials seemingly do not have a clear strategy how to prevent the effects of laws which are supposed to be implemented beyond Hungary's borders, on Slovak territory. Slovakia and Hungary however intensively cooperate, whether at the bilateral or the multilateral level, within international groupings such as the EU, NATO, or the V4, where they seem to be one of the closest regional allies. The questions of transnational infrastructure building, energy security, cooperation within the EU, support of its further enlargement and integration of the Western Balkans and participation in Eastern Partnership are the key areas of mutual cooperation. In order to broaden the possibilities for deep and constructive cooperation, it is essential to supplement the three principles of bilateral relations presented by Minister M. Dzurinda in September 2010 when meeting his Hungarian counterpart J. Martonyi in Budapest, with unconditional respect for democratic values, human rights, international norms and resolution on protection of national minorities, as well as principles of international law and equality of the EU members.

¹⁰³ According to the survey results, 22.0 per cent to 35.6 per cent of respondents consider conflicts between Slovaks and Hungarian to be acute or very acute; 23.5 to 47.4 per cent of respondents consider the acute or very acute conflicts between Slovaks and Roma community; while 8 to 27.8 per cent of respondents consider it to be the conflict between the rich and the poor. R. Džambazovič, M. Zeman, L. Pikulík, *Sociálne nerovnosti. ISSP Slovensko 2009 – 2010*, Bratislava: Faculty of Philosophy of the Comenius University, and Institute of Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2010, p. 109.

¹⁰⁴ In November 2007, only 6 per cent of respondents considered ethnic tensions and problems with coexistence (i.e. the Slovak–Hungarian relations as well as coexistence of the Roma and non-Roma communities) as the most serious issues; in November 2008, the number of respondents sharing this view raised to 16 per cent. According to surveys carried out in February and November 2010, 11 to 12 per cent of respondents considered them to be of key importance. Foreign policy or neighborhood relations problems respectively, were after 2008 considered to be most serious by approximately 1 per cent of respondents.

¹⁰⁵ A total of 23 per cent of respondents expected an improvement in Slovak–Hungarian relations in 1–2 years to come. The deterioration of relations was expected by 52 per cent. In case of the followers of the ruling coalition, ratio of optimists to pessimists was 43 to 44; while in case of the opposition followers it was 12 to 59. Z. Bútorová, O. Gyárfášová, "Verejná mienka," in M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútorová, eds, *Slovensko 2010. Správa o stave spoločnosti a demokracie a o trendoch na rok 2011*, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2011, pp. 174, 180.

SECOND GENERATION VISEGRAD

TOMÁŠ STRÁŽAY

Slovakia has always considered the Visegrad Group to be an important instrument in deepening cooperation within the region as well as in the realization of its own general and foreign policy priorities. In this context, 2010 can be seen as exceptional. Not only because Slovakia took over its third V4 Presidency in the first half of 2010, but also because of two important anniversaries which led politicians and analysts to a more thorough assessment of the achieved successes and failures and further talks on the future V4 existence. 2010 marked the last year of the V4's second decade. As of 2011, the V4 can symbolically be referred to as second generation Visegrad.

In reference to the two aforementioned anniversaries – the 10th anniversary of the International Visegrad Fund establishment and the 20th anniversary of the Visegrad Group creation – the text is subdivided into two parts. The first one focuses on key long-term factors characterizing Visegrad cooperation. It offers a concise assessment of the current state of cooperation – accenting mostly positive moments having anniversaries in mind. The second one focuses on V4 priorities in 2010. Special attention is paid to the preparation and implementation of Slovakia's V4 Presidency. Due to the nature of the publication, whose primary goal is to analyze the given year – in this case 2010 – the analysis is limited to the period of January 2010–March 2011.

20 YEARS OF VISEGRAD

It is no secret that over its two decade existence the V4 went through both, periods of success and relatively numerous problematic moments. The current V4 image is

quite different from that of the 1990s. It is therefore reasonable to briefly identify and underline the factors currently characterizing V4 cooperation – especially regarding the post-accession period, which defined new priorities in cooperation among the V4 countries. The Visegrad Group is enjoying a growing reputation among its EU and other partners, continuity in its priorities, as well as gradual strengthening of cooperation mechanisms. Last but not least, the V4 is becoming an ever greater inspiration for other regional initiatives in its neighborhood, specifically in the regions of Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans.

GROWING REPUTATION

It can be said – with a certain degree of satisfaction – that despite the ongoing financial crisis and turbulences in economic development, the V4 brand suffered no significant harm in 2010. The “brand” remained strong even though the developments in individual countries were very uneven with Poland, which was the only V4 or even the EU country to overcome the financial and economic crisis with a growing economy, on the one hand and Hungary, whose economic problems stood out over the V4 and even the EU average, on the other. As in 2010, the V4 remains the most effective and prospective regional initiative in Central Europe. Visegrad is held in high regard not only by representatives of V4 countries but also by the leaders of neighboring countries.

CONTINUITY IN PRIORITIES

Continuity in Visegrad Group priorities and its individual presidencies contributes to the good reputation of the V4. Continuity could be clearly observed both in 2009 through the Hungarian V4 presidency following the Polish one, and in 2010 in the case of Slovakia’s presidency following the Hungarian one. This is especially true in the choice of core issues which include – long-term cooperation with eastern partners and Western Balkan countries, energy security, and the development of relations with non-Visegrad partners in the V4+ format. In regards to the Hungarian and later Slovak presidencies this was underlined by the dedication of one of the two meetings of V4 foreign ministers to the Eastern Partnership and the other to the Western Balkans

STRENGTHENING COOPERATION MECHANISMS

Despite the consensus among Visegrad partners on further institutionalization or enlargement of the Visegrad group – which all V4 countries deem unnecessary – the V4 continues to strengthen cooperation mechanisms both on government and expert levels. It is now standard that representatives of the V4 countries meet for consulta-

tions before European Council sessions and some of the negotiations are held in the presence of high EU representatives or the representative of the presiding state. The strengthening of cooperation mechanisms is also visible on the sectoral level – cooperation in the field of energy and energy security can serve as the best example. The interest, dedicated to the matter by representatives of V4 countries, is supplemented by expert participation in regular meetings and official activities – not only in the energy field – are adequately supplemented by non-governmental sector initiatives, often supported by IVF grants.

THE V4 AS AN INSPIRATION

The Visegrad model of cooperation is becoming an ever greater inspiration to other regional initiatives, especially in Southeast Europe (Western Balkans) and the EU's eastern neighborhood. Next to the "export" of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006) to Southeast Europe, which can rightly be considered a joint initiative of V4 countries focused on the transfer of particular experience and know-how, partners from neighboring countries are also interested in other fields where the V4 could serve as an inspiration. This interest also revolves around the only Visegrad institution – the International Visegrad Fund – whose experience could be utilized both in Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans.¹

The growing role of the V4 presidency must also be noted in the context of cooperation development. The presidency is an opportunity for the presiding country to present new elements or solutions into the Visegrad agenda, both in terms of content and procedure, and subsequently participate in the implementation of its initiatives. This is of course conditioned by the consensual agreement of all Visegrad partners on the individual priorities of the presidency. From the perspective of the SR, 2010 can be seen in two dimensions – the first half of 2010 as a preparation for the V4 presidency and the latter half as the practical implementation of goals established by the presidency program. In the first half of 2010, Slovakia also participated in the realization of the Hungarian V4 presidency (July 2009–June 2010) which can be assessed as very successful in many aspects.

This interest revolves around the only Visegrad institution – the International Visegrad Fund – whose experience could be utilized both in Eastern Partnership countries and in the Western Balkans.

¹ The elaboration of a feasibility study focused on the establishment of institutions similar to the International Visegrad Fund should be mentioned in this context. The study was formulated with IVF support and authored by experts from multiple countries under the auspices of the Budapest International Centre for Democratic Transition – ICDT.

COMMON POINTS OF THE HUNGARIAN AND SLOVAK PRESIDENCIES

The second half of the Hungarian V4 presidency was dominated by the organization of two major summits. The summit of the prime ministers was primarily dedicated to energy security issues in the region and attended not only by V4 prime ministers but also by representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Austria, Slovenia, Serbia, and Romania. Visegrad countries form a transit region for strategic resources but due to their significant dependency on one source they are also among the most vulnerable states in terms of supply outages – as seen in the beginning of 2009 during the natural gas crisis. The region is also characteristic by its missing links between interconnectors, especially in the north-south direction. Strengthening energy security is therefore a core interest of Visegrad countries and other countries of Central and Southeast Europe. Its importance was underlined by the adopted declaration.² The “energy” summit of the prime ministers also resulted in the introduction of regular high level meetings on specific energy security issues which include the construction of new infrastructure (natural gas pipelines, LNG terminals) as well as the diversification of sources. The summit also resulted in the establishment of working groups which should discuss individual issues on an expert level. Another important conclusion of the summit lies in the focus on the European dimension of energy security and the search for resources for infrastructure projects in the existing EU financial mechanisms.³

The second summit held during the latter half of Hungary’s presidency and focused on Eastern Partnership was attended by not only V4 foreign ministers but also by representatives of Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as representatives of the European Commission, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, and the Baltic countries. In the adopted declaration, V4 foreign ministers designated the Eastern Partnership as an ideal instrument for deepening cooperation with partners beyond the eastern EU border while emphasizing the specific relation of V4 countries toward EP states.⁴ The declaration also highlighted the opportunity presented by the presidencies of Hungary and Poland in the European Council. Hungary’s V4 presidency was thus able to strike a balance between the two dominant territorial foreign policy priorities of the V4 creating a suitable model for following presidencies. A similar logic was already implemented in the subsequent Slovak V4 presidency as seen in the presidency program itself.⁵

² “Declaration of the Budapest V4+ Energy security summit,” February 24, 2010. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2010/declaration-of-the> (accessed on February 2, 2011).

³ See “Press statement of Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai. Delivered after the extended Energy security summit of the V4 countries,” February 2010. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2010/press-statement-of-prime> (accessed on February 2, 2011).

⁴ “Joint statement of the foreign ministers of the Visegrad Group at their meeting in Budapest,” March 2, 2010. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2010/joint-statement-of-the> (accessed on February 2, 2011).

⁵ “Program of the Slovak presidency of the Visegrad Group (July 2010–June 2011): efficient Visegrad – continuity, cohesion, solidarity, awareness,” July 2010, Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/2010-2011-slovak-110412> (accessed on July 7, 2010).

In general, the program of Slovakia's presidency continued in the Hungarian program. On the one hand, this supports continuity which is very important in the long-term implementation of regional interests; on the other hand however, Slovakia's presidency program did not present any innovative points or agenda which would give Slovakia its own profile. On the contrary, the program rather focused on the maintenance or development of well-established issues set forth by previous presidencies. The potential for innovative proposals presented by the upcoming 20th anniversary of the group's establishment, which would take place during Slovakia's presidency, also remained largely unutilized. The conservative approach is also exemplified by the motto of the presidency: Efficient Visegrad – continuity, cohesion, solidarity, awareness.⁶ The program profile of Slovakia's presidency would perhaps be better served by greater concentration on a few selected priority issues where Slovakia would attempt a stronger contribution.

The priorities of Slovakia's presidency were summed up by Prime Minister I. Radičová in the official handover of the presidency from Hungary and reflected in the joint statement of V4 prime ministers.⁷ In her words, the strategic task of the V4 is to strengthen Central Europe and improve its cohesion and solidarity within the EU. Slovakia's goal is to focus on issues such as the new EU financial perspective, implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy, infrastructure development, economic cooperation, or the social inclusion of the Roma population. The statement underlines the exceptionality of 2011 in two dimensions – the 20th anniversary of the Visegrad Group establishment and the two subsequent Visegrad presidencies of the European Council.⁸ The joint statement also mentioned the EU strategy for the Danube region (Danube strategy)⁹, currently under preparation, and its benefit for Central Europe even though it was clear Poland would not participate in its formulation.¹⁰ Its short mention probably got into the statement on the suggestion of Hungary which considers the Danube Strategy to be one of the flag ships of its EU presidency.

Right from the beginning of Slovakia's V4 presidency, the potential to intensify cooperation was increased by the fact that governments in all four countries were formed by right-wing or center-right wing coalitions. In the recent history of Visegrad countries this presented a unique opportunity. However, its potential still remains unutilized.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ "Joint statement – summit of the heads of government of the Visegrad group," July 20, 2010. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2010/joint-statement-summit> (accessed on July 20, 2010).

⁸ Hungary: January 1, 2011–June 30, 2011, Poland: July 1, 2011–December 31, 2011.

⁹ See "EU Strategy for the Danube Region." Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/danube/index_en.htm (accessed on February 15, 2011).

¹⁰ There are various debatable reasons for Poland's absence in preparation of the Danube Strategy – low interest on Poland's part, Poland's territories in the Danube river basin are too small, Poland is already participating in another macro-regional strategy (Baltic), and so on. The fact is that Poland remains outside of the Danube Strategy.

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SURPRISING DYNAMIC IN THE SLOVAK PRESIDENCY

It must be noted that Slovakia took over the V4 presidency during a period marked by the financial crisis and the consequences of recession as well as by the discussion on the future functioning of the euro zone. Due to its euro zone membership, Slovakia found itself in a different position to that of its Visegrad neighbors in terms of its future. Slovakia was also the only V4 country which could directly participate in decisions that would impact all other Visegrad countries in their scope. The European discourse on the euro was marked by more and more negative references. It is therefore no surprise that the intent to share know-how from the accession process to the euro zone with Visegrad partners, listed in Slovakia's presidency program, remained largely unfulfilled.

The program of the Slovak presidency itself was less positive than its implementation. Its dynamic escalated gradually and culminated in the third quarter. Outside factors of course played a role in this development – the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of cooperation took place in the third quarter of Slovakia's presidency along with turbulences in the Arab world which could not go by unnoticed. The active approach of the Slovak presidency, still only taking into consideration one third of its course, played a crucial role in its success.

TERRITORIAL PRIORITIES

With respect to the orientation toward two territorial priorities – Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans – the most noticeable activity of the Slovak presidency can be found in the V4+ foreign ministers meeting, attended by ministers of the V4 as well as the Western Balkans and the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Štefan Füle. The ministers not only declared their support for the integration ambitions of Western Balkan countries but also expressed their support toward the EU and its further enlargement. The conclusions of the meeting were summed up in a joint statement including a declaration of willingness on the part of V4 countries to share their transformation and integration experience. The ministers also declared the readiness of the Visegrad Group to serve as a model for regional initiatives in the Western Balkans.¹¹ The conference, organized in cooperation with the NGOs

¹¹ "Visegrad Group ministerial statement on the Western Balkans," October 22, 2010. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2010/visegrad-group> (accessed on October 22, 2010).

and taking place on the eve of the ministerial meeting, represented a new aspect in the organization of similar events during Hungary's V4 presidency. Next a discussion on the current issues related to the integration of the Western Balkans into the EU, the goal of this conference, was to formulate specific recommendations for the ministers and governments of Visegrad countries. This Foreign Ministry initiative can be seen as a contribution to the debate on priority issues of the Visegrad agenda but also as another opportunity to deepen cooperation with the nongovernmental sector. The participation of Visegrad ministers in accompanying events, mainly conferences, can be perceived as a characteristic feature of the Slovak presidency which could prove inspiring to following presidencies.¹² In listing the activities of Slovakia's presidency towards the Western Balkans we must also mention the V4 support offered to Montenegro in its efforts to achieve candidate status. Although this support was an initiative of the V4 as a whole, Slovakia's contribution as the presiding country was pivotal

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The joint meeting and statement of foreign ministers on the Eastern Partnership in March 2011 was specific in the participation of German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle. The statement summarized all Visegrad priorities towards

Eastern Partnership countries, including the will to offer their transformation experience and promote the full liberalization of the visa regime. The statement also includes an appeal to the EU to ensure sufficient funding for the Eastern Partnership policy.¹³

The Common declaration of the V4 and Germany on the situation in the southern neighborhood of the EU and the southern dimension of the European Neighborhood Policy can be considered well-timed and very innovative in the Visegrad context. Taking into consideration the two key vectors of the V4's foreign policy orientation – Eastern and Southeastern (Balkan) – this declaration is a truly new point in the Visegrad agenda.¹⁴ Even though the declaration was prompted by external factors – especially developments in Egypt and Libya and the participation of the German Foreign Minister – the V4's express reaction to current events was very positive. This reaction also confirms the advantages of the so-called weak institutionalization of the Visegrad Group which can, thanks to the absence of concrete institutions, act more flexibly than strongly institutionalized groups with a hierarchic structure. It is also probable, that due to the dynamic developments in countries bordering with

¹² Representatives of foreign ministries also met in the V4 panel – Energized during the GLOBSEC Conference, organized on September 14, 2010. They also participated in the following year of the conference in March 2011.

¹³ "The Visegrad Group and Germany foreign ministers statement on the Eastern Partnership," Bratislava, March 3, 2011. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/the-visegrad-group-and> (accessed on March 3, 2011).

¹⁴ "Common declaration of Germany and the Visegrad Group on the EU southern neighborhood policy," March 3, 2011. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/common-declaration-of> (accessed on March 3, 2011).

the EU in the south, the south vector will remain a core issue in the long-term foreign policy agenda of the V4.¹⁵

SECTORAL COOPERATION

The assessment of foreign policy and European V4 activities during Slovakia's presidency must include sectoral cooperation. Results achieved in individual sectors significantly differed. For example, the issue of integrating socially outcast Roma communities, assigned to the ministry of social affairs by the presidency program, became an issue already emphasized by the Hungarian V4 presidency. It also dominated the meeting of V4 presidents in Karlove Vary on November 5–7. The presidents declared that no V4 country is capable of resolving the issue on its own and called for European solutions. Because the issue of integrating Roma communities was also a priority of Hungary's EU presidency there were expectations of a possible synergic effect between both presidencies. In the analyzed timeframe (January 2010–March 2011), tangible results were however minimal. Decreased interest in this issue can be expected in the next two presidencies due to the diminished urgency of this issue in the Czech Republic and Poland.

On the other hand, significant progress was achieved in another priority of the Slovak V4 presidency – the energy security sector. The construction of the north–south interconnection of natural gas pipelines between Hungary and Poland plays a crucial role in this respect. Project implementation experienced a jump in progress through the announcement of the bilateral agreement with Hungary, adopted by the prime ministers during the December visit of Viktor Orbán to Bratislava. In this context, Prime Minister I. Radičová expressed her belief that the interconnection of natural gas pipelines between Slovakia and Poland was also feasible in the foreseeable future. The September meetings of the High level Energy working group and the V4+ Working group both serve as examples of the fruitful connection between the political and expert levels. Both working groups also met in January and their meetings were immediately followed by a meeting of V4 ministers responsible for energy. The September meetings are also closely related to the Letter of ministries, operators and regulators addressed to the EU Commissioner for Energy, Günther Oettinger, by Slovakia on behalf of the V4. The letter appealed to EU institutions for their maximum support in the construction of the North–South interconnection which should also utilize the financial assistance of the EU.¹⁶ The meeting of V4 ministers responsible for energy resulted in a declaration calling for the strengthening of coordination in energy and its research as well as expressing the need for the establishment of crisis

¹⁵ Any assessment of V4 activities in this context would be premature, although currently visible tendencies point toward the involvement of individual Visegrad countries and not the V4 as a whole.

¹⁶ See for example “Zástupcovia krajín V4 rokovali o energetických projektoch”, *energia.sk*, October 22, 2010. Available online: <http://www.energia.sk/tlacova-sprava/energeticka-bezpecnost/zastupcovia-krajin-v4-rokovali-o-energetickych-projektoch/0878/> (accessed on October 22, 2010).

management mechanisms and the synchronization of energy activities within the V4 with those on the EU level.¹⁷ In the field of energy security, the V4 was thus able to not only strengthen its internal coordination mechanisms, but also connect its activities with the EU, resulting in anticipated outcomes of the synergy effect between the Slovak V4 presidency and the Hungarian EU presidency. The establishment of the High level expert group on North-South interconnections in Central and Eastern Europe in February 2011, with the participation of the EU Commission and relevant member state representatives, serves as a confirmation. Energy security was also the focus point of activities carried out on the Visegrad level by nongovernmental actors. These include the first meeting of the Visegrad think-tank platform from the beginning of 2011, which resulted in a recommendation package for Visegrad governments and an opinion for the EU Commission, as well as the earlier analysis from Visegrad energy experts.¹⁸

Activities in the financial sector focused mainly on negotiations on the future financial framework for the upcoming years. They were primarily held on the expert level with consultations focused on the pre-negotiation and negotiation phases.

Paradoxically the issue of the macro-regional Danube strategy, whose operation is directly related to the future financial framework and the use of structural funds with direct impact on the transportation or environment sectors, remained rather neglected throughout V4 negotiations.

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THE V4+ FORMULA

Slovakia's V4 presidency continued in the use of the long adapted V4+ formula, allowing the Visegrad Group to effectively cooperate with other countries or regions. The meeting of V4 ministers responsible for cohesion with partners from Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia or the meeting of the political directors of V4 foreign ministries with the Japanese foreign ministry director for European affairs

¹⁷ "Declaration of V4 ministers responsible for energy," January 25, 2011, Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/declaration-of-v4-energy> (accessed on January 25, 2011).

¹⁸ See for example "Recommendations for governments of V4 countries with respect to regional energy cooperation adopted after the 1st meeting of the Working group on energy security of the V4 Think-Tank Platform," Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2011. Available online: <http://www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/publikacie/317> (accessed on February 15, 2011); V4 Think-Tank Platform – Working group "Energy security:" Opinion on the communication of the European Commission "The future role of regional initiatives," Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2011. Available online: <http://www.sfpa.sk/dokumenty/publikacie/319> (accessed on February 15, 2011); A. Nosko, A. Orbán, W. Paczyński, F. Černoch, J. Jaroš, *Energy security – policy paper*, Slovak Atlantic Commission. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=923> (accessed on February 15, 2011).

serve as examples. The participation of German representatives in V4 activities is exceptionally beneficial – Angela Merkel participated on the joint meeting of V4 prime ministers (with Austrian and Ukrainian prime ministers) and the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle took part in the second summit of V4 foreign ministers. Consultations with high EU representatives, generally held before European Council sessions, represent a distinct level of cooperation with non-Visegrad partners. The prime ministers met with the President of the European Council, H. Van Rompuy, in September and a meeting was also held with the President of the European Commission, J.M. Barroso, in December 2010. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton confirmed the legitimacy of Visegrad cooperation in the development of relations with Eastern Partnership countries by her presence at the extended summit of foreign ministers in Bratislava.

PRIME MINISTERS SUMMIT (AND ITS ADDED VALUE)

More important than the declaration of the prime ministers of Visegrad and neighboring countries, i.e. Germany, Austria, and Ukraine was the fact that a meeting in this format even took place. This was beyond a doubt the most prestigious event organized by the Slovak presidency with a high added symbolic value. The participation of the prime ministers from neighboring countries in what was essentially an “internal” event of Visegrad prime ministers denotes the importance assigned to Visegrad cooperation by our neighbors. With respect to Germany’s position in the EU, special heed should be paid to the statement of German Chancellor, Angela Merkel.¹⁹ The prime ministers summit also adopted the Bratislava Declaration, signed by four Visegrad prime ministers, declaring the key priorities of cooperation in the near

The Bratislava Declaration, adopted after 20 years of the V4’s successful existence by full-fledged EU members, designates priorities for the group’s further successful operation within the EU.

future. While the first declaration, adopted in 1991, determined the basis of regional cooperation and formulated goals for the period of post-communist transformation, the second – Kroměříž Declaration – defined goals for the period of EU accession. The Bratislava Declaration, adopted after 20 years of the V4’s successful existence by full-fledged EU members, designates priorities for the group’s further successful operation within the EU. Alongside well known priorities, also analyzed in this text, the declaration devotes one entire point to the need for the development and cultivation of the transatlantic partnership, considered to be pivotal in combating global

¹⁹ “Merkelová: V4 je důležitá pre silnéVýchodné partnerstvo,” *hnonline*, February 15, 2011. Available online: <http://hnonline.sk/svet/c1-50252790-merkelova-v4-je-dolezita-pre-silnevychodne-partnerstvo> (accessed on February 15, 2011).

threats.²⁰ The prime ministers summit also resulted in a joint statement on Belarus, aimed at emphasizing the common values and democratic principles which form the basis of Visegrad cooperation and are shared by all the signatory countries, and an appeal to the Belarusian regime to release political prisoners and allow for fair democratic elections. It was no surprise that the Prime Minister of Ukraine did not add his signature to the statement.²¹

INTERNATIONAL VISEGRAD FUND

As the only concrete institution of the Visegrad Group, the IVF continued to fulfill its role as one of the key pillars of Visegrad cooperation throughout 2010. Its ongoing focus on the nongovernmental sphere, civil society, and cross-border cooperation should be held in high regard. The Fund also continued to distribute grants and scholarships to candidates outside the Visegrad Group. Approximately one fifth of all resources were dedicated to these activities in 2010.²² Logically, this opens the question on how to deal with the growing demand. One of the options is to participate in the creation of similar funds directly in the interested regions which coincide with the territorial priorities of the V4's foreign policy – Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans, or initiate the establishment of a "sub-fund" formally under IVF supervision but focused exclusively on applicants from Eastern Partnership and Western Balkan countries. A combination of both cannot be excluded in the future.

Even though the Slovak presidency expressed its support of the IVF – as all other preceding presidencies have – the IVF remains, to a certain degree, an independent institution within the Visegrad Group with its own management. The grant scheme reform implemented by the IVF since the beginning of 2011 must also be attributed not to the presidency but to IVF management and those who adopted the reform on behalf of Visegrad countries. In any case, the grant scheme reform is received very positively especially thanks to the simplification of application procedures and the growing trend of abolishing excessive bureaucratic measures.

²⁰ "The Bratislava declaration of the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Visegrad Group," February 15, 2011. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/the-bratislava> (accessed on February 15, 2011).

²¹ "Statement by the heads of governments of Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia on Belarus," February 15, 2011. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/statement-by-the-heads> (accessed on February 15, 2011).

²² Information based on interviews with IVF Director, Petr Vágner, and IVF PR Manager, Jiří Sýkora. (February 2011).

FINAL ASSESSMENT – IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PRESIDENCIES

Although a final assessment of Slovakia's V4 presidency will only be possible after Slovakia hands over the reins to the Czech Republic, after analyzing two thirds of its course, certain conclusions can be made along with a profile of implications for future Visegrad Group presidencies. They can be summed up into six points:

- It is clear that upcoming V4 presidencies will continue the trend of focusing each of the two regular meetings of foreign ministers toward one of the two territorial priorities – the Eastern Partnership and the Western Balkans. Due to the character of V4 cooperation and its weak institutionalization the Visegrad Group could be very flexible in reacting to developments in surrounding countries as well as in the development of cooperation with partners in these regions. The joint statement of V4 and Germany's foreign ministers on the Eastern Partnership can serve as an example. At the same time, the challenges must be selected carefully so that Visegrad – paraphrasing a well-known statement on the Balkans – doesn't produce more initiatives than it is able to handle.
- Activities in neighboring, non-Visegrad countries and regions, should not come at the expense of internal cohesion and effectiveness of the Visegrad group. In this context, it is necessary to sharpen existing instruments and present new initiatives which could help improve the efficacy of cooperation mechanisms.
- It is clear that sectoral policies in 2010 were dominated by energy and the issue of ensuring energy security. Increased attention must however also be paid to other sectors – the neglected ones so far include for example transport, where unmet challenges remain in all types of transport, from water, to rail, to road. Cooperation among the defense departments could present an interesting point of observation as the experiences with establishing regional initiatives in this field have so far only offered bleak prospects.
- 2010 confirmed that, despite the cutback in open conflict situations and a change in rhetoric set on by a change of governments, Slovak–Hungarian relations remain the most intensive bilateral relationship in the Visegrad Group. All the while, it is also clear that this statement will remain true throughout the course of the upcoming period and its presidencies. In terms of the V4's operation it is however crucial that bilateral tensions do not transfer to the regional level as they have in the 1990s.
- The effective use of coordination mechanisms within the group remains a challenge both in regional affairs as well as those on the EU level. V4 consultations before European Council sessions have become standard. However, they should not become stereotypical and should be perceived as an opportunity to identify positions of other countries on European policies which directly impact all Visegrad countries and an opportunity to adopt common positions. The development of consular cooperation and the establishment of joint representations such as the Visegrad House in countries or regions of common interest are prospective areas of cooperation.

- Macro-regional strategies will most likely start becoming the new instrument of regional development within the EU.²³ Their importance can also increase following the adoption of the new future financial framework and the future perspective of the EU cohesion policy. The two macro-regional strategies established so far – Baltic and Danube – divided the V4 into two groups by an abstract line – Poland on one side and the other V4 countries on the other. It is in the best interest of Visegrad cooperation to serve as a communication channel between the two strategies and effectively utilize the opportunities presented by both of them.

²³ The existing Baltic and Danube strategies could possibly be supplemented by other macro-regional strategies – Adriatic-Ionian and Black Sea – while the two existing strategies, in case of their successful implementation, would serve as an example to the others.

SLOVAKIA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS EASTERN NEIGHBORS IN 2010

ALEXANDER DULEBA

The text offers an analytical survey of Slovakia's relations with its eastern neighbors in 2010. The first part is dedicated to countries that are a part of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) of the EU, the second one to Russia. Relations with EaP countries are examined according to their significance to Slovakia (not alphabetically). The analysis maps key contact activities between Slovakia and its eastern neighbors on the political level, follows the main issues of bilateral relations, including economic and trade cooperation, and compares the policies toward individual countries within the governments of Robert Fico and Iveta Radičová.

RELATIONS WITH EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES

UKRAINE

Relations with Ukraine came to a freezing halt after the "gas crisis" in January 2009. The then Prime Minister R. Fico referred to Ukraine as the culprit of the "gas crisis," which caused approximately 1 billion euro in economic damages to Slovakia, and called for a reevaluation of Slovakia's support for Ukraine's integration ambitions.¹ Therefore, no bilateral meetings on the level of government members took place in the rest of

¹ For more, see A. Duleba, *Slovakia's relations with its Eastern neighbors in 2008*, in P. Brezáni, ed., *Yearbook of Slovakia's foreign policy 2008*, Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2009, pp. 106–124.

2009. The situation changed only in February 2010, after the change of the Ukrainian Government. Viktor Yanukovich, the leader of the Party of Regions, became the new Ukrainian President and Mykola Azarov, the new Prime Minister.

The visit of the Foreign Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, to Kiev in April 2010 was the first bilateral event on the official diplomatic level after the "gas crisis." It focused mainly on starting a dialogue with the new Ukrainian Government and preparing the official visit of the President Ivan Gašparovič to Ukraine. Before his departure to Kiev, M. Lajčák stated: "We wish to have the best relations. Ukraine is our largest neighbor and contacts are maintained on all levels, from the civilian to the political. It is important for us to see Ukraine as a reliable and predictable partner."² In Kiev, talks were subsequently held with the new Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, Speaker of the Parliament Volodymyr Lytvyn, and President Viktor Yanukovich. The foreign ministers signed a protocol of cooperation between the ministries. Slovakia offered Ukraine a list of specific activities for cooperation in its transformation and harmonization with EU standards. In his meeting with V. Yanukovich, M. Lajčák emphasized that the continuous transit of raw materials to Slovakia through Ukraine is a matter of energy security, as well as one of the criteria defining the responsibility and credibility of Ukraine. V. Yanukovich assured M. Lajčák that the gas crisis will not be repeated.³

The issue of the importance of Ukraine's predictability as a partner was stressed by M. Lajčák on all occasions throughout the first half of 2010; including talks with the former Foreign Minister Piotr Poroshenko, during the meeting of V4 foreign ministers with partners from EaP countries during the Hungarian V4 Presidency on March 2, 2010; at the farewell address to Ukraine's Ambassador to Slovakia, Inna Ohnivec, who concluded her seven-year mission in April 2010; as well as during the informal meeting of EU foreign ministers with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, K. Gryshchenko, in Brussels on May 10, 2010.⁴ Despite the efforts of M. Lajčák, relations with Ukraine remained tainted with "gas bitterness" during the Fico Government.

Slovakia's approach to Ukraine changed and bilateral relations were revitalized with the new Government of I. Radičová that took office in July 2010. The new Government manifesto reads:

A secure, economically advancing, democratic and free Ukraine represents an important component of pan-European stability. The Government will continue to actively support the integration and modernization prospects of Ukraine, which bring the country closer to the area of security and prosperity, in which Slovakia is firmly established. To this end, the Government will conduct an intensive dialogue with the representa-

² *Aktuálne*, Press release, MFA SR, April 14, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on February 4, 2011).

³ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, April 14, 2010, April 15, 2010, May 24, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on February 4, 2011).

⁴ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, March 12, 2010, April 6, 2010, May 10, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on February 4, 2011).

tives of the government and of civil society in Ukraine. Modernization of Ukraine, improvement in the functioning of its internal market, and promotion of its economic growth can also create more opportunities for the east of Slovakia.⁵

Supporting Ukraine's EU integration is a national interest for Slovakia. Ukraine is Slovakia's last immediate neighbor being in a different international regime. This fact severely limits the possibilities of economic and social growth especially in the Eastern parts of Slovakia. The policy of promoting the EU integration process of Ukraine is a part of the policy of balancing regional development disparity within Slovakia. To question this support – which the former Prime Minister R. Fico *de facto* did – is to renounce a national interest of Slovakia, which should be avoided by all governments. In this context, the approach of the current government differs significantly to that of the former. In other words, Slovak–Ukrainian relations were revitalized in the latter half of 2010.

The Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda visited the Transcarpathian region on August 27, 2010. During the first official visit to this region, M. Dzurinda met with Governor Oleksandr Ledyda in Uzhgorod and visited a Slovak school. The visit was aimed at strengthening cross-border cooperation between the Prešov and Košice self-governing regions and the Transcarpathian region inhabited by a significant Slovak community. In his talks with local representatives, M. Dzurinda supported the integration ambitions of Ukraine. In his view, a prospering Ukraine is also a guarantor of growth for Eastern Slovakia. That is why Slovakia is willing to assist Ukraine in this process.⁶

The policy of promoting the EU integration process of Ukraine is a part of the policy of balancing regional development disparity within Slovakia. To question this support is to renounce a national interest of Slovakia.

The Minister of Economy Vasyl Tsushko who also acts (on behalf of Ukraine) as the Chairman of the Intergovernmental commission on trade and economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation between the Slovak Republic and Ukraine, visited Slovakia in September 2010. The meeting took place alongside the 10th meeting of the Bilateral commission on national minorities, education and culture on September 27–28, 2010. The 8th meeting of the Intergovernmental commission on cross-border cooperation took place at the beginning of October in Uzhgorod. Consultations were held between the foreign ministries' state secretaries, Milan Ježovica and Pavlo Klimkin, on October 29, 2010 during the European Border Dialogues conference focused

⁵ *Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca. Programové vyhlásenie vlády Slovenskej republiky na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014.* Bratislava: Government of the Slovak Republic, August 2010, p. 51. English version of the part on Foreign policy of the *Civic responsibility and Co-operation. Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the period of 2010 – 2014* is available online at: [http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_2EA988041768CA80C1257648004A7F62_EN/\\$File/PVV_2010_eng.pdf](http://www.foreign.gov.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_2EA988041768CA80C1257648004A7F62_EN/$File/PVV_2010_eng.pdf).

⁶ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, August 27, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on February 4, 2011).

on cross-border cooperation development. Both state secretaries also consulted on December 8–9, 2010 during the visit of M. Ježovica to Kiev, where he held talks with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister K. Gryshchenko.⁷

Bilateral relations reached the peak with the official visit of the Slovakia's President to Ukraine on October 5–8, 2010. Besides negotiations with his Ukrainian counterpart, the President held talks with the Speaker of the Parliament V. Lytvyn, and the Foreign Minister K. Gryshchenko. In Kiev, both Presidents opened the Slovak–Ukrainian economic forum. They confirmed the interest of both countries in developing good neighborhood relations and cooperation in the field of Ukraine's European integration. An Intergovernmental agreement on the abolition of consular fees was signed during the visit. State secretary, M. Ježovica, who accompanied the President on the visit, stated that Slovakia supports and will continue to support the active dialogue and liberalization process of the visa regime with Ukraine; including the mid-term goal of cancelling current visa fees and subsequently achieving a visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine. The Agreement on the abolition of fees on Slovak national visas for Ukrainian citizens is a part of the process of simplifying and facilitating the entry of Ukrainian citizens into Slovakia, while upholding existing Schengen rules. The Ukrainian President accepted the invitation for an official visit to Slovakia in 2011 from the Slovak President.⁸

On December 8, 2010 the state secretaries, M. Ježovica and P. Klimkin, officially opened the first meeting of the National convention on the EU in Ukraine. The project is implemented by the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (RC SFPA) in cooperation with the National Institute for Strategic Studies and the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research. The project, financed by SlovakAid, aims at supporting the institutional capacities building for the process of harmonization of EU norms and legislation, which Ukraine agreed to meet within the EaP framework, as well as for the negotiation process of the Association agreement. Within the National convention, four working groups were established (political issues, trade liberalization, justice, and regional development). Each working group is headed by two co-chairmen – one nominated by the state administration, the other elected by representatives of non-governmental or business institutions. Membership in working groups is open to everybody who is interested in the given sectoral agenda in EU–Ukraine relations. Working groups prepare recommendations for the Government of Ukraine on specific issues being on the top of the agenda of the actual decision-making process. Slovak experts participate in the meetings of working groups in order to inform the Ukrainian partners on Slovakia's experience on dealing with similar matters during her accession process to the EU as well as

⁷ For information on bilateral contacts throughout 2010 see the web page of the Ukrainian Embassy in Slovakia: <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/slovakia/ua/2538.htm> (accessed on February 6, 2011).

⁸ See "Prezident SR Ivan Gašparovič rokoval so svojím ukrajinským partnerom," Press department of the Office of President, October 6, 2010. Available online: http://www.prezident.sk/?rok-2010&news_id=12103 (accessed on February 4, 2011). See also *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, October 7, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on February 4, 2011).

informing them on the state and development in the given agenda with the today EU.⁹ The project is a direct expression of Slovakia's support for Ukraine's European integration. Furthermore, Slovakia's Embassy in Kiev has been the NATO Contact Point Embassy in Ukraine for the fourth consecutive year.¹⁰

After Russia, Ukraine is Slovakia's second largest trade partner among the post-soviet republics. In 2010, the trade turnover reached 814 million euro, which is an increase of approximately 300 million euro in comparison with 2009 (541 million euro).¹¹ The successful conclusion of negotiations between the EU and Ukraine on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which will become a part of the Association agreement, is in Slovakia's national interest. Responsible foreign policy makers should keep that in mind.

MOLDOVA

2010 marked a breakthrough year for bilateral relations with Moldova as this country was not a part of Slovakia's foreign policy priorities in the previous periods. There were several reasons for this. First of all, Moldova is not an immediate neighbor of the Slovak Republic, our bilateral trade is negligible,¹² and most of all there was no relevant common agenda which would encourage cooperation between both states. The situation changed after the 2009 parliamentary elections in Moldova, which ended the almost decade-long rule of the Communist Party of Moldova and gave power to the Alliance for European Integration (Liberal Democratic Party, Liberal Party, Democratic Party, and Our Moldova Alliance). EU membership became a priority for Moldova.

In February 2010 the Foreign Minister, Iurie Leancă, paid a visit to Slovakia. After meeting his Moldovan counterpart, Slovak Foreign Minister M. Lajčák, stated: "We see the visit of Minister Leancă as the beginning of a qualitatively new dialogue through which we hope to offer Moldova our assistance in multiple forms." Moldova can also benefit from Slovakia's experience and expertise in fulfilling EaP goals. Minister Leancă referred to the Slovak Republic as a friendly country, noting how he appreciates Slovakia's willingness to help and share its experience from the reform and integration process.¹³

Success story of Slovakia that was able to conclude the process of its EU integration quickly and successfully became an inspiration for the new Moldovan Government.

⁹ National convention on the EU in Ukraine project has its own website: <http://www.euconvention.org.ua/>.

¹⁰ "Správa o plnení úloh zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky v roku 2010," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 2011, pp. 2–3.

¹¹ "Zahraničný obchod SR za rok 2010 (a rok 2009)," Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic, 2011.

¹² Ibid; In 2009, the trade turnover with Moldova reached 28 million euro (export: 19 mil. euro, import to Slovakia: 9 mil. euro).

¹³ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR. February, 9 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 13, 2011).

M. Lajčák paid his visit to Moldova in May 2010. During his visit to Chisinau he also contributed with 100,000 euro, provided by the Slovak Government as development assistance, to the modernization of Moldova's public-service television station Tele Radio Moldova. "We support the integration goals and reforms of Moldova and we are prepared to assist you in their fulfillment," said M. Lajčák before signing the Joint declaration on cooperation in the area of European integration, signed also by his Moldovan counterpart. During the visit, M. Lajčák was received by the Prime Minister and the then acting President of Moldova Vlad Filat, with whom he signed an Intergovernmental agreement on development cooperation. With the Deputy Minister of the Economy Sergiu Ciobanu, M. Lajčák opened the Slovak–Moldovan economic forum. 21 Slovak entrepreneurs and SARIO representatives, who accompanied the Minister, took part in the forum. A joint seminar of Slovak and Moldovan non-governmental organizations also took place and was aimed at identifying the fields of possible transition of know-how and experience of Slovakia.¹⁴

The government change after the Slovak parliamentary elections in June 2010 did not change the mutual relations and undergoing cooperation in the area of European integration, quite on the contrary. The new Foreign Minister, M. Dzurinda, held his first talks with his Moldovan partner, I. Leancă, in Bratislava in September 2009, during the GLOBSEC 2010 conference. M. Dzurinda assured his counterpart that Slovakia supports the European integration of Moldova and that Moldova remains a target country of Slovakia's ODA. According to M. Dzurinda, Moldova is a key country of the EaP program, and the political will displayed by the Government of Moldova in fulfilling EaP goals sets an example for other countries involved in this initiative.¹⁵

On September 30, 2010 State Secretary M. Ježovica participated in an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers (Friends of Moldova group) with the top Moldovan representatives in Chisinau. In his speech, he commended the steps taken by Moldova toward its approximation to the EU under the leadership of the Alliance for European Integration. He emphasized Slovakia's support of Moldova on its path and expressed his confidence that the upcoming parliamentary elections (taking place on November 28, 2010) would confirm Moldova's European future. During his visit, M. Ježovica held talks with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova, Andrei Popov, and representatives of the NGO sector.¹⁶ In return, A. Popov visited Slovakia on October 25, 2010. Both state secretaries delivered their speeches at the international conference Strategic Framework for the EU Eastern Policy, organized in Bratislava by the RC SFPA.¹⁷

¹⁴ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, May 7, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 13, 2011).

¹⁵ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, September 14, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 13, 2011).

¹⁶ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, October 1, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 13, 2011).

¹⁷ For information on the conference see: <http://www.sfpa.sk/sk/podujatia/odborne-podujatia/983?rok=2010>.

The two-day working visit of M. Dzurinda paid on November 9–10, 2010 represented the final bilateral contact in 2010. The visit was aimed at supporting Moldova's European path, prior to the parliamentary elections on November 28, 2010, and further developing of the bilateral dialogue. M. Dzurinda held talks with Prime Minister V. Filat, acting President Mikhail Ghimpu, and acting Foreign Minister Natalia Gherman. He also met the students and teaching staff of Moldova State University. He visited the joint visa center at the Hungarian Embassy – created on the basis of the interministerial agreement between the Slovak and Hungarian foreign ministries on representation in visa affairs – as Slovakia does not have its own embassy in Moldova. As of November 1, 2010, Moldovan citizens can thus acquire Slovak visas at the Hungarian Embassy in Chisinau.¹⁸

During his visit to Chisinau, M. Dzurinda and his counterpart N. Gherman officially opened the National convention on the EU in Moldova. In his speech, M. Dzurinda pointed out that Moldova has all the predispositions to become a successful EaP country, as well as an example to other countries within the EaP program. Once again, he also confirmed that Slovakia will serve as Moldova's advocate in EU institutions and offer Moldova its assistance in the European integration process through development assistance. The National convention on the EU, financed by SlovakAid, is one of the examples of such assistance.¹⁹

The project is implemented by the RC SFPFA in cooperation with a consortium of Moldovan NGOs: Institute for Development and Social Initiative (IDIS-Viitorul), Foreign Policy Association (APE), and Expert Grup. Three permanent working groups have been established. They hold regular meetings and cover all key issues in the fulfillment of Moldova's EaP commitments. At the same time, they are to prepare Moldova for negotiations on the Association agreement with the EU and are focused on the visa dialogue with the EU, agriculture and regional development, trade – movement of capital and services, trade competition rules, etc. The project is an example of Slovakia's political promise to assist Moldova in the process of European integration.²⁰

Not only were the political positions of AEI parties confirmed in the Moldovan parliamentary elections of November 28, 2010, they were even strengthened.²¹ The Government of V. Filat continues its reform efforts in the attempt to bring Moldova even closer to the EU. The harmonization of legislation with European standards is considered a part of the country's complex modernization. In other words, there is enough political space for further development in Slovak–Moldovan cooperation successfully launched in 2010.

¹⁸ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, November 9, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 13, 2011).

¹⁹ *Ibid*; see also *Správa o plnení úloh zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky v roku 2010*, op. cit., pp. 8.

²⁰ For more information on the project see the project web page at www.conventia.md.

²¹ Results of the Moldovan parliamentary elections are accessible on the web page e-democracy.md: <http://www.e-democracy.md/en/elections> (accessed on March 1, 2011).

BELARUS

President Alexander Lukashenko's decision to free political prisoners in 2008 raised hope for the improvement of relations between the EU and Belarus. As a consequence the EU decided to invite Belarus into the EaP program. This was an extraordinary step on the part of the EU, which froze relations with Belarus in 1997 as a response to the authoritarian style of government and restrictions on the political and civil rights of its citizens. The decision to invite Belarus into the EaP, however, was motivated by geopolitical reasons – in the context of the Russia–Georgia war in August 2008 and ongoing disputes between Belarus and Russia in energy issues – rather than by a change of Lukashenko's regime. There

The Slovak policy toward Belarus is linked to that of the EU. Thus, the government change in mid-2010 in Slovakia did not bring the significant change in the approach of Slovakia towards Belarus.

was a hope that Belarus would be forced to democratize and meet EU demands due to tense and worsening relations with Russia.²² However, events following the December 2010 presidential elections in Belarus proved this decision was premature and incorrect.

There were no official political contacts between Slovakia and Belarus in 2010. The Slovak policy toward Belarus is linked to that of the EU.

Thus, the government change in mid-2010 in Slovakia did not bring the significant change in the approach of Slovakia towards Belarus. Slovakia's policy toward Belarus has two levels: EU institutions and the support of civil society. Slovak diplomacy, under the leadership of M. Lajčák in the first half and M. Dzurinda in the second half of 2010 – up to the presidential elections in Belarus on December 19, 2010 – worked within the shared expectation among the EU member states and institutions that Belarus would slowly start progressive democratization changes after being invited to the EaP.²³

The Ministry sent six short-term observers into the OSCE/ODIHR observer mission monitoring Belarus presidential elections.²⁴ On December 20, 2010 the OSCE/ODIHR observer mission declared the elections did not meet international criteria for free and impartial elections.²⁵ On the same day, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement express-

²² See for example S. Ananicz, "The Belarusian challenge and the EU's response," *EaPCommunity*, January 14, 2011. Available online: <http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/debate/belarusian-challenge-and-eu-s-response> (accessed on March 1, 2011).

²³ See for example *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, May 24, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 1, 2011). Information on the informal meeting of Minister M. Lajčák with the foreign ministers of EU member states on the EaP, in the Polish town of Sopoty. At the meeting, the Minister emphasized that the EaP will be the priority for Slovakia's V4 Presidency (July 2010–June 2011). Under the leadership of M. Dzurinda, Slovak diplomacy did not alter this priority, on the contrary, it was implemented successfully, although the main activities took place in the first half of 2011, i.e. in the period beyond the scope of the assessed year of 2010.

²⁴ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, May 24, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 1, 2011).

²⁵ See the final report in "Republic of Belarus. Presidential election 19 December 2010. OSCE/ODIHR

ing its concern over the Belarus presidential elections due to numerous violations of international standards, condemning the use of force against the citizens of Belarus who protested against the manipulation of election results on the streets of Minsk on December 19, 2010, as well as expressing its particular concern over the cases of serious violence and politically motivated arrests of the opposition candidates for President of the Republic of Belarus Uladzimir Neklyajev, Andrei Sannikov, Vital Rymashevsky, Mikalay Statkievich and Ryhor Kastusyov. At the same time, the MFA also called for the immediate release of detainees and investigation of the use of violence against journalists and participants in the protest.²⁶ At the beginning of 2011 the Ministry issued another statement formulating the axioms of Slovakia's policy toward Belarus:

The recent steps by the leaders of Belarus are in conflict with the values of democracy, the rule of law and protection of fundamental freedoms, including that of expression. The Slovak Republic shall support the use of all tools by the European Union, including the renewal of sanctions as part of the EU policy that responds to the decision by the supreme leaders of Belarus. The cooperation with civil society institutions shall remain one of the top priorities of the Slovak foreign policy in relation to Belarus.²⁷

Slovak diplomacy, under the leadership of M. Dzurinda, acted as one of the main proponents of expanding EU sanctions on the Lukashenko regime, i.e. beside the visa restrictions imposed on top representatives of the Belarus regime, the imposition of targeted trade sanctions limiting the regime's income, especially from oil exports to EU markets.²⁸

Belarus is one of the project countries of SlovakAid. A significant part of the projects focuses on capacity building of civil society and NGOs. The Pontis Foundation has been active in Belarus since 2001. In February 2010 Pontis launched the project Cooperation for the community: building cross-sector cooperation in Belarus based on the Slovak experience in cooperation with the World Association of Belarusians – Batskauschyna. The main aim of this project is to contribute to the long-term strengthening of the sustainability of Belarusian NGOs by creating partnerships with the entrepreneurial sector in the country.²⁹

election observation mission final report," OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Available online: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/75713> (accessed on March 1, 2011).

²⁶ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, December 20, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 1, 2011).

²⁷ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, January 5, 2011. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on March 1, 2011).

²⁸ See interview with the Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda in the daily *Pravda*: "Dzurinda podporuje sankcie," *Pravda*, April 3, 2011. Available online: http://spravy.pravda.sk/dzurinda-podporuje-sankcie-df4/sk_svet.asp?c=A110403_102412_sk_svet_p58 (accessed on April 3, 2011).

²⁹ The list of activities and projects of the Pontis Foundation implemented in cooperation with Belarusian partners, including the aforementioned project launched in 2010, is available on the Pontis web page at: <http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/bielorusko>.

Despite frozen political contacts, Belarus remains the second largest trade partner of Slovakia among EaP countries (after Ukraine). In 2010, the annual trade turnover reached 131 million euro (81.2 export and 49.7 import to Slovakia) while exhibiting a growing tendency – in 2009 the turnover was 126 million euro.³⁰

The future development of Slovak–Belarus relations depends on the character of EU–Belarus relations. The key question is: how long will the Lukashenko regime be able to maintain its power in Belarus? The Belarus regime squandered its chance to improve relations with the EU prior to the presidential elections in December 2010. The probability of good relations with the EU after the elections is absolutely minimal.

SOUTH CAUCASUS

In comparison to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus the countries of the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) have long remained in the shadows of Slovakia's foreign policy. Slovakia has no immediate interests in the South Caucasus region and the volume of foreign trade with the three countries in this region combined does not amount to one tenth of the trade with Ukraine. Slovakia still lacks agreements on the avoidance of double taxation and the protection of investments with these countries. On the other hand, the South Caucasus are a part of the EaP and at least two of them – Azerbaijan and Georgia – are of strategic importance to the construction of the South energy corridor allowing for the transit of oil and natural gas from the Caspian Sea region to the EU and to Central Europe. The transit of Azerbaijan oil to Central Europe is also increasing in significance in the context of the reduction or anticipated cessation of Russian oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline around 2014. The Nabucco pipeline, with its final station in the Austrian natural gas hub Baumgarten, should grant Slovakia access to supplies of natural gas from Central Asia and the Middle East.³¹ In other words, Slovakia has long-term interests in the South Caucasus region most of all related to strengthening its energy security through access to other sources of hydrocarbon supply.

The visit of M. Lajčák in March 2010 marked the historically first official visit of the Foreign Minister to the South Caucasus and attempted to bring changes into bilateral relations. Throughout March 14–19, 2010 the Minister visited Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. He was accompanied with a group of 14 Slovak entrepreneurs, who expressed their interest in cooperation with regional partners. Bilateral economic forums were held during the visits of Baku, Tbilisi, and Yerevan. Beside negotiations with counterparts, M. Lajčák was also received by the Presidents of all three countries.³² The negotiations

³⁰ "Zahraničný obchod SR za rok 2010 (a rok 2009)," op. cit.

³¹ The reverse flow of natural gas from Baumgarten to Slovakia is operational since October 24, 2010. See "V Baumgartene sa skončili práce umožňujúce reverzný tok plynu do SR," *TASR*, October 24, 2010.

³² *Aktuálne*, Press releases of the MFA SR, March 15, 2010, March 17, 2010, March 18, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on April 3, 2011).

focused mainly on Slovakia's cooperation with the countries in the EaP, the construction of the South energy corridor, and the development of bilateral economic cooperation.

In Azerbaijan, the Minister presented his counterpart Elmar Mammadyarov with an offer for cooperation on the EaP agenda, especially in the area of harmonization with EU legislation and Slovakia's experience from its transition and EU integration process. Slovakia already participates on one specific project of energy regulation in Azerbaijan. The Regulatory Office for Network Industries of the Slovak Republic (URSO) assists the Regulatory Office for Energy of Azerbaijan in harmonizing domestic legislation with the EU norms. Because Slovakia has a relatively fresh experience of implementing three EU legislative packages in the area of natural gas and energy trade regulation, it attempts to promote similar activities not only in Azerbaijan but also in other countries in the region. That is why the Chairman of URSO, Jozef Holjenčík, accompanied the Minister on his visit to the South Caucasus.³³ The realization of the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project was the main agenda of negotiations between M. Lajčák and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev. The President confirmed that Azerbaijan is ready to supply natural gas to European consumers through Nabucco when European consumers are prepared. With President Aliyev and Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, M. Lajčák signed an Agreement on the future bilateral agreements on the support and protection of investments and the avoidance of double taxation with the goal of supporting bilateral trade development.³⁴

The Minister's visit to the South Caucasus was a stimulating initiative. Unfortunately, it was not followed by further official contacts throughout the rest of 2010.

The drafting of such bilateral agreements was also the subject of the Minister's visit to Georgia. Besides negotiations with his counterpart Grigol Vashadze the Minister held talks with the President Mikheil Saakashvili, Speaker of the Parliament David Bakradze, and the Deputy Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze. The Georgian side appreciated Slovakia's clear positions on the issue of Georgia's territorial integrity after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. Due to Georgia's ambitions of becoming a member of NATO, our Georgian partners welcomed Slovakia's support of NATO's "open door policy." M. Lajčák also presented G. Vashadze with Slovakia's offer of assistance in the area of transformation and harmonization with the European legislation within the EaP program. Georgia sees the construction and operation of hydroelectric power plants – with which Slovakia has excellent experience and which Georgia would like to focus on – as the most perspective area for the development of economic cooperation.³⁵

During his visit to Georgia M. Lajčák, accompanied by the Minister for refugees Koba Subeliani, visited the Tserovani camp for displaced persons where SlovakAid

³³ *Aktuálne*, Press releases of the MFA SR, March 11, 2010, March 15, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on April 3, 2011).

³⁴ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, March 15, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on April 3, 2011).

³⁵ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, March 17, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on February 3, 2011).

is sponsoring the teaching of English language and computer skills to refugees from South Ossetia.

Cooperation within the EaP was the main subject of negotiation with Armenian representatives – the Foreign Minister, Eduard Nalbandyan, President, Serzh Sargsyan, and Prime Minister, Tigran Sargsyan. In Armenia, the Minister also presented the offer of Slovakia's assistance in the fulfillment of EaP goals in legislation harmonization and the transfer of experience know-how from the EU integration process. The foreign ministers signed an Intergovernmental agreement on aviation services and a memorandum between the ministries of foreign affairs on cooperation in the area of European integration. Both parties agreed to prepare bilateral agreements on the support and protection of investments and the avoidance of double taxation.³⁶

The Minister's visit to the South Caucasus was a stimulating initiative. Unfortunately, it was not followed by further official contacts throughout the rest of 2010. The bilateral investment and trade agreements with the South Caucasus have not been signed yet. The volume of foreign trade with the three countries remained practically unchanged in 2010 and continues to represent only a negligible amount in the overall foreign trade of Slovakia (Azerbaijan 17,8, Georgia 7,8, and Armenia 4,6 million euro).³⁷ In contrast to Ukraine and Moldova, the South Caucasus – with the exception of Georgia – have so far only expressed minor interest in Slovakia's assistance with EaP agenda and the development of relations with the EU. Furthermore, Georgia is the only one of the three South Caucasus which ranks as a priority country of ODA SR.³⁸ In spite of the efforts of Slovak diplomacy to start a new chapter in Slovakia's relations with the South Caucasus in 2010, so far no significant changes have been made.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Unlike relations with EaP countries, where Slovakia's policy has maintained its continuity between the governments of R. Fico and I. Radičová (with some exceptions in the case of Ukraine), relations with Russia were subject to change in 2010. The new government adopted significantly different positions on key issues in Slovak–Russian relations than those of R. Fico – who was one of the few NATO and EU statesmen to publicly support Russia's positions on the deployment of US ballistic missile defense elements (ABM) in the Czech Republic and Poland. In the very sensitive issue of Russia's dispute with Ukraine in January 2009, the former Prime Minister fully adopted Russia's interpretation and labeled Ukraine as the cause of the crisis.³⁹ Slovakia's opposition, forming the Government after June 2010 elections, adopted different posi-

³⁶ *Aktuálne*, Press release of the MFA SR, March 18, 2010. Available online: www.mzv.sk (accessed on February 3, 2011).

³⁷ "Zahraničný obchod SR za rok 2010 (a rok 2009)," op. cit.

³⁸ See "Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci SR na rok 2010" and "Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky na rok 2011." Available online: www.slovakaid.sk (accessed on February 3, 2011).

³⁹ See A. Duleba, op. cit.

tions on the ABM issue and the natural gas crisis of January 2009⁴⁰ as well as changed Slovakia's official standpoint on the construction of a wide-gauge railway track from Košice to Bratislava and Vienna – the previous government's preferred project of bilateral cooperation with Russia.

The official two-day visit of Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, to Bratislava on April 6–7, 2010 marked the main event of official bilateral contacts. It was the third official visit of the Russian President to Slovakia.

He was accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, Presidential Aide Sergei Prikhodko, Minister of Justice Alexander Kononov, and Minister of Energy Sergei Shmatko. The President was received by the highest constitutional representatives of the Slovak Republic – President I. Gašparovič, Speaker of the Parliament P. Paška, and Prime Minister R. Fico. Besides talks with top Slovak representatives,

D. Medvedev also took part in the ceremonial event marking the 65th anniversary of Bratislava's liberation at Slavín. The Presidents addressed the assembly in speeches and presented state decorations to Russian (Order of the White Double Cross 2nd class) and Slovak (Order of Friendship) veterans.⁴¹ The Presidents signed a joint declaration on the 65th anniversary commemorating the end of World War II and friendly Slovak–Russian relations.⁴²

Eight new bilateral intergovernmental and trade agreements were concluded in the presence of both Presidents.⁴³ The visit was a culmination of the diplomatic efforts

Unlike relations with EaP countries, where Slovakia's policy has maintained its continuity between the governments of R. Fico and I. Radičová, relations with Russia were subject to change in 2010.

⁴⁰ See interview of SDKU expert on foreign policy, M. Ježovica, with Lucia Nicholson before the parliamentary elections in February 2007: "Ježovica, M.: Premiér riskuje stratu partnerov v Európe," *Aktuálne.sk*, February 20, 2007. Available online: <http://aktualne.centrum.sk/clanek.phtml?id=228345> (accessed on February 3, 2011).

⁴¹ "Oficiálny vizit v Slovenskej Republike," April 6–7, 2010. Available online: <http://news.kremlin.ru/visits/7383> (accessed on February 3, 2011).

⁴² "Prezident Ruskej federácie Dmitrij Medvedev na oficiálnej návšteve Slovenskej republiky," Press department, Office of the President of Slovakia, April 6, 2010. Available online: http://www.prezident.sk/?spravy-tlacoveho-oddelenia&news_id=10998 (accessed on February 3, 2011).

⁴³ *Ibid*; agreements adopted: Agreement on the mutual safeguarding of intellectual property rights, utilized and acquired in the process of bilateral military-technology cooperation; Agreement between the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Federal Service of the Russian Federation for Narcotics Traffic Control on Cooperation in combating illicit trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, psychotropic Substances and their Precursors; Intergovernmental Implementing Protocol on the Agreement between the European Community and the Russian Federation on readmission from May 26, 2006; Memorandum of Understanding on Establishing the Joint Slovak–Russian Scientific Research Venture Cyclotron Centre of the SR; Agreement between Tatravagónka, Inc., and Russian Railway, Inc., on cooperation in science and technology (in the Slovak–Russian company Engineering centre); Agreement between Tatravagónka, Inc., and Russian Railway, Inc., on the establishment and operation of a joint Slovak–Russian company for the design and manufacture of freight wagons; Agreement between Tatravagónka, Inc., and TMH Vagonstroj holding on the establishment of a joint venture for the production of flat bogies wagons; Trade contract between Slovenské elektrárne, Inc., and TVEL, Inc., on the supply of nuclear fuel for the Mochovce nuclear

of R. Fico's government striving for good and pragmatic economic relations between Slovakia and Russia.

During the visit, the Office of the Government organized a presentation of the construction project of the wide-gauge railway track from Košice to Bratislava and Vienna. The project was presented by the President of Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin. According to Yakunin 505 kilometers of wide-gauge track should lead through Slovakia and 60 kilometers through Austria. Construction should begin in 2013 and last until 2015. Commercial operation of freight transport on the track should commence in 2016. If the wide-gauge track was constructed, by 2025 the estimated volume of freight transport between Košice and Bratislava could reach 23,7 million tons and 18,5 million tons between Bratislava and Vienna. According to Russian Railways, the business plan and project documentation should be processed in 2011 to 2013. The estimated price of extending the wide-gauge railway track from Košice to Bratislava and Vienna is 4,7 billion euro.⁴⁴ The construction project of the wide-gauge railway track became the key project of Slovak–Russian relations during the government of R. Fico.

The new Government declared in its manifesto that it does not support the construction of wide-gauge railway track projects on Slovak territory.⁴⁵ In November 2010, Prime Minister I. Radičová gave a clear and concise answer to a journalist's question, asking whether a wide-gauge railway track will be constructed across Slovakia: "No. Transshipment will continue in Čierna nad Tisou."⁴⁶ The Government Manifesto from August 2010 reads:

The Government has a vested interest in good political, economic and cultural relations with Russia. The depth of these relations will be determined by the values to which it adheres and by the clearly defined interests of Slovakia. In the bilateral field, it will pursue the pragmatic objective of developing mutually beneficial economic relations, the deepening of cultural relations and learning about one another. Slovakia has a natural interest in a modern, plural and democratic Russia respecting the freedom of individuals, and will support Russia on this road both bilaterally and within the EU, NATO and in other international organizations. It will support strong and transparent relations between the EU and Russia (including in the energy field), and will endorse the membership of Russia in the World Trade Organization (WTO).⁴⁷

power plant blocks 3 and 4; Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Natural Gas Industry.

⁴⁴ "Širokorozchodná železnica môže byť ešte drahšia," *SITA*, April 7, 2010.

⁴⁵ "Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca," *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁴⁶ "Radičová sklamala Rusov. Širokorozchodná nebude," *ČTK*, November 25, 2010. Further negotiations on the construction project of the wide-gauge railway track with the Russian side were held by the Deputy Prime Minister for Transportation, Ján Figel', at the beginning of 2011.

⁴⁷ "Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca," *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53.

In relation to the visit of the Russian President to Slovakia in April 2010, the 2010 Slovak Foreign Policy Report reads: The visit of the Russian President was met with a critical public response, because issues that are historically important to Slovakia were not addressed.⁴⁸ Even though the report does not specifically list the historical events, part of the Slovak public expected a mention of the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact armies in 1968 in the Presidents' assessments of post-war history, during the commemoration of Bratislava's liberation in April 2010.⁴⁹

The first talks between the Foreign Minister, M. Dzurinda, and his Russian counterpart took place on September 21, 2010 during the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly in New York. According to information provided by the Russian Foreign Ministry, the ministers discussed bilateral cooperation issues in the context of the implementation of agreements concluded during the visit of President D. Medvedev to Slovakia in April 2010 and prospects for collaboration in multilateral formats.⁵⁰ The Slovak Ministry offered humanitarian assistance, in the form of medical and wellness trips for children from socially underprivileged Russian families, after the catastrophic wildfires in Russia.⁵¹

The policy shift of the new Government in relation to Russia had no effect on mutual foreign trade. On the contrary, in 2010 the trade turnover was 1 billion larger (6 billion euro) than in 2009 (4,8 billion euro).⁵² However, the fact remains that Russia is attempting to reduce the transit of natural gas through Slovakia's territory, through the construction of new transit pipelines Nord Stream and South Stream, which is against the long-term interests of the Slovak Republic. Our interests are clearly heading in different directions in this issue. At the same time, the natural gas crisis of January 2009 showed that even the former Prime Minister's support of Russia's positions in international security issues could not prevent the cessation of natural gas supply to the Slovak Republic and damage to Slovakia's economic interests. The new Government made it clear it will not deal with Russia on political and security issues outside of NATO and the EU. Furthermore, the government's negative position on the construction of a wide-gauge railway track through the Slovak Republic means that Slovak-Russian relations are losing a common agenda. Our relations lack any "joint project," not only

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⁴⁸ "Správa o plnení úloh zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky v roku 2010," op. cit., p. 8.

⁴⁹ See the full text of the Joint statement of Presidents of the SR, Ivan Gašparovič, and Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, on the end of World War II, adopted in Bratislava in April 2010, in the daily report materials *Pravda*: "Medvedev a Gašparovič spomínali na rok 1945, na august 1968 zabudli," *Pravda*, April 7, 2010.

⁵⁰ "O vstreche Ministra inostrannych del Rossijskoi S.V. Lavrova s Ministrom inostrannych del Slovakii M. Dzurindoi," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, September 22, 2010. Available online: <http://www.mid.ru/bdcomp/ns-reuro.nsf/348bd0da1d5a7185432569e700419c7a/432569d80022027ec32577a6002cfa0?OpenDocument> (accessed on April 16, 2011).

⁵¹ "Správa o plnení úloh zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky v roku 2010," op. cit., p. 10.

⁵² "Zahranický obchod SR za rok 2010 (a rok 2009)," op. cit.

the wide-gauge railway track as a specific project, which would represent a meaningful, constructive, and developing agenda for either or both sides. In the past, this role was fulfilled by the strategic importance of cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas transit. However, due to decisions adopted by Russia, this is slowly becoming a historical niche. Slovakia and Russia are gradually losing larger common issues in bilateral relations and it seems this trend is irreversible.

CONCLUSION

In the case of EaP, Slovakia's foreign policy has maintained its continuity. This is especially true in the case of Moldova, which appeared more significantly on the map of Slovakia's foreign policy in the beginning of 2010. With M. Dzurinda, Slovak diplomacy fully developed the cooperation with Moldova in the Eastern Partnership agenda launched by the previous Minister M. Lajčák.

The policy toward Ukraine underwent a significant change. Only the Government of I. Radičová was finally able to overcome the natural gas crisis syndrome resonating throughout the first half of 2010. From the latter half of 2010, Slovak policy finally became a strategic promotion of Slovakia's long-term interest – the support of Ukraine's European integration without regard to the political affiliations of its current political representation. Any other policy is a resignation of our long-term state interest.

Hopes of positive changes in relations with Belarus were squandered by the events of its presidential elections in December 2010. M. Dzurinda was one of the strongest proponents of targeted trade sanctions against the Lukashenko regime in the EU, with the goal of freeing political prisoners.

The diplomatic activities of Minister M. Lajčák toward the South Caucasus in March 2010 brought neither significant results, nor continued contacts on the level of diplomatic relations throughout the rest of 2010.

Throughout the past year, Slovakia offered all EaP countries, with the understandable exception of Belarus, bilateral assistance in the fulfillment of the EaP program and the development of relations with the EU. The ODA program was adjusted to the country's foreign policy priorities in order to assist the EaP countries and the Western Balkans in their transformation process and in strengthening their ties with the EU. This also enabled the implementation of the National convention on EU projects in Ukraine and Moldova. The Foreign Ministry established a Center for transfer of integration and reform experience which should increase the efficiency in providing Slovak development assistance in the upcoming period.

The fact that the former Minister M. Lajčák was appointed the Managing Director for Russia, Eastern Neighborhood and the Western Balkans in the EU's European External Action Service is one of the interesting events of 2010 in the context of future policies toward our Eastern neighbors.

The development of relations between Slovakia and Russia in 2010 confirmed their gradual lack of a "greater" agenda. Russia does not wish to become a member of the EU; ergo it has no interest in cooperating with Slovakia in the field of European integration. Russia's policy toward the diversification of oil and natural gas supply to the EU, beyond the existing transit routes through Ukraine, means that sooner or later Slovakia will cease to be a strategic partner in Russia's key field of interest – the transit of oil and natural gas to Europe. This development is against the interests of the Slovak Republic; however, Slovakia does not possess the capabilities to change Russia's policy.

The natural gas crisis of January 2009 showed that even the former Prime Minister's support of Russia's positions in international security issues could not prevent the cessation of natural gas supply to the SR.

The construction project of the wide-gauge railway track across Slovakia did not become an overlapping issue which could overcome the diverging interests of Russia and Slovakia in the transit of energy carriers. At the same time however, the fact remains that trade between Slovakia and Russia is immune to political factors and exhibits a growing trend. The year 2010 brought a political sobering up in the relations of Slovakia and Russia as well as a better understanding of their real significance for Slovakia's interests. And that is not bad news for Slovakia's foreign policy.

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THE WESTERN BALKANS – SUCCESSES AND STAGNATION

JÚLIUS LŐRINCZ

The Western Balkans belongs to the long-term regional priorities of Slovakia's foreign policy. Without any doubts, Slovakia has gained a certain degree of authority and respected political positions in this issue, appreciated by our allies in NATO as well as the EU. Throughout 2010, continuity in this respect was obvious both in Slovakia's political and diplomatic activities at the governmental level as well as in the activities of the non-governmental sector.

The Foreign Ministry's 2010 Annual Report emphasizes: "With respect to further EU enlargement, Slovakia was primarily engaged in supporting European prospects of the Western Balkans."¹ It is necessary to note that Slovakia indeed played an active and effective role in this respect. Slovakia's political involvement and diplomatic efforts also contributed to one of the key 2010 events in the Western Balkans – the decision of the European Council, in the format of the General Affairs and External Relations Council, adopted on October 25, 2010, calling upon the European Commission to assess the possibility of accepting Serbia among the candidate countries. Serbia is expected to join the candidate countries by the end of 2011.

Another Western Balkan country – Montenegro – became a candidate for EU membership in December 2010. Slovakia's foreign policy activities also played their role in this process, both in the EU and directly in the political environment of Montenegro. In the case of Montenegro the initiative did originate from the entire V4, but the contribution of Slovakia as the presiding country was rather significant.

¹ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Foreign Policy. Annual Report 2010*, Bratislava: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, 2011, p. 16, Available online: http://www.mzv.sk/sk/cinnost_ministerstva/vyrocn_sprav (accessed on April 27, 2011).

Slovakia also continued to vigorously support efforts toward the earliest possible conclusion of accession negotiations with Croatia. Activities in this direction culminated in April 2011 during the joint visit of the Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, with his Austrian counterpart Michael Spindelegger in Zagreb. In essence, throughout 2010 Slovak diplomacy and non-governmental organizations continued in multilateral and bilateral activities supporting the successful conclusion of Croatia's accession process. These activities included talks between the former State Secretary Oľga Algayerová with her Croatian counterpart, Davor Božinović, on June 1, 2010 in Bratislava or the address and negotiations of State Secretary, Milan Ježovica, in Zagreb on October 15, 2010 during the conference on communication with the EU, organized on the initiative of Slovakia's Foreign Ministry and NGOs. A continuous dialogue was also maintained between the foreign ministers, Mikuláš Dzurinda and his predecessor Miroslav Lajčák with their Croatian counterpart Gordan Jandroković.²

It is well known that Croatia's accession negotiations were successfully concluded during Hungary's presidency in the first half of 2011. This country can therefore become a full-fledged EU member by the mid-2013. This fact is crucial because Croatia will become the first former Yugoslavian country directly engaged in the extensive and destructive mutual military confrontation in the 1990's (of course not taking into consideration Slovenia, which is however not a Western Balkans country and followed a rather different pattern of development) that joins the EU.

Especially in this respect, it is the significant sign of a new era of the EU enlargement into Southeastern Europe. It is perhaps also a form of satisfaction for Slovakia, which has – for many years and with persistence – kept promoting and supporting the integration of Western Balkan countries into the Euro-Atlantic structures and is one of the EU states which are not skeptical toward the enlargement of these organizations to the southeastern part of the European continent.

At this point, it is necessary to mention the considerable personal contribution of the current Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda in Western Balkan affairs. He managed not only to follow very smoothly the activities of his predecessors Miroslav Lajčák, Ján Kubiš and Eduard Kukan, but also his own when he served as Prime Minister between 1998–2006. It is also equally important that in the spirit of continuity Foreign Ministry created a specific program for countries of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership called Center for transfer of integration and reform experience.³

² Further information on these activities is available on the web pages of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak Embassy in the Republic of Croatia: www.mzv.sk and www.mzv.sk/zahreb.

³ The Center for transfer of integration and reform experience (CETIR) was established by the Foreign Ministry within the framework of official development assistance. The aim of the program is to transfer Slovakia's experience from the integration process into European and Euro-Atlantic structures and the implementation of reforms related to transformation processes. In 2011, the program will be primarily designated to experts from the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership countries.

BRATISLAVA'S INITIATIVES

Another initiative of Slovakia, and the Foreign Ministry in particular, which proved to be a success was the meeting and talks between the Visegrad and Balkan foreign ministers in Bratislava in October 2010, held by Slovakia as the presiding V4 country. There was, however, not any "family photo" made due to political reasons as the Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić refused to be on one picture with representative of Kosovo's Foreign Ministry. Nevertheless, this was only a minor detail as both representatives of the Serbian and Kosovo governments were in one negotiation room anyway, which is still not very common. More importantly, it became apparent that Slovakia's position on Kosovo independence, which remains unchanged, does not pose any obstacle for Kosovo's European perspective. The Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda stated that, "the goal is to establish genuinely good relations between Belgrade and Pristina... We support a dialogue and it's time for a dialogue to truly start."⁴

In this respect, Bratislava's challenge practically followed the UN General Assembly Resolution of September 9, 2010 proposed and adopted after Serbia's agreement with the EU, which not only takes into account the opinion of the International Court of Justice, from July 22, 2010 on the issue of Kosovo's declaration of independence, but also welcomes and supports the EU's preparedness to facilitate the dialogue between both sides. It should be noted that almost immediately after the resolution the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, met separately with the Serbian President Boris Tadić and the Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, and was already able to reach an agreement on elements of expert negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina.⁵ Expert negotiations were finally launched after numerous obstacles related to, among other things, parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo and have brought their first results in the form of facilitating the entry and movement of Kosovo citizens into and around Serbia (with their Kosovo personal identification – not passports – as well as driver's licenses and automobile registration) and agreements on the exchange of information between registry offices (copies of registry entries).

The aforementioned informal meeting of the V4 foreign ministers with the representatives of the Western Balkans and the then Belgian EU Presidency as well as the

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⁴ "Dzurinda: Neuznanie Kosova nie je prekážkou na jeho ceste do Európy," *Pravda*, October 22, 2010. Available online: http://spravy.pravda.sk/dzurinda-neuznanie-kosova-nie-je-prekazkou-na-jeho-ceste-do-euro-109/-sk_domace.asp?c=A101022_160135_sk_domace_p58 (accessed on October 22, 2010).

⁵ "Grabež, N.: Što pre početi dijalog Prištine i Beograda," *Danas*, September 21, 2010. Available online: http://www.danas.org/content/taci_eston_tadic_njujork/2163782.html (accessed on September 21, 2010); "Tadić-Eštonova: Dijalog što pre," *B92*, September 23, 2010. Available online: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=09&dd=23&nav_id=460728 (accessed on September 23, 2010).

European Commission was also supplemented by a significant accompanying event. The day before the meeting, the Ministry, along with the non-governmental sector – specifically the Slovak Atlantic Commission – organized an expert conference on the issues of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans.⁶

Slovak NGOs held similar activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. In Bosnia and Herzegovina it was the National Convention on the European Union realized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association with the European Research Center. In Montenegro, the Slovak Atlantic Commission organized a tour of lectures and debates of Slovak experts with Slovak and foreign diplomats focused on increasing public support for the Euro-Atlantic integration of the country. The final phase of this project was opened by the Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda in Podgorica in November 2010. Both projects were financed by SlovakAid.⁷ In April 2010 in Sarajevo, the then Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák also presented “measures aimed at closer coordination of the EU countries in enhancing regional cooperation and the enlargement and reform process.”⁸

It is also worth noting that the Slovak Embassy was opened in Montenegro last year.

WARNING SIGNS OF STAGNATION

Despite the efforts of Slovakia’s diplomacy as well as in the broader sense European and American policy and diplomacy Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Macedonia are not among the Western Balkans “success stories.” Since the parliamentary and presidential elections in October 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina was not able to establish a central government and, therefore, the political developments and relations are of fragile or even destructive character. In the sixteenth year after the war the current situation still maintains a sense of uncertainty and tension. Questions have risen even on its future existence as a unified sovereign state. Obviously, domestic political elites, their orientation, will, and ability to act responsibly in the interest of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the deciding factors, but this country and its fate are also a trial of the effectiveness of European, and thus Slovak as well, foreign policy.

⁶ “Chorvátsko už stojí pred dverami EÚ, chceme aj ďalších,” Slovak Atlantic Commission, October 22, 2010. Available online: <http://www.ata-sac.org/article-88-489-Chorvatsko-uz-stoji-pred-dverami-EU-chceme-aj-dalsich> (accessed on October 22, 2010).

⁷ Further information on the National convention on the EU project in Bosnia and Herzegovina is available at www.eukonvent.ba. Slovak Atlantic Commission projects are accessible at <http://www.ata-sac.org/>.

⁸ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Foreign Policy. Annual Report 2010*, op. cit., p. 18.

Although Macedonia has been an EU candidate country since 2005 the clear stagnation of the integration process is not only the result of unsettled relations with Greece regarding the name of the country itself, it is also a reflection of insufficient activity on the part of domestic political elites in relation to the Union and reforms that must be undertaken in order to achieve compatibility with the EU.

In both cases – the Bosnian and the Macedonian – a higher degree of imagination, initiatives, and creativity on the part of the EU and in this regard also Slovakia would be helpful. This concerns Macedonia with its large Albanian minority, but also Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania where the EU integration processes are marked by stagnation. The Albanian factor is a crucial part of the development in the Western Balkans, confirmed also by the case of Kosovo. This fact is, however, overlooked; and not only in Slovakia. Nevertheless, neglecting this crucial factor can lead to negative consequences for the strengthening of security and stability in the region as well as its peaceful future.

THE OPEN QUESTION OF KOSOVO

Talking about Slovakia's foreign policy in the Western Balkans without addressing the issue of Kosovo is not possible because Slovakia is among the five EU member states (along with Cyprus, Greece, Romania, and Spain) that do not recognize the independence and sovereignty of Kosovo. The Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2010 reads: "October negotiations between Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda and his Serbian counterpart Vuk

Jeremić confirmed Slovakia's position on the issue of recognizing Kosovo's independence and at the same time encouraged Belgrade to seek solutions to improve regional cooperation."⁹ At first glance this statement seems diplomatically clever and constructive especially in its second part, however the question is to what extent the statement was based on reality in its first part and whether this position is maintainable in the long-term and without consequences.

The opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 is already mentioned. Its text from July 22, 2010 includes a key sentence: "General international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence Declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law."¹⁰ The Slovak Foreign Ministry issued a response statement that "The opinions of the International Court of Justice are of an advisory nature and thus are not legally

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See "Advisory opinion of 22 July 2010 - Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo (Request for advisory opinion)," International Court of Justice, July 22, 2010. Available online: <http://www3.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf> (accessed on July 22, 2010); See also B92 reports from July 22, 2010 at www.b92.net.

binding.”¹¹ Eventhough it is true, the MFA did not draw attention to the fact that the decisions and opinions of the ICJ are an important part of international law and bear a significant moral and political impact on it.

The statement of the Ministry also emphasized that “The existing resolution 1244/1999 of the UN Security Council sets the basis of our position on this matter.”¹² But according to the ICJ President Hisashi Owada, “the court cannot accept the argument that resolution 1244/1999 prohibits the declaration of independence by Kosovo” because its aim was to establish a transitional administration without any intention of deciding the final status of Kosovo.¹³

In reality, Slovakia’s problem with Kosovo is not legal, but political. A number of experts point to its domestic dimension as it is perceived by Slovak elites through the prism of potential developments in the position of the Hungarian minority. However, no such parallel can be made historically or politically. If we were to talk of a precedent, the only one would

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rest in the lesson of the Kosovo problem on how not to deal with national minorities, because their unequal rights and their perception from a position of superiority will lead to crises and conflicts.

At present, no one forces Serbia to recognize Kosovo. However, the ability and will to improve regional cooperation and achieve positive results in this direction are a crucial part of the integration process for the EU and Serbia alike. It has to learn to coexist with Kosovo and cooperate with it in the interest of Serbs who have stayed there or will even return there in the future. It is also in the interest of regional security and stability which is another crucial component of Western Balkans integration into the EU. Today, these issues can be openly and rationally discussed in Serbia where they remain a very sensitive topic. Maybe even more openly than in Slovakia.

THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION IS FALLING BEHIND

There is a huge gap behind the Slovak political and diplomatic activities in the Western Balkans. Slovakia is not able to capitalize on its good political and even historical positions in the economic sphere. Even though lately the situation improved, many countries with a similar profile to Slovakia are able to make better use of the regional

¹¹ “Statement of MFA SR about advisory opinion on Kosovo independence,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, July 22, 2010. Available online: [http://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C0B1D004B5A332B2C1257627003301E7_EN&A-L=&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&PAGE_NEWSVIEWMAINJDRK-7X8F93=36&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/\(vw_ByID\)/ID_1E553CB710511E72C125776900283CF8](http://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C0B1D004B5A332B2C1257627003301E7_EN&A-L=&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=EN&PAGE_NEWSVIEWMAINJDRK-7X8F93=36&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/(vw_ByID)/ID_1E553CB710511E72C125776900283CF8) (accessed on July 22, 2011).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ For more information see the web pages www.unmultimedia.org, www.b92.net, www.fonet.rs, www.tanjug.rs – reports from July 22, 2010.

economic potential in the Western Balkan countries. If we take a look at the statistics on trade and foreign investments in Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also Montenegro and Macedonia, Slovakia is lost within these numbers.

If we take a look at, for example, foreign investment in Serbia in 2000–2008 where conclusive and compact data is available, the first five positions are occupied by Austria, Greece, Norway, Germany, and the Netherlands, Slovenia is seventh, Hungary tenth, and Slovakia is seventeenth with an investment worth 67.69 million US dollars. It is worth mentioning that for example Montenegro since its independence in 2006 until 2008 has already invested approximately 300 million dollars.¹⁴

In the long term, Austria has been holding the first position among foreign investors in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with billions of dollars or euros. In the case of Croatia, Hungary maintains its fourth position. In relation to both countries, the statistics put Slovakia somewhere in the category of “other countries.” In terms of foreign trade between the EU27 and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovakia is in the fourteenth position.¹⁵

At the same time, that is not to say that SARIO (Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency), which significantly increased its activities in the past year for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Economy Ministry have not been trying to gather entrepreneurs from Slovakia and partner countries. However, so far they have been unable to break the incomprehensibly faint economic interest of Slovak businesses and companies to invest in this region even in cooperation with other foreign partners. And Western Balkan countries always provide lucrative tax options and a steady hunger for investments in for example energy, construction, tourism, foods, infrastructure, etc. For quite some time now, the SARIO web page has been offering participation in various projects in Croatia, many in the lucrative and attractive tourism and even modern technology fields. There are 16 offers in Montenegro and more in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁶

Croatia recently presented new offers for potential investments and cooperation for example on the reconstruction of the railway track, which is also important for Slovakia, from the port town of Rijeka to the Hungarian border. Many of these projects are related to energy, including the reconstruction and expansion of the large seaside thermal power plant Plomin on the Istrian peninsula.¹⁷

Is the Western Balkans region less attractive for our investments? Why then Austria has invested almost 2.6 billion dollars over eight years in this country alone according

¹⁴ Data from the National Bank of Serbia. Available online: http://www.nbs.rs/export/sites/default/internet/latinica/80/ino_ekonomski_odnosi/platni_bilans/fdi_netno.xls (accessed on February 22, 2011).

¹⁵ “Analiza vanjskotrgovinske razmjene Bosne i Hercegovine za 2010. Godinu,” Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010. Available online: http://www.mvteo.gov.ba/izvjestaji_publikacije/izvjestaji/ANALIZA%20.pdf (accessed on March 5, 2011).

¹⁶ “Zahraničné teritória,” SARIO. Available online: <http://www.sario.sk/index.php?zahrancne-teritoria-2> (accessed on March 5, 2011).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

to data provided by the National Bank of Serbia?¹⁸ What draws them there? Involved Austrian investors say that among other things it is the advantageous geographical position, a qualified work force, and the lowest profit tax in the region. Since 2000, Austria's investments helped to create 20,000 jobs in Serbia.¹⁹

A HELPING HAND

Slovak development assistance and cooperation have traditionally played a crucial role in representing Slovakia in the countries and society of the Western Balkans. In the aforementioned Foreign Ministry 2010 Annual Report, Mikuláš Dzurinda, cited this form of assistance among the key attributes of Slovakia's foreign policy, "The fundamental human values and the feeling of accountability encourage us to place much greater emphasis on development assistance to countries that have found themselves in an emergency situation or that are going through complicated developments."²⁰ Both these characteristics have also been in some shape or form also found in the Western Balkan countries. Similarly to Eastern Partnership countries, development assistance in this region is also designed as an instrument supporting democratic reforms, integration, market economy, and civil society. It is interesting however that in Serbia these projects represent a minority in comparison to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia where they dominate. Serbia was, however, as mentioned in the 2010 Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation (SAIDC) Annual Report, the program country and the largest recipient of Slovak official development assistance worth 1,022,018.85 euro. Projects in other Western Balkan states being the SlovakAid project countries were worth 789,256.25 euro.²¹

Nevertheless, these two numbers cannot offer a realistic picture of the scope and structure of Slovakia's development assistance and cooperation in the Western Balkans due to activities carried out with the support of ODA resources by NGOs such as the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, the Pontis Foundation, and others, as well as various companies across Slovakia.

A more detailed picture of these projects can be found in the list of implemented projects for 2010 in the annex of the mentioned Annual Report. The list includes a char-

¹⁸ Data from the National Bank of Serbia, c.d.

¹⁹ The statement and data on the number of new jobs was provided by the State Secretary of the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development of the Republic of Serbia, Vesna Arsić, in the interview *Europe – the largest investor in Serbia* published in May 2010 on the internet site www.promoney.rs. This data was also used by the site www.vibilia.rs in the report on the Serbian Investment Forum in Vienna in June 2010.

²⁰ *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Foreign Policy. Annual Report 2010*, op. cit., p. 4.

²¹ *Výročná správa Slovenskej agentúry pre medzinárodnú rozvojovú spoluprácu – za rok 2010*, p. 9, table 2. Available online: <http://www.slovakaid.sk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Vyrocnna-Sprava-SAMRS2010.pdf> (accessed on April, 27 2011).

acterization of individual projects along with their entire budget and the approved ODA contribution throughout the full course of the project, not only for one year.

In Serbia's case, the list names 21 projects in the total sum of 3,388,463 euro. These include four projects related to the construction of water pipelines or drinking water distribution, two sewage projects (Hajdučica and Kovačica), as well as projects in ecologic agriculture production, young people in civil society, creating jobs for the handicapped, local municipality enterprises, or sharing experience from Slovakia's integration process with young journalists and analysts. The Vršac project can be considered a paradox – constructing wind power stations which are met with general misunderstanding and rejection in Slovakia.

Second place belongs to Bosnia and Herzegovina where ten projects represent a total sum of 1,606,629 euro. They include the organization of the National convention on the European Union and other projects related to European integration, a project on the social welfare system, projects in the energy market reform according to EU criteria, in creating job opportunities for landmine victims, as well as the construction of a women's center in Srebrenica – one of the hardest hit towns and regions during the 1990s wars.

Three out of the four projects in Macedonia focus on the issue of responsible business and the transfer of Slovakia's know-how into Macedonia's conditions and the fourth and most

expensive project is concerned with waste water management and the delivery of a sewage treatment facility in Nova Sela–Kolasin. Together the projects implemented in Macedonia amounted to a sum of 517,461 euro.

The two Slovak development cooperation projects in Montenegro, in the total amount of 279,192 euro, focus on improving the use of local municipality capacities and improving quality management and environmentally friendly agriculture.

The total sum of all assistance projects in the Western Balkan states, to be more precise four of the former Yugoslavia countries (not including Kosovo or Albania), is 5,791,745 euro. This sum is supplemented by micro grants provided from the competence of Ambassadors. These entail one time financial contributions of up to 5,000 euro for example for the reconstruction of schools, purchase of computers, library equipment, cultural events, and similar. Slovak Ambassadors in the Western Balkans provided their regional partners with 190,080 euro through 29 micro grants in Belgrade, 8 in Sarajevo, 3 in Podgorica, and 3 in Skopje. Together they represent 43 out of the total of 76 of all funded micro grants in the sum of 352,061 euro.

In Slovakia's humble circumstances and the struggle of public finances, it's quite a large sum. In a situation where the majority of all projects consists of relatively small and short-term projects of up to two years, the aim of SAIDC to "evaluate them in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and impact"²² in the future, has to be commended. Close atten-

Development assistance in this region is also designed as an instrument supporting democratic reforms, integration, market economy, and civil society.

²² Ibid, p. 25.

tion must also be paid to the fact that sharing Slovakia's experience from the integration process, transformation, and reforms requires closer cooperation with the recipients. It must be noted that in most cases this requirement was and is being fulfilled.

CONCLUSION

It should be repeated that in 2010 Slovakia's foreign policy in the Western Balkans was not only active but also effective in solving problems and handling tasks related to the stabilization of the region and the creation of its European perspective. Without any doubt, we can say that in relation to the Western Balkans, Slovakia's foreign policy brings an added value to Europe's policy in the attempt to integrate this region into Euro-Atlantic structures and thus contribute to its security, stability, and a better future for this region and the entire continent. This statement remains valid despite the fact that Slovakia does not belong to the European majority concerning the Kosovo issue. The ongoing refusal to recognize Kosovo's independence is in fact falling behind reality and the logic of further developments and limiting Slovakia's maneuvering space.

The situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is often dramatic and even painful in its internal struggle for stability and efforts to join the European integration processes which are so crucial for the country. Most of all it represents a challenge for the local political elites but also for European foreign policy and in turn naturally, Slovakia's as well. Stagnation in multiple areas of the reform and integration processes related to the European perspectives of Macedonia and Albania is also a thorn in the flesh.

Utilizing the possibilities of mutual economic cooperation with Western Balkan countries remains a permanent task for Slovakia in order to bring this area of cooperation closer to Slovakia's successful political and diplomatic activities in the region.

It would be worth exploring what could possibly be done with the fact that, despite extensive relations, the general public has very little knowledge of our respective countries, their history and current events, woes and joys, and the society which lives in them. We need to breach the information barriers, but this is a greater problem most of all concerning the media sphere and the politics within it.

Many events, situations, and positions in the Western Balkans show that local countries are all often dominated by the recent past and stigmatized by prejudices, myths, true and feigned grievances, with the past biased and manipulated by positions which led to hatred, animosity, and inevitably to war and crimes which can never be justified. Crimes committed by those defending themselves were no different from crimes committed by the attackers. Coming to terms with this fact is not easy. Each society in each country has to win this fight with itself. No foreign policy of friends and allies can substitute this process, it can only aid by its straightforwardness, practicality, and openness in cooperation and in the effort to help. Such a policy is one of moral values and inevitably the only truly perspective and pragmatic policy. Our sincere dialogue with partners in the Western Balkans should also be held under these terms.

III.

SLOVAKIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOOLS

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AND SLOVAKIA IN 2010

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The year 2010 was a long-anticipated milestone in the field of official development assistance. The EU donor countries committed themselves to spending the amount worth 0.33 per cent (for EU15) or 0.17 per cent of GDP (for new member states) respectively on development cooperation by 2010. Not only the financial crisis but also the long-criticized unwillingness to increase the development assistance budget in the times of enormous economic growth has led Slovakia into an embarrassing position, as roughly a half of the minimum agreed GDP percentage is spent on development assistance. Unfortunately, it is still true that instead of discussing meaningful increase and the capacity building matters, Slovakia is forced to reflect on the possible ways of maintaining at least the attained level from previous years. The fact that the agreed level has not been attained by the majority of EU countries could not pose any consolation.

The innovations of last year could, in the future, lead to the improvement of the system as well as the quality of the assistance. OECD's special peer review of the Slovak development cooperation, signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and Non-Governmental Development Organizations Platform (Platform), initialization of work at the complex National strategy for global development education, changes in the system of providing humanitarian assistance, the approval of the Communication strategy of the official development assistance of the Slovak Republic, prepared and adopted subsidy law – have all aimed at improving the system. Some of the taken measures have succeeded; some have encountered certain difficulties.

2010 NATIONAL PROGRAM: PLANS VS. REALITY

The National program for Slovakia's official development assistance¹ (NP ODA) was approved on May 25, 2010. Once again, the key program document was prepared almost in the middle of the programming period. Neither the structure nor the content of the second NP ODA, rooted in the 2009–2013 Medium-term strategy, differs from the framework of the previous program material. Similarly to the 2009 document, the concrete and very specific tasks as well as verification indicators were defined.² Contrarily to 2009, the number of specified tasks was reduced from overly ambitious 21 to a more real 9, while the quality of indicators increased. The fact that in NP ODA 2010 are not any deadlines of realization of the tasks set, that there is missing indications of the desired state by the end of 2010 and that the responsibility (of very concrete people, institutions – branches/departments, perhaps even the entire chain of responsibility) is not determined for a specific task could be considered a weakness of the document. Eventhough that in some cases the desired picture for 2010 appeared in the text; however, the final results did not get into the evaluation table.³ Thus, the fulfillment of tasks was given a looser interpretation and some activities could be considered fulfilled by being defined as “in the preparatory process,” or even by simply claiming the “desired” status without a source of verification. The list of the tasks and its fulfillment, as presented by the Foreign Ministry, can be seen in Table 1.⁴

BILATERAL ASSISTANCE: FOCUS AND FINANCING

2010 NP brought a remarkable long-recommended and, to a certain extent, anticipated news – a decrease in the number of project countries. The 2009–2013 Medium-term strategy defined 16 project and three program countries and the NP 2009 adopted them in their full extent. NP 2010 can thus be considered a turning point, given the decrease in number of project countries to 11. The lack of the system

¹ “Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky na rok 2010,” 2010. Available online: <http://www.slovakaid.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/NP-ODA-2010.pdf> (accessed on January 12, 2011).

² Another negative aspect is a missing evaluation of 2009 realization of the tasks which would surely contribute to a greater transparency, better control and policy-planning. This could not be found in any 2009 concluding document of ODA; and therefore authors expected it to appear at least within the introduction of 2010 NP ODA. However, it must be added that a comprehensive evaluation of 2010 can be found in the following document: “Informácia o oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci poskytnutej SR v roku 2010,” 2011, pp. 10–12.

³ As an example, the planned preparation and introduction of the plan for capacity development as well as the SAIDC staff reinforcement mentioned in the NP ODA 2010 transformed in the evaluation table in NP ODA 2010 where the intentions were not declared in the same way, into “several” trainings and information on the beginning of the project.

⁴ The Table cited from the “Informácia o oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci poskytnutej SR v roku 2010,” op. cit., pp. 10–12.

Table 1. Fulfillment of the NP ODA 2010 tasks

Tasks	Indicator	Fulfillment
Strengthening coordination and coherence of ODA activities on national level	Coordination Committee work plan for 2010	Gradual strengthening of development policy status and effective increase of the policy coherence with regards to development policy. Coordination committee meeting was held on December 16, 2010
The strengthening of the Legislative framework for implementation of development and humanitarian assistance	Draft law on provision of subsidies in the competence of the Foreign Ministry amending and supplementing the law No. 617/2007 Coll.	Approved on December 8, 2010.
	Executive regulation to the implementation of humanitarian aid	Regulation is under preparation.
Preparation of the program framework for the ODA program countries	Country strategy papers for Serbia, Afghanistan and Kenya	Under preparation.
Building the system of monitoring and evaluation	Created general rules for monitoring and evaluation of development projects and SlovakAid programs	Evaluation mission of development projects in Afghanistan is planned for April 2011. Monitoring of projects in Serbia, planned for March 2011.
	Evaluation of the select development projects carried out in 2007–2009	Evaluation of projects in Afghanistan. Possible cooperation with the Czech Republic on the evaluation of the projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Public awareness and development education	Communication strategy of the official development assistance of the Slovak Republic	The strategy was approved by the leadership of the Foreign Ministry in 2010
	The plan of activities for the implementation of the Communication strategy	Approved by the leadership of the Foreign Ministry
	Development education strategy	The strategy is under preparation. The working group responsible for its preparation has been holding sessions since April 2010.
Strengthening of statistical reporting	The proposal to strengthen the statistical reporting of development assistance and statistical report submitted by individual stakeholders	The Foreign Ministry work closely with OECD DAC, Finance Ministry as well as with SAIDC in order to create the information system for statistical reporting
Developing cooperation with the NGO sector	Memorandum of Understanding between the Foreign Ministry and NGDO Platform	Memorandum was signed on May 4, 2010.

Improvement of the humanitarian aid system	Creation of the database of the Slovak organizations providing humanitarian aid	Foreign Ministry in cooperation with the NGDO Platform has been preparing a database. Accreditation model of the above-mentioned organizations to humanitarian aid system of Slovakia was created as well.
	Strengthening of cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and humanitarian organizations on humanitarian aid	The cooperation has had plausible effects: a number of seminars and workshops on humanitarian assistance were held in 2010.
	Strengthening of cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the Interior Ministry on provision of planned material humanitarian assistance	The cooperation with the Interior Ministry on humanitarian assistance has had plausible effects. In 2010, material humanitarian aid was provided to Afghanistan.
Development assistance capacity building	The plan for capacity development and SAIDC staff reinforcement	A number of trainings for the SAIDC employees were held – participation on WG on global development education activities, Practitioners, etc. The capacity building project was launched, too, focusing on three fields: capacity building and the improvement of processes, information development center, ODA information system building.
	The creation of a state system of volunteer and expert deployment	The law is under preparation at the Interior Ministry. The Foreign Ministry collaborates on the law draft via the NGDO Platform.
	The project of official information system and database on development assistance	A database of a bilateral assistance of the Foreign Ministry was created within the SAIDC, in accordance with the procedures of the ODA reporting according to OECD DAC. In 2010, project MIS ODA SR focused on the collection, evidence and reporting of ODA SR, was approved.
	The plan to engage Slovak embassies abroad into the system of development assistance	Slovak embassies abroad are engaged in development assistance within the scope of the Project commission, evaluation of project documents, as well as monitoring of projects under way. SAIDC has carried out a number of trainings for Foreign Ministry staff on development assistance before their deployment in the foreign country.
	Re-evaluation of the system of humanitarian assistance and its financing (information)	Sectoral as well as territorial priorities of humanitarian assistance were reevaluated within the scope of NP ODA 2011.

approach in defining the sectoral priorities with individual countries can be regarded as a marking the time. Similarly to last year's edition, authors stress that despite the fact that NP 2010 included a task leading directly to the creation of country strategies, their preparation has not advanced. To a certain extent, this is due to the constantly postponed evaluation of the Slovak ODA by the OECD experts, which results were supposed to be projected into the follow-up planning of the Slovak bilateral cooperation.

As already mentioned, in 2010, the Slovak bilateral ODA was reduced to 3 program and 11 project countries.⁵ Nevertheless, there was not a significant shift in terms of financial resources. Similarly to previous years, the share of bilateral assistance on the ODA remained rather low (27 %)⁶ and one can state that its amount (both in absolute and relative values) will be unlikely fundamentally changed in the nearest future.

In total, 15,203,603.70 euro was provided as bilateral development assistance in 2010. The amount of 6,519,567.10 euro (including the administrative expenditures) was assigned to development projects administered by the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation (SAIDC). The total expenditure for bilateral assistance of the Foreign Ministry was 486,538 euro, (including administrative costs – 404,089 euro). The Interior Ministry carried out

National program for 2010 can be considered a turning point, given the decrease in number of project countries to 11.

a big part of its bilateral assistance by means of material humanitarian aid (1,639,620 euro), activities related to refugees, building asylum capacities, asylum procedures, and co-financing the asylum projects (1,867,777 euro). The administration costs amounted to 1,474,576 euro. The Health Ministry spent 947.8 euro on development activities and the Nuclear Regulatory Authority 49,100 euro – both bodies used the funds on covering expert consulting, internships and business trips abroad. The Education Ministry used the resources reported as development assistance on scholarships, "Slovak as the Foreign Language" educational program, on teachers' and lecturers' salaries and administrative costs in the total amount of 2,280,867.90 euro. The Finance Ministry assigned 120,085 euro to the realization of internships, information system for the ODA reporting and for covering the administrative costs. The Slovak Office of Standards, Metrology and Testing carried out trainings for 4,400 euro; the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family realized business trips abroad related to the development activities for 44,100 euro. Resources provided by the Defense Ministry (81,402

⁵ Afghanistan, Kenya and Serbia remained the program countries. The project countries for 2010 were Ethiopia, Sudan, Vietnam, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The number of projects in the above-mentioned countries was reflected on the 2010 calls only, seeing that projects from previous years went beyond this territorial framework.

⁶ The following part of the text was elaborated on the basis of data published in "Informácia o oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci poskytnutej SR v roku 2010," op. cit. and "Výročná správa Slovenskej agentúry pre medzinárodnú rozvojovú spoluprácu za rok 2010," Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation, 2011. Available online: <http://www.slovakaid.sk/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Vyrocna-Sprava-SAMRS2010.pdf> (accessed on March 27, 2011).

euro) were aimed at the civil-military cooperation within ISAF operation. The National Bank of Slovakia implemented projects in the amount 10,454 euro and the Office of the President realized business trips related to bilateral development assistance worth 175,869 euro.

The biggest bulk of bilateral activities was implemented via SAIDC. As mentioned in the footnote, two sources usually serve as the basic statistic documents when summarizing the bilateral projects and activities, i.e. Information on the official development assistance published by the Foreign Ministry and the SAIDC Annual report. As for 2010, however, both documents included several inconsistencies. Eventhough both documents provided to a certain extent similar or roughly similar digits in total, subtotals were often different. Despite these differences, to a considerable extent caused rather by mathematical/statistical errors or inappropriate attention, a reader can still get the very main idea of the trends, priorities, and use of resources when implementing Slovak bilateral assistance. When mentioning numbers and statistical data, the SAIDC material serve as a source; while in case of different digits in materials of the Foreign Ministry, reader's attention will be drawn to this fact.

In 2010, 233 projects⁷ were implemented and some of them even completed. 48 were carried out in program countries (7 in Afghanistan, 14 in Kenya, 27 in Serbia) and 55 in project countries.⁸ 19 were realized in the field of global development education. Nine projects which succeeded in European Commission calls were co-financed; nine humanitarian aid⁹ and one post-humanitarian project were realized. Three projects approved within the Current development challenges calls,¹⁰ two capacity-building projects and two projects focused on public awareness were implemented.¹¹ 85 projects were under way in case of more and more popular and attractive scheme of microgrants.¹² Even in 2010 the projects were implemented in a considerably broad territorial and sectoral framework, which was the result of the previous set-up. As mentioned already, 2010 brought about a significant change: development assistance decreased territorially, while the sector field remained relatively broad – the assistance was redistributed among 12 different sectors.

In 2010, 14 calls were announced and 211 projects were submitted. Besides the traditionally most numerous microgrant applications, many applicants tried to succeed with their projects in the countries of the Western Balkans (41) and/or Eastern Partner-

⁷ Document "Informácia o oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci poskytnutej SR v roku 2010," op. cit., speaks of 226 projects. However, data about projects carried out in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are missing completely in this document. According to SAIDC Annual report (Chart 2, p. 9), 24 projects were carried out in this territorial framework. The appendix of the annual report mentions, however, only 21 specific projects.

⁸ In case of the Foreign Ministry document, data about projects in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are missing.

⁹ Once again, data vary – the Foreign Ministry mentions eight projects only.

¹⁰ The Foreign Ministry report speaks of two projects only, which are specifically enumerated.

¹¹ The Foreign Ministry document declares one project for each sectoral priority.

¹² Number 106 appears in the Foreign Ministry materials. It is interesting to note that the overall amount in 2010 is the same in both documents, despite the significant difference in the number of projects.

ship (16). In the end, 122 projects were approved in the total amount of 5,122,599.05 euro.

As for the program countries, 11 projects were approved.¹³ Most of them deal with the sectoral priority of environment protection (five in Kenya and one in Serbia), two projects approved focus on health care (Kenya), two on education (Afghanistan and Kenya), one project deals with the infrastructure (Afghanistan) and one is focused on the issue of agriculture (Kenya). There were 13 projects approved in project countries.¹⁴ In terms of territorial priorities, five projects were approved in the countries of the Western Balkans. These focused mainly on building democratic institutions (two projects in Bosnia and Herzegovina), one project focused on building a market economy, assistance with integration to international organizations (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and infrastructure (Macedonia). Since 2010 there will be seven more projects realized in the countries of the Eastern Partnership (three in Moldova, two in Ukraine or Georgia respectively). Except for the project in Georgia, the Eastern Partnership projects will be focused on building democratic institutions. After the 2010 ODA call, one more project will be carried out in Africa, focused on education in Sudan.

In the field of global education, two projects focusing on creating methodical materials as well as raising awareness about global education were approved. Equally, two projects were supported primarily in the field of public awareness and ODA capacity building (including state institutions). Nine humanitarian and one post-humanitarian project were approved and implemented.

The program of micro-grants is becoming a more and more popular component of our ODA, being realized via embassies in Belgrade (29 projects for subjects in Serbia), Sarajevo (eight for Bosnia and Herzegovina), Nairobi (nine for Kenya), Minsk (two for Belarus), Kiev (three for Ukraine), Bucharest (19 for Moldova), Podgorica (three for Montenegro), Skopje (three for Macedonia). As previously indicated, 76 projects were approved in total with the amount of 352,061.58 euro. However, contrary to the previous period, the sectoral intervention was significantly reduced. The micro-grants were distributed among seven different sectors and 90 per cent of projects were in three sectoral priorities (civil society, infrastructure and education).

The year 2010 brought about important change in the form of narrowing territorial priorities – the number of project countries decreased by almost one third. The phase out from Serbia became a significant trend having in mind only one project approved in 2010 comparing to 11 in 2009. The Eastern Partnership region, especially Moldova and Ukraine, are slowly but surely coming before the Western Balkan region, where Bosnia and Herzegovina along with Montenegro have the greatest development “potential.” As for sectoral priorities, the assistance remains considerably extensive, while

¹³ Two projects in Afghanistan, one in Serbia, and eight in Kenya. Even here, the authors encountered the problem with varying data appearing in the same source: Chart 2, p. 9 of SAIDC Annual report mentions seven projects approved in Kenya, including projects aimed at mitigating the impact of climate change. However, Chart 4, p. 12 of the same report, states that 8 projects were approved for Kenya.

¹⁴ In concluding charts, both documents declare 14 projects. Chart 4, p. 12 of the SAIDC Annual report however mentions 13 projects approved in project countries.

it is valid that, to a certain extent, the specific priority fields are set on the *ad hoc* basis, based on the “on the ground experience” of the Slovak organizations’ in the given field, or sometimes the logic of the sectoral focus is not very clear at all. Previously evoked (and constantly planned) strategic documents, which would clearly define our long-term interests based on thorough analysis, would surely facilitate the planning and contributed to the ODA efficiency.

MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE¹⁵

2010 posed no change in the system of the multilateral development cooperation. It could be repeated that this form of intervention continued to be characterized by minimal or no respective endeavor to create a “mechanism for internationalization” of implementing our sectoral and territorial priorities on an international level, by a passive approach and by a simple acceptance of obligatory membership fees. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that this topic is still markedly undersized on a personal level, demanding and complex and depends on the quality of the entire network – from policy-makers, through decision-makers (those interested in issues) to those who implement the specific activities.

In 2010, Slovakia realized most of its development assistance on the basis of her contract obligations with international organizations. Nearly 73 per cent of all the funds for the development assistance, i.e. 40,609,177.10 euro, was spent on multilateral

In 2010, Slovakia realized most of its development assistance on the basis of her contract obligations with international organizations.

development cooperation. The Finance Ministry was traditionally the biggest contributor with its contributions to the development assistance to the EU budget (36,360,000 euro). The Ministry also contributed to the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the total amount of 107,744 euro, 587,548 euro

on interest rate subsidies and grant-funded technical assistance of investment projects financed from the EIB investment tool. The Ministry paid the second installment to the UNDP Trust fund for Public finance for development program in the amount of 236,628 euro and contributed with 625,000 euro to the Technical cooperation fund established between the Slovak Republic and EBRD. Within the admission to 15th replenishment of International Development Association (IDA), the Ministry paid the second installment in the amount of 680,000 euro. As far as IDA’s debt relief initiative is concerned, the debt in the amount of 40,000 euro was cancelled. The Finance Ministry also contributed with 344 euro to Haiti via Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB).

The Foreign Ministry spent 1,165,828.70 euro on multilateral assistance in the form of contributions to UN and UN organizations (UNESCO, UNICEF, UNIFEM, UNHCR –543,781.30 euro), as well as to UN peacekeeping operations (MINURCAT, MINURSO, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO/MONUC, UNAMID, UNIFIL, UNMIK, UNMIL, UNMIT,

¹⁵ Data used from “Informácia o oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci poskytnutej SR v roku 2010,” op. cit., pp. 30–35.

UNOCI, UNOMIG – 36,077.40 euro), to OECD (154,327 euro), to the International Committee of the Red Cross (24,000 euro), to the International Organization for Migration (150,000 euro), and to the Ministry's UNDO Trust Fund (257,643 euro).

The Environment Ministry paid membership fees to international organizations and environmental funds in the total amount of 141,492.50 euro, from which 8,100 euro was contributed to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN FCCC), 6,082 euro to Kyoto Protocol to the UN FCCC, 41,161.50 euro to UNEP, 76,321.90 euro to the UNEP Trust Fund for the Montreal Protocol, and 2,126.50 euro to the World Meteorological Organization. 2,439.70 euro was dedicated to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and 5,260.90 euro was provided for the International Union for the Protection of Nature.

The Agriculture Ministry allocated to various international organizations contributions in the amount of 239,845.40 euro, reported as ODA. The Ministry contributed with the amount of 115 254.40 euro to FAO; the amount of 42,115 euro was contributed to FAO-CEECFOODS. It also provided 33,919 euro to the FAO depository library. The contribution to the UN World Food Program was 10,750.40 euro. The Ministry made a contribution of 4,670 euro within the UN Convention to Combat Desertification in those countries experiencing serious drought, 21,720 euro for the European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization and 11,416.60 euro for regional programs of Biodiversity International.

The Health Ministry paid its World Health Organization membership fees (162,608.80 euro), the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family paid a contribution to the International Labour Organization (103,891 euro). The Interior Ministry provided funds for the UNHCR Office in the amount of 12,105 euro, and 24,716 euro for the International Organization for Migration (Bratislava office).

The Ministry of Transport, Construction and Regional Development statistically increased the Slovak ODA with the amount of 14,628.30 euro, in form of a contribution to the International Postal Union.

The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic appeared in statistics with its contribution of 86,668.80 euro to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and by paying a percentage share of IAEA membership fees. The Industrial Property Office of the Slovak Republic contributed with 2,734.60 euro to World Intellectual Property Organization.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE¹⁶

In 2010, Slovakia provided humanitarian assistance, both material and financial, worth 1,894,897.20 euro. The latter was implemented via nine humanitarian and one post-humanitarian projects for the total amount of 255,277.20 euro provided to four coun-

¹⁶ Data used from "Výročná správa Slovenskej agentúry pre medzinárodnú rozvojovú spoluprácu za rok 2010," op. cit., pp. 13–14.

tries affected by a destructive earthquake (Haiti), high floods (Pakistan and Moldova) and an environmental catastrophe (Hungary).

FINANCIAL AID

A financial contribution of 50,000 euro to Haiti, provided by the Foreign Ministry, was in the first phase given to international organizations, namely UNICEF, Red Cross, People in Peril and ADRA. It was, together with the resources from public collections, used mainly for specific field projects – water and sanitation, providing medical assistance, construction of temporary dwellings and schools. It is well worth stressing that NGOs managed to collect a record amount of 2,25 million euro for Haiti, while Slovak catholic charity alone managed to receive 1,7 million euro.

Regarding post-humanitarian reconstruction of Haiti, the Foreign Ministry announced a call, under which a MAGNA Children at risk organization was granted 150,000 euro¹⁷ to carry out a project focused on improving of the health-care service sector.

People in Peril and ADRA organizations were granted the contribution of 50,000 euro each to realize health-care service projects, sanitation improvement projects, reconstruction of dwellings, distributing water purification tablets in Pakistan.

Moreover, the Foreign Ministry contributed with 35,000 euro to eliminating the flood damage in Moldova. As a respond to the environmental catastrophe concerning the red mud leaking from two waste reservoirs in Hungary, the Ministry provided 10,000 euro for the International Rescue Team activities and Special International Rescue Dog Service (SIRDS).

MATERIAL AID

Material aid worth 1,639,620 euro was realized via the Interior Ministry (which has it in its portfolio). Assistance to Haiti was carried out in two phases in the amount of 445,000 euro. First shipment was accompanied by Slovak doctors and rescue workers who also ensured its redistribution. The second, March 2010, shipment, like in the case of other countries, was held at Haitian customs for about a year.¹⁸ In the end, after an agreement with the Foreign Ministry, its redistribution was ensured by a MAGNA Children at risk organization. Another material aid was distributed to the flood damaged Pakistan, Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine, Hungary, to earthquake damaged Chile and to a Caribbean island of St Lucia ravaged by a hurricane. Material aid was sent to the Palestinian National Authority for health care for people affected by war conflicts, and to Uruzgan in Afghanistan where it was delivered by soldiers.

¹⁷ In 2010, the organization realized activities worth 125,277.22 euro.

¹⁸ "Humanitárna pomoc zo Slovenska konečne u Haifanov," Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation, 2011. Available online: <http://www.slovakaid.sk/?p=6627> (accessed on May 3, 2011).

A MORE EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

In 2010 NP ODA, the Foreign Ministry defined the strengthening of cooperation with Slovak humanitarian organizations when providing and planning humanitarian assistance (both financial and material) as one of its priorities. Experience from 2010 showed that distribution of material aid, being under the auspices of the Interior Ministry, can be efficient only when its distribution is equally ensured in a recipient state. Slovak embassies abroad, providing there is one in a recipient state, can deliver assistance to the recipients. If it is not the case, it is essential to ensure accompanying or aid distribution in a target country via Slovak humanitarian organizations. Therefore, financial aid seems to be more efficient than material ones. However, this component is significantly financially under-sized (in 2011, it was only 250,000 euro). Having the financial resource, the Slovak humanitarian organizations in coordination and under control of their workers or volunteers, can directly help victims of environmental catastrophe, realize direct purchases in a country. The latter could both revitalize local economy and directly involve local population in reconstruction of their own country. Eventually, Slovak doctors, rescue and humanitarian workers help building a good reputation of Slovakia not only in an affected country but also back home in Slovakia.

Experience from 2010 showed that distribution of material aid, being under the auspices of the Interior Ministry, can be efficient only when its distribution is equally ensured in a recipient state.

CAPACITY BUILDING

With regards to capacity building, NP ODA especially mentioned a number of important needs¹⁹ that had (not) been fulfilled to different extents throughout 2010:

- *The plan for capacity development and the proposal for SAIDC staff reinforcement.* The plan was supposed to be prepared and submitted in 2010, which was not the case. The goal was therefore only partially attained by participation of employees on a number of trainings which were not qualitatively specified in any ODA reports and by an attendance of SAIDC at a capacity building project aimed at improvement of processes, at building of ODA information system and development information center. Certain efforts and activities are evident along the line, however, from a global perspective, one cannot state that it is the strategic approach. The authors perceive it rather as a way to exploit an opportunity and a necessity to solve matters assuming urgency due to the course of other processes.
- *The creation of a state system of volunteer deployment.* The Law on volunteering, under the auspices of the Interior Ministry, is under preparation. The collaboration with the NGDO Platform regarding the finalization of the state system for

¹⁹ According to "Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci Slovenskej republiky na rok 2010," op. cit.

sending volunteers abroad, as a new component of humanitarian assistance, is under way.

- *The project of an official information system and of database on development assistance.* It is essential to acknowledge the creation of a database of experts, created in close collaboration with the NGDO Platform, as well as continuing work on its further completion and enhancement. Moreover, a proposal of a new project form, methodical instructions for implementing the DAC OECD statistical methodology was elaborated, too.
- *Engaging Slovak embassies abroad in the ODA system.* The Embassies are engaged in project evaluations and monitoring phase. However, one should add, that the whole process lacks the necessary involvement of professionals who focus on the issues of development assistance in at least those countries, where there are the most projects under way.

Besides that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to support the capacities of the Slovak NGOs to participate in implementation of EU projects as well as the capacities of the umbrella organization of Slovak NGDOs.

Slovak ODA still lacks the involvement of businesses. For now, a “proper” forum for discussing and clarifying this form of development cooperation is still missing.

EVALUATION AND MONITORING

There is still no official monitoring and evaluation system created within the Slovak ODA. Similarly to the previous NP, one of the main objectives of the 2010 NP ODA was to build the system of monitoring and evaluation by the creation of the rules for monitoring and evaluation of the SlovakAid development projects and programs as well as the evaluation of the 2007–2009 projects. Once again it can be stated that the mentioned activities happened more-or-less on an *ad hoc* basis, without a clear and explicitly-defined methodology of collection, classification, and evaluation of information; without defining responsible institutions and persons who should deal with the results and decision-making process based on the assessment results.

The OECD evaluation mission, whose main goal was to assess the Slovak ODA system via the so-called *peer review*, could be perceived as the bright side of 2010. Peer review allows the OECD DAC members to provide each other quality feed-back regarding the setting of development policies as well as advice for their possible improvement. Over the last years, even the non-permanent members of the DAC had shown their interest in these peer review tools.²⁰ Slovakia had long considered inviting the OECD experts, and it succeeded at the end of 2010. The experts’ report, including recommendations, is to be made public in the first half of 2011. For Slovak development assistance, tools like *peer review* are an important source of feed-back and they could lead to discussion restructuring and to a better perspective of the Slovak ODA.

²⁰ Among the neighboring countries, the Czech Republic has undergone the so-called small *peer review* process.

THE NEXT STEPS AND MEASURES

In 2010, the Foreign Ministry continued with its effort to improve the set up of the ODA system. In March, the Communication strategy of the official development assistance of the Slovak Republic was approved. During the spring NGDO Platform meeting, the member organizations opened the discussion on ethics in informing on development and the Code of conduct on images and messages was adopted. In May 2010, Minister Miroslav Lajčák signed with Nora Beňáková, NGDO Platform chair, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovak Republic and the NGDO Platform. In the first half of 2010, several, more complex, debate on strategies began; on global development education and on volunteers deployment to development programs. Following the change of government in autumn, besides standard preparations of the NP 2010, preparations of draft law on provision of subsidies in the competence of the Foreign Ministry, were under way. The Law was passed on December 8, 2010, under the number 545/2010 Coll.

SLOVAKAID COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

The Communication strategy pose the first attempt of the Foreign Ministry to grasp the issue of informing the public and raising awareness about development cooperation in its full complexity. Creation of the concrete budget line within NP ODA 2010 constituted an important part of the decision on strategy. Indicative plan of communication activities for 2010 as a significant part of the strategy was approved as well.

The communication with the public in the field of development policy is highly undersized, which is regularly seen in discrepancies between the declared standpoints, presumptions and reality of the development assistance in public opinion surveys.²¹ In this sense, an approved document is a significant step forward. The relatively broad and all-inclusive tone of the document remains its sole drawback as it lowers the ambition to the level of a common collection and coordination of various

The communication with the public in the field of development policy is highly undersized, which is regularly seen in discrepancies between the declared standpoints, presumptions and reality of the development assistance in public opinion surveys.

²¹ See the following opinion polls: "Eurobarometer. 2007. Citizens of the new EU member states and development aid," September 2007. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_286_en.pdf (accessed on June 24, 2010); "Eurobarometer. 2007b. Europeans and development aid," June 2007. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_280_en.pdf (accessed on June 24, 2010); "Eurobarometer. 2010. Europeans, development aid and the Millennium Development Goals," September 2010. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_352_en.pdf (accessed on September 27, 2010); "Focus. Rozvojová pomoc. Závěrečná správa z výskumu verejnej mienky pre spoločnosť Nadácia Pontis," September 2009. Available online: http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/tmp/asset_cache/link/0000023449/091020_RP2009_sprava_web.pdf (accessed on June 27, 2010).

(and mainly previously planned) activities reaching out to the public. The bright side is that the evaluation of planned activities was included into the report which is to be submitted before March of the next year. As long as the report is handled more than formally, it could become an important source of lessons learned and improvement of communication with the public.

The communication with the public is the field in which the donor, in case of Slovakia represented by the SAIDC, naturally cooperates closer with NGOs as those who implement development assistance projects. However, it will be essential to develop further the potential of this kind of cooperation. Specific activities planned and carried out throughout 2010 (e.g. the so-called *road show*, bulletin *Rozvojová pomoc* (*Development assistance*) published by the NGDO Platform etc.) show willingness to move in this direction.

DEVELOPMENT EDUCATION AND VOLUNTEERS DEPLOYMENT

The closer cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and NGOs/academics resulted in the processes leading towards the formulating of complex strategies in the field of global development education as well as volunteers deployment within the development projects.

Global development education requires close cooperation of several stakeholders (the Foreign Ministry and the Education Ministry primarily) with experts. In spite of several initiatives,²² all the players have not yet been engaged in cooperation to the same extent.

The 2010 National program set the elaboration of the National strategy for global development education as the main goal in this field. The NGDO Platform got a Foreign Ministry grant to prepare the background expert material. This task was undertaken between May and October 2010; the respected experts in the field of global development education in cooperation with and under the leadership of NGDO Platform initiated a process of formulating a strategy for a broader community of stakeholders (NGO experts, teachers, representatives of the National Institute for Education, as well as representatives of the methodology and pedagogy centers) via conferences and smaller working group meetings. Similar processes that are carried out in Austria, Ireland or Portugal, served as an inspiration. The final strategy proposal was presented to the working group for Global development education established by the Foreign Ministry in May 2010 including the representatives of the Education Ministry and the Government Office. The working group comments and prepares the final wording of 2012–2016 strategy. The strategy will be proposed to the government by the Foreign and Education Ministries in the second half of 2011, along with the 2012 Action Plan.

²² Besides the NGDO Platform, an interdepartmental working group for development education with a remarkable participation of SAIDC representatives as well as academics has been operating for several years now. In 2009, the WG was divided into two sub-groups: the first one focuses on GDE at elementary schools, the second one at universities.

Although this process is still under way, it already seems that it could serve as an example of good practice in the formulation of broader strategies and policies.

To date, volunteer deployment within Slovak development assistance projects has not yet been directly supported. It sporadically appeared predominantly within the projects of some NGOs. The environment and capacity of deploying organizations have grown over the last couple of years. Therefore, within the use of the additional resources of the UNDP Trust Fund the goal to support of the creation of strategies aimed at volunteer deployment was set. A part of the resources was distributed to volunteer deployment via the United Nations Volunteers scheme and another part was used by a consortium of four NGOs, under the NGDO Platform umbrella, to deploy volunteers abroad within their own projects, and supported a process of mutual clarification of standards and approaches of these kinds of programs. All processes should result in a draft proposal of the strategy at the beginning of 2011.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

The Memorandum of understanding between the Foreign Ministry and the NGDO Platform²³ represents an important step forward in relations between NGOs and the Ministry: for the first time, an official framework for the cooperation was established and clearly defined the standpoints as well as mutual expectations of the partners. While it is not a document that would tie the signatories to any specific measures, it significantly contributes to transparency in relations and serves as a basis to which both parties could refer to. Recognition of NGOs via their umbrella organization NGDO Platform as partners in development assistance significantly contributes to a positive mind-set of both parties for cooperation. The fundamental extent of the cooperation materializes in early communication about the intentions as well as in an openness to improve them on the basis of a mutual dialogue.

SUBSIDY LAW

The Law No. 545/2010 on provision of subsidies in the competence of the Foreign Ministry²⁴ resulted from the necessity to standardize subsidies in competence of individual departments in accordance with European legislation. Considering given deadlines, the law was adopted at the last moment.²⁵ It reflected a special position of development assistance which have several specific characteristics. The law defined a basic broad network which has to be further specified and amended by documents of lower legal force.

²³ Memorandum is available at the NGDO Platform website: <http://www.mvro.sk/sk/kniznica/category/27-verejne-dokumenty-platformy-mvro> (accessed on January 12, 2011).

²⁴ Full text of the law is available at the NGDO Platform website: <http://mvro.sk/sk/kniznica/category/1-dokumenty>.

²⁵ The law entered into force on January 1, 2011.

A greater effort for the subsidy mechanism to be transparent is a significant contribution of the law. However, despite a broad conceptualization, several of its articles ran into practical difficulties (such as very specific determination of the minimum co-financing to 20 per cent or 10 per cent for various kinds of applicants respectively). These issues will have to be solved in the period to come. Discussion among NGOs was initiated by the following article of the law: "... the requirement for providing subsidies is [...] to ensure cofinancing from applicant's own resources [...]" However, the definition of "applicant's own resources" was not specified. Strictly speaking, most of the NGOs have either limited or no resources of its own at all and they implement projects thanks to resources acquired from various donors. The third issue of the law is the introduction of an anonymous evaluation of the project. On one hand, anonymity can only be achieved on technical level because the number of organizations working in individual target countries is very low. Thus, the project reviewer should easily tell which organization submitted the project proposal. On the other hand, especially when demanding projects are concerned (in complicated areas from a security point of view, such as Afghanistan or South Sudan), it is important to consider the organization's experience and capacities to carry out a project according to plan.

NP ODA 2011 – NEW ADMINISTRATION, DIFFERENT APPROACH

At the end of 2010, the government approved the National ODA program for 2011 which was a welcomed novelty following the series of programs coming through usually in the middle of the year. The document encompasses several qualitative changes, all in accordance with the Program manifesto of the Government²⁶ as well as with recommendations of the *peer review* process. The first and the major one is the differentiation between the development and technical assistance.

In case of development assistance, the number of recipient countries as well as their sectoral focus on activities will be once again narrowed. Kenya, Afganistan remained the program countries, while project countries are Sudan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Montenegro.

As for sectoral priorities, the focus on education, health care, agriculture and rural development dominates in the cases of Kenya, Sudan and Afghanistan. Selected sectoral priorities stem from the experience and activities of Slovak subjects in the target countries.

In case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Moldova, development assistance will be mainly concentrated on the return and reintegration of refugees and on water management (BiH); on water management and environment (MN); on water

²⁶ "Občianska zodpovednosť a spolupráca. Programové vyhlásenie vlády Slovenskej republiky na obdobie rokov 2010 – 2014," Bratislava, 2010. Available online: <http://www.vlada.gov.sk/programove-vyhlasenie-vlady-sr-na-obdobie-rokov-2010-2014/> (accessed on January 9, 2011).

management, education and health care (MD). The selected sectoral priorities are not very clearly explained within the NP considering the real needs of a country. To illustrate, in the case of Moldova, building of the democratic institutions, civil society, mitigation of the migration of youth are all considered to be needs of the country as well as a challenge for Slovakia. Having said that, in order to solve, for instance, the migration problem, priority should be given to supporting employment and small businesses instead of focusing on health and water management.

In general, absence of strategic program documents that would define the main goals of Slovakia for several years to come, poses the problem to set sectoral priorities efficiently for any selected country. Even though the creation of program documents for Kenya, Afghanistan, and Serbia was envisaged within the 2010 NP ODA tasks, they still do not exist. The elaboration of such documents for all of the six selected countries (at least in form of donor intentions) would facilitate planning, NGO capacity building and predictability.

As already mentioned, the NP ODA for 2011 focus on strategy topics, such as the transfer of transition experience in form of technical assistance and/or Slovak capacity building in the field of development assistance and development education.

Within the so-called technical assistance, the activities aimed at transition experience transfer to Western Balkan region and Eastern Partnership countries (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) are planned to be implemented. For that purpose, a special Center for the transfer of integration and reform experience (CETIR) was founded by the Foreign Ministry. Its goal is to accelerate and enhance development in Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries by means of expert exchange, awareness about the EU and consulting in decision-making process mainly at intergovernmental level (i.e. primarily by means of short-term trainings for state bodies' representatives from recipient countries, and, in some case, training by Slovak experts in recipient countries). Accordingly, besides traditional calls, the NP ODA introduces a new modality based predominantly on experience from a small pilot project entitled Transfer of the EU integration experience and implemented by the Foreign Ministry.

Considering real capacities of the Slovak "expert market" for transition, reforms, and institutional memory, as well as their abilities to get involved in similar projects, the program seems overly ambitious. Only 2011 will reveal whether this form of project is feasible or not.

The Finance Ministry will be also engaged in the transition know-how by implementing the Public finance for development program. The program will get under way in Serbia, Montenegro and Moldova.

Providing scholarships directly in developing countries where the Slovak universities have their branches is a new form of assistance introduced in 2011. The amount of 10,000 euro was set for Kenya for 2011. It is rather a positive change given that to date, the scholarships falling under the auspices of the Education Ministry (total of 1,7 million

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euro) were offered to students from developing countries only for studying in Slovakia and no statistics on how many students actually returned to their home countries exist.

A greater emphasis on the development aspect will be given to microgrants, provided by Slovak embassies in developing countries, which aim at improving the living conditions of the local communities.

The NP estimates 9.6 million euro to be allocated for bilateral development assistance carried out by the Foreign Ministry (already implemented and new projects). The total of 11,7 million euro is allocated to bilateral assistance (including other departments, too).

As for the multilateral assistance, for the first time, Slovakia will contribute with the amount of 6,36 million euro to European Development Fund (EDF) for assistance to African countries, the Caribbean, and Pacific islands.

This is the reason why Slovakia has ambition to participate in EU external assistance to a greater degree via the improvement of coordination and awareness of business enterprises, NGOs and public organizations from Slovakia about the possibilities to apply in EU calls – mainly the IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance), ENPI (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) and DCI (Development Co-operation Instrument).

WHAT NEXT?

The change of administration in the second half of 2010 brought many questions as well as expectations to carry out essential changes in ODA system. For now, development assistance seems to belong to the priorities of new administration – certainly at the level of rhetoric. The upcoming years will show to what extent the good intentions w(c)ould be realized. To improve the ODA quality, authors present the following proposals, which are not new in many cases; some of them have already been published,²⁷ however, authors believe that discussion, and/or their implementation could improve the Slovak ODA system.

1. Sectoral priorities:

- a. to elaborate long-term donor intentions for all countries/regions with specific sectoral priorities;
- b. to gradually reduce the share of the sectoral priority of infrastructure – to build assistance programs on Slovakia's transition and integration experience in the countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership countries.

²⁷ Recommendations and proposals were elaborated by the authors on the basis of conclusions of their analyses, consulting with other experts and ODA performer (Marián Čaučík, Vladimír Benč), and conclusions (recommendations) of the NGDO Platform chairmanship (of which the authors are the members). For more, see: J. Mihálik, P. Brezáni, "Development cooperation and Slovakia in 2009," in P. Brezáni, ed., *Yearbook of Slovakia's foreign policy 2009*, Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2010, pp. 163–181; or "Vytvárajme dobrý obraz Slovenska cez program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci," The NGDO Platform, Bratislava, 2010.

2. *Conceptual, legislative and technical changes (project cycle):*
 - a. to amend the subsidy law in competence of the Foreign Ministry;
 - b. to adopt the Strategy for global development education and ensure its implementation;
 - c. to create the internal evaluation and monitoring system;
 - d. to reinforce the staff at the development cooperation department of the Foreign Ministry to safeguard its continuity. At the same time, it is important to ensure that there be, on a continuous basis, development cooperation expert, or eventually, a representative of SAIDC at the embassies;
 - e. to ensure cooperation with other donors in order to accumulate resources, facilitate financing of long-term projects, to make implementation mechanisms/institutions more effective, acquire a partner with whom to build up our capabilities within ODA and for a perspective change or modification of territorial priorities;
 - f. to establish a system of clear rules on support for co-financing international development cooperation projects and on Slovakia's involvement in such projects;
 - g. to change a system of SAIDC subsidies towards a higher degree of flexibility in the use of state budget resources taking specifics of work in developing countries into the consideration;
 - h. to prepare the planning Country strategy papers.
3. *Financial changes*
 - a. to establish the long-term obligatory financial prospects of the funds to be allocated to SlovakAid to enable Slovakia's approach to fulfillment of her international obligations within the EU/OECD;
 - b. to considerably increase the volume of bilateral and regionally provided assistance (up to at least 50 per cent of the ODA).

SLOVAKIA'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN 2010

ONDREJ GAŽOVIČ

The text assesses Slovakia's public diplomacy in 2010. While 2009 presented a number of hopeful moments in this field, 2010 could be referred to as a period of reconfiguration. In Slovakia's case, 2010 confirmed the conclusions of expert analyses stating that public diplomacy projects in Central and Eastern European countries are especially vulnerable and prone to discontinuous development related to the election cycle.¹ The June 2010 parliamentary elections are closely related to many of the changes in the institutional and contextual focus of Slovakia's public diplomacy addressed in this text. Furthermore, the text offers a survey of the practical implementation of this policy, the 2010 opportunities that were seized or laid-waste, as well as thoughts on the future perspective of public diplomacy in the context of Slovakia's foreign policy.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The institutional framework under which Slovakia's public diplomacy entered 2010 was based on the complex reorganization and institutional reform² of the Ministry

¹ G. Szondi, "Central and Eastern European public diplomacy: A transitional perspective on national reputation management," in N. Snow, P.M. Taylor, eds, *Routledge handbook of public diplomacy*, New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 292–313.

² See for example: M. Peško, "Modernization of the Slovak foreign service," in P. Brezáni, ed., *Yearbook of Slovakia's foreign policy 2007*, Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2008, pp. 91–10, as well as M. Peško, "Modernization of the Slovak foreign service – from analysis to implementation," in P. Brezáni, ed., *Yearbook of Slovakia's foreign policy 2008*, Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2009, pp. 125–142.

of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (MFA) as of September 1, 2008. The newly formed Public diplomacy department (PD), working within the also newly established Public diplomacy and public services directorate (PDPS), increased the amount of its activity – after a slower beginning – especially in the latter half of 2009. The PD began 2010 with a number of ambitious plans and projects under way.

Under the leadership of Elena Mallicková, the PD's activities for 2010 were planned out in three levels:

- elaborating and presenting the Concept of Slovakia's public diplomacy, i.e. the strategic document clearly stating the vision, content, and form of the country's public diplomacy activities;
- administering everyday agenda, including the maintenance of the Foreign Ministry web pages and its intranet, publishing, preparing various exhibitions and conferences for the Foreign Ministry, and other similar activities;
- coordinating the process of the so-called uniform presentation of the SR abroad.³

To secure the implementation of these activities the PD employed a staff of seven (including the director), of which four were responsible solely for technical activities (web page editors and publication/conference editors).

A detailed critical analysis of the fulfillment of these goals will appear later in the text, although it is already possible to present a first preliminary assessment here. By the end of 2010, the Foreign Ministry still did not have a document which would set a strategic goal of Slovakia's public diplomacy. Throughout 2010, the process of the so-called uniform presentation of SR abroad also proved to be *de facto* "dead" and is no longer implemented. Therefore, the PD was unsuccessful in two out of the three main dimensions of its activities for 2010. The PD was only able to successfully realize activities within the administration of continuous agendas, including the organization of several positively evaluated events.⁴ It is necessary to mention that the responsibility for this state cannot be left with the department itself without taking into account some of the major structural obstacles they had to face in their work in 2010.

The June 2010 parliamentary elections had a crucial impact on the development of the institutional framework, as well as the substantive focus of Slovakia's public diplomacy. Their results led to changes not only in the government itself but also to personnel changes in the Foreign Ministry itself. The responsibility for the Ministry was taken over by the strongest party in the new coalition, SDKÚ–DS, with a new Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda and State Secretary Milan Ježovica. The new leadership

³ On the integrated presentation process see for example: O. Gažovič, *Public diplomacy in 2009*, in P. Brežani, ed., *Yearbook of Slovakia's foreign policy 2009*, Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2010, pp. 183–202. Information on the PD's planned activities – personal interview with the former PD director Elena Mallicková and personal interview with head of the presentation department Miriam Mádrová.

⁴ The Foreign Ministry Open Day took place on March 20, 2010. It is an example of a very successful event in terms of public interest.

confirmed the Ministry's ambition to continue in public diplomacy activities.⁵ This ambition is also presented in the new Government manifesto.

Several factors, very closely linked to the post-election period, led to the reconfiguration of public diplomacy in 2010. Especially the first few months after the elections could be characterized by uncertainty and performance restrictions on the part of PD staff. Firstly, the Ministry did not have the leadership, which was only being formed during coalition talks, and secondly, after the leadership entered the Ministry, it (understandably) had to handle high-priority foreign policy issues. In this hectic period, public diplomacy did not become one of these issues. At the same time, the new leadership was preparing the anticipated Ministry reform aimed at expense reductions and improvement of efficiency at the Ministry through personnel reductions and/or the reevaluation of their salaries. These processes were logically followed by the changes in the overall organizational structure.

The post-election structure of the Ministry influenced the PD in many ways. After the period of uncertainty and decreased performance in the latter half of 2010 the first change involved a replacement of the department director. Elena Mallicková left the Foreign Ministry and was replaced by her PD colleague Miriam Mádrová on November 15, 2010. It can be said, that certain continuity in PD activities maintained. However, immediately after this replacement the entire PDPS ceased to exist and, consequently, the PD itself was dissolved as of December 1, 2010. At the end of 2010 Slovakia

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The interpretation of this fact in the context of the Ministry's ambitions to expand relations with the public at home and abroad remains questionable. On the one hand, the previously chosen path with all its expenditures has been abandoned. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible as well as legitimate to realize such activities even without the existence of a specific department on a high level of quality, too. Norway may serve as an example, whereby its Foreign Ministry also lacks a similar department, but all public diplomacy activities are handled by more flexible teams composed of relevant Ministry staff.⁶

As of December 2010 the agenda of public diplomacy fully employs only two people at the Ministry working within the Press department. Obviously, their activities are to

⁵ M. Ježovica, "Globálna prezentácia: možnosti a výzvy. (Úvodný príhovor)," in J. Bátora, E. Jambor, eds, *Globálna prezentácia: možnosti a výzvy*, Bratislava: Institute of European Studies and International Relations of the Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, Comenius University in Bratislava, 2011, pp. 9–11.

⁶ Author owes this observation to Jozef Bátora.

a certain extent coordinated with the department of cultural diplomacy, members of economic departments, and Foreign Ministry web page editors.⁷

FOCUS OF THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Any assessment of the public diplomacy's focus is based on the aforementioned three dimensions of PD activities in 2010. As noted previously, the first goal – preparing the public diplomacy concept – remained unfulfilled. At the end of 2010, the concept still did not exist, even though its formulation was one of the main goals set forth in 2009.⁸ Problems related to that can be further explained by the fact that throughout its entire existence the department did not have enough employees who lacked enough time for conceptual and creative activities next to the administration of an everyday agenda.

The second goal, which the PD also failed to fulfill in 2010, consisted of the active coordination of the Council of the Government for a uniform presentation. The key problem with the Council was its minimal action flexibility – in 2010 it was virtually impossible to convene a meeting on the highest levels, including the Prime Minister, the ministers of foreign affairs, education, agriculture, economy, the DG of the Slovak Tourist Board and the Slovak Investment and Trade Development Agency (SARIO), etc. On the other hand, meetings on lower levels did not have the competences on the part of the process coordinator – the PD. The meetings between multiple autonomous bodies were mostly held in the form of discussions without commitments and without specific practical outcomes – lower level representatives of these bodies did not have the competences to adopt such decisions and the Council did not have a unit with superior authority possessing some directive rights. It is necessary to mention, that only minimal progress was achieved in the field of Slovakia's uniform presentation in 2010. The chosen institutional framework proved to be highly ineffective and by the end of 2010 it became clear that the new Government would stop the entire process and attempt to carry out similar activities in a completely new setting. To a certain degree, the failure of the entire project rests with the PD. However, the PD did not possess sufficient management competences to coordinate the process efficiently, and it lacked also the appropriate financial resources which would allow for the potential initiation of specific steps in this field.

The third dimension of activities in 2010 consisted of everyday administration of the Foreign Ministry web page, publishing various materials, information and presentation booklets, ensuring conference services, and preparing specific partial public

⁷ Personal interview with Vladimír Talian from the Presentation department and director of the Department of cultural diplomacy Igor Otčenáš.

⁸ See for example: E. Mallicková, "Verejná diplomacia ako priorita MZV SR," in J. Batora, Z. Hozlárová, eds, *Verejná diplomacia: nový strategický nástroj MZV SR?*, Bratislava: Institute of European Studies and International Relations of the Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, Comenius University in Bratislava, 2010, pp. 10–13.

diplomacy projects. In this field the PD was apparently more successful than in the former two dimensions.

Regarding the internet presence of the Foreign Ministry, the PD continued to expand on various forms of interactive communication between the Ministry and the public. Throughout the first half of 2010 the web page continued to host regular chat rooms with the public on various current issues and Minister, Miroslav Lajčák, continued to blog.⁹ In the latter half of 2010 these activities came to an end. The Ministry continued to at least expand the multimedia content of the web page and began preparations to open the Ministry's Facebook account. According to the plans, the Facebook page should mainly serve to inform the public on current conditions in various countries around the world, as well as a feedback channel from Slovak citizens who find themselves in the location of crisis situations.¹⁰

Two events taking place at the Foreign Ministry can be considered the most significant public diplomacy projects in 2010. The first one was the Open Day being held on March 20, 2010 which was accompanied with the presentation of the "Goodwill envoy" award to Slovak citizens who were very successful abroad. The Ministry prepared an interesting accompanying program which brought several thousand visitors from the general public. According to M. Lajčák the main aim of the event was to "show that the Ministry is here for the people, for the citizens, to promote the interests of our country and all its citizens."¹¹ This event can be perceived positively, because it registered high public interest and thus represents one of the ways to overcome unnecessary barriers between the Foreign Ministry and the country's citizens, leading both to a higher degree of cooperation.

At the Open Day, the already mentioned "Goodwill envoy" award was awarded to three laureates – professor Ján Vlček (an immunologist working in the USA), professor Jaroslav Fabián (a physicist working in Germany), and a security policy expert Tomáš Valášek (working in Great Britain). All three laureates are leading world experts in their fields promoting Slovakia's good reputation abroad.

The idea of awarding successful Slovaks is positive in itself. However, it is also necessary to place one reservation. Awarding the prize should only have been a first step in

Only minimal progress was achieved in the field of Slovakia's uniform presentation in 2010. The chosen institutional framework proved to be highly ineffective and by the end of 2010 it became clear that the new Government would stop the entire process and attempt to carry out similar activities in a completely new setting.

⁹ See <http://www.mzv.sk/Chat> as well as <http://moje.hnonline.sk/blog/120> (accessed on February 19, 2011).

¹⁰ Personal interview with the Miriam Mádrová, director of the presentation unit.

¹¹ See TA3 report available at http://www.ta3.com/sk/reportaze/148140_mzv-sr-den-otvorenych-dveri-prilakal-stovky-navstevnikov (accessed on June 4, 2010), as well as web page of the MFA SR [http://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C0B-1D004B5A332B2C1257627003301E7_SK&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=SK&PAGE_NEWSVIEW-MAINJDRK-7X8F93=7&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/\(vw_ByID\)/ID_407EF-4F78230DBA8C12576EC005BEAE3](http://www.mzv.sk/servlet/content?MT=/App/WCM/main.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_C0B-1D004B5A332B2C1257627003301E7_SK&OpenDocument=Y&LANG=SK&PAGE_NEWSVIEW-MAINJDRK-7X8F93=7&TG=BlankMaster&URL=/App/WCM/Aktualit.nsf/(vw_ByID)/ID_407EF-4F78230DBA8C12576EC005BEAE3) (accessed on June 4, 2010).

more long-term cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the laureates on future joint public diplomacy activities. Yet, the Foreign Ministry did not attempt to develop this cooperation any further and the potential of the laureates to support Slovakia in its public diplomacy activities, beyond the scope of everyday good work, remained unutilized by the Ministry. Whether there was a long-term vision of specific cooperation with the prize laureates at all remains a question. If there was one, why was it not realized?

The conference *Global presentation: possibilities and challenges*¹² was the second event organized by the PD, this time in cooperation with the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University. The conference took place on November 24, 2010 and followed a previous conference on public diplomacy from December 2009.¹³ In 2010, a number of top experts on public diplomacy and related issues from the SR (Jozef Bátora, Juraj Buzalka, Oľga Gyárfášová, Vladimír Talian and others) and abroad (Thomas Carlhed, Jan Melissen and others) spoke at the conference.

The aim of the conference was to bring impetus for Slovakia's public diplomacy. The structure of the conference reflected this aim – the first panel presented successful examples from abroad; the second one elaborated on the content which Slovakia should present abroad; and the final panel opened the discussion on the possible specific forms of this presentation. The conference in fact brought some impetus. On the other hand, however, certain skepticism could be perceived among the participants of this event stemming from the fact that very little had been achieved in one year in terms of the conceptual definition and practical implementation of public diplomacy in Slovakia.

The conference also indicated a certain shift in an emphasis being put in the field of public diplomacy at the Foreign Ministry. This shift is already visible and was further strengthened by the abolition of the PD. The term “uniform presentation of Slovakia abroad” has since disappeared from the discourse at the Foreign Ministry and the term “public diplomacy” itself is also slowly fading away. At the end of 2010 both terms are starting to be replaced by the term “global presentation,” which has its positive and negative aspects – both will be analyzed in greater detail in the final chapter of this text.

WASTED OPPORTUNITIES

2010 was full of global events which Slovakia's public diplomacy could have used to draw attention to the country or to establish long-term relations and partnerships with

¹² See J. Bátora, E. Jambor, eds, *Globálna prezentácia: možnosti a výzvy*, Bratislava: Institute of European Studies and International Relations of the Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, Comenius University in Bratislava, 2011.

¹³ J. Bátora, Z. Hozlárová, eds, *Verejná diplomacia: nový strategický nástroj MZV SR?* Institute of European Studies and International Relations of the Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, Comenius University in Bratislava, 2010.

the public at home or abroad. Among these events, attracting the attention of the majority of the world's population, were especially the XXI. Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver (Canada, February 2010), World EXPO 2010 Shanghai (China, May through October 2010), and the FIFA World Cup in South Africa (June–July 2010).

Sadly, the Foreign Ministry was not able to use these events despite trying repeatedly. According to PD employees the Ministry expressed its interest in cooperating with the Slovak Olympic Committee and the Slovak Football Association. Due to a series of factors, however, cooperation was not launched. One of the reasons lies in the minimal financial potential the Ministry could bring to the cooperation, along with the fact that many accompanying activities had already been commissioned to private entities which had no interest in the active participation of the Ministry.¹⁴

In relation to the country's participation on the aforementioned events, the Ministry also expressed its interest in cooperating with organizations who are partners in the process of Slovakia's presentation abroad – SACR and SARIO – assuming that both organizations possessed adequate financial funds for such tasks. However, the Ministry's initiative was not met with a welcoming reaction. Both organizations were already individually involved in the aforementioned activities and expressed no interest in closer cooperation with the PD (as was the case in the unfulfilled cooperation with SACR on Slovakia's participation on EXPO 2010), or on the contrary, the location of the events was not among the target countries of these organizations (the case of the FIFA World Cup in South Africa 2010 and the unfulfilled cooperation with SARIO).¹⁵

2010 was full of global events which Slovakia's public diplomacy could have used to draw attention to the country. Sadly, the Foreign Ministry was not able to use these events despite trying repeatedly.

These unsuccessful coordination efforts led to an unfavorable result for the PD; the department had no influence on the final form of Slovakia's presentation activities at these events, and yet it became the subject of negative publicity aimed at the quality of those presentations – criticisms of the substandard quality of Slovakia's pavilion in Shanghai or the Slovak representation house in Vancouver may serve as examples.¹⁶

However, the fact that the potential of these events in promoting Slovakia beyond the scope of regular media coverage remained untapped is a much greater loss. Successes, achieved by the SR at the aforementioned forums (e.g. the unexpected elimination of Italy in the group stage of the World Cup), were not followed by a creative communication strategy, which could utilize the already increased media interest in Slovakia. This confirmed the fact – already set forth in the previous edition of the Annual report in the case of a failed communication strategy related to the “Irish explosive”

¹⁴ The Slovak representation house at the Olympic Games in Vancouver serves as an example of these activities.

¹⁵ Personal interview with the former PD director Elena Mallicková; personal interview with the head of the presentation unit Miriam Mádrová.

¹⁶ See for example: “Slovenský olympijský dom terčom kritiky,” *tvnoviny.sk*, February 19, 2010, Available online: http://tvnoviny.sk/bin/article.php?article_id=540869&page=1&p_all_items=23&order=ASC (accessed on February 19, 2010).

scandal – that Slovakia lacks a mechanism to ensure the prompt and creative management of opportunities as well as threats to the country's media image abroad.¹⁷

WHAT'S NEXT – GLOBAL PRESENTATION OR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

As mentioned above, throughout 2010, the development of public diplomacy at the Ministry was defined by three key factors – the abolition of the Public Diplomacy Department itself, the suspension of the process of Slovakia's uniform presentation abroad, and the discursive shift from an emphasis on public diplomacy to an emphasis on the process of Slovakia's global presentation. How have these changes started to influence the Ministry's activity in the end of 2010 and what may their potential consequences on these activities look like in the future?

The potential negative aspects, which the Ministry should attempt to avoid, include most of all the risk of a very narrow perception of public diplomacy activities only in terms of so-called branding.

The key task of the staff members responsible for the public diplomacy agenda at the Ministry is the formulation of the so-called content/program identity of Slovakia's presentation. A shift

is therefore taking place, from the coordination of activities, where the PD lacked competences as well as an impact on the content of the presentation, toward a search and formulation of this missing content. From the end of 2010, Ministry professionals, in cooperation with experts from various fields (nongovernmental sphere, academia, commercial sector, etc.), are working on the task of creating the country's story – a story which would reflect its very nature and the messages suitable for its promotion abroad. The same group of experts should also elaborate on the suitable communication elements of the country and the country's visual and content identity. Only when these intellectual foundations have been formulated can the forms of presentation and implementation be addressed. It is possible, that the implementation itself will reach beyond the capabilities of the Foreign Ministry and its execution will be handed over to professionals from creative, media, or advertisement fields. It is also important to mention, that the entire product is being created primarily for the needs of the Ministry and its individual embassies – its utilization by other ministries is possible although not an automatically planned alternative.¹⁸

The changes and plans of the Ministry presented here have several positive and negative aspects in terms of the public diplomacy activities of Slovakia. Abandoning the ineffective mechanism of Slovakia's uniform presentation abroad, as well as the use of the term "uniform presentation," which evoked images of centralization and restrictions, can both be deemed positive. The increased emphasis of the Foreign Ministry on

¹⁷ O. Gažovič, op. cit.

¹⁸ Personal interview with a Vladimír Talian from presentation unit; personal interview with the head of the presentation unit Miriam Mádrová.

searching for the content of Slovakia's presentation, while maintaining that the image must be trustworthy and accepted by the public at home, is also a correct step.

The potential negative aspects, which the Ministry should attempt to avoid, include most of all the risk of a very narrow perception of public diplomacy activities only in terms of so-called branding. It is clear from the works of key experts in the fields related to public diplomacy, such as Mark Leonard or Joseph S. Nye, that in comparison to global presentation, public diplomacy is perceived as a broader term. In other words, the set of public diplomacy activities includes a country's presentation efforts known as branding, but is by no means exhausted by these efforts alone. According to Nye, public diplomacy is a set of instruments which contribute to a country's soft power and the presentation of a specific country image is only one of these instruments, which does not even have to be the most effective one.¹⁹ Leonard draws attention to three dimensions in public diplomacy, each being crucial in its own right. The first dimension is the management of everyday communication, the second is strategic communication, and the third consists of building relations. Country branding only covers the second of these three dimensions.²⁰ Other authors also remind of the broad selection of other public diplomacy activities, which are not related to branding, and may be more effective in specific situations.²¹

Abolishing the Public Diplomacy Department and shifting the emphasis from public diplomacy to global presentation may lead to the Foreign Ministry neglecting other activities, which could assist in the expansion of the country's soft power. It is not in the realistic capabilities of two Ministry's staff members, without a specific department, to cover all three dimensions of public diplomacy. All the while it is clear that the Foreign Ministry has also struggled with the prompt and creative management of opportunities and threats to the media image of Slovakia, as well as the long-term development of relations with various actors from the foreign public (with exceptions) throughout the past.²² Therefore, whether to expect an improvement in these activities in the near future remains a question. More likely, it would require an approach opposite to the one the Ministry adopted in 2010 – instead of abolishing the PD it should have been strengthened both in terms of personnel and finances. Due to the remnants of the economic crisis and the tendency toward budget cuts in Slovakia, such an approach seems unrealistic in the nearest future.

¹⁹ See J.S. Nye, "Public diplomacy and soft power," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 616, No. 1, March 2008, pp. 94–109.

²⁰ M. Leonard, C. Stead, C. Smewing, *Public diplomacy*, London: The Foreign Policy Center, 2002.

²¹ See for example R. S. Zaharna, "Mapping out a spectrum of public diplomacy initiatives," in N. Snow, P. M. Taylor, eds, *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, op. cit.; D. Copeland, *Guerrilla diplomacy: rethinking international relations*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009; O. Gažovič, "Digitálna diplomacia: dve muchy jednou ranou?," in M. Rybář, T. Tökölyová, eds, *Od úpadku k oživeniu? Príčiny, priebeh a následky hospodárskej krízy*, Bratislava: Slovenské združenie pre politické vedy pri SAV; Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2010, p. 104.

²² These exceptions for example include the long-term involvement of Slovak diplomacy and non-governmental organizations in the region of the Western Balkans.

An alternate route to the successful operation of Slovakia's public diplomacy, without the existence of a specific department, could lead through its decentralization. Raising awareness of public diplomacy in all of the Ministry's relevant departments could encourage their involvement in activities with a public diplomacy overlap even without the existence of a specific umbrella department. Specialized education of the broader diplomatic personnel of the Ministry, aimed at the significance and potential of public diplomacy utilization, could be very beneficial to this end. Employees with these enhanced capabilities could then utilize public diplomacy techniques in their every day agendas, while being able to cooperate in *ad hoc* expert groups.

The ambitious start of Slovak public diplomacy in the latter half of 2009 and its continued progress through the first months of 2010 was followed by a period of stagnation and later reconfiguration. Slovakia's public diplomacy activities were hit by the uncertainties, brought on by the parliamentary elections of June 2010 and the following changes at the Ministry. After organizational and personnel changes the situation in public diplomacy stabilized and restarted at the end of 2010.

This new start is also linked to new tasks and new ambitious plans. In order to fulfill them the Ministry must retain continuity in this policy field and optimally increase the personnel and financial capacities dedicated to these tasks. The successful promotion of Slovakia's positive image abroad can be further supported by focusing on all three dimensions of public diplomacy – next to branding, that includes the creative and prompt management of everyday opportunities and threats, and the development of long-term partnerships based on mutual, bilateral communication with the public both at home and abroad.

In conclusion, it seems to be necessary to repeat a warning issued by a number of experts in the past – a good presentation will not help any country in its long-term attractiveness and trustworthiness if the country's domestic and foreign policies are not attractive and trustworthy in the first place.²³ From this perspective, so far the new government of SDKÚ–DS, SaS, Most–Híd, and KDH seems to be more successful than its predecessor – a significant decline in nationalist tendencies and diplomatic conflicts with Hungary brought on by the new government serve as an example. This tangibly improved policy can then be followed by successful public diplomacy activities, such as the participation of Minister M. Dzurinda in the Budapest Marathon on September 26, 2010.²⁴

²³ See J. Batora, "Prvé kroky slovenskej verejnej diplomacie," *Zahraničná politika* Vol. XIII, No. 2, 2009, pp. 8–9; as well as J.S. Nye, op. cit.

²⁴ Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda himself commented on his activity simply: "Sport unites." His participation was noted and a positively reflected by many media outlets. See for example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b4_AIXAhhkw (accessed on February 19, 2011), as well as "V Budapešti fandili Dzurindovi aj Maďari," *webnoviny.sk*, September 26, 2010, Available online: <http://www.webnoviny.sk/politika/v-budapesti-fandili-dzurindovi-aj-mada/225361-clanok.html> (accessed on February 19, 2011).

IV.

**THE HISTORY OF
SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY**

THE DIPLOMAT MILAN RASTISLAV ŠTEFÁNIK

MIROSLAV MUSIL

*“This tiny man, whose light eyes shine
on his ridged face, is a diplomat and a conqueror.”
Louise Weiss*

ŠTEFÁNIK’S PLACE AMONGST THE CZECHO-SLOVAK TRIO OF FOUNDING FATHERS

Milan Rastislav Štefánik has become a “classic” for many. It seems that there has been so much written and said about him that it is hard to add anything new. Nevertheless, many authors and academics have fallen to the bias of their predecessors and inadequately attributed the successes of the founding of Czecho-Slovakia to the other two leading figures at the expense of Štefánik. Too often they have used phrases such as “He opened the doors to the world leading politicians at the time for Masaryk and Beneš,” or even worse “What Masaryk thought of, Beneš said and Štefánik did” – creating an image depicting Štefánik as a good and obedient soldier. Where was then Štefánik’s brilliant ability to conceive ideas, improvise, lead and persuade skeptics lost?

The top academics say that the biggest compliment for a teacher is that his student will outshine and outperform him. Štefánik treated Masaryk throughout his life as his teacher and as one of his father figures. However, one would certainly lie when claiming that Štefánik remained at the level of executing orders. Quite the contrary, Masaryk’s ideas were transformed by Štefánik into a fully functional strategy within the political situation. That is why it is misleading to date Štefánik’s inclusion into the creation of a new state of Czechs and Slovaks to the time when Štefánik contacted Beneš in Paris. Young Štefánik was doubtlessly strongly influenced by Masaryk’s the-

The core of the study uses the parts of the text by M. Musil, “Diplomat a stratég Milan Rastislav Štefánik (pri príležitosti 130. výročia narodenia),” *Studia Politica Slovaca* Vol 46, No. 2, 2010, pp. 132–139.

ses about the necessity of the dissolution of the Austrian–Hungarian Empire and the creation of a united state for the Czechs and Slovaks. However, he elaborated more on the theses and applied them in his own functional fashion.

Shortly after Štefánik distinguished himself in the ranks of French pilots, he put forth the idea to create a Slovak air force. General Maurice Janin, the commander of the French Air Force at the time, in a letter to the State Secretary for the Air Force on the October 29, 1915 writes:

I have encouraged lieutenant Štefánik in his intentions to draft Slovak volunteers, to create a squadron of this nationality. You have formed a positive opinion to the idea to create an American squadron as well and that we have the interest to group together foreign pilots into a combined fighting unit. This arrangement would encourage their competitiveness and allows strengthening of the sympathy for our cause abroad.¹

Incidentally it is also a testimony that Štefánik upheld his Slovak identity even though he was permanently assimilated abroad. Later he broadened his idea to the Czechs and possibly other Slavs. Štefánik also voluntarily joined a few enticing missions in Serbia (which was then in a very bad situation) with the intention to attain volunteers – the deserters from the Austrian–Hungarian Army, as on

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the Serbian front there were a lot of Czechs and Slovaks. It is almost a miracle that he survived an airplane crash and recuperated in Rome, thanks to the connections of his benefactress Claire Boas de Jouvenelle from Paris.

The noblewoman de Jouvenelle was behind the first breakthrough meeting of Štefánik with the French Prime Minister Aristide Briand, arranged in her prestigious salon, which then took place

on December 23, 1915. Štefánik thus showed to Beneš, with whom he was already in contact, and through him also to Masaryk, how necessary it is to move from inefficient pamphlet propaganda to close negotiations with the highest representatives of the Entente. In Štefánik's thank you letter to Briand from December 24, 1915,² in which an experienced strategist would not omit the preparations of the next steps, there is no mention of Masaryk. One can assume, that the meeting was not intended to prepare the meeting of Briand and Masaryk, as claimed by conventional historiography^{3,4}, it

¹ F. Guelton, E. Braud, M. Kšiňan, *Milan Rastislav Štefánik v archívnych dokumentoch Historickéj služby francúzskeho ministerstva obrany*, Paris: Service historique de la Défense, 2008; Bratislava: Vojenský historický ústav, 2009, p. 41.

² Diplomatic archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. Guerre 1914–1918. Vol. 153, f. 89.

³ J. Juriček, *Milan Rastislav Štefánik*, Bratislava: Mladé letá, 1968.

⁴ B. Ferenčuhová, ed., *Milan Rastislav Štefánik astronome, soldat, grande figure franco-slovaque et européenne*, Paris: L'Association pour l'histoire et la culture de l'Europe centrale et orientale, 1999, p. 66.

was rather aimed at convincing one of the highest representatives of the Entente of the necessity to establish a new state.

The Czech National Committee's calls presented until then during public appearances and periodicals had no effect. A leading French pro-European Louise Weiss stressed that neither the French public nor political parties had problems with the existence of the Austrian–Hungarian Empire.⁵ This fact was also reflected in a negative response of the French Senate's Chairman, Paul Deschanel, to Masaryk's and Štefánik's proposals.⁶ Štefánik brought a fundamental change of the strategy of the founders' team through at least four decisive factors:

1. To move from ineffective and indirect calls to immediate direct negotiations with the high politicians of the Entente. It was mentioned already, what Štefánik did in this matter.
2. To create a Czecho–Slovak Army, which could support or reverse the situation on the Western Front (and provide the reinforcements, which the Russian Empire pledged but did not deliver⁷). This approach could win the sympathy of Entente leaders and put the representatives of Czecho–Slovak Army into a favorable position during the peace negotiations on the side of the Entente powers. Conventional historiography presents Štefánik's efforts to create such an army as some "technical" supplement to Masaryk's approach. As shown later in the text, this Štefánik's idea was in fact crucial and could have been proposed and realized only by Štefánik (!).
3. To create immediately an official political body of the future independent state; originally the Czech National Council, later on the Czecho–Slovak National Council. It soon became the leading authority for the world Czecho–Slovak movement. For the governments of the Entente, it represented a legitimate partner for negotiations. It is worth mentioning that several Slovak authors even nowadays keep ignoring the very important dash in the name of this umbrella institution which was enforced by another member of the founding team, the Slovak Štefan Osuský. The dash then appeared in all documents prepared by Štefánik or Osuský. An example is the Agreement between the Italian government and the Czecho–Slovak National Council, which Štefánik signed with the Italian Prime Minister Orlando on the April 21, 1918.⁸ It is very consistently applied in the international document embedding Czecho–Slovakia in Europe, the Trianon Peace Treaty, even in the seating arrangement of the delegations in the Grand Trianon. The dash version of the name is also preserved on the commemorative plaque beside the *Altare della Patria* in Rome, whose installment was initiated by the present author in his capacity of the director of the Slovak Institute in Rome in 2004. The plaque was officially inaugurated by the former Slovak Prime Minister and the current Foreign Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda on

⁵ L. Weiss, *La République Tchéco-Slovaque*, Paris: Payot, 1919, p. 163.

⁶ J. Juríček, op. cit., p. 109.

⁷ Ibid., p. 110.

⁸ Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma, PCM. Guerra europea, 19.4.3, 7/12.

October 29, 2004; on the day the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed.

4. To provide the governments of the Entente with the very concrete concept of the post-war Central Europe arrangement as a bloc of newly formed or newly defined states, which will support the Entente geographically, politically, militarily and to some extent economically.⁹ Štefánik grandiosely thought about a United States of Europe¹⁰ or about a Danube Confederation.¹¹ However, these ideas are preserved only in very general concepts mentioned in Štefánik's debates with his close partners, such as an important Parisian journalist Robert de Billy.¹²

It was important to present these proposals to the adequate audience. Masaryk put too much emphasis on convincing the United Kingdom. In a memorandum addressed to the British Government through Seton-Watson,¹³ Masaryk labels as the world powers only the USA, UK and the Russian Empire, even though one could predict that the French Government would learn of the details of the Memorandum and would consider

Štefánik was proposing to create a Central European belt of states that could act as reliable partners to the Entente powers and be a buffer zone against Germany. This concept got its confirmation as a key argument in the 1918 March memorandum, with which Štefánik convinced the Italian Government to form the Czecho-Slovak Legions.

it as an insult. The UK later showed as a partner remaining in pragmatic expectation that took position only when the cards were revealed.

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Yugoslavia (12 million people) – create a bloc that will be geographically, politically and partly economically leaned on the Entente Powers, especially on Italy, one can certainly assume..." It is obviously the prototype of the latter so-called Little Entente that could, according to Štefánik, act as a bulwark against German and Hungarian expansionism. Štefánik added to the concept Poland, too. It is very likely, that this is the reason why, on June 28, 1918,¹⁵ the then French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon officially recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council and Czecho-Slovak Army as an allied force and expresses his wish that "the Czecho-Slovak state become soon, with the efforts of the Allies and in the close cooperation with Poland and Yugoslavia, an invincible barrier

⁹ F. Guelton, E. Braud, M. Kšiňan, op. cit., pp. 109–115.

¹⁰ J. Juríček, op. cit., p. 109.

¹¹ Diplomatic archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, PA-AP 021. Robert de Billy, edition 5, f. 172 – 174.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ J. Rychlík, T. Marzik, M. Bielik, R. W. Seton-Watson. *Dokumenty 1906 – 1951, Ústav T. G. Masaryka, Matica slovenská, 1995.*

¹⁴ F. Guelton, E. Braud, M. Kšiňan, op. cit., pp. 109–115.

¹⁵ Military Historical Archive, Prague, ČSNR III – Paris, French recognition, kr. 44.

against German aggression and a factor of peace within Europe...". Štefánik expressed another, unfortunately, prophetic warning: "If the post-war arrangement of Central Europe is not taken care of by the Entente powers, we will find ourselves face-to-face in grave danger, that it will be arranged by Germany, which would thus ensure the success of its immoral 'Weltpolitik.'"

CREATION OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK ARMY AND ITS PITFALLS

Let us return to the argument of the necessity to create a Czecho-Slovak Army. It was the creation of Czecho-Slovak units that convinced the long-hesitating French, Italians, and other Allies about the idea of a Czecho-Slovak Republic. Subsequently, this allowed the Czecho-Slovak National Council to officially declare war against Austria-Hungary and Germany and find itself on the side of winning Allies. This argument is supported by several official documents of gradual recognition of the Czecho-Slovak movement and the Czecho-Slovak National Council as its umbrella body. These include the aforementioned Agreement signed by Orlando and Štefánik in Rome, which define the status of the Czecho-Slovak Army and its command in Italy. Similarly, the United Kingdom announced with the notes from June 3, 1918 and August 9, 1918¹⁶ that it recognized Czecho-Slovakia as an "allied state" and its Army as an "allied fighting force." France in its note from June 29, 1918¹⁷ refers to the autonomous Czecho-Slovak Army. Similar content could be seen in notes from September 2, 1918 and October 19, 1918,¹⁸ by which the USA recognized the right of Czecho-Slovakia for independence, stating that the Czecho-Slovaks are in war with the German and Austrian-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is *de facto* a government, which wages war. The Japanese note from September 9, 1918¹⁹ states:

The Japanese government has the pleasure to announce to consider the Czechoslovak Army as an allied war-waging one that wages regular war against the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and Germany, and recognizes the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council to exercise the highest command over this Army.

The Chinese note from October 3, 1918²⁰ states: "Given that the Czecho-Slovak military operations grow stronger every day, the Chinese Government expresses the hope to achieve its desired goal against Germany and Austria..." These documents are at the same time a testimony, that the Entente powers also respected the "dash" version of the future Czecho-Slovak state and its ruling component.

¹⁶ Military Historical Archive, Prague, ČSNR III – Paris, English recognition, kr. 44.

¹⁷ Military Historical Archive, Prague, ČSNR III – Paris, French recognition, kr. 44.

¹⁸ Military Historical Archive, Prague, ČSNR III – Paris, US recognition, kr. 44.

¹⁹ Military Historical Archive, Prague, ČSNR III – diplomatic korespondence – received, kr. 26.

²⁰ Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, Paris archive, Vol. 10, document No. 1195.

It seemed like an idyll. Entente acutely needed reinforcements and Štefánik was ready to offer them – from prisoners of war (POWs), deserters and volunteers. Paradoxically, Štefánik repeatedly got a negative response from the Entente. In literature, a complex overview of the obstacles or barriers, which Štefánik had to overcome, has been missing. Thus presenting now such an overview puts forth Štefánik's diplomatic skills. The fact, that Štefánik already from the grade of lieutenant accomplished diplomatic missions {served as a diplomat} is proven by the diplomatic passport issued on July 24, 1916, in which are reported missions to Russia and the USA and request for relevant offices to cooperate.²¹ The obstacles Štefánik had to face can be divided into two categories:

1. General barriers for all states, where Štefánik based the Czecho–Slovak Legions (France, Italy, Russia, Romania, etc.)

- a. In the Haag Convention's annex {of 1907} from the October 18, 1907, concerning land warfare, in paragraph 6 states that: "The State may utilize the labor of prisoners of war... The tasks...shall have no connection with the operations of the war."²² The Convention, whose contracting parties were both the members of the Entente and their adversaries, strictly forbid the use of POWs in military operations.
- b. Prisoners being in action against their original Army risked in the case of being captured an immediate execution.
- c. The Allies were afraid of the retaliation measures of the enemies regarding the POW from allied armies.
- d. Prisoners swore loyalty to the government of a different state – their use in action would result into an undesired example for their own Army.
- e. As a rule it was acceptable to use Czechs and Slovaks from the ranks of already existing prisoners. However, convincing them to desert was a deterrent example for the morale of their own Army.
- f. An enemy's deserter was in general considered a potential enemy and/or spy.
- g. Pragmatically, it was difficult to ensure communication of information and orders to the foreign prisoners in a different Army (language, organizational and other barriers).
- h. The question was how to incorporate the newly-formed Czecho–Slovak units in relation to the home Army. The command had the tendency to divide these units, "dissolve" them within other Army units and thus control them better or to create a mixed battalion from the prisoners of other nations. Štefánik, on the other hand, argued that to incorporate the Czecho–Slovak prisoners into a Czecho–Slovak Army under the new state organization of Czecho–Slovakia,

²¹ Slovak National Archive, M. R. Štefánik Fund, No. 24.

²² D. Schindler, J. Toman, *Laws of armed conflicts*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988, p. 76.

which was not a signatory of the Haag Convention of 1907, would avoid established rules of the convention as well as other problems.²³

2. Specific barriers for certain states

2.1 United States of America

The Situation in the United States is well described in a secret note from the French Embassy in Washington from July 31, 1917.²⁴

- a. The USA was not yet in war with Austria–Hungary then (they declared war on December 7, 1917) and therefore refrained from any hostile gestures.
- b. The USA maintained the policy of a unified nation and looked with resentment to create units from specific national groups. Previously the USA refused to create a national army unit to Poles, Romanians and Yugoslavs.
- c. Already in May 1917 President Woodrow Wilson refused the proposition by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt to recruit volunteers for the French front.
- d. An act passed by the US Defense Department disallowed recruitment into other armies but the US'.
- e. The US citizens of Czech and Slovak origin were subjected to duty to the US Army.
- f. The administration of expatriate associations, that usually insured its members, pointed out to the danger of insolvency, if too many members of the association die on the front. (the obligation to pay compensation to the family of the deceased)
- g. The leaders of Czech and especially Slovak associations were at first reluctant to support the creation of joint units.

Štefánik achieved there another diplomatic success, as he successfully harmonized very different concepts of these associations regarding the resistance and the future state of Czechs and Slovaks. Later, when Masaryk signed with his fellow countrymen the Pittsburgh Agreement, he reaped the fruits of Štefánik's campaign. Štefánik succeeded to enter in a negotiation with the advisor, and later the deputy Secretary of State, Frank Polk. Based on these negotiations the US Government promised to allow discrete recruitment of Czech and Slovak volunteers, providing that they,

- a. were not US citizens
- b. were citizens of the USA in the years below 20 or above 30, so out of the recruitment age
- c. eventually the US Government extended the permission to all volunteers of Czech and Slovak origin, which were not recruited into the US Army.

Štefánik had to make sure, that there would be no circumstances that could damage the credibility of the US Government. Here comes, another proof of Štefánik's diplomatic skill, because similar recruitment projects initiated by Serbs and Romanians were

²³ Štefánikova argumentácia voči talianskej vláde, Slovak National Archive, personal M.R. Štefánik fund, No. 1227.

²⁴ Slovak National Archive, M.R. Štefánik Fund, No. 1191.

refused by the US Government as not discrete enough. Štefánik ensured the discretion of his campaign through expatriate associations and their regular events, where the recruitment of volunteers was taking place behind the scene.

2.2 Russian Empire

- a. A barrier created by Štefánik's fellow countrymen, Russophiles, who saw the future of Slovakia in Russia's sphere of influence and discredited Štefánik in front of Russian authorities;
- b. Russian authorities did not take it well that Czecho-Slovak units are meant to fight at the French Western Front and not the Russian Eastern Front;²⁵
- c. A jealousy of the "East" towards the "West."²⁶

General M. Janin in his report concerning Štefánik's visit to the Russian Empire, February 22 – March 7, 1917,²⁷ describes in detail the barriers Štefánik faced at his arrival as well as how he successfully overcame them. Soon he acquired the trust of the Chief of Staff of the Russian Army general Alekseev and his deputy, general Gurkov. Štefánik pointed to the absurd fights between the local Czechs and Slovaks, but most importantly, he got the permission of the reluctant Russian command to transfer the Czecho-Slovak units created in Russia to the Western Front. On the proposal of Russian High Command Štefánik was decorated with the Order of Saint Vladimir. General Alekseev assured Štefánik that he could leave satisfied because the agreements will be upheld.²⁸ In addition to that Štefánik, by signing the Kiev Agreement between the Czech and Slovak countrymen, prepared the grounds for another successful Masaryk mission.

2.3 Romania

The Romanian King himself did not agree that there would be soldiers in his army that had sworn previously to a different ruler. Štefánik managed successfully an agreement that those volunteers that he would acquire from Romanian POW camps, will be moved to the Czecho-Slovak Legion in France, which no longer created an obstacle for the Romanian king.²⁹

2.4 Italy

The Italian Government was worried that his support to Czecho-Slovak ambitions could open a Pandora's Box with the Yugoslav demands in the Adriatic region, which was in direct conflict with Italian future intentions.

To persuade the Italians, Štefánik used diplomacy in the style of medieval knights. In April and May 1916 Štefánik did very risky flights over enemy territories. Based

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ M. Janin, *Note concernant le séjour du Commandant Stefanik en Russie*, Slovak National Archive, personal M.R. Štefánik fund, No. 1136.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ F. Guelton, E. Braud, M. Kšiňan, op. cit., pp. 58–59.

on his flight reports from April 29 till May 4, 1916, he discovered numerous enemy vehicle movements, 13 hangars of enemy air force and numerous barracks clusters.³⁰ Another flight report from May 7, 1916 confirmed, that Štefánik directly initiated bombardment (and participated in), which caused the destruction of the enemy air force squadron, barracks and railway wagons with strategic load.³¹ In addition, he released thousands of flyers over enemy territory encouraging Czechs and Slovaks in the Austrian–Hungarian Army to desert. With these military successes and efforts, Štefánik created the basis for persuasive diplomatic negotiations with the Italian High Command. Nevertheless, during the negotiations he faced both of the aforementioned barriers. When Štefánik found himself in this situation, he used a help of his friend Marquise Giuliana Benzoni.³² Thanks to her contacts, she arranged a meeting for Štefánik with the Italian Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando, enabling Štefánik to “bypass” the Italian Foreign Minister Sydney Sonnino, who similarly as the Italian High Command refused to use Czech and Slovak POWs in military operations.³³ Furthermore, Marquise Giuliana Benzoni informed Štefánik about the serious disagreements between Orlando and Sonnino, which was later confirmed by the French Ambassador Barrère.³⁴ Combining the brilliant argumentation with the tactical negotiation, Štefánik achieved to sign with Orlando the aforementioned Agreement establishing Czecho–Slovak Legions in Italy, on April 21, 1918. It was the first international document, in which Czecho–Slovakia appears as a signatory state.

Štefánik's promotion to general was not connected to what he achieved, but was related to what he was expected to achieve – to retain the needed authority within Italy and establish the necessary authority within the Russian Empire.

CZECHO–SLOVAK GENERAL APPOINTED BY FRANCE

Štefánik's military grades progressed up steeply – proportionally to the significance of his diplomatic and military missions. In literature it is often mistakenly stated³⁵ that Štefánik was promoted to the brigadier general of the French Army in relation to his success in Italy. In reality, his promotion to general was not connected to what he

³⁰ Stato Maggiore dell'Esercizio, Ufficio storico, Roma, AUSMEE, Miscellanea, L3 Studi particolari, busta 175, fascicolo 2.

³¹ F. Guelton, E. Braud, M. Kšiňan, op. cit., pp. 58–59.

³² G. Benzoni, *La vita ribelle*, Milan: Il Mulino, 1985, p. 48.

³³ Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma, PCM, Guerra europea, 7.8.1917, 19.4.3, 7/9. Formazione ed impiego dei reparti cecho-slovacchi.

³⁴ F. Guelton, E. Braud, M. Kšiňan, op. cit., pp. 82–83.

³⁵ M. Hronský, “M. R. Štefánik – organizovanie a štátotvorná úloha česko-slovenských légii,” in *Generál Dr. Milan Rastislav Štefánik – vojak a diplomat*, Bratislava: Military Historical Institute, 1999, pp. 38–56.

achieved, but was related to what he was expected to achieve – to retain the needed authority within Italy and establish the necessary authority within the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, it was not easy for the French Army, which highly praised Štefánik, to see a soldier become a general in such a short period of time. It is characteristic that the solution came from the French Head of Diplomacy Stephen Pichon. He mentioned, that he was aware of the fact that Štefánik could not be promoted to general within the valid rules of the French Army, because his progress was already too fast. Pichon proposed to the Defense Ministry that “without promoting Štefánik to a general of the French Army..., it is acceptable to promote him to a general of the Czecho-Slovak Army, with the paramount symbols of the referred Army, carrying the distinguishing grade of Major General!”³⁶ In the appointing decree from June 20, 1918, signed by the French Prime Minister and Minister of War George Clémenceau, it is stated that “the lieutenant colonel Štefánik is promoted to Major General with respect to his mission within the Czecho-Slovak Army... He will exercise authority of his rank only towards Czecho-Slovak units...”³⁷ As a result, having in mind this appointing decree, as well as the proposal argumentation, Štefánik was not a French Major General but a Major General appointed by France. It is necessary to mention, the symbols of the Czecho-Slovak Army were very similar to the ones of the French Army. In terms of Štefánik’s authority – at the time and at the present as well – it is not important in what context he was appointed as a General.

CHERCHEZ LA FEMME

Štefánik knew the golden rule of diplomacy: “Cherchez la femme!” (“Look for the woman!”) It is usually commented as an anecdotal supplement to his activities, e.g.: “While Beneš was taking care of the politicians, Štefánik took care of their wives.” In reality, the women were the key to access high level politicians.

His first fiancée Yvonne was the daughter of the influential French senator and also Minister of the Navy, Émile Chautemps, who supported Štefánik politically and financially in both his astronomical and political endeavors. Chautemps, who was himself a member of the Freemasonry,³⁸ introduced Štefánik to other influential partners. As a matter of fact, Štefánik was sent to his first diplomatic mission ever to Ecuador by Anatole de Monzie, also an influential freemason.

³⁶ M. Musil, “Diplomatická stratégia Milana Rastislava Štefánika ako rozhodujúci faktor vzniku Česko-Slovenskej republiky vo svetle zahraničných archívov,” in M. Čaplovič, B. Ferenčuhová, M. Stanová, *Milan Rastislav Štefánik v zrkadle prameňov a najnovších poznatkov historiografie*, Bratislava: Military Historical Institute, 2010, p. 156, 161.

³⁷ Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. Europe 1918–1940, Tchecoslovaquie Vol. 8, pp. 101–102.

³⁸ B. Michel, “Les amitiés parisiennes du général Milan Rastislav Štefánik,” in B. Ferenčuhová, ed., op. cit., pp. 34–40.

The wife of another influential senator, Claire Boas de Jouvenelle, introduced Štefánik into highest French circles. Her cousin Louise Weiss mediated his access to media and other political contacts. His “political guide” in Rome was his other fiancée, Marquise Giuliana Belzoni. The Marquise was not a novice in diplomacy then and she proved to be resourceful as a “liaison woman” during secret negotiations between France and Italy about including Italy into the war on the side of the Entente.³⁹

CONCLUSION OF ŠTEFÁNIK'S DIPLOMATIC MISSION

Only Štefánik could realize that for the predominantly catholic Slovakia (unlike in the case of the predominantly protestant Bohemia) it was necessary to create a functional bond of the new state with the Holy See. In a dispatch by the Italian legacy it is mentioned that Štefánik was the only one of the founders of Czech–Slovakia, who met with the Holy Father.⁴⁰

In literature, Štefánik is not praised enough for his practically last diplomatic mission, where he achieved a very needed agreement between the French and Italian command about the division and control of their respective armies in the newly-established Czecho–Slovakia, as he informed Masaryk about it.⁴¹ Afterwards, Štefánik took his flight home, to the request of minister Šrobár.

Several historians respond to the questions raised regarding the unresolved mystery of Štefánik's tragic death with an allegedly objective report of the Italian captain Zapelloni from May 4, 1919. In reality, in that report there are objectively provable false affirmations. At the time, Italy and France were in a fierce competition, as for who will supply the newly created state with airplanes.⁴² Thus, Zapelloni clearly had to seek to present as many arguments as possible to avoid any considerations of possible problems of the Italian airplane Caproni. Zapelloni received such orders from his commanding officers.⁴³ For this purpose, the easiest way was to blame someone who could not defend himself – Štefánik. Zapelloni presents the most likely cause of

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³⁹ G. Benzoni, op. cit., p. 48.

⁴⁰ “Archivio Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Archivio del Gabinetto del Ministro. Czecho-Slovacchi,” March 2, 1919.

⁴¹ “Archivio Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Archivio del Gabinetto del Ministro. Czecho-Slovacchi,” April 18, 1919.

⁴² M. Musil, A. Biagini, *Milan Rastislav Štefánik vo svetle talianskych archívov*, Bratislava: Nadácia pre záchranu kultúrneho dedičstva, 2010, pp. 186.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 175, 176.

the accident by claiming that Štefánik took the pilot's seat, lost consciousness and as he collapsed upon the steering wheel he caused the accident. According to the report, the gradual emotional escalation of Štefánik, after seeing the crowd waiting for him at the airport and being aware that his mother (!) was amongst them, contributed to his loss of consciousness. In reality, there was no crowd awaiting Štefánik. As the general Piccione states in his report from May 7,⁴⁴ according to the weather conditions in the morning, they did not expect Štefánik's arrival. Thus, Piccione together with minister Šrobár, left for a celebration to Skalica – where Štefánik's mother was likely to be present. In order to justify that Štefánik was piloting the plane, Zapelloni argues that Štefánik himself expressed the wish to pilot the airplane to his homeland. One can logically assume, that if the Minister General Štefánik had this desire, he would have done it in front of the legion in Campoformido and would not have attempted to climb over to the pilot's seat in the middle of the flight, which was very risky. There are records of communication between the Italian pilot and Štefánik in the "black box" i.e. in the notepad of the mechanic in the back of the plane, yet none mentioning that Štefánik would swap his place with the one of the pilots. It seems unlikely that the person taking care of the flight journal would miss to mention such a swap between Štefánik and the pilot. Several investigators, which put much effort into the reconstruction of the accident, doubt that such a change between the pilot and the passenger could be possible.

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⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 131.

V.

ANNEXES

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE IMPORTANT EVENTS IN SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY IN 2010

January 14 During a working visit to Slovakia Spanish Prime Minister, J.L. Zapatero, discussed with Prime Minister R. Fico the bilateral relations and priorities of the Spanish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The visit created an outlook to strengthen mutual economic cooperation. R. Fico expressed support for the priorities of the Spanish Presidency and asked to give special attention to the topic of energy security.

January 18 For the first time since declaring independence, Montenegro's Prime Minister, M. Đukanović, arrived to Slovakia for the official visit. After discussing with R. Fico, both Prime Ministers expressed interest to build bilateral relations and agreed on establishing a Slovak Embassy in Podgorica and a Montenegrin Embassy in Bratislava. Slovak representatives expressed their support for Montenegrin ambitions within the EU integration process.

January 27 During an official visit to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, P. Paška, met with the highest representatives of Vietnam. The main goal of the visit was to intensify economic cooperation.

January 27 Slovak Government agreed to dispatch a new guard unit of 57 members of the Slovak Armed Forces into the Afghan province of Kandahar. The total number the Slovak Armed Forces taking part in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan rose to 319.

February 4 During his visit to the Slovak Republic, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhang Zhi-jun, spoke with Foreign Minister M. Lajčák about human rights, the possibilities of intensifying

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commercial and economic cooperation, and about Iran's nuclear program. M. Lajčák considered this visit as a continuation of friendly dialogue that Slovakia leads with China in which there are no open issues.

February 8 Chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic J. Horváth received the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, K. Vollebaek. After the meeting with the Foreign Minister M. Lajčák announced that Slovakia is focusing on the interpretation and enforcement of the language law and to preserve the balance between protecting the official state language and providing rights to minorities to use their languages.

February 8 The Foreign Ministry welcomed a calm course of the presidential elections in the Ukraine. The elections were assessed as free and fair. The Ministry expressed the readiness of Slovakia to actively cooperate with the Ukrainian Government on their bilateral relations and to help close the gap between the Ukraine and transatlantic structures.

February 9 Foreign Ministry welcomed the approval of the new European Commission by the European Council and at the same time the Ministry welcomed that the Slovak diplomat M. Šefčovič became European Commission Vice-President and Commissioner for inter-institutional relations and administration.

February 15 Slovakia, as a member of the United Nations Council for Human Rights, expressed serious concern over the situation of human rights in Iran. The Slovak Republic has questioned the high number of capital punishments, limiting freedom of speech and the freedom of peaceful assembly and has advised the Iranian government to enforce measures to eliminate violence against women.

February 16 Foreign Minister M. Lajčák received the Australian Foreign Minister S. Smith. It was historically the first official visit of the Australian Foreign Minister to the Slovak Republic.

February 17 German Foreign Minister, G. Westerwelle, was received by the Slovak President I. Gašparovič and Prime Minister R. Fico. After a discussion between foreign ministers, M. Lajčák characterized Germany as a key strategic partner. The two discussed the expansion of the EU to the Western Balkans and signed a common declaration of an amendment to the Agreement of Cultural Cooperation between the Slovak Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, which is to legally strengthen the status of a German school in Bratislava.

February 18 President I. Gašparovič attended the inauguration of the reelected president of the Croatian Republic I. Josipović. To the invitation of the President I. Gašparovič, I. Josipović arrived to an official visit of the Slovak Republic on May 19, 2011.

February 24 At an extended summit of the V4 prime ministers concerning energy security in Budapest, a V4+ declaration was adopted. The declaration emphasized the need for the diversification of energy sources, transportation and the creation of energetic solidarity amongst the nations. The summit was attended by V4 representatives, high representatives of Central and Southeastern Europe, a representative from the United States of America and the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency.

February 25 The Foreign Ministry welcomed the recommendation of the European Commission to start accession negotiations with the Republic of Iceland. At the same time Foreign Minister

M. Lajčák pinpointed that the process of the EU enlargement must follow necessary criteria without favoring one candidate country or another.

March 2 V4 foreign ministers discussed the intensified cooperation with the Eastern Partnership nations in Budapest. In its conclusion, ministers signed a common declaration about Eastern Partnership Cooperation.

March 3 The government of the Slovak Republic adopted a National position towards the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, which follows the main ideas outlined by the European Commission: transportation, water and socio-economic development.

March 15 Foreign Minister M. Lajčák began his trip to the countries of the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia) aimed at discussing the economic cooperation and negotiations of basic economic agreements. The delegation was accompanied by a group of Slovak businessmen.

March 26 Euro zone member states agreed on a rescue package for Greece. Prime Minister R. Fico, the head of the Slovak delegation, emphasized the responsibilities of the Euro zone and the principle of solidarity. Keeping with the accord of this attitude, the Slovak Republic supported the idea to create a financial mechanism for euro zone member states in financial need.

March 30 During his official visit to Kazakhstan, President I. Gašparovič met with President N. Nazarbayev. The visit was an expression of an interest of the Slovak Republic to continue the political dialogue on the highest level.

March 30 At the invitation of the Prime Minister J. Fisher, Prime Minister R. Fico paid an official visit to the Czech Republic. Both prime ministers consider the preparations for a joint construction of a new nuclear source in the nuclear power plant, Jaslovské Bohunice, the most actual and important project in the area of commercial cooperation.

April 6 President I. Gašparovič received the Russian President D. Medvedev in Bratislava. The President of the Russian Federation was accompanied by the Foreign Minister as well as the Justice Minister and the Energy Minister. Besides the nine agreements, which were signed, the Presidents announced a Common declaration to the 65th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe, which admitted credit to Russia and the Red Army during the liberation of Slovakia.

April 14 Foreign Minister M. Lajčák was received in Kiev by the highest representatives of the newly established Ukrainian administration, as one of the first heads of diplomacy of the EU countries. The goal of his visit was to start a dialogue with the new government and confirm the interest of Slovakia for intensive relations with the Ukraine. M. Lajčák signed with his Ukrainian counterpart K. Hryshchenko a protocol on Mutual cooperation of the Ministries. With the Ukrainian President J. Janukovych, he discussed the transit of energy resources through the territory of Ukraine and energy security issues.

April 18 The highest constitutional representatives of the Slovak Republic attended the funeral of the Polish President and the Polish First Lady who died during a tragic plane accident near the Russian town of Smolensk. Slovakia declared a national day of mourning.

April 30 Foreign Minister M. Lajčák met representatives of Obama's administration in Washington D.C. They discussed the cooperation in issues of global security, relations between the EU and the USA, the situation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the EU's Eastern Partnership. With Congressman P. Visclosky, M. Lajčák also discussed the interest of Slovakia to intensify mutual cooperation with the USA on a parliamentary level. A long-term goal is to achieve the creation of a Slovak caucus in the American Congress.

April 30 At the meeting in New York, Foreign Minister M. Lajčák met the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Secretary-General and praised active participation of Slovak Diplomats in Central Asia, most notably in preventing conflict and resolution of the crisis in Kyrgyzstan and acknowledged the Slovak security sector reform initiative and support to the activity of the International Criminal Court.

May 7 Euro zone leaders agreed to provide Greece with 80 billion euros in a joint package with the IMF of 110 billion euro. The Slovak Republic was set to contribute with a bilateral loan in the sum of 817 million euro. The Slovak Government, however, postponed the approval of the credit in Parliament to the period after the parliamentary elections (June 12).

May 26 As a response to the Hungarian amendment to the citizenship law and the law on national solidarity, the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved a government proposal to amend the law on state citizenship. The law sets the loss of the Slovak citizenship *ex lege* as a result of willingly acquiring citizenship of a foreign state. The clause does not apply when acquiring citizenship of a foreign state through marriage or birth.

June 3 Foreign Minister M. Lajčák, after a meeting with the Serbian counterpart V. Jeremić in Bratislava, considered relations between Serbia and Slovakia as very friendly and exceptional on a political level. The two signed a memorandum between the two ministries concerning cooperation of diplomatic academies.

June 12 The parliamentary elections' turnout in the Slovak Republic was 58.83 per cent. The elections were won by the political party SMER-SD (34.79 per cent). Four political parties have agreed to create a coalition: SDKÚ-DS (15.42 per cent), SaS (12.14 per cent), KDH (8.52 per cent) and Most-Híd (8.12 per cent) and formed the government headed by I. Radičová.

July 1 Slovakia was handed over the V4 Presidency from Hungary. The main priorities of the Slovak Presidency were strengthening the regional cooperation of V4 in the areas of energy security, infrastructure development, economic cooperation and social inclusion of the Roma minority.

July 12 Prime Minister I. Radičová made her first official trip abroad to Brussels. At the meetings with the President of the European Council H. Van Rompuy, the President of Eurogroup J.C. Juncker, and the Commissioner for inter-institutional relations and administration M. Šeřčovič she explained the position of Slovakia on the European Financial Stabilization Facility and loan to Greece.

July 15 Newly appointed Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda traditionally paid his first visit as the Foreign Minister to the Czech Republic. In Prague, he was received by his counterpart K. Schwarzenberg, the *Chairperson* of Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, M. Němcová and by the Prime Minister P. Nečas.

July 15 The Slovak government has approved the decision of the previous administration and would not block the European Stabilization Financial Facility (ESPF). However, the Government stressed that it would support its implementation only under the prerequisite of tightening the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, including the possibility of a controlled state bankruptcy. In the following resolution the Government did recommend to Parliament not to refuse the loan to Greece. The voting of MPs took place on August 11. It approved the membership of the Slovak Republic in the EFSF and refused a bail-out plan for Greece. The contribution of the Slovak Republic to the EFSF should amount to 4,37 billion euro out of the total of 750 billion euro.

July 19 Czech Prime Minister P. Nečas paid his first official trip abroad after assuming the office traditionally to the Slovak Republic. Main topics of his discussion with the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic R. Sulík and the Prime Minister I. Radičová were bilateral relations, energy security, economic reforms and social security issues in the context of the financial crisis, possibilities of further development of mutual cooperation between the Slovak and Czech Republics, strengthening exceptionally good bilateral relations as well as cooperation in the V4 and EU.

July 20 Prime Minister I. Radičová participated in the prime ministers V4 summit in Budapest. The prime ministers approved the program of the Slovak chairmanship for the period of July 2010 to June 2011. They also discussed promotion of the V4 mutual interests within the EU, strengthening the energy security, revision of the EU budget and a new financial framework as well as the Danube Strategy of the EU. After the summit I. Radičová had a bilateral meeting with the Hungarian Prime Minister V. Orbán.

July 20 Prime Minister I. Radičová met the NATO Secretary-General A.F. Rasmussen in Brussels. During the meeting, they focused on the preparation of the new NATO's Strategic concept. Prime Minister I. Radičová confirmed that the Slovak Republic will abide to the political commitment to gradually increase the participation of the Slovak Armed Forces in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

July 22 The Foreign Ministry took into account the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. The opinion says that the declaration of independence did not violate general international law because international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence, so Kosovo has not broken international law. The Foreign Ministry emphasized that the conclusion of the International Court is of advisory character and will not change the official position of the Slovak Republic.

July 23 I. Radičová paid her first visit as the Prime minister to the Republic of Poland. Talks with her counterpart D. Tusk, the Marshall of the Sejm G. Schetyna and the Governor of Poland's Central Bank M. Belka, aimed at energy security and intensifying cooperation in building strategic regional pipelines connecting north and south. They also discussed the financial perspective of the EU and V4 for 2014–2020 and the possibility of introducing the Euro currency in Poland.

July 29 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda was received in Berlin by his German counterpart G. Westerwelle. The main topics of their debates focused on the issues of the EU – mainly stability and European development.

August 23 During the first official visit to Austria while in, the Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda discussed the deepening of the economic cooperation between the two countries with the

Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Finance J. Pröll. During the negotiations with his counterpart M. Spendelegger talks concentrated on the issues of the Western Balkans, bilateral cooperation, Nabucco pipeline and other European issues.

August 27 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda paid a first official visit to the Transcarpathian Oblast of Ukraine. He met the local governor O. Ledych and visited a local Slovak school. The goal of the visit was to strengthen cross-border cooperation between Eastern Slovak regions and the Transcarpathian Oblast, where lives a numerous Slovak minority. Minister M. Dzurinda has also supported integration ambitions of the Ukraine.

September 4 President I. Gašparovič officially opened the National Day of the Slovak Republic at the World Expo 2010. He also paid an official visit to Hong Kong, Macao and the Kingdom of Cambodia. The President was accompanied by the Economy Minister J. Miškov and a group of Slovak businesspersons.

September 13 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda and NATO Secretary-General A.F. Rasmussen met in Brussels and discussed security issues, ISAF operation in Afghanistan, reform as well as the future of NATO.

September 14 V4 foreign ministers gathered in Bratislava to discuss energy security within the V4, the financial framework of the EU, transatlantic relations, anti-missile defense system project and cooperation of the V4 in the consular area.

September 14 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda during a meeting with his Moldavian counterpart I. Leancă in Bratislava expressed support for a pro-European path of Moldova.

September 16 During the V4 presidency the working meeting of the V4 prime ministers and the President of the European Council H. van Rompuy took place prior to the European Council meeting in Brussels. The meeting focused on the priorities of the Slovak V4 Presidency and the program session. As for the European Council conclusions, Slovakia considered the reference to the European prospects of the Western Balkans as well as relations with the EU's Eastern neighbors through the Eastern Partnership program very important.

September 17 Prime Minister I. Radičová opened the NATO Military Committee conference in the High Tatras. The two-day conference of NATO's highest military body was aimed at operations, restructuring and at NATO's new strategic concept.

September 20 The first official visit of the Speaker of the Parliament R. Sulík was paid to the Czech Republic. During the visit, he met Czech President V. Klaus and Senate Chairman P. Sobotka (ODS).

September 20 Minister of Defense Ľ. Galko assured the Secretary General of NATO, that even with the complicated economic situation, the Slovak Republic will keep its forces and resources deployed in NATO operations. Ľ. Galko considered the ISAF military operation in Afghanistan as a priority.

September 22 During the UN General Assembly in New York, Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda met his Russian counterpart S. Lavrov. Both ministers discussed the issues of energy security, cooperation between the EU and Russia as well as NATO and Russia. M. Dzurinda also met the

US Secretary of State H. Clinton. During the Millennium Development Goals round-table on Support to Sustainable Development M. Dzurinda emphasized Slovakia's contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gases and increasing energy efficiency.

September 25 During a working visit to the United States of America, President I. Gašparovič addressed the UN General Assembly as well as at the summit of the Millennium Development Goals. At the meeting with the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, the President reiterated Slovakia's commitments to the peace missions in Cyprus, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

September 27 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda agreed with his Hungarian counterpart J. Martonyi that problems in bilateral relations could be resolved through an open and friendly dialogue, while for sensitive issues a mechanism of early warning shall be created.

September 27 Prime Minister I. Radičová announced during the concluding ceremony of cooperation between Slovak and Czech military personnel in Kosovo that Slovakia, as a NATO, member would be supporting the KFOR activities in Kosovo, despite the fact that the Slovak contingent in Kosovo would be withdrawn by the end of November. The KFOR Commander was also informed that the decision of the Slovak Government was adopted due to the focus on the mission in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of 136 members of the Slovak Armed Forces from the KFOR mission in Kosovo was adopted by the Government of the Slovak Republic on September 29.

September 29 OSCE High Commissioner on national minorities K. Vollebaek paid a visit to Slovakia. The 2009 amendments to the Act concerning the official language of the Slovak Republic was the topic of the talks with the Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities R. Chmel, Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Dzurinda, Minister of Culture D. Krajcer and political representatives of the Hungarian minority. Slovak representatives informed him about planned amendments to the Act, the situation of national minorities in Slovakia and intentions of the government in regards to national minorities.

October 5–8 During an official visit to Ukraine President I. Gašparovič together with the Ukrainian President V. Yanukovich opened the Slovak–Ukrainian business forum. Foreign Ministry's State Secretary M. Ježovica signed a bilateral agreement on cancellation of national visa fees.

October 5 During an official visit paid to Serbia, Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda confirmed Slovakia's position concerning the independence of Kosovo. The talks with Serbian representatives focused on relations between the EU and Serbia and future dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. The Serbian partners appreciated the significant contribution of the Slovak Republic, its diplomacy and NGOs to the democratic changes in Serbia that had taken place 10 years ago.

October 8 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda welcomed that the Chinese dissident and political prisoner Liou Xiaobo was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. The Ministry regretted that the prize would be awarded in his absence.

October 18 During her first official visit to the Czech Republic, Prime Minister I. Radičová met with the highest representatives of the state and discussed strengthening the cooperation between the two states with an emphasis on economic agenda and energy security. The financial policy of the EU member states and cooperation of the two countries within the V4 framework was on the agenda as well.

October 19 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda met his American counterpart H. Clinton. The two discussed political issues, military as well as economic cooperation. H. Clinton stressed the role Slovakia plays in integrating the Western Balkans and Eastern neighbors into the Euro-Atlantic structures and the positive example of wider European integration Slovakia poses. She also appreciated Slovak contribution to the NATO ISAF mission.

October 22 Based on the invitation of the Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda a meeting of V4 and the countries of the Western Balkans ministers with the representatives of the Belgian EU Presidency took place in Bratislava. The ministers discussed the V4 cooperation in realization of the mutual projects and activities aimed at the sharing of transition experience and integration know-how with Western Balkan partners.

October 24 The construction project enabling the reverse flow of natural gas from Austria to Slovakia was completed and launched in Baumgarten. The event was attended by the Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda, the Economy Minister J. Miškov, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Austria J. Kyrle and the OMV Gas & Power Executive Board Member W. Auli.

October 25 At the meetings of the General Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council, ministers referred to Serbia's application for EU membership. Slovakia with some other member states requested this issue to be included in the agenda of the Council, and fully supported the soonest possible start of accession negotiations.

October 26 President I. Gašparovič received His Majesty Norwegian King Harald V. and Her Majesty Norwegian Queen Sonja. On the occasion of this visit Memorandums of understanding were signed setting priorities of the grants granted within the Financial Mechanism of European Economic Area and Norwegian Financial Mechanism for 2009–2014.

November 3 The Government of the Slovak Republic approved of the proposal to deploy members of the Slovak Armed Forces into the military mission ISAF in Afghanistan and to increase its total number to 348.

November 8–10 During the working visit to the United States of America, Prime Minister I. Radičová negotiated with the representatives of the American financial and business community and informed them about the measures the government prepared to attract foreign investors. She also met with the Secretary of State H. Clinton which supported the effort of the Slovak Government to reform the judicial system and law enforcement.

November 10 The Foreign Ministry welcomed the document issued by the European Commission on the Enlargement Strategy and main challenges for 2010–2011 as well as Progress Reports of individual candidate countries. Slovakia expressed support for conclusion of accession talks with Croatia in 2011 and welcomed the recommendations to grant Montenegro candidate status.

November 19–20 President I. Gašparovič led the Slovak delegation on the NATO summit in Lisbon, where a new Strategic concept was adopted. At the summit, a transition to Afghan responsibility beginning in 2011 with Afghan forces taking the lead for security across Afghanistan by 2014 was announced. During the summit the Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda also met his Ukrainian counterpart K. Hryshenko.

November 24 The Foreign Ministry's State Secretary, M. Ježovica, emphasized at the conference, Global presentation of the Slovak Republic – possibilities and challenges, the need to create a functional system for a coordinated presentation of the Slovak Republic abroad. Its core is to be a clear basic system of values. This system should be created by effective cooperation of the Government, NGOs, businesses and academics.

November 25 On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Slovakia's OECD accession, the OECD Secretary-General Á. Gurría paid visit to Slovakia. He met the highest representatives of the Slovak Republic. Together with Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda he opened an international economic conference evaluating Slovakia's OECD activities. During a visit, he also presented the OECD Economic Survey of the Slovak Republic 2010.

November 29 The Foreign Ministry welcomed that the early parliamentary elections in Moldova met most of the OCSE and Council of Europe commitments.

December 1 In accordance with the Government's decision to decrease spending and increase the efficiency of the public administration, the Foreign Ministry announced a change of its organizational structure. The changes are supposed to increase operational capabilities to meet the goals set in the Government Manifesto, such as building a modern European diplomacy and management of commercial and economic sections of the Embassies abroad.

December 1 The Foreign Ministry welcomed the creation of a European External Action Service. The Ministry also expressed the interest of the Slovak Republic to actively contribute to its operation with the experience gained in the Western Balkans and countries of the Eastern Partnership. The former Foreign Minister M. Lajčák became a Managing Director for Russia, Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans.

December 2 The negotiations under the Slovak chairmanship on the future regime of arms control and disarmament in Europe began at the OSCE summit in Astana. Slovakia successfully promoted the topic of energy security to be included in summit conclusions. During the summit, President I. Gašparovič met the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, N. Ramanović whom he assured of Slovak support for the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the EU. Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda met with his Kazakh counterpart K. Saudabajev. Both discussed mainly the issues of economic cooperation.

December 10 In Cancun, an agreement was signed at the 16th Conference of the Contracting Parties of the UN Framework Agreement Concerning the Climate Change, the developed nations committed themselves to spend till 2020 around USD 100 billion annually to the implementation of mitigation and adaptation measures in developing countries. The Slovak delegation at the conference was led by the Minister of Environment J. Nagy.

December 10 Defense Minister L. Galko visited the Slovak contingent in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The commander of the EUFOR General-Major B. Bair appreciated the decision of the Slovak Republic to increase the number of personnel in the mission and offered Slovakia the possibility to be the leading nation of the EUFOR in Region South. On December 17, 2010 the Government of the Slovak Republic approved to withdraw a guard unit of 35 members of the Slovak Armed Forces from the operation EUFOR-ALTHEA and approved to send another 43 members from the January 1, 2011.

December 14 On the invitation of Prime Minister I. Radičová and within the preparations for the Hungarian EU Presidency, the Prime Minister of Hungary V. Orbán paid a visit to the Slovak Republic. The two partners agreed to build a north-south interconnection pipeline Veľký Krtíš–Vecsés, which is to be part of a larger North–South corridor. Both noted the progress of the joint commissions and confirmed the differences of opinions on the issue of the state citizenship

December 16 Foreign Minister M. Dzurinda met his Polish counterpart R. Sikorski in Warsaw. Both ministers emphasized the strategic importance of the project connecting Prešov with Polish Rzeszów and North-South corridor pipeline project. Ministers also discussed the possibility of mutual representation in visa issue procedures in third countries.

December 16–17 The European Council decided on the framework for future European Stabilization Mechanism, which would replace current temporary financial mechanisms by January 1, 2013. It also decided to grant candidate status to Montenegro which was strongly promoted by Slovakia and as a V4 presiding country, the Slovak Republic initiated a letter of foreign ministers to the Belgian EU Presidency and to the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Š. Füle.

December 20 The Foreign Ministry announced with regret that despite the small progress of Belarus in the pre-election period, the presidential elections, which took place on December 19, 2010, violated international standards. The Ministry strongly condemned the use of force against Belarusian citizens and called for the immediate release of imprisoned persons and the investigation of the use of violence against participants of demonstrations and journalists.

December 21 The Head of the Slovak Permanent Mission to International Organizations in Vienna M. Peško signed, with the mandate of the President, an agreement of creating an International Anti-Corruption Academy. The Slovak Republic became one of the founding members of the first international and educational institution of this kind.

TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, CONVENTIONS PUBLISHED IN 2010

BILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

INTERSTATES TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

1. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic on avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income
(Damask, February 18, 2009, published under the No. 35/2010 Coll.)
2. Instrument on extradition between the Slovak Republic and the United States of America as contemplated by Article 3 of the Agreement between the Slovak Republic and United States of America on mutual legal assistance signed on June 25, 2003
(Bratislava, February 6, 2006, published under the No. 29/2010 Coll.)
3. Instrument on extradition between the Slovak Republic and the United States of America as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on mutual legal assistance signed on June 25, 2003
(Bratislava, February 6, 2006, published under the No. 28/2010 Coll.)
4. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Korea on social security
(Bratislava, February 9, 2009, published under the No. 51/2010 Coll.)
5. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia on avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and property
(Bratislava, October 5, 2009, published under the No. 153/2010 Coll.)

6. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Lebanese Republic on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments
(Beirut, February 20, 2009, published under the No. 223/2010 Coll.)
7. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments
(Amman, February 21, 2008, published under the No. 249/2010 Coll.)
8. Further enforcement of bilateral agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic after the beginning of the complete enforcement of Schengen acquis by both states that took place on August 2–3, 2007 in Prague
(published under the No. 257/2010 Coll.)
9. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the People’s Bureau of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income
(Bratislava, February 20, 2009, published under the No. 258/2010 Coll.)
10. Confirmation of the Agreements between the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Iraq after the succession of the Slovak Republic in respect to the Treaties and Agreements signed by the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
(published under the No. 301/2010 Coll.)
11. Expiration of the validity of the Agriculture Agreement between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Swiss Confederation (exchange of notes)
(Bern, June 10, 1992, published under the No. 370/2010 Coll.)
12. Agreement between the Slovak Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on the privileges and immunities of the liaison officers seconded by the Slovak Republic to Europol
(The Hague, September 30, 2009, published under the No. 393/2010 Coll.)
13. Expiration of the validity of the Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Mongolian People’s Republic on cooperation in the field of plant quarantine and plant protection
(Prague, December 9, 1966, published under the No. 395/2010 Coll.)
14. Expiration of the validity of the Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Mongolian People’s Republic on cooperation in the field of veterinary medicine
(Ulaanbaatar, October 21, 1964, published under the No. 394/2010 Coll.)
15. Protocol between the Slovak Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands changing and amending the Agreement between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and property and protocol to the Agreement
(Bratislava, June 7, 2010, published under the No. 450/2010 Coll.)

INTERGOVERNMENTAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

1. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on economic cooperation
(Ankara, March 16, 2007, published under the No. 19/2010 Coll.)
2. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Romania on scientific and technological cooperation
(Bratislava, March 31, 2009, published under the No. 44/2010 Coll.)
3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Serbia on development cooperation
(Belgrade, December 3, 2007, published under the No. 49/2010 Coll.)
4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Moldova on cooperation and mutual assistance in custom matters
(Bratislava, March 2, 2007, published under the No. 72/2010 Coll.)
5. Expiration of the validity of the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the donation of the military material signed in Kabul on February 23 as amended by First Amendment signed in Sevilla on February 8, 2007
(published under the No. 99/2010 Coll.)
6. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on scientific and technological cooperation
(Pretoria, May 15, 2006, published under the No. 156/2010 Coll.)
7. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic Slovenia on the gainful occupation of dependents of members of diplomatic missions and consular posts
(Bled, August 30, 2009, published under the No.167/2010 Coll.)
8. Agreement between the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Federal Drug Control Service of Russian Federation on cooperation in combating the illicit trafficking of narcotics, psychotropic substances and precursors
(Bratislava, April 7, 2010, published under the No.182/2010 Coll.)
9. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Montenegro on mutual protection of classified information
(Podgorica, June 17, 2009, published under the No. 183/2010 Coll.)
10. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the French Republic on mutual exchange and protection of classified information
(Bratislava, January 26, 2010, published under the No. 190/2010 Coll.)
11. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on cooperation in military issues
(Budapest, October 8, 2010, published under the No. 191/2010 Coll.)

12. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on mutual protection of classified information (Tirana, June 18, 2009, published under the No. 241/2010 Coll.)
13. Executive protocol between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation to the Agreement between the European Communities and the Russian Federation on readmission signed on May 25, 2006 (Bratislava, April 7, 2010, published under the No. 284/2010 Coll.)
14. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and European Space Agency concerning space cooperation for peaceful purposes (Bratislava, April 28, 2010, published under the No. 319/2010 Coll.)
15. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia on police cooperation in the fight against crime (Bratislava, October 5, 2009, published under the No. 326/2010 Coll.)
16. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the abolition of visa requirements for holders of diplomatic and service passports (Jakarta, March 29, 2010, published under the No. 330/2010 Coll.)
17. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on war graves (Bratislava, November 2, 2009, published under the No. 343/2010 Coll.)
18. Protocol between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Moldova on implementation of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Republic of Moldova on readmission of persons residing without authorization signed on October 10, 2007 (Bratislava, May 12, 2010, published under the No. 354/2010 Coll.)
19. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Croatia on mutual protection of classified information (Zagreb, October 6, 2009, published under the No. 386/2010 Coll.)
20. Agreement between the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic and Ministry of Health of the Republic of Iraq on cooperation in health care (Bratislava, May 28, 2010, published under the No. 392/2010 Coll.)
21. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Moldova on development cooperation (Chisinau, May 7, 2010, published under the No. 406/2010 Coll.)
22. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Swiss Federal Council on the gainful occupation of dependents of members of diplomatic missions and consular posts (Bratislava, October 26, 2010, published under the No. 432/2010 Coll.)

23. Communication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic on expiration of validity of education agreements with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, People's Republic of Bulgaria, Republic of India, Republic of Iraq, Mongolian People's Republic, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Ukraine and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (published under the No. 459/2010 Coll.)
24. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Italy on war graves (Rome, May 5, 2010, published under the No. 474/2010 Coll.)

MINISTERIAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

1. Exchange program between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the French Republic in the fields of education, language training, university and scientific cooperation for 2010 (Bratislava, March 9, 2010, published under the No.116/2010 Coll.)
2. Protocol between the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Albania on the implementation of the Agreement between the European Communities and the Republic of Albania on readmission of persons residing without authorization signed on April 14, 2005 (readmission agreement) (Tirana, January 21, 2010, published under the No. 150/2010 Coll.)
3. Program of cooperation between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport of the Republic of Croatia for 2010–2013 (Zagreb, April 19, 2010, published under the No. 213/2010 Coll.)
4. Executive protocol between the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic to the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Czech Republic on mutual use of the archives being established by the Ministries of Interior in the field of internal security signed on October 29, 1992 (Bratislava, May 13, 2010, published under the No. 248/2010 Coll.)
5. Agreement between the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic on cooperation (Bratislava, May 13, 2010, published under the No. 247/2010 Coll.)
6. Protocol between the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic and the Administration of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine on exchange of information (Kiev, April 16, 2010, published under the No.246/2010 Coll.)
7. Agreement between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the French Republic on operation of their bilingual sections (Bratislava, May 18, 2010, published under the No.256/2010 Coll.)
8. Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (Bratislava, June 3, 2010, published under the No.285/2010 Coll.)

9. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Italy on bilateral agreements
(Rome, June 22, 2010, published under the No.324/2010 Coll.)
10. Agreement between the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Hungary, the Ministry of Defense of Romania, the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine on joint drill "Blonde Avalanche 2010"
(Vinogradov, September 9, 2010, published under the No.391/2010 Coll.)
11. Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia on mutual representation by diplomatic and consular missions of their states in visa application procedure (exchange of notes, September 23, 2010 and September 24, 2010)
(published under the No. 400/2010 Coll.)
12. Agreement between the Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic on facilitation of the mineral oil transportation through the pipeline with the consumption tax exemption
(Bratislava, October 21, 2010, published under the No. 415/2010 Coll.)
13. Agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia on mutual representation by diplomatic and consular missions of their states in visa application procedure
(Ljubljana, October 15, 2010, published under the No. 416/2010 Coll.)
14. Agreement on cooperation between the Slovak Office of Standards, Metrology and Testing and the State Committee of Ukraine on Technical Regulation and Consumer Policy in the field of standards, metrology and conformity assessment
(Bratislava, October 28, 2010, published under the No. 431/2010 Coll.)

MULTILATERAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

1. Expiration of validity of the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the establishment of a European Police Office
(Brussels, June 24, 1966, published under the No. 11/2010 Coll.)
2. Acts of the Universal Postal Union – Eight additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, First additional protocol to the General regulations of the Universal Postal Union, Universal Postal Convention and Postal Payment Services Agreement
(Geneva, August 12, 2008, published under the No. 50/2010 Coll.)
3. Decision amending the rules relating to fees to European Patent Convention
(Munich, October 28, 2009, published under the No.63/2010 Coll. and No. 64/2010 Coll.)
4. Decision of the Administrative Council amending the implementing regulations to the European Patent Convention
(Munich, October 27, 2009, published under the No. 65/2010 Coll. and No. 66/2010 Coll.)

5. Convention of 5 October 1961 abolishing the requirement for legalisation for foreign public documents amended by the completion of the list of the bodies of the contracting parties according to the Article 6 of the Convention (published under the No. 77/2010 Coll.)
6. Convention of 19 October 1996 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and co-operation in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children – completion of the list of the contracting parties (published under the No. 76/2010 Coll.)
7. Singapore Treaty on the law of trademarks (Singapore, March 27, 2006, published under the No. 90/2010 Coll.)
8. Declaration of the Slovak Republic in accordance with the article 42 of the Convention concerning international carriage by rail (COTIF) signed in Bern on May 9, 1980 as amended by Protocol of June 3, 1999 for the modification of the Convention concerning international carriage by rail (COTIF) from May 9, 1980 (published under the No. 165/2010 Coll.)
9. Amendments to Regulations concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by rail (RID) – Appendix C of the Convention concerning international carriage by rail (COTIF) signed in Bern on May 9, 1980 as amended by Protocol of June 3, 1999 for the modification of the Convention concerning international carriage by rail (COTIF) from May 9, 1980 (Bern, May 16, 2008, published under the No. 166/2010 Coll.)
10. International Labor Organization Convention 151 concerning Protection of the rights to organize and Procedures for determining conditions of employment in the public service from 1978 (Geneva, June 27, 1978, published under the No. 171/2010 Coll.)
11. International Labor Organization Convention 158 on termination of employment from 1982 (Geneva, June 22, 1982, published under the No. 172/2010 Coll.)
12. International Labor Organization Convention 181 on private employment agencies from 1997 (Geneva, June 19, 1997, published under the No. 173/2010 Coll.)
13. International Labor Organization Convention 187 concerning the promotional framework for occupational safety and health from 2006 (Geneva, June 15, 2006, published under the No. 174/2010 Coll.)
14. Instruments amending the Convention for the establishment of the European Radiocommunications Office (ERO) establishing the Convention for the establishment of the European Communications Office (ECO) (The Hague, June 23, 1993 and April 9, 2002, published under the No. 215/2010 Coll.)
15. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms amending the control system of the Convention (Strasbourg, May 13, 2004, published under the No. 208/2010 Coll.)

16. Amendment No. 2 to the Agreement on the conservation of bats in Europe (Bristol, July 24–26, 2000, published under the No. 214/2010 Coll.)
17. Stabilisation and association agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part (Luxembourg, October 15, 2007, published under the No. 244/2010 Coll.)
18. Amendments to the regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (published under the No. 265/2010 Coll.)
19. UN Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (New York, December 13, 2006, published under the No.317/2010 Coll.)
20. Optional protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (New York, December 13, 2006, published under the No.318/2010 Coll.)
21. European agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by inland Waterways (Geneva, May 26, 2000, published under the No. 331/2010 Coll.)
22. Protocol on pollutant release and transfer registers to the Convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters (Kiev, May 21, 2003, published under the No. 353/2010 Coll.)
23. EFSF Framework agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Malta, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, the Republic of Finland, the Hellenic Republic and European Financial Stability Facility (Bratislava, July 15, 2010, published under the No. 380/2010 Coll.)
24. Completion of the Full list of the bodies of the contracting parties in accordance with article 6 of the Convention of 5 October 1961 abolishing the requirement for legalisation for foreign public documents (published under the No. 371/2010 Coll.)
25. Completion of the list of the contracting parties to Convention of 19 October 1996 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and co-operation in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children (published under the No. 412/2010 Coll.)
26. Agreement for the establishment of the global crop diversity trust (Rome, April 1, 2004, published under the No. 446/2010 Coll.)
27. International treaty on genetic resources for food and agriculture (Rome, November 3, 2001, published under the No. 449/2010 Coll.)

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28. Amendments to the Convention concerning international carriage by rail (COTIF) signed in Bern on May 9, 1980 as amended by Protocol of June 3, 1999 for the modification of the Convention concerning international carriage by rail (COTIF) from May 9, 1980 (published under the No. 460/2010 Coll.)
 29. Amendments to the European agreement concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by inland waterways (published under the No. 461/2010 Coll.)
 30. Amendments of the implementing regulations to European Patent Convention (published under the No. 475/2010 Coll.)
 31. Amendments of the implementing regulations to European Patent Convention (published under the No. 476/2010 Coll.)
 32. Amendments of the implementing regulations to European Patent Convention and amending the rules relating to fees to European Patent Convention (published under the No. 477/2010 Coll.)
 33. Amendments to Regulations concerning the international carriage of dangerous goods by rail (published under the No. 554/2010 Coll.)

STRUCTURE OF THE STATE ADMINISTRATION AUTHORITIES ACTING IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN 2010

President of the Slovak Republic

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Head of the Department: Peter Priputen, tel. +421 2 5933 3339

Department of Foreign Affairs

Head of the Department: Ján Šoth, tel. +421 2 5788 8165

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Nám. Alexandra Dubčeka 1, 812 80 Bratislava 1

tel. +421 2 5972 1111

www.nrsr.sk

Speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic

Pavol Paška (until July 8, 2010)

Richard Sulík (since July 9, 2010)

Foreign Affairs Committee

František Šebej, chairman, tel. +421 2 5972 1233, zv@nrsr.sk

Prepared by Matúš Vranko, intern, RC SFPA.

Source: Slovak Republic Government Office

Committee for European Affairs

Ivan Štefanec, chairman, tel. +421 2 5972 2751, vez@nrsl.sk, oez@nrsl.sk

Committee for Human Rights, Minorities and the Position of Women

Anna Belousovová, chairperson, tel. +421 2 5972 1699, lpn@nrsl.sk

Defense and Security Committee

Martin Fedor, chairman, tel. +421 2 5972 1225, vob@nrsl.sk

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

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Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic

Robert Fico (until July 8, 2010)

Iveta Radičová (since July 9, 2010)

Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and Minorities

Dušan Čaplovič (until July 8, 2010)

Rudolf Chmel (since July 9, 2010)

European Affairs and Knowledge-Based Society Section

Director General: Pavel Holík, tel. +421 2 5729 5503

Department for European Affairs

Head of the Department: Daniel Ország, tel. +421 2 5729 5503

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

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www.mzv.sk

Minister

Miroslav Lajčák (until July 8, 2010)

Mikuláš Dzurinda (since July 9, 2010)

Office of the Minister

Head of the Office: Viktória Jančoškóvá, tel.: +421 2 5978 3003, Viktoria.Jancosekova@mzv.sk

State Secretary

Oľga Algayerová (until July 8, 2010)

Diana Štrofová (until July 8, 2010)

Milan Ježovica (since July 9, 2010)

Secretary-General of the Ministry

Martin Maruška, tel.: +421 2 5978 3301, Martin.Maruska@mzv.sk

Analyses and Strategy Department

Head of the Department: Peter Holásek, tel. +421 2 5978 3021, Peter.Holasek@mzv.sk

Political Directorate

Director General: Igor Slobodník, tel. +421 2 5978 3401, Igor.Slobodnik@mzv.sk

Common Foreign and Security Policy Department

Head of the Department: Peter Mišík, tel. +421 2 5978 3411, Peter.Misik@mzv.sk

Department of Security Policy

Head of the Department: Juraj Podhorský, tel. +421 2 5978 3481, Juraj.Podhorsky@mzv.sk

Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia Department

Head of the Department: Marián Jakubócy, tel. +421 2 5978 3431, Marian.Jakuboczy@mzv.sk

Southeastern Europe Department

Head of the Department: Peter Michalko, tel. +421 2 5978 3441, Peter.Michalko@mzv.sk

North America and Australia and Middle East Department

Head of the Department: Radovan Javorčík, tel. +421 2 5978 3450, Radovan.Javorcik@mzv.sk

European Affairs Directorate

Director General: František Ružička, tel. +421 2 5978 3500, Frantisek.Ruzicka@mzv.sk

Department of European Policies

Head of the Department: Ingrid Brocková, tel. +421 2 5978 3561, Ingrid.Brockova@mzv.sk

Department of Common Affairs and Relations with EU Institutions

Head of the Department: Drahoslav Štefánek, tel. +421 2 5978 3571, Drahoslav.Stefanek@mzv.sk

Western and Southern Europe Department

Head of the Department: Ján Gábor, tel. +421 2 5978 3511, Jan.Gabor@mzv.sk

Central and Northern Europe Department

Head of the Department: František Dlhopolček, tel. +421 2 5978 3541, Frantisek.Dlhopolcek@mzv.sk

Global Issues, Human Rights, UN and the International Organizations Directorate

Director General: Mária Krasnohorská, tel. +421 2 5978 3601, Maria.Krasnohorska@mzv.sk

UN Department

Head of the Department: Ján Varšo, tel. +421 2 5978 3611, Jan.Varso@mzv.sk

Arms Control, Disarmament and Global Challenges Department

Head of the Department: Milan Cigánik, tel.: +421 2 5978 3621, Milan.Ciganik@mzv.sk

Human Rights, Council of Europe, OECD and National Minorities Department

Head of the Department: Veronika Lombardini, tel. +421 2 5978 3641, Veronika.Lombardini@mzv.sk

Economic Cooperation and ODA Directorate

Director General: Radomír Boháč, tel. +421 2 5978 3801, Radmoir.Bohac@mzv.sk

Economic Diplomacy Department

Head of the Department: Tomáš Bičan, tel.: +421 2 5978 3810, Tomas.Bican@mzv.sk

Department of International Economic Organizations

Head of the Department: Jaroslav Chlebo, tel. +421 2 5978 3860, Jaroslav.Chlebo@mzv.sk

Department of Development and Humanitarian Cooperation

Head of the Department: Karla Würsterová, tel. +421 2 5978 3820, Karla.Wursterova@mzv.sk

Asia, Africa, Latin America and Persian Gulf States Department

Head of the Department: Vladimír Halgaš, tel.: 421 2 5978 3831, Vladimir.Halgas@mzv.sk

Legal Affairs Directorate

Director General: Milan Kollár, tel. +421 2 5978 3701, Milan.Kollar@mzv.sk

International Law Department

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EU law Department

Head of the Department: Igor Bartho, Igor.Bartho@mzv.sk

Legislation and Legal Services Unit

Head of the Unit: Peter Hlobeň, Peter.Hlobeň@mzv.sk

Public Diplomacy and Public Services Directorate

Director General: Vasil Grivna, tel. +421 2 5978 3901, vokso@foreign.gov.sk

Public Diplomacy Department

Head of the Department: Elena Mallicková, tel.: +421 2 5978 3961, Elena.Mallickova@mzv.sk

Consular Department

Head of the Department: Anna Juriková, tel. +421 2 5978 3921, Anna.Jurikova@mzv.sk

Press Department

Head of the Department: Igor Skoček, tel.: +421 2 5978 3980, Igor.Skocek@mzv.sk

Archive and Library Department

Head of the Department: Oto Koči, tel.: 421 2 5978 3950, Oto.Koci@mzv.sk

Cultural Diplomacy Department

Head of the Department: Jana Tomková, tel.: +421 2 5978 3971, Jana.Tomkova@mzv.sk

Slovak Honorary Consulates Unit:

Head of the Unit: Ivan Zachar, tel.: +421 2 5978 3990, Ivan.Zachar@mzv.sk

Public Assistance Center

Head of the Center: Jozef Cibula, tel.: +421 2 5978 3995, Jozef.Cibula@mzv.sk

MINISTRY OF ECONOMY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Mierová 19, 827 15 Bratislava

tel. +421 2 4854 1111

www.economy.gov.sk

Minister

Ľubomír Jahnátek (until July 8, 2010)

Juraj Miškov (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Peter Žiga (until July 8, 2010)

Ľuboš Halák (until July 8, 2010)

Martin Chren (since July 9, 2010)

Section for European Affairs

Director General: Jana Sermeková, tel. +421 2 4854 2517, sermekova@mhsr.sk

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Kutuzovova 8, 832 47 Bratislava

tel. +421 960 11 22 33

www.mod.gov.sk

Minister

Jaroslav Baška (until July 8, 2010)

Ľubomír Galko (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Daniel Duchoň (until July 8, 2010)

Róbert Ondrejcsák (since July 9, 2010)

Defense Policy, International Affairs and Legislation Department

Director General: Jaroslav Nad', tel. +421 960 312 156, +421 2 4425 8781,
jaroslav.nad@mod.gov.sk

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Pribinova 2, 812 72 Bratislava
tel. +421 2 5094 1111
www.minv.sk

Minister

Robert Kaliňák (until July 8, 2010)
Daniel Lipšic (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Jozef Buček (until July 8, 2010)
Vladimír Čechot (until July 8, 2010)
Maroš Žilinka (since July 9, 2010)

MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Štefanovičova 5, 817 82 Bratislava
tel. +421 2 5958 1111
www.finance.gov.sk

Minister

Ján Počiatek (until July 8, 2010)
Ivan Mikloš (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

František Palko (until July 8, 2010)
Peter Kažimír (until July 8, 2010)
Vladimír Tyaroška (since July 9, 2010)
Branislav Ďurajka (since July 9, 2010)

MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Námestie SNP č. 33, 813 31 Bratislava
tel. +421 2 2048 2111
www.culture.gov.sk

Minister

Marek Maďarič (until July 8, 2010)
Daniel Krajcer (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Ivan Sečík (until July 8, 2010)
Augustín Jozef Lang (until July 8, 2010)
Natália Cehláriková (since July 9, 2010)

Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic

Limbová 2, 837 52 Bratislava 37

tel. +421 2 5937 3111

www.health.gov.sk

Minister

Richard Raši (until July 8, 2010)

Ivan Uhliarik (since July 9, 2010)

MINISTRY OF LABOR, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND FAMILY OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Špitálska 4-6, 816 43 Bratislava

tel. +421 2 2046 0000

www.employment.gov.sk

Minister

Viera Tomanová (until July 8, 2010)

Jozef Mihál (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Emília Kršíková (until July 8, 2010)

Peter Sika (until July 8, 2010)

Lucia Nicholsonová (since July 9, 2010)

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Stromová 1, 813 30 Bratislava

tel. +421 2 5937 4111

www.education.gov.sk

Minister

Ján Mikolaj (until July 8, 2010)

Eugen Jurzyca (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Bibiána Obrimčáková (until July 8, 2010)

Jozef Habánik (until July 8, 2010)

Jaroslav Ivančo (since July 9, 2010)

MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Župné námestie 13, 813 11 Bratislava

tel. +421 2 5935 3111

www.justice.gov.sk

Minister

Viera Petříková (until July 8, 2010)

Lucia Žitňanská (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Anna Vitteková (until July 8, 2010)

Daniel Hudák (until July 8, 2010)

Mária Kolíková (since July 9, 2010)

Section for International and European Law

Director General: Peter Báňas, tel. +421 2 5935 3381, ms.smep.sek@justice.sk

Department of Private and Procedural International Law

Head of the Department: Miloš Haňapka, tel. +421 2 5935 3347, inter.coop@justice.sk

Department of International Relations and Human Rights

Head of the Department: Jana Vnuková, tel. +421 2 5935 3473, jana.vnukova@justice.sk

MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC*

Nám. L. Štúra 1, 812 35 Bratislava

tel. +421 2 5956 1111

www.enviro.gov.sk

Minister

Jozef Medved' (until June 30, 2010)

József Nagy (since November 2, 2010)

State Secretary

Jaroslav Jadaš (until June 30, 2010)

Miloslav Šebek (until June 30, 2010)

Branislav Čimerman (since November 2, 2010)

Section for Environmental Policy, EU Affairs and legislation

Director General: Kamil Vilinovič, tel.: +421 2 5956 2003, kamil.vilinovic@enviro.gov.sk

Department of EU Affairs

Head of the Department: Katarína Butkovská, tel. +421 2 5956 2132, katarina.butkovska@enviro.gov.sk

**The Ministry was dissolved by Act 37/2010, Coll and ceased to exist on July 1, 2010. The new government of Iveta Radičová decided to keep the Environment Ministry in place.*

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Dobrovičova 12, 812 66 Bratislava

tel. +421 2 5926 6111

www.mpsr.sk

Minister

Vladimír Chovan (until July 8, 2010)

Zsolt Simon (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Vladimír Paša (until July 8, 2010)

Ján Slabý (until July 8, 2010)

Gabriel Csicsai (since July 9, 2010)

**MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC
(UNTIL JULY 2010)**

**MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, CONSTRUCTION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (SINCE JULY
2010)**

Námestie slobody č. 6, 810 05 Bratislava
tel. +421 2 5949 4111
www.telecom.gov.sk

Minister

Ľubomír Vážny (until July 8, 2010)
Ján Figel' (since July 9, 2010)

State Secretary

Milan Mojš (until July 8, 2010)
Dušan Švantner (until July 8, 2010)
Ján Hudacký (since July 9, 2010)
Arpád Érsek (since July 9, 2010)

Section for European Union and International Affairs

Director General: Ján Krak, tel. +421 2 5273 1446, jan.krak@telecom.gov.sk

MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC*

Preievozská 2/B, 825 25 Bratislava
tel. +421 2 5831 7111
www.build.gov.sk

Minister

Igor Štefanov (until March 11, 2010)
Ján Mikolaj (until July 1, 2010)

State Secretary

Martin Glváč
Daniel Ács

**The Ministry ceased to exist on July 1, 2010.*

ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Drieňová 24, 826 03 Bratislava
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Head

Danica Paroulková, tel. +421 2 4333 7305

STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

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tel. +421 2 5023 6111
www.statistics.sk

Head

Ľudmila Benkovičová, tel. +421 2 5542 5802

LIST OF THE EMBASSIES OF THE EU, NATO COUNTRIES AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES

THE EMBASSIES IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THEIR HEADS AS OF FEBRUARY 2011

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	-	Komornická1852/25 160 00 Praha 6 Czech Republic	Abdul Qudus Khalil Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a. i.
The Republic of Albania	1. 1. 1993	Nad Šárkou 1594/59 160 00 Praha 6 Czech Republic	Qazim Tepshi Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: May 30, 2007
Democratic People's Republic of Algeria	1. 1. 1993	Rudolfínegasse 18 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Taous Feroukhi Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: February 21, 2002
The Principality of Andorra	3. 6. 1996	Kärtnering 2A/13 1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Maria Ubach Font Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a. i.
The Republic of Angola	30. 9. 1993	Jelenia ulica č. 4 811 05 Bratislava	Alberto Correia Neto Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: May 30, 2007
The Argentine Republic	1. 1. 1993	Goldschmiedgasse 2/1 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Eugenio Maria Curia Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: March 21, 2007
The Republic of Armenia	14. 11. 1993	Hadikgasse 28 A-1140 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ashot Hovakimian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: December 11, 2006
The Commonwealth of Australia	1. 1. 1993	Mattiellistrasse 2 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Michael John Potts Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: February 02, 2010
The Republic of Austria	1. 1. 1993	Ventúrska 10 811 01 Bratislava 1	Josef Markus Wuketich Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: October 11, 2010
The Republic of Azerbaijan	27. 11. 1993	Hügelgasse 2 A-1130 Vienna Republic of Austria	Fuad Ismayilov Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: September 11, 2006
The People's Republic of Bangladesh	3. 3. 1993	Dovestr. 1 105 87 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Mosud Mannan Ambassador Designated

Prepared by Matúš Vranko, RC SFPA intern.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Translation: Anita Boršová, RC SFPA intern

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
The Republic of Belarus	1. 1. 1993	Jančova 5 811 02 Bratislava 1	Vladimir Chekhlov <i>Senior Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a. i.</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	1. 1. 1993	Fraňa Kráľa 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	Alain Cools <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: October 3, 2006
The Republic of Benin	19. 1. 1993	Englerallee 23 D-14159 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Isidore Bio <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The Plurinational State of Bolivia	5. 3. 1993	Waaggasse 10/4 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ricardo Javier Martinez Covarrubias <i>Chargé d'Affaires a. i.</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1. 1. 1993	Opletalova 27 110 00 Prague Czech Republic	Slobodan Srdanović <i>Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>
The Republic of Botswana	29. 11. 2001	High Commission of the Republic of Botswana, 6 Stratford Place W1C 1AY, London The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Roy Blackbeard <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: April 16, 2002
The Federative Republic of Brazil	1. 1. 1993	Palisády 47, 3.-4. posch. 811 06 Bratislava	Marília Sardenberg Zelter Gonçalves <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: September 29, 2008
The Republic of Bulgaria	1. 1. 1993	Kuzmányho 1 811 06 Bratislava 1	Nachko Georgiev Pehlivanov <i>Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>
Burkina Faso	1. 8. 1997	Strohgasse 14c A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Saliffou Diallo <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: January 13, 2010
The Republic of Burundi	29. 6. 1999	Berliner Strasse 36 D-10715 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Barthélemy Mfayokurera <i>First Secretary</i>
The Republic of Cape Verde	-	Schwindgasse 20/2 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Hercules do Nascimento Cruz <i>Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>
The Kingdom of Cambodia	-	Benjamin-Vogelsdorf Str. 2 D-13187 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Chem Widhya <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
Canada	1. 1. 1993	Muchova 6 160 00 Prague 6 Czech Republic	Valerie Raymond <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: December 7, 2009
The Republic of Chile	1. 1. 1993	Lugeck 1/3/10 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Francisco Javier Bergu o Hurtado <i>Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>
The Peoples Republic of China	1. 1. 1993	Jančova 8b 811 02 Bratislava 1	Ziping Gu <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: August 18, 2010
The Republic of Colombia	1. 1. 1993	Stadiongasse 6-8/15 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Howell Ricardo Quimbaya Morales <i>Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
The Republic of the Congo	30. 6. 1998	Grabbeallee 47 D-13156 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Serge Michel Odzocki <i>Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Minister – Counsellor</i>
The Democratic Republic of Congo	18. 2. 1993	Soukenicka 34/1765 110 00 Prague 1-Nové Mesto Czech Republic	Henri Benjamin Ntikala Booto <i>Minister - Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a. i.</i>
The Republic of Costa Rica	6. 10. 1993	Wagramer Strasse 23/1/1/2-3 A-1220 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ana Teresa Dengo Benavides <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC.: June 4, 2008
The Republic of Côte d'Ivoire	28. 10. 2002	Schinkelstrasse 10 D-10785 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Serges Gba <i>First Secretary</i>
The Republic of Croatia	1. 1. 1993	Mišikova 21 811 06 Bratislava 1	Tomislav Car <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: January 16, 2007
The Republic of Cuba	1. 1. 1993	Somolickéhoho 1/A 811 05 Bratislava 1	David Paulovich Escalona <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: November 11, 2006
The Republic of Cyprus	1. 1. 1993	Parking 20 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Marios Lyssiotis <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: April 27, 2009
The Czech Republic	1. 1. 1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 8 811 02 Bratislava 1	Jakub Karfík <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: October 11, 2010
The Kingdom of Denmark	1. 1. 1993	Panská 27 816 06 Bratislava	Anita Hugau <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: November 15, 2005
The Republic of Ecuador	1. 1. 1993	Goldschmiedgasse 10/2/24 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Juan Diego Stacey Moreno <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The Arab Republic of Egypt	1. 1. 1993	Dunajská 4 P.O. Box 322 811 08 Bratislava	Ihab Ahmed Talaat Nasr <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: October 11, 2010
The Republic of Estonia	1. 1. 1993	Wohlebengasse 9/13 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Eve-Küllü Kala <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: February 2, 2010
Delegation of the European Commission		Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	Andrea Elscheková-Matisová <i>Ambassador of EC to SR</i>
European Parliament Information Office		Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	Robert Hajšel <i>Executive Director</i>
The Republic of Finland	1. 1. 1993	Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	Jukka Jalmari Leino <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: September 29, 2008
The French Republic	1. 1. 1993	Hlavné námestie 7 P.O.Box 152 810 00 Bratislava 1	Jean- Marie Bruno <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: October 13, 2010
The Republic of Gambia	18. 8. 1995	Avenue F. D. Roosevelt 126 1050 Bruxelles The Kingdom of Belgium	Mamour A. Jagne <i>Ambassador Designated</i>

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
The Federal Republic of Germany	1. 1. 1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 10 811 02 Bratislava 1	Axel Hartmann Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: September 29, 2009
The Republic of Ghana	1. 10. 1993	V Tišine 4 160 00 Praha 6-Bubeneč Czech Republic	Victor Emmanuel Smith Ambassador Designated
Georgia	25. 11. 1993	Michalská 9 811 01 Bratislava	Nikoloz Nikolozishvili Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: October 3, 2006
The Republic of Guatemala	15. 4. 1993	Landstrasser Hauptstrasse 21/9 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Carla María Rodríguez Mancía Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 13, 2010
The Republic of Guinea	16. 3. 1993	Jägerstrasse 67-69 D-10117 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Mohamed Lamine Kaba Counsellor
The Hellenic Republic	1. 1. 1993	Hlavné námestie 4 811 01 Bratislava 1	Nicolaos Kanellos Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: December 15, 2008
The Holy See	1. 1. 1993	Nekrasovova 17 811 04 Bratislava 1	Mario Giordana Apostolic Nuncio LoC: June 4, 2008
The Republic of Hungary	1. 1. 1993	Sedlárska 3 814 25 Bratislava 1	Antal Heizer Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 16, 2007
The Republic of Iceland	1. 1. 1993	Naglergasse 2/8 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Stefán Skjaldarson Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: April 20, 2010
The Republic of India	1. 1. 1993	Dunajská 4 811 08 Bratislava	Rajiva Misra Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 18, 2011
The Republic of Indonesia	1. 1. 1993	Brnianska 31 811 04 Bratislava 1	Harsha Edwana Joesoef Ambassador Designated
The Islamic Republic of Iran	1. 1. 1993	Jsuergasse 9 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ebrahim Sheibany Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: April 27, 2009
The Republic of Iraq	1. 1. 1993	Korabinského 3 811 02 Bratislava	Matheel Dhayif Majeed Al-Sabti Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: August 18, 2010
Ireland	1. 1. 1993	Carlton Savoy Building Mostová 2 811 02 Bratislava	Kathryn Coll Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: September 29, 2008
The State of Israel	1. 1. 1993	Slávičie údolie 106 P. O. Box 6 811 02 Bratislava	Alexander Ben-Zvi Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: August 18, 2010
The Republic of Italy	1. 1. 1993	Palisády 49 811 06 Bratislava	Brunella Borzi Comacchia Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: December 15, 2008
Jamaica	1. 1. 1993	Schmargendorfer Strasse 32 D-12159 Berlin, The Federal Republic of Germany	Joy Elfreda WHEELER Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 12, 2009

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
Japan	1. 1. 1993	Hlavné nám. 2 813 27 Bratislava	Yoshio Nomoto <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: January 12, 2009
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	3. 3. 1993	Rennweg 17/4 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Makram Mustafa Queisi <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: February 2, 2009
The Republic of Kazakhstan	1. 1. 1993	Romana Rollanda 12 160 00 Prague 6 Czech Republic	Anarbek B. Karashev <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: September 29, 2008
The Republic of Kenya	1. 1. 1993	Neulingasse 29/8 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ukur Kanacho Yatani <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The Republic of Korea	1. 1. 1993	Dunajská 4 811 08 Bratislava	Seok-Soong Seo <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: December 7, 2009
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1. 1. 1993	Na Větru 395/18 162 00 Prague 6 Czech Republic	Pyong Gap Ri <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: November 4, 2004
The State of Kuwait	1. 1. 1993	Strassergasse 32 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Bader Nasser Ali Alhouthi <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: December 13, 2010
The Kyrgyz Republic	1. 1. 1993	Invalidenstrasse 3/8 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Lidia Adamkalyevna Imanalieva <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The Republic of Latvia	1. 1. 1993	Stefan Esders Platz 4 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Indulis Berziņš <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The Lebanese Republic	1. 1. 1993	Oppolzgasse 6/3 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ishaya El-Khoury <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: October 21, 2009
The Kingdom of Lesotho	8. 5. 1995	Via Serchio 8 001 98, Rome The Republic of Italy	Jonas Sponkie Malewa <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: Jul 16, 2007
People's Bureau of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1. 1. 1993	Révova 45 811 02 Bratislava	Khalifa Ahmed <i>Chargé d'Affaires a. i.</i>
The Republic of Lithuania	1. 1. 1993	Löwengasse 47/4 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Giedrus Poudžiūnas <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: May 30, 2007
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	1. 1. 1993	Wallnerstrasse 2/1/2 1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Marc Thill <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: May 9, 2006
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	1. 1. 1993	Kinderspitalgasse 5/2 A-1090 Vienna Republic of Austria	Hilda Kolevska <i>Chargé d'Affaires a. i.</i>
The Republic of Madagascar	16. 2. 1996	Koursovoy Per.5 119 034 Moscow Russian Federation	Eloi A. Maxime Dovo <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: November 26, 2003
Malaysia	1. 1. 1993	24th Floor, Florido Tower Floridsdorfer Hauptstrasse 1-7 A-1210 Vienna Republic of Austria	Dato Muhammad Shahrul Ikram Bin Yaakob <i>Ambassador Designated</i>

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
The Republic of Malawi	30. 12. 1993	Westfälische strasse 86 D-10709 Berlin, The Federal Republic of Germany	Oliver M. C. Kumbambe <i>Deputy Head of Mission</i>
The Republic of Mali	12. 2. 1993	Novokuznetskaya 11 115184 Moscow Russian Federation	Brahima Coulibaly <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The Republic of Malta	1. 1. 1993	Opernring 5/1 1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Christopher Grima <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: December 15, 2008
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem Of Rhodes and Of Malta	1. 1. 1993	Kapitulská 9 811 01 Bratislava 1	Francis Martin O' Donnell <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: December 7, 2009
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania	1. 1. 1993	Korovy Val 7, kanc. 12 119049 Moscow Russian Federation	Mohamed Mahmoud Ould Dahi <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: March 22, 2005
The Republic of Moldova	1. 1. 1993	Loewengasse 47/10 1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Valeriu Chiveri <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
Mongolia	1. 1. 1993	Na Marně 5 160 00 Prague 6 Czech Republic	Suren Tsoggerel <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: May 31, 2010
Montenegro	1. 1. 1993	Nibelungengasse 13 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Dragana Radulović <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: February 2, 2010
The Kingdom of Morocco	1. 1. 1993	Opernring 3, 4. Floor. A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Omar Zniber <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: August 26, 2003
The Republic of Namibia	9. 12. 1997	Ungargasse 33/5. Floor A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Penda A. Naanda <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
Nepal	4. 3. 1994	Guerickestrasse 27 D-10587 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Madan Kumar Bhattarai <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: June 4, 2008
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	1. 1. 1993	Fraňa Kráľa 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	Daphne Bergsma <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: September 22, 2009
New Zealand	1. 1. 1993	Atrium Friedrichstrasse 60 D-10117 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Peter Howard Rider <i>Chargé d'Affaires a. i.</i>
The Republic of Nicaragua	5. 1. 1993	Ebendorferstrasse 10/3/12 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Isolda Frixione Miranda <i>Chargé d'Affaires a.i., Minister - Counsellor</i>
Republic of the Niger		Machnowerstr. 24 14165 Berlin	Djibo Ali Amina Bazindre <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The Federal Republic of Nigeria	1. 1. 1993	Rennweg 25 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ayoola Lawrence Olukanni <i>Minister, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
The Kingdom of Norway	1. 1. 1993	Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	Trine Skymoen Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: September 22, 2009
The Sultanate of Oman	3. 3. 1993	Wahringer Strasse 2-4/24-25 A-1090 Vienna Republic of Austria	Badr bin Mohammed Zahr al-Hinai Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: February 5, 2009
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan	1. 1. 1993	Hofzeile 13-A A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Khursid Anwar Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 13, 2010
The State of Palestine	1. 1. 1993	Klemensova 6 810 08 Bratislava	Abdallahman S.O. Bsaiso Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: October 11, 2010
The Republic of Panama	15. 2. 1993	Wichmannstrasse 6 107 87 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Lourdes C. Vallarino Counsellor – Minister
The Republic of Paraguay	8. 1. 1993	Prinz Eugen Strasse 18/1/7 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Horacio Norguez Zubizarreta Ambassador Designated
The Republic of Peru	1. 1. 1993	Mahlerstrasse 7/22 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Antonio García Revilla Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 13, 2010
The Republic of the Philippines	1. 1. 1993	Laurenzerberg 2 A-1010 Vienna Republic of Austria	Lourdes Ortiz Yparraquirre Ambassador Designated
The Republic of Poland	1. 1. 1993	Hummelova 4 811 03 Bratislava 1	Andrzej Krawczyk Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 12, 2009
The Republic of Portugal	1. 1. 1993	Moskovská 10 811 08 Bratislava 1	Joao Lu.s Niza Pinheiro Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 18, 2011
The State of Qatar	1. 1. 1993	Gárdonyi Géza 19 1026 Budapest The Republic of Hungary	Mubarak Rashid Al-Boainin Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: March 21, 2007
Romania	1. 1. 1993	Fraňa Kráľa 11 811 05 Bratislava 1	Florin Vodit Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: February 5, 2009
The Russian Federation	1. 1. 1993	Godrova 4 811 06 Bratislava 1	Pavel Kuznecov Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: May 31, 2010
The Republic of El Salvador	1. 1. 1993	Prinz Eugen Strasse 72/2/1 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Julia Emma Villatoro Tario Minister, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
The Republic of San Marino	1. 1. 1993	Via Eleonora Duse 35 00197 Rome The Republic of Italy	Severino Bollini Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: February 22, 2007
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	16. 6. 1995	Formanekgasse 38 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Mansour Bin Khalid Al Farhan Al-Saud Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: July 6, 2009

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
The Republic of Serbia	1. 1. 1993	Búdkova 38 811 04 Bratislava 1	Danko Prokić Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: September 11, 2007
The Republic of Sierra Leone	1. 1. 1993	26/1 Rublyovskoye Chaussee Apt. 58-59 121615 Moscow The Russian Federation	Ibrahim Vandi Kondoh Minister, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
The Republic of Singapore	12. 2. 1993	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tanglin 248163 Singapore	Jennie Chua Kheng Yeng Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: July 16, 2007
The Republic of Slovenia	1. 1. 1993	Moyzevska 4 813 15 Bratislava 1	Stanislav Vidovič Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: July 6, 2009
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	15. 2. 1993	Rainergasse 1/2/5 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Musthaf Mohammed Jaffer Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 12, 2009
The Somali Democratic Republic	-	Simferopolsky Bulvar, 7a-145 117 556 Moscow Russian Federation	Mohamed Mohamoud Handulle Chargé d'Affaires a.i., First Secretary
The Republic of South Africa	1. 1. 1993	Sandgasse 33 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Talent Dumisile Georgina Molaba Counsellor - Minister, Chargé d'Affaires a. i.
The Kingdom of Spain	1. 1. 1993	Prepoštská 10 811 01 Bratislava 1	José Ángel López Jorrín Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: December 15, 2008
The Republic of Sudan	27. 7. 1993	Reisnerstrasse 29/5 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Mahmoud Hassan Elamin Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: February 2, 2010
The Kingdom of Sweden	1. 1. 1993	Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava 1	Hans Tage Harald Lundborg Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 18, 2011
Switzerland	1. 1. 1993	Tolstého 9 811 06 Bratislava 1	Christian Martin Fotsch Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: January 18, 2011
The Syrian Arab Republic	1. 1. 1993	Daffingerstrasse 4 A-1030 Vienna Republic of Austria	Bassam Ahmad Nazin Al Sabbagh Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: December 13, 2010
The United Republic of Tanzania	1. 1. 1993	Eschenallee 11 D-14050 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Ahmad Rweyemamu Ngemera Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: March 17, 2008
The Kingdom of Thailand	1. 1. 1993	Cottagegasse 48 A-1180 Vienna Republic of Austria	Nongnuth Phetcharatana Ambassador Designated
The Republic of Tunisia	1. 1. 1993	Sieveringerstrasse 187 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Sabri Chaabani Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.
The Republic of Turkey	1. 1. 1993	Holubyho 11 811 03 Bratislava 1	F. Dicle Kopuz Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary LoC: May 31, 2010

Country	Start of diplomatic relations	Address of embassy	In charge of embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
Turkmenistan	1. 1. 1993	Argentinierstrasse 22/II/EG A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Yazkuli Mammedov <i>First Secretary</i>
Ukraine	1. 1. 1993	Radvanská 35 811 01 Bratislava 1	Oleh Havaši <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: October 13, 2010
The United Arab Emirates	3. 1. 1993	Peter Jordan Strasse 66 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Mohammed Hamad Omran Alshamsi <i>Ambassador Designated</i>
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1. 1. 1993	Panská 16 811 01 Bratislava 1	Dominic Schroeder <i>Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>
The United Mexican States	1. 10. 1993	Operngasse 21/10 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Alejandro Díaz y Pérez Durate <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: December 12, 2007
United States of America	1. 1. 1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 5 811 02 Bratislava 1	Theodore Sedgwick <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: August 18, 2010
The Republic of Uzbekistan	20. 1. 1993	Pötzeleinsdorfer Strasse 49 A-1180 Vienna Republic of Austria	Ravshanbek Duschanov <i>Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	1. 1. 1993	Prinz Eugen Strasse 72/1 A-1040 Vienna Republic of Austria	Alí de Jesus Uzcátegui Dugue <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: April 27, 2009
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam	1. 1. 1993	Felix Mottlstrasse 20 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	
The Republic of Yemen	1. 1. 1993	Reisnerstrasse 18-20 1030 Vienn Republic of Austria	Mohamed Nasser Binnaser Alarwy <i>Counsellor, Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</i>
The Republic of Zambia	5. 5. 1993	Axel-Springer Strasse 54 A D-10117 Berlin The Federal Republic of Germany	Chalwe Lombe <i>Counsellor</i>
The Republic of Zimbabwe	3. 3. 1993	Strozzigasse 10/15 A-1080 Vienna Republic of Austria	Grace Tsitsi Mutandiro <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: Jun 13, 2006
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of Saint John of Jerusalem of Rhodes and of Malta	1. 1. 1993	Kapitulská 9 811 01 Bratislava	Francis Martin O'Donnell <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> LoC: Dece,ber 7, 2009

LIST OF CONSULATES IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

THE HEADS OF THE CONSULATES AS OF FEBRUARY 2011

State	Address of the consulate in the SR	Consul
The Republic of Azerbaijan	Klobučnícka 4 811 01 Bratislava	Džalal Gasymov <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Commonwealth of the Bahamas	Rybárska brána 8 811 08 Bratislava	Michal Lazar <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The People's Republic of Bangladesh	Pod záhradami 41 841 01 Bratislava	Štefan Petkanič <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Belarus	Osadská 679/15 028 01 Trstená	Marián Murín <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Gelnická 88 040 14 Košice	Dany R. E. Rottiers <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Chile	Laurinská 2 815 08 Bratislava 1	Jaroslav Šoltys <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Colombia	AC Diplomat Palisády 29/A 811 06 Bratislava	Anton Siekel <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Democratic Republic of the Congo	Štefanovičova 12 811 04 Bratislava	Pavol Jánošík <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Costa Rica	Prepoštská 6 811 01 Bratislava	Tomáš Chrenek <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Denmark	Letecká 10 831 03 Bratislava	Michal Lörintz <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	Obchodná 6 Pasáž Zlatý Jeleň 811 08 Bratislava	Štefan Rosina <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Finland	Moyzesova 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	Karol Kállay <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Republic of Guatemala	Vajnorská 8/A 831 04 Bratislava 3	Zoroslav Kollár <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Hungary	Hlavná 67 040 01 Košice	János Szerencsés <i>General Consul</i>
The Republic of Iceland	Palisády 39 811 06 Bratislava	Otto Halás <i>Honorary Consul</i>

Prepared by Matúš Vranko, RC SFFPA intern.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Translation: Anita Boršová, RC SFFPA intern

State	Address of the consulate in the SR	Consul
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	Čajakova 26 831 01 Bratislava	Štefan Žiak <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Kazakhstan	Obchodná 6 Pasáž Zlatý Jeleň 811 08 Bratislava	Štefan Rosina <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Korea	Hviezdoslavovo nám. 20 811 02 Bratislava 1	Marián Mojžiš <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Kyrgyz Republic	Miletičova 1 821 08 Bratislava	Tibor Podoba <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Latvia	Krmanova 1 040 01 Košice	
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	Apollo Business Centrum Mlynské Nivy 43 821 09 Bratislava	Peter Kriško <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Malaysia	Jašíkova 2 821 03 Bratislava	Igor Junas <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Maldives	Lazaretská 2 811 09 Bratislava	
The Kingdom of Morocco	Krajná 86 821 04 Bratislava 2	Lubomír Šidala <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Košická 44 P.O. BOX 21 080 01 Prešov	Matúš Murajda <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Nicaragua	Stredný hon 430 900 43 Hamuliakovo	Vladimír Kaštak <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Paraguay	Prepoštská 8 811 01 Bratislava	Martin Šamaj <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Peru	Tuhovská 5 831 07 Bratislava	Andrej Glatz <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Republic of Philippines	Cesta na Senec 15725/24 830 06 Bratislava	Pavol Konštiak <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Nám. osloboditeľov 1 031 01 Liptovský Mikuláš	Tadeusz Frackowiak <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Russian Federation	office 511, Štúrova 7 040 11 Košice	Ladislav Štefko <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of El Salvador	Zahradnícka 20 900 28 Ivanka pri Dunaji	Igor Moravčík <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Senegal	Na kopci 24 010 01 Žilina – Trnové	Souleymane Seck <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Serbia	Jesenského 12 040 11 Košice	
The Republic of Seychelles	Beblavého 4 811 01 Bratislava 1	Andrej Hryc <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Sierra Leone	Partizánska 16 A 811 03 Bratislava	Branislav Hronec <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of South Africa	Fraňa Kráľa 1 851 01 Bratislava	Milan Lopašovský <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Hutnícka 1 040 01 Košice	Daniel Lučkanič <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Tomášikova 30 821 01 Bratislava	Vladimír Kestler <i>honorary general consul</i>

State	Address of the consulate in the SR	Consul
The Kingdom of Thailand	Viedenská cesta 7 851 01 Bratislava	Alexander Rozin <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Kuzmányho 16 974 01 Banská Bystrica	Vladimír Soták <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Mlynská ulica 2 040 01 Košice	Štefan Melník <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Syrian Arab Republic	Tatranská ulica 1 841 06 Bratislava-Záhorská Bystrica	Mustafa Al Sabouni <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Ukraine	Budovateľská 29 093 01 Vranov nad Topľou	Stanislav Obický <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United Mexican States	Prepoštská 8 811 01 Bratislava	Václav Míka <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Uzbekistan	kalinčiakova 31 831 04 Bratislava	Ludovít Černák <i>Honorary Consul</i>

LIST OF THE EMBASSIES OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC, PERMANENT MISSIONS, CONSULATES GENERAL, SLOVAK INSTITUTES ABROAD

EMBASSIES OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC, PERMANENT MISSIONS, CONSULATES GENERAL, SLOVAK INSTITUTES AND THEIR HEADS AS OF FEBRUARY 2011

Embassy	Accredited	Address	Head of the embassy
Abuja	Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Cameroon, Gabon, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia, Togo, S o Tomé and Príncipe, Côte d'Ivoire	Plot 187, Lord Lugar Close, Asokoro, Abuja The Federal Republic of Nigeria	Miroslav Hacek Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Addis Abeba	Ethiopia	Bole sub-city, Erer Ber Shola Residential houses, W 17, Kebele 14/15, House No. 408 Addis Abeba The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	Milan Dubček Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Ankara	Turkey, Georgia	Atatürk Bulvarı 245 06692 Ankara Republic of Turkey	Vladimír Jakabčín Head of the Mission
Astana	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan	Sary-Arka, Karatökeř 5 010000 Astana Republic of Kazakhstan	Dušan Podhorský Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Athens	Greece	Georgiou Seferi 4 Paleo Psychiko 154 52 Athens The Hellenic Republic	Ján Voderadský Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Baghdad	Iraq	Hayy Babil (Al Jadriyah), Section 923, Street 37, House 94, Bagdad – Jadriyah, Republic of Iraq	Jozef Marheřka Chargé d'Affaires
Bangkok	Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar	No. 21/144, South Sathorn Road Bangkok 101 20 The Kingdom of Thailand	Alexander Meřitov Head of the Mission
Beijing	China, Mongolia, North Korea	Ritan Lu, Jian Guo Men Wai 100 600 Beijing The People's Republic of China	František Dřhopolček Head of the Mission
Belgrade	Serbia, Macedonia	Bulevar umetnosti 18 New Belgrade 110 70 Republic of Serbia	Ján Pšenica Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Berlin	Germany	Friedrichstrasse 60 101 17 Berlin Federal Republic of Germany	Igor Slobodník Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Prepared by Matúř Vranko, RC SFFA intern.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Translation: Anita Borřová, RC SFFA intern

Embassy	Accredited	Address	Head of the embassy
Bern	Switzerland, Lichtenstein	Thunstrasse 63, 3074 Muri b. Bern Switzerland	Ján Foltín <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Brasília	Brazil, Ecuador, Columbia, Venezuela, Surinam, Guyana	SES, Avenida das Nações Lote 21 B, Qd. 805, CEP 70 200-902 Brasília Federal Republic of Brazil	Branislav Hitka <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Brussels	Belgium, Luxemburg	Avenue Moliere 195 1050 Brussels Kingdom of Belgium	Ján Kuderjavý <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Budapest	Hungary	Stefánia út. 22–24 1143 Budapest XIV Republic of Hungary	Peter Weiss <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Buenos Aires	Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay	Figueroa Alcorta 1425 Buenos Aires The Argentine Republic	Pavel Šípka <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Bucharest	Romania, Moldova	Strada Otetari 020 977 Bucuresti Romania	Dagmar Repčková <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Canberra	Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua-New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu	47 Culgoa Circuit, O' Malley 2606 Canberra Commonwealth of Australia	Eva Ponomarenková <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Damascus	Syria, Lebanon, Jordan	Al Shafei Str. 33115 Damascus The Syrian Arab Republic	Milan Hubcej <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Delhi	India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bhutan	50-M, Niti Marg Chanakyapuri 110021 New Delhi Republic of India	Marián Tomášik <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Dublin	Ireland	Clyde Road, Ballsbridge Dublin Ireland	Roman Bužek <i>Ambassador</i>
The Hague	the Netherlands	Parkweg 1 2585 Hague Kingdom of the Netherlands	Oksana Tomová <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Hanoi	Vietnam	12 Ba Huyen Thanh Quan, Ba Dinh District Hanoi The Socialist Republic of Vietnam	Petr Svitek <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Havana	Antigua a Barbuda, Bahamas, Barba- dos, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Cuba, Saint Lucia, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago.	Calle 66, No. 52, entre 5 - tay7- ma, Miramar Havana Republic of Cuba	Zdenek Rozhold <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Helsinki	Finland	Annankatu 25 00100 Helsinki Republic of Finland	Juraj Podhorský <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Jakarta	Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, East Timor	Jalan Profesor Mohammad Yamin 29 1368 Jakarta 103 10 Republic of Indonesia	Štefan Rozkopál <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Cairo	Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE	3, Adel Hosein Rostom 11794 – Ramses Post Office Cairo Arab Republic of Egypt	Peter Zsoldos <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>

Embassy	Accredited	Address	Head of the embassy
Copenhagen	Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, Faroe Islands, Greenland)	Vesterled 26–28 2100 Copenhagen Kingdom of Denmark	Magda Pospíšilová <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia, Brunei	11, Jalan U-Thant 55 000 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia	Milan Lajčiak <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Kuwait	Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar	Block No.2, Street No.16, Villa No 22 131 23 Area Surra State of Kuwait	Ivan Lančarič <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Kiev	Ukraine	Jaroslavov val 34 019 01 Kiev Ukraine	Pavol Hamžik <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Lisbon	Portugal	Avenida da Liberdade 200 1250-147 Lisbon Portuguese Republic	Jaroslav Jarúnek <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
London	The United Kingdom	25, Kensington Palace Gardens W8 4QY, London The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Milan Vojtko <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Ljubljana	Slovenia	Tivoli Road 4, P.P.395 1000 Ljubljana Republic of Slovenia	Marianna Oravcová <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Madrid	Spain, Andorra, Morocco	C/Pinar, 20 28006 Madrid Kingdom of Spain	Ján Škoda <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Mexico City	Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Belize	México 11 560 Julio Verne 35 United Mexican States	Jaroslav Blažko <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Minsk	Belarus	Volodarskogo 6 220 034 Minsk Republic of Belarus	Marián Servátka <i>Ambassador</i>
Moscow	Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan	J. Fucik str. 17/19 Moscow The Russian Federation	Jozef Migaš <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Nairobi	Kenya, Tanzania, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Seychelles, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Djibouti, Somalia, Comoros, Congo, Central African Republic	Milimani Road 30 204 00 100 Nairobi Republic of Kenya	Milan Zachar <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Nicosia	Republic of Cyprus	4,Kalamatas St., Acropolis, Strovolos 2002 1165 Nicosia Republic of Cyprus	Anna Tureníčová <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Oslo	Norway, Iceland	Thomas Heftyes Gate 24 NO-0244 Oslo The Kingdom of Norway	Dušan Rozbora <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Ottawa	Canada	Rideau Terrace K1M 2A1 Ottawa Canada	Milan Kollár <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Paris	France, Monaco, Algeria	14 Avenue d'Eylau, 75016 Paris Republic of France	Marek Eštok <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Prague	Czech Republic	Pelléova 12 160 00 Prague Czech Republic	Peter Briňo <i>Head of the Mission</i>

Embassy	Accredited	Address	Head of the embassy
Pretoria	South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe	930 Arcadia Street Arcadia 0083 Pretoria The Republic of South Africa	Ladislav Straka <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Prishtina	Serbia	Metush Krasniqi 7 Dragodan 10000 Prishtina The Republic of Serbia	Miroslav Nađ <i>Head of the Branch of the Embassy</i>
Riga	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	Smilšu iela 8 1050, Riga Republic of Latvia	Dušan Krištofík <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Roma	Italy, Malta, San Marino, Vatican, Sovereign Military Order of Malta	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 144V/A 00194 Roma Italian Republic	Stanislav Vallo <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Sarajevo	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Skopljanska Nr. 7 710 00 Sarajevo Bosnia and Herzegovina	Miroslav Mojića <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Skopje	Macedonia	Budimpeštanska 39 1000, Skopje The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Róbert Kirmág <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Sofia	Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania	Blv. Janko Sakazov 1504 Sofia Republic of Bulgaria	Karol Mistrík <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Seoul	South Korea	389-1 Hannam-dong Yongsam-gu 140-210 Seoul Republic of South Korea	Dušan Bella <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Stockholm	Sweden	Arsenalsgatan 2/3 TR 10388 Stockholm Kingdom of Sweden	Peter Kmec <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Taipei	Taiwan	333 Keelung Road, Section 1 110 Taipei Republic of China	Dušan Dacho <i>Head of the Office</i>
Tashkent	Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan	ul. Kičik Bešjogoč 38 100070 Tashkent Republic of Uzbekistan	Roman Krištofík <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Tehran	Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan	No. 38, Sarlashgar Fallahi Street 19887 Tehran Islamic Republic of Iran	Anton Hajduk <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Tel Aviv	Israel, Palestinian Autonomy	Jabotinsky 37 P.O.Box 6459 Tel Aviv State of Israel	Jozef Hudec <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Tirana	Albania	Rruga Skenderbeu 8 Tirana Republic of Albania	Ivan Šveda <i>Chargé d'Affaires</i>
Tokyo	Japan, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau	2-11-33, Motoazabu Minato-ku 106-0046 Tokyo Japan	Drahomír Štos <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Tripoli	Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, Chad	Hay Al-Andalus, Gargaresh Str. P.O.BOX 5721 Tripoli People's Bureau of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	Marian Záhora <i>Head of the Mission</i>

Embassy	Accredited	Address	Head of the embassy
Warsaw	Poland	Litewska 6 00-581 Warsaw Republic of Poland	Peter Kormúth <i>Head of the Mission</i>
Vatican (The Holy See)	Vatican, The Holy See	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 144 00 194 Roma Italian Republic	Jozef Drapecký <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Vienna	Austria	Armbrustergasse 24 A-1190 Wien Republic of Austria	Peter Lizák <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Washington	USA	3523 International Court, NW 20008 Washington D.C. United States of America	Peter Burian <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
Zagreb	Croatia	Prilaz Gjure Deželica Nr. 10 10000 Zagreb Republic of Croatia	Roman Supek <i>Head of the Mission</i>

PERMANENT MISSIONS

Permanent mission	Address	Head of the mission
PM EU Brussels	Avenue de Cortenbergh 79 1110 Brussels Kingdom of Belgium	Ivan Korčok
PM NATO Brussels	Boulevard Leopold III, NATO HQ 1110 Brussels Kingdom of Belgium	František Kašický
PM UN New York	801 Second Avenue 10017 New York United States of America	Miloš Koterec
PM UN Geneva	9, Chemin de l'Ancienne Route 1218 Grand Saconnex Switzerland	Fedor Rosocha
PM Council of Europe Strasbourg	1, Rue Ehrmann 67000 Štrasburg Republic of France	Emil Kuchár
PM OECD Paris	28, Avenue d'Eylau 750 16 Paris Republic of France	Ivan Šramko
PM International Organizations Vienna	Blaastraße 34 A-1190 Vienna Republic of Austria	Marcel Peško

CONSULATES GENERAL

State	Address of the consulate general	Consul general
The People's Republic of China	Shanghai, Qi Hua Tower 4B 1375 Huai Hai Yhong Lu 200031 Shanghai	Pavol Sykorčín
The Federal Republic of Germany	Vollmannstrasse 25d 819 25 Munich	František Zemanovič
The Republic of Hungary	Derkovits sor 7 5600 Bekescsaba	Štefán Daňo

State	Address of the consulate general	Consul general
The Republic of Poland	sw. Tomazsa 34 31 027 Cracow	<i>Marek Lisánsky</i>
The Russian Federation	ul. Orbeli č. 21/2 194 223 Sankt Peterburg	<i>Peter Osvald</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Sümbül Sok. / Bambu Sok. 6 3. Levent, Istanbul, 343 30 Istanbul	<i>Jozef Šesták</i>
The United States of America	10 940 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2030 CA 90024 California, Los Angeles	
The United States of America	801 Second Avenue, 12th Floor New York, N.Y. 10017	<i>Igor Pokojný</i>
Ukraine	Lokoty 4 880 17 Uzhhorod	<i>Marian Sládeček</i>

SLOVAK INSTITUTES

Name	Address	Head
Slovak Institute Berlin	Zimmerstrasse 27, D-10117 Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Martin Sarvaš</i>
Slovak Institute Budapest	Rákóczi út. 15, H-1088 Budapest, Republic of Hungary	<i>Milan Kurucz</i>
Slovak Institute Moscow	Ul. 2 Brestská 27, 125-056, Moscow, Russian Federation	<i>Aneta Marenčíková</i>
Slovak Institute Paris	14, Avenue d'Eylau F-75016 Paris, Republic of France	<i>Božena Kržíková</i>
Slovak Institute Prague	Jilská 450/16, 110 00 Prague, Czech Republic	<i>Vladimír Valovič</i>
Slovak Institute Roma	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 144, I-00194 Rome, Italian Republic	<i>Peter Krupár</i>
Slovak Institute Vienna	Wipplingerstrasse 24-26, A-1010 Vienna, Republic of Austria	<i>Viera Polakovičová</i>
Slovak Institute Warsaw	ul. Krzywe Kolo 12/14a, PL-00 270 Warsaw, Republic of Poland	<i>Helena Jacošová</i>

LIST OF CONSULATES OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC HEADED BY THE HONORARY CONSULS

THE HEADS OF THE CONSULATES AS OF FEBRUARY 2011

State	Consulate	Consul
The Republic of Albania	Tirana	Faik Dizdarii <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Argentine Republic	La Plata	Eduardo Kabát <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Republic of Armenia	Yerevan	Gagik Vladimirovič Martirosian <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Graz	Volker Pichler <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Innsbruck	Jurgen Bodenser <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Linz	Ernst Papesch <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Salzburg	Gerald Hubner <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Vienna	Walter Hildebrand <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Gent	Arnold Vanhaecke <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Liège	Raffaele Antonio Apruzzese <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Mons	Mario Annaert <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Bolivia	La Paz	Hernán Guido Vera Ruiz <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Medjugorje	Rajko Zelenika <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Joinville	Ernesto Heinzelmann <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Recife	Joao Alixandre Neto <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	M. Façal Hammoud <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Sao Paulo	Peter Pauliček <i>Honorary General Consul</i>

Prepared by Matúš Vranko, RC SFPA intern.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

Translation: Anita Boršová, RC SFPA intern

State	Consulate	Consul
The Republic of Bulgaria	Varna	Edita Blagoevova <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Canada	Calgary	Ludovít Zanzotto <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
Canada	Montreal	Dezider Michaletz <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Canada	Toronto	Michael Martinček <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Canada	Vancouver	Stanislav Lišiak <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Canada	Winnipeg	Jozef Kiška <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Chile	Santiago	Paul Nador <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The People's Republic of China	Hong Kong	Willy Sun Mo Lin <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Colombia	Medellín	Jenaro Pérez Gutiérrez <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Denmark	Aarhus	Štefan Petö <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Arab Republic of Egypt	Alexandria	Mohamed Moustafa el Naggar <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Estonia	Tallinn	Evan Tudeberg <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	Addis Abeba	Feleke Bekele Safo <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Finland	Teerijärvi	Mikael Albäck <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The French Republic	Grenoble	Menyhért Kocsis <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The French Republic	Lille	Alain Bar <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The French Republic	Lyon	Christian Michel-Mestrallet <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The French Republic	Nancy	Jean-Marie Keller <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Bad Homburg	Imrich Donath <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Hamburg	Peter Littmann <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Hannover	Dirk Bettels <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Leipzig	Wolfgang Fritz Eschment <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Stuttgart	Christoph Goeser <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Wuppertal	Ivan Koval <i>Honorary Consul</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Belfast	Thomas Sullivan <i>Honorary Consul</i>
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Cardiff	Nigel Bruce Harold Payne <i>Honorary Consul</i>

State	Consulate	Consul
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Edinburgh	Duncan Alexander Spiers <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Indonesia	Denpasar	Jürgen Schreiber <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Indonesia	Surabaya	Sindunata Sambudhi <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Iceland	Reykjavik	Runólfur Oddsson <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The State of Israel	Ha Sharon	Karol Nathan Steiner <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The State of Israel	Jerusalem	Martin Rodan <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Ascoli Piceno	Carlo Matarazzo <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Florenca	Massimo Sani <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Forlí	Alvaro Ravaglioli <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Milan	Luigi Cuzzolin <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Neapol	Franca Serao <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Terst	Miljan Todorovič <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Torino	Giuseppe Pellegrino <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Kazakhstan	Karaganda	Alexej Petrovich Nefedov <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Kazakhstan	Kurchatov	Kairat Kamalovich Kadyrzhanov <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Kenya	Mombassa	Christoph Modigell <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Kyrgyz Republic	Bishkek	Igor Konstantinovič Gusarov <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	Luxembourg	Blanche Mourtrier <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Macedonia	Skopje	Vlade Tome Stojanovski <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Malaysia	Kota Kinabalu	Wong Khen Thau <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Malawi	Blantyre	Salim David Bapu <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Malta	Valletta	Godwin Edvard Bencini <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Morocco	Casablanca	Kamil Ouzzani Touhamy <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Moldova	Kishinev	Iurie Grigore Popovici <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Principality of Monaco	Monaco	Cristine Noghés-Ménio <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Republic of Mozambique	Maputo	Ismael Mussá Mangureira <i>Honorary Consul</i>

State	Consulate	Consul
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Eindhoven	Gerardus Hendrik Meulesteen <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Groningen	Gerhard Tonnis Poppempa <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Rotterdam	Jacob Ten Hoope <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Drammen	Zuzana Opavská Wahl <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Trondheim	Erik Frederiksen <i>Honorary Consul</i>
New Zealand	Auckland	Peter Kiely <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Islamic republic of Pakistan	Karachi	Abdula Sikander Ghulamali <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Panama	Panama	Julio César Benedetti <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Paraguay	Cuidad del Este	Charif Mammoud <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Peru	Lima	Teresa Koetzle - Daly <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Philippines	Cebu City	Antonio N. Chiu <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Philippines	Manila	Robert Chin Siy <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Poznań	Piotr Stanisław Styczynski <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Rzeszow	Adam Góral <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Sopot	Jerzy Lesniak <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Wroclaw	Maciej Kaczmarek <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Zakopane	Wiesław Tadeusz Wojaś <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Portugal	Porto	Manuel de Sá Bastos <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Romania	Salonta	Miroslav Jabloncsik <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Russian Federation	Astrakhan	Vladimir Stepanovich Sinchenko <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Russian Federation	Chanty-Mansijsk	Eduard Vasiljevič Lebedev <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Russian Federation	Rostov-on-Don	Peter Šulek <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Russian Federation	Omsk	Jurij Viktorovič Šapovalov <i>Honorary Consul Honorary Consul</i>
Russian Federation	Krasnoyarsk	Valerij Alexandrovič Gračev <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of El Salvador	San Salvador	Nicolas Antonio Salume Babun <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Senegal	Dakar	Mapathé Ndiouck <i>Honorary Consul</i>

State	Consulate	Consul
The Republic of Serbia	Niš	Stela Jovanović <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Seychelles	Victoria	Joseph France Albert <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Singapore	Singapore	Cheo Guan Ow <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	Colombo	Mahen Roshan Andrew Kariyawan <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Sudan	Khartoum	Nasreldin Ibrahim Shulgami <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Syrian Arab Republic	Lattakia	Anas Dib Joud <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Barcelona	Joaquín Ignacio Torredemer Galles <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Santa Cruz de Tenerife	Francisco José Perera Molinero <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Zaragoza	Jean-Pol Jules Marie Bastiaanas <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Swiss Confederation	Zürich	Michal Čierny <i>Honorary General Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Göteborg	Carl Magnus Richard Kindal <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Malmö	Rolf Bjernell <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Togolese republic	Lomé	Viwoto James Victor Sossou <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Bursa	Hüseyin Özdilek <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Edirne	Coskun Molla <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Izmir	Selçuk Borovali <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Ukraine	Doneck	Tamara Timofejevna Lysenko <i>Honorary Consul</i>
Ukraine	Uzhhorod	Ivan Juljevič Šufrič <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Boston	Peter Mužila <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Cleveland	Edward George Keshock <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Denver	Gregor James Fasing <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Detroit	Edward Zelenak <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Chicago	Thomas Kenneth Klimek Ward <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Indianapolis	Steve Zlatos <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Kansas City	Ross F. Marine <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Las Vegas	Geoffrey A. VanderPal <i>Honorary Consul</i>

State	Consulate	Consul
The United States of America	Bloomington, Minneapolis	Donald Paľko <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	North Miami	Cecilia F. Rokusek <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	Pittsburgh	Joseph T. Senko <i>Honorary Consul</i>
The United States of America	San Francisco	Barbara M. Pivnicka <i>Honorary Consul</i>

NUMBERS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC IN PEACE MISSIONS

AS OF JANUARY 2011

Mission	Country	Number of the Slovak Armed Forces members
UN		
UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) – UN	Cyprus	198
UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) – UN	Syria, Israel	2
NATO		
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)	Afghanistan	314
KFOR (Kosovo Force) – NATO	Kosovo	139*
NATO Headquarters (Sarajevo)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
EU		
ALTHEA	Bosnia and Herzegovina	35 + 4 (Headquarters)

*Slovak Republic accomplished its mission in KFOR on November 16, 2010 and withdrew its soldiers.

Prepared by Matúš Vranko, RC SFPA intern

Source: Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic (www.mosr.sk)

VI.

AUTHORS

AUTHORS

Nora Beňáková graduated from the University of Economics in Bratislava. Already as a student, she became involved in the activities concerning the civil society development. She worked for Bratislava based organizations such as Slovak Academic Institution Agency and/or Civil Society Development Foundation. Between 2002 and 2009 she worked as an executive director in People in Peril organization focusing mainly on humanitarian and post-humanitarian interventions in the countries like Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Sudan. Since 2010, she has been chairing the Slovak NGDO Platform – an umbrella organization of the 31 Slovak non-governmental organizations which deal mainly with international development and humanitarian assistance. (nora.benakova@mvro.sk)



Vladimír Bilčík studied political science and economics at Swarthmore College in the USA, European politics at the University of Oxford in the UK and political theory at Comenius University in Bratislava. He has been working as an analyst and head of the European studies research program at the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association since September 1999. From December 2005 he has also been working as assistant professor in the Department of political science at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Comenius University. In 2002–2003 he worked as advisor to Ján Figel' who was then a member of the Convention on the Future of Europe. Vladimír Bilčík's research covers various aspects of European integration and international relations. (bilcik@sfpa.sk)





Peter Brezáni graduated from the University of Economics in Bratislava in 2002. In 2001, he studied at Sejong University of Korea in Seoul and in 2009, spent two months as a researcher at the University of Tokyo in Japan. He began his career as a development policy analyst at the Slovak Institute of International Studies in 2002. In 2003, he joined the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association as an editor and foreign policy analyst. He has been responsible, both as editor and co-editor, for the journal *Listy SFPA* (2003); the quarterly *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* (2004–present); and the *Yearbook of Slovakia's foreign policy* (2003–present). He is a member of the Slovak NGDO Platform Chairmanship. In his research, he focuses on the issues of relations in Northeast Asia and development policy. (brezani@sfpa.sk)



Alexander Duleba graduated from the National Taras Shevchenko University of Kiev in 1989. In 1990–1993, he worked at the University of Pavol Jozef Šafárik in Prešov. From May 1993 to August 1995, he worked as an analyst for the MFA's Slovak Institute for International Studies. Since September 1995, he has been working at the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, and from May 2000, as its director and head of the Eastern Europe research program. He got his PhD at the Institute for Political Sciences of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in 1998 and the Ass. Prof. (Doc.) degree from the Comenius University in Bratislava in 2009. Since May 2010 he has been teaching at the Prešov University. Among his most important publications are: *Toward a strategic regional framework for the EU Eastern policy* (2010); *Searching for new momentum in EU-Russia relations* (2009), *The reform of the neighborhood policy* (2008); *Regional integration in the East and West: Challenges and responses* (2008); *Foreign policy of Slovakia after NATO and EU accession* (2004); *Eastern policy of the enlarged European Union. A Visegrad perspective* (2003); *Ukraine and Slovakia* (2000). (duleba@sfpa.sk)

Mikuláš Dzurinda graduated from the Žilina-based University of Transport and Communication in 1979. Until 1988, he worked as an economic analyst at the Research Transport Institute in Žilina. In 1988 he got his PhD there. In 1988–1990 he worked as the director for information technologies in Czechoslovak state railways in Bratislava. In 1990 he entered the politics and was one of the founding fathers of the Christian Democratic Movement party (KDH). He served as the Deputy Minister of Transportation and Posts (1991), in 1994 he served as the Minister of the Transportation, Posts and Public Works in the government of Jozef Moravčík. He was also the member of parliament (1992–1994, 1994–1998 and 2006–2010). Between 1998–2006 he served as the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic. Since 2010 he has been the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. He founded the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union political party and has been its chairman since 2000. (kami@mzv.sk)



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Ondrej Gažovič is a PhD candidate at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University in Bratislava. He studied international relations and law at the Masaryk University in Brno. He spent six months as a student at the University of Oslo (January–June 2006) and as a researcher at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna (beginning of 2010). He has been working with the editorial team of *Global Politics* journal (www.globalpolitics.cz) since 2006. In his research he is focused on public diplomacy, development assistance and theories of international relations. (gazovic@gmail.com)



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