



SFPFA
Slovak Foreign Policy Association



Slovakia: (Re)Discovering of the international crisis management

Samuel Goda



Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (RC SFPA) is a foreign policy think-tank that provides:

- independent expert analyses on crucial issues of international relations and the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic;
- publishes periodical and non-periodical expert publications serving to increase awareness in the field of international relations and the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic and as a source of qualified information for both, the expert as well as the general public;
- organizes expert events and participates in international scientific cooperation in the field of international relations and security;
- contributes to fostering expert discourse on international relations and the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic;
- creates a favorable environment for the growth of the new generation of Slovak experts in the field of international relations; and
- stimulates the interest of a wider Slovak public in global events as well as a deeper understanding of the significance of foreign policy and its links to domestic policy.

Slovakia: (Re)Discovering of the international crisis management

Samuel Goda

Bratislava 2015



- © Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Bratislava 2015
- © Author

Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association
Staromestská 6/D
811 03 Bratislava
Tel.: +421 2 5443 3151
www.sfpa.sk

Author


Samuel Goda (Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association and
University of Economics in Bratislava)

Proofreading

Jonathan McCormick



Published within the project “The challenges and opportunities for Slovakia’s engagement in international crisis management: NATO, EU, OSCE” supported by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak republic.



Published with the support of the U.S. Embassy in Bratislava within the project “The role and perspective of Slovakia’s engagement in international conflict/crisis resolution/management (CR/M): NATO, EU, OSCE.”



The book also appears thanks to the kind support of the Bratislava-based office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Contents

Introduction	5
What is international crisis management?	7
Slovakia and international crisis management	12
Development of the Slovak ICM approach.....	15
Draft procedure for deciding on the participation of Slovak Armed Forces in international crisis management operations	17
Implementation of the draft concept.....	20
Overview of the Slovak approach to crisis management	21
Slovak Armed Forces' experience in international crisis management.....	24
Conclusion	32
After Ukraine...	33
Russian engagement.....	35
What consequences?	39
Instead of a conclusion	42

Introduction

The security environment in “wider Europe” has changed significantly in recent years. Depending on one’s preferences, a wide range of milestones may be named – the airstrikes in Yugoslavia, the 9/11 attacks, the Madrid attacks, the war in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, etc. In this study, however, the main issue we are addressing is the Ukrainian crisis (or war), Ukraine being our direct neighbor and a country of special interest – and this being the issue, according to a wide range of experts, that has had the most impact on the region’s security in decades.

Hence it was our desire to offer an analysis of Slovakia’s engagement in international crisis management (ICM) efforts in this context, as well as of the response of those international organizations (NATO, EU and OSCE) that are predominantly involved in ICM. This study will show, based on the country’s previous experience in ICM activities, that the Slovak Republic is an engaged partner and responsible member of these organizations. However, there is always room for improvement, both in the level of expertise and engagement with each particular organization, and in the promotion of Slovakia’s own interests.

To analyze Slovakia’s engagement in international crisis management activities alone would be to miss the point. Therefore, we also allow space here for a consideration of the broader European security environment and the situation in Ukraine, which is without a doubt having a great impact on the role and activities of all three organizations – NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

This publication is an outcome of a larger research project called “International Crisis Management,” conducted by a team of analysts at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) in 2015–2016. As part of this project we have organized several events in Slovakia dedicated to the topic of international crisis management, with the aim of putting this topic “back on the table” in Slovakia and the larger Visegrad region. The Visegrad aspect has been important for us, as it has provided an overview of the opportunities for cooperation between Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in the field of crisis management, paying special attention to Ukraine. With this aim, and in cooperation with our partners in V4 countries, we have organized an international workshop and released a publication entitled “In search for greater V4 engagement in international crisis management.”

In the course of preparing the current publication – which involved rationale creation, as well as the preparatory stages of the whole project – we decided that an overview and analysis of the broader security environment was indispensable. With this in mind, we organized a NATO SPS Advanced

Research Workshop on the topic of “Best practices and lessons learned in conflict management: NATO, OSCE, EU and civil society,” where a number of recognized experts from academia and think tanks shared their views and ideas on this subject. Hence we decided to take this opportunity to share them in this publication as well.

The main aim of the publication, and indeed of the overall project, is to revive the discussion of experts on international crisis management and the role of international institutions such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE in this field, and to contribute to ongoing discussions on rethinking (or reaffirming) Slovak interests in the changing broader security environment. Also, it offers up-to-date data and analysis on Slovak crisis management activities, providing a broader international audience with a window into Slovakia’s engagement in crisis management, in line with its national laws and strategies.

What is international crisis management?

The current security environment, be it national, regional or global, is currently marked by a high degree of instability and uneven development. At the same time, due to the high level of complexity and mutual conditionality inherent in current international relations, the ongoing processes are likewise more dynamic and less predictable. The main phenomenon of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century is an increased globalization, bringing with it changes in the global security situation, complicated by the fact that States are no longer the exclusive security actors. This latest development in the field of security, which began in the late 1990s and early 2000s, is demonstrated by the considerable rise in non-State actors. These actors bring with them new strategies of warfare which States and international crisis management organizations have to deal with, i.e. non-military threats. Non-military (or asymmetric) threats are becoming a very powerful and low cost tool in hands of non-State actors. The main such threats are terrorism, (international) organized crime, all types of smuggling, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Most generally, we consider the contemporary situation in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions to be a consequence of several factors, including (among others) distrust between the regional powers (poles), barely predictable international affairs, the economic crisis (affecting mostly the US, the EU, and developing world), unstable alliances, and the search – within the context of protracted conflicts – for partners in economic and other types of cooperation (the status quo, etc.).

The entire concept and tradition of conflict resolution has gone through various “ups and downs” and an evolution since its emergence as a field of study in the 1950s and 1960s. The rise of this new field of study was accompanied by certain concerns as to its relevance, and a lack of trust even from other closely related academic fields. It is of course not unusual for new ideas to be rejected by mainstream thinking at first, especially in the field of science. However, time has proven this new academic field to be more than relevant to the practice of international relations. According to the pragmatic theory of international relations based on Realpolitik, and the more liberal practice of international law, the main actors in international relations are States. However, the relevance of other actors in international relations, such as international organizations (although these generally derive their authority from that of States), is being debated in contemporary discussions. In the early 1970s, older ideas for resolving the situation in Germany, and addressing the question of the final “areas of influence” between the two Superpowers,

materialized in the founding of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE was the first successful attempt to bring the two superpowers together to discuss numerous topics on the security of the area ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It is not surprising that it took three years or so to see any result. The result, however, was impressive – the Helsinki Final Act, commonly known as the Decalogue. The Decalogue established a “guideline” for the behavior of States in the realm of international politics. Its ten principles are based on previous documents which contained the notions of basic human rights and universal principles (UN Charter, Human rights declaration, etc.). Nearly 40 years later, these principles are still followed and respected. Moreover, the understanding of security as involving three dimensions (understood today as the politico-military, economic-environmental, and human rights dimensions) was something very new.¹ The CSCE was a pioneer in dealing with security in its broader scope, even though its main focus was on politico-military issues. We could go so far as to call the CSCE/OSCE the “founder” of conflict resolution and prevention in the international organization agenda. The influence of the CSCE/OSCE – and not only in conflict resolution and prevention – is far more reaching than is generally recognized nowadays. The whole idea of conflict resolution is based on the rejection of war as an instrument (except in some cases as a last resort) when dealing with conflicts between States. The process itself is understood as one of reconciliation.

From the theoretical point of view, two of the most influential authorities in this field, Johan Galtung and John Paul Lederach, deserve attention, in our opinion. Of course, there are a number of other important thinkers in area of conflict resolution and conflict transformation, as well as numerous schools of thought that have provided extremely important ideas and thus contributed to the development of this research area. To borrow a few words from Hans Joachim Giessmann, who provided a short but detailed analysis and summary of both concepts, “Johan Galtung reminded us that social and political conflicts are determined either through cultural difference, active behavior, or structural inequality. Furthermore, social and political conflicts are systemic by nature – i.e. beyond the interpersonal dimension, they also occur at the social and socioeconomic levels. Thus, they require both a systemic understanding and approach in order to be dealt with.”² Moreover, Giessmann

¹ Of course, meaning here the negotiations during the Cold war when the security was understood mainly in military and political terms. However, the very principle of different meanings of security are much older.

² H.J. Giessmann, “Conflict transformation and the Russia-Ukraine crisis,” Presentation during NATO SPS ARW „Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Conflict Management: NATO, OSCE, EU and Civil Society,” organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association SPPA, IFSH at University of Hamburg and Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, Bratislava, June 2015.

thinks that conflict transformation offers a better conceptual response to this dilemma. He understands conflict transformation as a “complex social process within which the relations, attitudes, behaviors, interests, and discourses that construct social and political conflicts are influenced and altered – i.e. transformed – in such a way that the conflicting parties’ cultural, behavioral and structural incentives to use force against each other decrease and become deconstructed through mutual confidence-building and constructive interaction.” When comparing both concepts, he comes to the conclusion that “(I)n contrast to conflict prevention and conflict resolution, which focus on the conflict as such, conflict transformation focuses on its underlying root causes and on the affected, broken relationship between the parties to a conflict. The concept of conflict transformation puts the social actors and their responsibilities at the center of attention. The self-responsibility of the parties to a conflict is considered key to conflict transformation”.

Besides the relationship-oriented focus of conflict transformation theory, the concept of “identity” in this context is also very important (the concept of identity, of course, is very closely related to that of “relationship,” although distinct from it). During his address in Bratislava, Marko Lehti³ pointed out that the main problem of identity conflict is not antagonism, “but rather how it is possible to support the transformation from enemy to adversary. What distinguishes adversaries from enemies is the relational aspect of respect. For the granting and withholding of recognition and respect, narratives of the past have a core role in transformation, as sustained exclusive roles of enmity and victimhood are rooted in conflicting narratives about the past. Therefore, conflict transformation calls attention to how a complicated history, inequitable economic conditions, and political dynamics are all entangled in identity struggles.” The issues of identity and conflicting narratives of the past constitute one of the most difficult and problematic areas in dealing with conflict, especially in the period after a (violent) conflict. It is very common not only that former parties to a conflict distinguish themselves as against “the others,” but that every party perceives itself as a victim of those others, who are seen as the perpetrators. Lehti further argues: “(T)he narratives of the past should not, however, be regarded as fixed and predetermined: there is room for a dialogic transformation of memories and identities by renegotiating the narratives of the past. Mediating the narratives of the past, however, cannot be based on an interest-based negotiation model looking for a solution – rather it is merely the opening up of a dialogic process that

³ M. Lehti, “Rethinking identities and dialogue in conflict transformation,” Presentation during NATO SPS ARW „Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Conflict Management: NATO, OSCE, EU and Civil Society,” organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association SPPA, IFSH at University of Hamburg and Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, Bratislava, June 2015.

seeks a fusion of horizons. All this requires a rethinking of how the past is determining the present.”

Nonetheless, first and foremost, when trying to analyze any kind of conflict, as P. Terrence Hopmann⁴ argues: “(A)ny party that seeks to engage in the management of a conflict anywhere in the world needs to begin with a diagnosis of the conflict. All too often, conflict management practitioners seem to ‘parachute’ into a region of conflict and attempt to apply their own specific bag of tools before trying to understand the local dynamics that are driving the conflict. Often this approach leads not only to failure to end the conflict, but may even exacerbate the conflict by applying approaches that heighten tensions and fail to respond to the underlying drivers of a particular conflict.” In other words, a “one size fits all” approach is, as usual, very complicated to apply.

As Wolfgang Zellner⁵ has stated, multilateral conflict management could be defined as “international co-operative interference in the domestic affairs of a State where a conflict is happening, with the objective of containing, managing or resolving this conflict.” He continues: “A ‘co-operative’ approach means including all internal and external parties to the conflict, particularly the State concerned, observing the sovereignty of this State. An ‘international’ intervention means interference in the domestic affairs of the State concerned, legitimized by a proper mandate of an inclusive international organization, such as the UN or the OSCE.” Accordingly, not only individually but also under the umbrella of ad hoc coalitions, or under the mandate of international organizations dealing with crisis management, States are obliged to undertake steps in order to oppose such threats. In this regard, NATO, the EU and the OSCE are the principal ICM organizations promoting a comprehensive approach to these new security threats, and using a wide range of tools and effective mechanisms. P. T. Hopmann, in his speech in Bratislava on June 8, 2015, mentioned that institutions like the UN, and regional institutions such as the OSCE, “may have an advantage in engagement in conflicts over any individuals or single States in the sense that they represent a collective interest in conflict resolution over and above the interests of any particular State party. In this respect, conflicts involving member or participating States may be mediated by these institutions not completely as outside parties but in fact as institutions to which the conflicting parties belong.” Hopmann

⁴ P.T. Hopmann, “Principles of conflict management for conflict management institutions: best practices and lessons learned,” Presentation during NATO SPS ARW „Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Conflict Management: NATO, OSCE, EU and Civil Society,” organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association SFPA, IFSH at University of Hamburg and Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, Bratislava, June 2015.

⁵ W. Zellner, “Conflict management in confrontational political environment,” Presentation during NATO SPS ARW, op. cit.

goes further in his analysis when he continues that in general “these institutions have a primary interest in cooperative security and maintaining peace and stability rather than favoring one State party over another. However, they may lack legitimacy when becoming engaged in intra-State conflicts, since the non-State party may not trust an institution that consists solely of recognized States on the grounds that these institutions may be biased in favor of the prerogatives of States over the rights to self-determination and security of individuals or groups. In these latter cases the engagement of civil society is also essential.”

One of the most important and effective tools for generating specific military and civilian capabilities in the attempt to deliver an adequate response to security threats is represented by international crisis management operations. By virtue of its membership, the Slovak Republic is an active contributor to operations conducted under the auspices of ICM organizations.⁶

Due to the abovementioned changes in the dynamics of international relations and international security, the nature of international crisis management operations today is very different from a few decades ago. The United Nations, NATO, the EU, and the OSCE are all undergoing permanent changes in order to face this situation. These organizations must develop new tools or reform existing ones at all levels, including decision-making, prevention, planning, and all issues related to field operations.

The end of Cold War has also brought a qualitative change in the nature of crisis management missions and peace operations. These days such missions include a mixture of civil and military elements, including human rights promotion, elections support, monitoring, security-related activities (reform, capacity building, etc.), public administration development, democracy, and State building – a wide range of activities falling within the areas of politico-military, economic-environmental, and human rights (to use the OSCE’s labels). As mentioned above, there is no “one size fits all” approach to such missions: all of them are unique in terms of mandate, framework and overall conditions. For the Slovak Republic, to engage in such missions through international organizations is a special opportunity, not only in terms of transferring its own best practices, but also because of the benefit of lessons learned in the process of international crisis management.

⁶ R. Ivančík, V. Jurčák, *Mierové operácie vybraných organizácií medzinárodného krízového manažmentu* [Peace operations of international crisis management], Liptovský Mikuláš: AOS, 2013, p. 231.

Slovakia and international crisis management

Since its establishment, and in accordance with its own security and defense interests and priorities, the Slovak Republic has been actively involved in activities to deepen peace and strengthen security in Europe and the larger world, not only through its political and diplomatic activities but also via the active involvement of its forces in crisis management. Fundamental changes in the security environment in recent years, as well as Slovak membership in NATO and the EU, have increased Slovakia's political weight internationally, its level of responsibility for a safer and more stable world, and its opportunities to actively shape its own security environment and promote its interests abroad.

Given these developments, a systematic procedure is needed for making decisions on the participation of the Slovak Armed Forces in international crisis management operations, decisions that will match Slovakia's interests and capabilities with its commitments. It is necessary first, therefore, to introduce the ideas behind the new approach to Slovak engagement in international crisis management, which are based on a document called "Draft concept for the participation of Slovak Armed Forces in operations of international crisis management." The aim of this paper is to draft an outline for a systematic approach to be used by the military in international crisis management.

The international community aims to respond in a timely and adequate way to emerging tensions and crises, to which end they have developed, and make use of, a system of international crisis management. In the past decade there has been a significant qualitative change in the nature of international crisis management, enabling the effective collaboration of the main actors in international crisis management – such as the UN, NATO, the EU, the OSCE, regional initiatives, and ad hoc coalitions – in conflict prevention, crisis management, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, and rescue and humanitarian operations.

The key role in crisis management operations – both in terms of international legitimacy and breadth of scope – belongs to the United Nations. In addition to its own operations, the UN provides a mandate to several regional and sub-regional organizations for the conducting of operations. The UN Security Council is working on an ad-hoc basis with regional and sub-regional organizations. This strengthening of mutual cooperation points to changes in the global responsibility of the UN and a move towards a more regionalist approach. The UN standby system is based on the contingent

obligations of member States to provide specific resources (military units, specialized civilian and military personnel, services, materials and equipment) within the agreed response times. These are maintained in “standby mode” in their home countries, where the preparation for the fulfillment of their tasks is organized. If necessary, emergency units may be used for participation in operations, upon the request of the UN Secretary General and the approval of the Member States. Despite the global nature of the UN and its undisputed international authority, the reality is that the UN is unable to generate sufficient and readily available military capabilities for the prevention or addressing of crisis and conflict situations, and is increasingly reliant upon the cooperation of regional organizations, in particular NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

In terms of the ability to conduct effective military operations, the most important position in international crisis management is held by NATO, which has led operations in Kosovo (KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF), and the Mediterranean (Active Endeavour), has a Headquarters in Sarajevo, and a NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). In line with the Washington Summit of July 2001, the Military Committee of NATO forces approved a different concept of the Alliance’s readiness, on the basis of which the authority and the means to conduct operations within and outside Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty was generated. In 2002, the Prague NATO summit agreed the creation of Rapid Reaction Forces capable of rapid deployment (within five days of a decision) and independent operation (within 30 days). The Slovak Republic is participating actively within these forces.

At the end of the twentieth century, the EU began to grow in importance in terms of the building of a European security and defense. In 2003, a cooperation agreement between the EU and NATO (the so-called Berlin+) was concluded. The first EU military mission was established in Macedonia (Concordia), then in Congo (ARTEMIS), with two other police missions led by the EU following, in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), and in Macedonia (EUPOL Proxima). As of December 2, 2004, international EUFOR troops began to operate in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the ALTHEA operation. In December 2003, the European Council approved the first ever European Security Strategy. The adopted EU Lisbon Treaty extends the range of possible EU missions beyond the Petersberg tasks and provides new mechanisms to deepen integration in the field of security and defense (institute of structured cooperation). In 2004, the EU created a new battle group concept, in which the Slovak Republic also participates. In its international crisis management, the OSCE has focused on early warning and conflict prevention, the nature of its mission being exclusively diplomatic, monitoring or assisting. NATO and the EU, however, have generally welcomed the opportunity to lead a peacekeeping operation under the mandate of the OSCE.

Given the size of Slovakia's Armed Forces, participation in more than ten operations simultaneously would be excessive and would result in the fragmentation of its capacities. A Slovak commitment to participate in international crisis management operations globally, which would give rise to such a geographic fragmentation, would also not allow Slovakia to focus on regions of priority interest.

Slovakia has its own approach to international crisis management, derived from its previous experience both during the "Czechoslovak era" of the Warsaw Pact, and more particularly during the post-1993 transition. From the outset, Slovakia declared its willingness to adopt a European and Euro-Atlantic direction. Nevertheless, in 1994 the Government briefly opted for an unclear, unpredictable, and opaque foreign and security policy, which led to Slovakia's being the only V4 country not to be invited to join the first round of NATO enlargement at the 1997 Madrid Summit. Meanwhile, however, Slovak engagement with the OSCE followed a different narrative. Slovakia joined the CSCE/OSCE on January 1, 1993, immediately after gaining independence, the OSCE opting for a more inclusive approach. From 1994 to 1998 Slovak diplomat Ján Kubiš served as director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center, the most important institution within the OSCE. Afterwards, between 1999 and 2005, he served as OSCE secretary general. In general, however, Slovakia's international reputation, despite its engagement in several UN, OSCE and NATO-led missions, was an unhappy one.

Slovakia generally uses conventional instruments when dealing with international crisis management situations – civil and military operations and missions, reconstruction and stabilization activities, and development and humanitarian aid. It contributes particular specialized capacities to multinational and international missions, which – when combined with the contributions of other actors – should lead to greater synergy. From the regional point of view, Slovakia is interested, and willing to participate, in a wide range of missions, placing particular emphasis on the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, in such areas of activity as improving the security situation, preventing conflict, promoting confidence building measures, reconstructing and developing the economy, and building civil society and the rule of law. As already mentioned, regional preferences play a secondary role when it comes to urgent needs such as those seen in Afghanistan or eastern Africa. Slovakia's most important contributions are in the form of the Slovak Armed Forces, civil experts (including diplomats, police and customs forces), and last but not least, Slovak Official Development Aid programs. Which particular form of engagement is used naturally depends on the needs on the ground; however, when combined all these instruments together comprise the framework of Slovakia's assets.

On the institutional level, Slovakia actively promotes Security Sector Reform. Within the UN, as chair of the informal UN member States group,

it has organized or been involved in numerous events devoted to this topic. Security Sector Reform is also seen to contribute to the effective functioning of executive structures and OSCE missions as well. As initiator and Chairman of the Group of Friends of Security Sector Reform/G within the OSCE, Slovakia has also promoted this topic in Hofburg. Slovakia supports the creation of a handbook of practical experience of the democratic control of Armed Forces, and a guide to the executive structures of the OSCE.

Development of the Slovak ICM approach

The deployment of Slovak Armed Forces in international crisis management has generally been based on the justified interest of the Slovak Government, as endorsed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic, or as required by the UN, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, or those States under whose leadership operations were carried out. Previously, however, no approved concept for the participation of Slovak Armed Forces in operations abroad existed, while at the same time demands on our participation in foreign operations far exceeded our ability and competence. The result was an unbalanced participation of Armed Forces units in operations of various international organizations, with the funding for participation coming at the expense of their own equipment and training and other obligations of the Slovak Republic. The participation of Slovak Armed Forces in operations under the UN – especially after Slovakia's accession to NATO and the EU, with their increasing engagement in international crisis management – brought about a situation in which it was difficult to fulfill the commitments of the Slovak Republic resulting from its membership in these organizations. For these reasons, it was necessary, and in the interests of the Slovak Republic, to gradually achieve a more balanced participation of its Armed Forces in international crisis management operations, with a focus on strengthening our participation in operations led by NATO and the EU. So far, Slovak participation in international crisis management operations – both that of its Armed Forces and of those forces of the Police Corps allocated for this purpose – has earned Slovakia recognition in the eyes of our allies and partners and of the international community. The main benefits to Slovakia of its Armed Forces' participation in peacekeeping operations include a deepening of the military-technical level and professionalism of its troops, and the experience gained in the planning, leadership and use of the practices of these international operations.

The then (until 2012) existing legal situation in the Slovak Republic did not allow soldiers to be deployed in operations outside Slovak territory for the carrying out of basic services. Therefore, units of the Armed Forces were transferred to international crisis management based on individual voluntary contracts. That allowed for the deployment of only small units, mainly

combat and support units. Lack of expertise was offset by the recruitment of soldiers from reserve units, who after leaving the mission generally took their experience outside the Armed Forces.

In the area of physical security (equipment, armament, military), Slovak Armed Forces units did not have sufficiently developed standards for the operation of equipment under harsh climatic conditions. According to experts, the available equipment did not provide sufficient protection for the lives and health of soldiers, reducing their ability to perform their assigned technical tasks within international crisis management operations. To some extent, this situation still exists today. The retrofitting of units with adequate material and technical support is financed as unplanned expenditures, thus putting pressure on the budget of the Slovak Ministry of Defense.

The system of funding contingency operations during the financial year has been a negative experience in ensuring the participation of the Armed Forces in crisis management. Slovakia's participation in such operations is financially covered under the budget of its Ministry of Defense, at the expense of the Armed Forces' modernization and transformation programs. This has resulted in a slowdown of the reform process within the Armed Forces. The participation of Slovak Armed Forces in international crisis management operations has demonstrated the need to improve the current utilization of knowledge and experience, and to ensure their use in improving the operating procedures, technical equipment, and combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

When calculating the needed funding to ensure participation of our Armed Forces in international crisis management operations, one must consider all potential contributions of our Armed Forces to the common defense, in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: the posting and maintaining of our units in new, unplanned operations in accordance with Slovak interests and commitments; contributing our share of the common costs of the EU (regardless of whether we participate in its operations); maintaining our troops in ongoing operations; and ensuring the continued participation of our Armed Forces in international crisis management operations in accordance with the further political aims of the Slovak Republic.

Previous experience in the field of crisis management has demonstrated the need to introduce a new crisis management system into the security system of the Slovak Republic, compatible with the crisis management of our allies and partners, with links to crisis management systems of international organizations, in particular NATO and the EU. An integral part of this system must be the Situation Centre, to ensure the continuous monitoring of the security environment at home and abroad. The need for the implementation of this measure is also based on Slovakia's commitment to NATO, which the Government adopted in its Resolution no. 133 of February 25, 2003, for

reporting on the results of the accession negotiations between the Slovak Republic and NATO and offering a proposal for further proceedings. The then existing legal framework of the Slovak Republic, which addressed the issue of sending its Armed Forces and the recruitment of foreign Armed Forces within its territory, was created under a different security situation. The nature of the tasks and missions in which the Armed Forces will participate in the future is fundamentally different from what it was during the past decade. It is far more likely in the future that Slovak Armed Forces will be deployed in international crisis management missions to protect and defend our interests and meet our commitments – in certain cases, even on extremely short notice, on the order of five days from receipt of the relevant decisions of the international community.

Draft procedure for deciding on the participation of Slovak Armed Forces in international crisis management operations⁷

Given the above analysis of Slovakia's experience in this area, a proposal was introduced to establish the following procedure for deciding on the participation of the Armed Forces in crisis management situations:

- an early warning system in order to identify emerging crisis situations;
- a comprehensive professional (political, military, resource, legislative) analysis of the impact of the crisis on the interests and obligations of the Slovak Republic, and the possibility of the involvement of our Armed Forces in response;
- the preparation and approval of the Government of the Slovak Republic in deciding on the next steps regarding the emerging crisis;
- the presentation and promotion of the participation of Slovak Armed Forces in crisis management situations, by Slovakia's Permanent Representatives in international organizations, including participation in their decision-making processes on the basis of relevant Slovak policies;
- the approval of the participation of Slovak Armed Forces in accordance with the applicable legislation, after the decision of an international organization to perform an operation and the results of the planning conference;
- operational planning.

⁷ "Konceptia účasti OS SR v operáciách medzinárodného krízového manažmentu," [Strategy of the participation of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in international crisis management operations] Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, 2011.

The aspect of early warning includes the complex and continuous collection and monitoring of information (international organizations, foreign sources, intelligence services, publicly available sources, other sectors); an analysis from the perspective of the safety aspects; identifying and analyzing an emerging crisis (its impact on the interests of the Slovak Republic and on its allies and partners, projections of possible crisis scenarios) as well as regular, relevant, special reporting for decision makers (Slovak ministers and Government) with conclusions and recommendations for further action.

The expert analysis is a key element in these recommendations and includes political, resource and legislative analyses:

The political analysis assesses the impact of the emerging crisis on the interests of the Slovak Republic, and the priorities to be considered regarding the interests defined in the Security Strategy and Slovakia's international commitments, the priorities being considered in the following order:

- common defense under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- peace support operations led by NATO and under the Common Security and Defense Policy;
- UN operations to strengthen stability and security inside and outside of Europe, and to address conflicts affecting European security; peace support operations within a multinational coalition (ad hoc), preferably under a UN mandate;
- observation, training and assistance missions of NATO, the EU, the UN, and the OSCE.

We include here also other Slovak political ambitions, which are perceived as the will of the Slovak Government to engage beyond our commitments in international crisis management operations, despite the fact that this may have a direct, possibly negative impact on Slovak interests. The political analysis further evaluates the political and security situation in the crisis area being considered, the international response to the crisis, and the mandate and policy objectives of the operation in which the deployment of our Armed Forces is suggested. This political analysis would be drawn up by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense.

The *military analysis* assesses the military framework for the participation of the Armed Forces in a potential operation, with an emphasis on the mandate, military target, and anticipated nature of the operation; the availability of those capabilities required to meet the mandate and military objectives of the operation; the impact of national restraints on performing the required tasks; the geographical area of operation and its impact on the performance of these tasks; the expected period of deployment and the conditions of termination of the operation, in connection with the fulfillment of its objectives; the immediate military and security risks to the deployed unit, and

the requirements for ensuring the sustainability of the deployed forces. The military analysis would be elaborated by the Slovak Ministry of Defense.

The *source analysis* would assess, based on the outcome of the political and military analyses, the availability of capacities and resources for the participation of the Armed Forces in a potential international crisis management operation, with a focus on:

Personnel capacities:

- the type of unit and the specifics of its composition, according to expert opinion;
- training units (expertise, language and physical readiness);
- experience in joint activities in the framework of joint operations or exercises;
- organizational structure, subordination, dislocation.

Material capacities – technical, informational and physical – focusing on the interoperability of military forces in the areas of:

- doctrines and practices;
- communication and information systems;
- compatibility of weaponry and equipment;
- interoperability of material supplies.

Last but not least, the availability of financial resources, in the following order:

- quantification of the financial resources needed for the full participation of the Armed Forces in the upcoming operation;
- a proposal for the financial security of the Armed Forces in this participation.

This analysis of the personnel and material capacities and financial resources needed for the full participation of the Armed Forces within the upcoming operation would be elaborated by the Slovak Ministry of Defense. The issue of financial security would be determined by the Government of the Slovak Republic.

The *legislative analysis* would assess the legal implications of the potential participation of the Armed Forces in operations of international crisis management, with emphasis placed on: a compliance assessment with respect to alternatives for addressing the crisis, in light of international law and the legislation of the Slovak Republic; the defining of decision-making responsibilities and a proposed timeframe within which to decide; and determining the legal means for the deployment of soldiers – the international and bilateral contractual basis, rules of engagement, and the law of armed conflict. This legislative analysis would be drawn up by the Slovak Ministry of Defense, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In terms of determining Slovakia's position on what further steps should be taken (third item in the Draft procedure), this pertains to how the international community is to ultimately deal with the emerging crisis, and the

possible role of the Slovak Republic in this. It is also a mandate for the Slovak Permanent Representatives to international organizations, for the presentation and promotion of the Slovak Republic, and for their involvement in the planning and decision-making processes of these organizations. This would be subject to the Slovak Government approval of a proposal prepared as an outcome of expert analysis. The position adopted would be one of a political nature, not a decision as to any specific form of participation.

This position of Slovakia on further steps to be taken would be drafted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense. A proposal to authorize the participation of the Armed Forces in particular international crisis management activities would be proposed by the Ministry of Defense, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, and submitted to the Slovakia's Security Council and the Slovak Government. Other State administrative bodies may also participate in the drafting process, if necessary. The approval of Slovak participation would be decided by the Government (according to its relevant law) and by the Slovak National Council, based on the submitted expert analysis.

Implementation of the draft concept

The aim of the concept paper is to propose a framework for a flexible mechanism allowing the Slovak Republic to make quality and timely decisions, and to plan and ensure the participation of the Armed Forces in international crisis management operations. The decision-making mechanism must ensure that the Slovak Government is able to take the necessary decisions in parallel with the decision-making processes of international organizations, and also within relatively short time scales. To establish such a framework, the following is needed:

- a) In the field of early warning, to establish a national office in the organizational structure of the Office of the Security Council of the Slovak Republic, to ensure the comprehensive and continuous monitoring and analysis of the security situation, with an emphasis on the interests of the Slovak Republic in accordance with the Slovak Government's Resolution no. 1177 of December 8, 2004. With respect to the emerging of crisis centers at the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to support the creation of a so-called "light version" Situation Centre (without material support and equipment).
- b) Regarding the expert analysis:
 - any proposal for the deployment of Armed Forces in international crisis management operations must contain the results of expert analysis;
 - financial resources to ensure ongoing operations should be earmarked under the budget of the Slovak Ministry of Defense.

- The method of financially ensuring the participation of the Armed Forces in new operations should be provided by the Slovak Government on the basis of a proposal by the Ministry of Finance;
- c) Change the legislative framework of the Slovak Republic in relation to decision-making concerning the deployment of Armed Forces in operations of international crisis management so as to:
 - allow the decision-making process of the national constitutional bodies to be in parallel with those of international organizations, with respect to sending Slovak Armed Forces to their operations, particularly in the context of the NATO Response Force and the EU Rapid Response (e.g. by extending the authority of the Government, which would require a change in the rules of procedure of the National Council of the Slovak Republic);
 - reflect the changing nature of peace support operations and the role of Armed Forces in these operations;
 - d) In proposing the participation of Slovak Armed Forces in international crisis management operations, the terms of the operation's termination should be established, in line with the aims of the operation.

Overview of the Slovak approach to crisis management

The need to address the new security environment was reflected in a number of national security and defense documents. The first conceptual document dealing with security and defense issues was the 1994 Defense Doctrine of the Slovak Republic (Obranná doktrína SR). Of particular importance was the declared aim to transform individual defense into collective defense through participation in the Partnership for Peace program. Despite the emphasis on addressing threats to national security and sovereignty, the defense doctrine declared Slovakia's willingness to participate in international crisis management activities. This was also true of The Fundamental Aims and Principles of the National Security of the Slovak Republic (1996). The fourth principle stated that Slovakia was willing to participate in international organizations to prevent conflict and in peaceful conflict resolution missions and that it was ready to extend its participation in international peace missions.

The 1998 change of Government signaled a significant shift in Slovak foreign and security policy. Slovakia not only declared its commitment to joining NATO and EU but also took several steps towards achieving it. The Security Strategy as well as the Defense Strategy and Military Strategy of 2001 reflected both this and the desire to approximate the EU and NATO approach to security thinking. The most fundamental document is the Security Strategy and the Defense and Military Strategies build upon it. The Security Strategy declared once more that Slovakia was committed to the work of the

UN and OSCE, including international missions. It also States that the aim is to build a comprehensive national crisis management strategy capable of operating within UN international crisis management. The Defense and Military Strategies also indicate Slovakia's willingness, following in-depth consideration, to participate in international crisis management missions under the command of a coalition of nations, if the EU or NATO should decide not to establish and lead the mission.

In this period, from 1993 to 2003, two important highpoints can be identified in Slovak engagement in international crisis management missions. In March 1999 Slovakia opened up its airspace to NATO as required for airstrikes in Kosovo, at that time part of Yugoslavia. This step was considered to be a sign of commitment to future NATO membership and to follow in the heels of neighboring countries – already NATO member States. The second turning point is considered to be the crisis in Iraq in 2003 and the NATO Prague Summit in the autumn of the previous year. The Prague Summit was important not only because Slovakia was invited to become a full NATO member, but also because it presented Slovakia with the opportunity to choose which areas the Slovak Armed Forces would specialize in and offer expertise, ultimately sapper activities, protection against WMD, special units and the military police.

The next chapter of the Slovak approach to national and international security came after NATO and EU accession in 2004 when Slovakia adopted a new and updated Security Strategy and an associated Defense Strategy in 2005. Both documents basically reiterate the main ideas of the European Security Strategy, NATO Strategy Concept and post-September 11 developments. Here Slovakia reaffirms it is willing to participate in missions outside national territory under UN, OSCE, NATO or EU mandate, and that it will modernize the capacities of the Slovak Armed Forces to ensure interoperability with NATO and EU. The conceptual aims of modernizing the Armed Forces and developing defense capacities, including the then current (2006) and future challenges, are reflected in Model 2015,⁸ an updated version of Model 2010. In the context of international crisis management missions Model 2015 suggests that the Armed Forces should be prepared to participate in at least two simultaneous international crisis management operations; retain a permanent land force of up to 8 per cent for international crisis management operations and that 40 per cent of the forces must have the capacity to be deployed in these operations; ensure the rotation of troops deployed in international crisis management operations after 2010 at the level of battalion, battalion

⁸ “Model 2015: Dlhodobý plán rozvoja Ministerstva obrany s výhľadom do roku 2015,” [Model 2015: Longterm development plan of Ministry of Defense with horizon to 2015] Ministry of Defense of the Slovak republic, 2006. Available online: <http://www.mosr.sk/data/files/834.pdf> (accessed on September 19, 2015).

group or an equivalent up to the size of a battalion.⁹ The 2013 White Paper on Slovak Defense States, among other things, that the future deployment of the Armed Forces abroad will involve hybrid methods of war, including conventional and non-conventional methods. Since 2013 the European security environment has changed significantly and this assumption can now be viewed as correct.

In July 2005 the Slovak Government approved a very important document – the “Draft concept for the Participation of the Slovak Armed Forces in operations of international crisis management” (Konceptcia účasti ozbrojených síl Slovenskej republiky v operáciách medzinárodného krízového manažmentu) – the aim of which is to propose a systematic military approach to international crisis management. It also tackles the most important financial, operational and managerial issues in crisis management from the national point of view. Hence, it proposes the following procedure for deciding whether to deploy the Armed Forces in international crisis management missions: early warning; comprehensive expert (political, military, resource, legislative) analysis of the impact of the crisis on Slovakia’s interests and obligations and the possibility of engaging the Armed Forces in crisis resolution; preparing and adopting the Slovak Government position in decisions on further crisis solution seeking; presenting the potential engagement of the Armed Forces in operations to relevant international organizations via the Slovak representatives of these institutions and participation in the decision making processes within these organizations; approval of Armed Forces participation in line with national legislation and, once an international organization has made a decision, to execute the operation and hold a planning conference; operational planning.

The Slovak defense ministry in cooperation with the foreign and finance ministries will submit to the Slovak Security Council and parliament a proposal to authorize the participation of the Armed Forces in a specific international crisis management operation. Other State administration bodies will also be involved in the drafting process if deemed necessary. The Slovak Government and parliament will decide whether to approve participation in accordance with the legislation and on the basis of expert analysis. Moreover, the Concept proposes that a clear crisis management framework should be established so that qualified decision making can be undertaken on the operational planning and deployment of the Slovak Armed Forces in missions abroad.

Since 2012, the Slovak foreign ministry has been mandated to provide a comprehensive annual report on Slovak engagement in complex civil and military activities related to international crisis management so that Slovak engagement in missions of this nature can be assessed and analyzed. Currently, three such reports have been produced – from 2012, 2013 and 2014.

⁹ Ibid

Slovak Armed Forces' experience in international crisis management

Since gaining independence in 1993, the Slovak Republic has undergone a unique journey towards becoming a reliable partner within the key security stakeholder organizations on the European continent – NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Twenty years later, Slovakia is still more of a security consumer than a provider, in general terms; nonetheless, it is working progressively to improve its own capacities in defense and crisis management capabilities. In the following section we will briefly discuss Slovak engagement in international crisis management missions on different continents, attempting to follow a chronological order.

The history of Slovak engagement in civil and military international crisis management and stabilization missions is relatively rich. Slovakia has participated in and completed 24 missions with personnel of up to 10,000 under the mandates of the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE, and is currently taking part in another five missions. In May 1993, the Slovak Armed Forces, particularly its sappers, took part in the UNPROFOR mission in the Croatian towns of Lipik and Daruvar. The Slovak peace force engineers battalion involved 606 troops and more than 400 pieces of equipment. The main responsibilities included sweeping, repairing roads, constructing and renovating bridges, constructing camps and checkpoints, maintaining roads in winter and, last but not least, helping local people reconstruct war-damaged infrastructure. Once the UNPROFOR mandate came to an end in January 1996, the battalion joined the UNTAES (1996–1998) mission in Eastern Slavonia, mainly performing the same tasks as in the previous mission. Slovak personnel on the UNGCI (1991–2003) mission helped protect humanitarian aid workers, Kurds and Shia Muslims. The Slovak Armed Forces were involved in UNOMIL (1993–1997) monitored elections, investigated crimes against humanitarian law, supervised disarmament, and agreements between adversaries. During the UNOMUR mission (1993–1994) members of the Slovak Armed Forces monitored the ceasefire on the border between Uganda and Rwanda. They continued performing these tasks in Rwanda as part of the UNAMIR mission (1993–1996), and helped provide humanitarian assistance related to the return of displaced persons. There were three stages of the UNAVEM mission in Angola (I, II, III; 1993–1997), which later became the MONUA mission (1997–1999). On this mission a total of 36 members of the Slovak Armed Forces gained a wealth of experience working with humanitarian and other international organizations and on disarmament programs of former enemies. As part of the UNDOF mission (1974–) between 1998 and 2008, Slovak Armed Forces participated in monitoring activities at several checkpoints. The Armed Forces were also engaged in the Balkans during the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1998–2001), where six members

were stationed. In 1999 and 2005, two Slovak monitors on the UNAMSIL mission were engaged in collecting, processing and assessing information in the field, and also in the full assessment of military threats and collecting data on the diamond business. In June 1999, the Slovak engineers battalion was stationed at the Casablanca base as part of the NATO AFOR mission, later the KFOR mission (1999–2002), where members helped reconstruct transport infrastructure and were involved in demining and constructing several local civilian buildings. This was the first ever mission in which the Slovak Armed Forces were an organic part of a peacekeeping mission under NATO command. After the Bosnian War, NATO established a peacekeeping mission called SFOR (1996–2004) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The deployment of a Slovak Armed Forces helicopter unit to this mission strengthened Slovakia's position among the countries concerned and enhanced relations with NATO member countries. With the anticipated development of sustainable peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, participation in the SFOR operation was broadened so Slovakia had an equal position in the consultations and in preparing decisions on the international community's future engagement in the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This also created an opportunity for Slovakia to help apply strategies to reinforce the influence of European countries in solving the continent's security problems. The Slovak army also made an important contribution to the SFOR operation, this being the first time Slovak Air Force units had been deployed in a peacekeeping operation, and the Slovak Air Force as a whole gained valuable experience in operational planning and deploying their troops in a peacekeeping operation. Slovakia deployed its engineers battalion and was therefore also involved in the UNMEE mission (2000–2004) from January 2001. In July 2001 Slovak Armed Forces deployed a military field hospital under the mandate of the UNMISET mission (2001–2003). In Afghanistan Slovakia took part in Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF, which are the subject of the next section. In 2003 the Slovak parliament decided to deploy the Slovak Armed Forces in three missions – Enduring Freedom Kuwait (2003), Iraqi Freedom (2003–2007), and the first ever EU–CONCORDIA military operation in Macedonia (2003). In Kuwait, the Slovak Armed Forces operated within the First Czechoslovak chemical, radiological and biological protection battalion. The role of Slovak unit in Iraq was to perform demining and pyrotechnical work and carry out weapons and ammunition disposal on Iraqi territory. Three Armed Forces members were also deployed in monitoring tasks as part of the AMIS II mission (2004).

These missions are all ones in which either the Slovak Armed Forces have already concluded their mandate, or the missions have come to an end. However, they are still active in a number of missions, namely Operation Resolute Support in Afghanistan (since 2015), the EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2004), UNFICYP (since 2001), UNTSO

(since 1998), and EUMM (since 2009). Moreover, Slovakia also has a mandate to deploy a monitor within the OSCE Mission in Moldova¹⁰ and the OSCE Mission in Georgia. However, the mandate has yet to be fulfilled.

Kosovo

As mentioned already, the Balkan region is one of Slovakia's long-term foreign and security priorities. It is no secret that Kosovo is still considered to be an area of instability with the mass engagement of international actors, including the UN, NATO, the EU and the OSCE. One such operation was participation in the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo following a decision by the Slovak parliament on December 16, 1998. However, the number of personnel involved was somewhat symbolic – four members of the Slovak Armed Forces in 1999 and two in 2000. These experts then continued to work in the transformed OMIK mission until 2001.

Despite the fact that Slovakia was not a NATO member State at the time, it participated in an operation under NATO command – KFOR.¹¹ On September 7, 1999, a Slovak engineer battalion numbering 40 persons became part of the Austrian AUSCON/KFOR. In September 2000, two Armed Forces members were stationed at mission HQ. At the beginning of 2000, twenty non-member States contributed 7,700 soldiers to the KFOR mission. In February 2002, Slovakia increased its number of soldiers to 100 on the basis of an agreement between the Czech and Slovak ministries of defense and the Slovak army. The Slovak Armed Forces sent a mechanized platoon to a joint Czech–Slovak mechanized battalion. The joint Czech–Slovak unit operated within Central MNB under the operational command of the United Kingdom. Funding for this came from the Ministry of Defense budget totaling around 8,766,679 EUR in 2002. Members of the Slovak unit were in charge of patrolling and monitoring local objects, securing local infrastructure, and ensuring the continued and safe return of Kosovar Serbs following the 2004 clashes. They provided protection to the Serbian minority and assistance to humanitarian organizations carrying out work in the Kosovo area, and attempted to create a peaceful environment for the coexistence of Serbs and Albanians in the area they were allocated to. In 2006 another 35 members of the Armed Forces joined the unit, primarily to ensure logistical support for the unit. The overall cost of the mission reached 6,944,878 EUR in 2006. Between 2007 and 2009 Slovak Armed Forces members in KFOR were boosted to include five experts who joined the HQ for 12 months and the Armed Forces also sent

¹⁰ Slovak Armed Forces personnel took part in the OSCE mission to Moldova between 1998 and 2002. It still has a mandate to send one expert. Slovakia also has a mandate to send two experts as part of the OSCE mission to Georgia.

¹¹ And, of course, KFOR is an integral part of UNMIK.

two Mi-17 helicopters together with a 39 member helicopter unit. Deploying the helicopters and helicopter unit members for two three-month rotations cost around 1.826 million EUR. Hence, there was a total of 140 Slovak Armed Forces members for the duration of Slovak participation within the mission, which ended on December 31, 2010.¹² Six members of the Slovak police force are currently working for the EULEX mission in Kosovo. Their main tasks included monitoring and advising local police on management systems and developing professional standards at regional police HQs. Some members are in charge of executive tasks relating to special police units. Their core task was to prepare and implement EU projects on the reorganization and restructuring of police forces in Kosovo.

Afghanistan

From the military point of view, the ISAF operation created on December 20, 2001 under NATO command was the largest and most important in terms of the Slovak Armed Forces capacities. This operation was not only about the Slovak contribution to the Allied Forces, as the Slovak Armed Forces also benefited considerably in terms of lessons learned and capacity building. We have already mentioned the Enduring Freedom operation, which was the “predecessor” to ISAF. On December 14, 2005, the Slovak parliament decided to relocate the Slovak engineers unit from Enduring Freedom to ISAF. This unit, together with the sapper and demining units, was integrated into the engineers company of the multifunctional Kabul International Brigade. The specialized capacities undertaken by the Slovak Armed Forces were eliminating unexploded explosives, radiological, chemical and biological protection, and special forces. The Slovak Armed Forces participated in ISAF as part of: the combat engineering unit; guard unit; field hospital; Provincial Reconstruction Team; the Train, Advise and Assist Team; National Support Element; Special Forces Unit; Communication and Information Systems; Explosive Ordnance Device; national police training center; Very High Readiness Joint Task Force; ISAF Headquarters; and the military advisory team.

In September 2008, a patrol unit was sent to Afghanistan tasked with protecting Camp Holland in Tarin Kowte, Uruzgan province. In December 2008 another such unit was located in Kandahar province to protect the air base in Kandahar. Both units comprised 50 members. In March 2009 another 50-member patrol unit was sent to camp Deh Rawood in Uruzgan province. In June 2013 the mandate was increased to 179 guard unit members when the ISAF operation was extended until December 31, 2014. One of the great achievements of the Slovak Armed Forces was the 236 successful

¹² More information can be found here: <http://www.rokovania.sk/Rokovanie.aspx/Vyhľadavanie?page=1>.

interventions made by the Slovak Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit from 2010 to 2013. The Armed Forces participated in the work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in May 2007 – an officer for the development of civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) was posted to the Hungarian Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Pol-e-Khor in the province of Baghlan, and in August an additional officer was sent to operations management. Slovak army officers were also involved in the Dutch PRT in Tarin Kowt. The Slovak mission of officers in the PRT was completed in July 2013. The main task of the PRT was to build confidence among the local population, the institutions and the ISAF forces. It also promoted and coordinated projects to help in the reconstruction and reform of the security sector and Government interest in PRT. Members of the Slovak Armed Forces assigned to PRTs carried out instructions given by the provincial reconstruction command team. Their involvement in the activities of the PRTs operating in NATO operations is essential to the development of CIMIC.

In 2008, Slovakia decided to send three Armed Forces members to build a module of Deployable Communications and Information Systems to be used to provide support for the communication and information systems (CIS) used in operations and also in other NATO activities. Slovakia was able to provide a rare but crucial NATO capability. Slovak members helped provide support services to CIS as part of the united command of the ISAF headquarters in Kabul, and supported radio systems within the Special Forces Command in Kabul. The Slovak Armed Forces thus proved their CIS expertise and acquired new skills and knowledge which may be used in complying with NATO commitments in the future.

A total of 15,375,090 EUR (and an extra 117,202 EUR for DCIS) was spent ensuring that the Slovak Armed Forces fulfill their role in the ISAF operation in 2014. In addition to military assistance, in the last three years the Slovak Republic has sent material aid of around 400,000 EUR. Operation ISAF ended on December 31, 2014, by which time Slovakia had contributed more than 3,600 Armed Forces members. On the basis of the NATO North Atlantic Council decision of November 28, 2014 and existing agreements on the status of forces (SOFA), Operation Resolute Support was begun by January 1, 2015. Unlike the ISAF military operation, this operation is non-military in nature. Almost 12,000 soldiers are providing training, advice and assistance to the Afghan components. On the basis of National Council Resolution no. 1327/2014, Slovakia is sending 66 professional soldiers in support of this non-military operation.¹³

¹³ L. Tomášeková, “Ozbrojené sily Slovenskej republiky a vojenská operácia ISAF” [Armed forces of the Slovak republic and military operation ISAF], *Vojenské rozhledy* Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, pp. 131–7.

It is worth noting a very important achievement for Slovak diplomacy, one that testifies to the personal and professional qualities of Ambassador Ján Kubiš. Ján Kubiš was appointed Ambassador by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and served as his Special Representative and Head of UNAMA (the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) in Afghanistan from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014. Ambassador Kubiš now serves as the UNSG Special Representative for Iraq and the Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The mandate for EUFOR's Operation Althea is two-fold. The Executive mandate is given by the UN Security Council, and in this regard EUFOR is in charge of "supporting the BiH authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment." It also includes and a Non-Executive part referring to Capacity Building & Training, in order to make Armed Forces of BiH interoperable for participating in peace support operations around the world.

Since the beginning of the operation, officers of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic have served both at EUFOR HQ and NATO HQ Sarajevo, as was Stated under the terms of National Council of the Slovak Republic Resolution No. 1358 of December 1, 2004. In the years 2006–2010 (NCSR Resolution No. 2003 of December 14, 2005) the Armed Forces participated in operation ALTHEA deploying a Force Protection Platoon in Camp Butmir 2 in Sarajevo. During 2009, from February to June, the AFSR provided two transport helicopters which were deployed for transport, special, and training flights.

In 2010 the Force Protection Platoon of the AFSR ceased their activities in operation ALTHEA (NCSR Resolution No. 194 of December 7, 2010), and in 2011 the AFSR took over responsibility for three Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) in Novo Sarajevo, Foca and Visegrad. The key task of the LOTs is to operate in direct contact with officials of local Governments, NGOs, and structures of international organizations within areas of operation, in order to ensure the EU's adequate response to any changes in the security situation. From March 1, 2011 to August 31, 2012, the Slovak Republic acted as Lead Nation of the Regional Coordination Centre (RCC) South, which supervises control and coordination between the LOTs stationed in the South of the country and the EUFOR HQ body in charge of situational awareness.

In September 2010, as a result of the operation's reconfiguration, the Regional Coordination Centres were replaced with a single LOT Coordination Centre (LCC), responsible for the management and coordination of all LOTs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Slovak Republic has commanded the LCC since September 1, 2012. The LCC maintains situational awareness across Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The current military presence of Slovak Armed Forces in Operation EUFOR ALTHEA is as follows: EUFOR HQ – four members of the Armed Forces; LCC (Lead Nation) – three members of the Armed Forces; three LOTs – eight members of the Armed Forces in each team; National Support Element (NSE) – three members of the Armed Forces.

Ukraine

Slovakia, along with the other V4 and Eastern European countries, supported Ukrainian attempts to develop closer relations with the EU through the Association Agreement including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The Slovak Government and civil society also stood firm from the beginning of the Maidan movement. However, the situation became less clear, and it became difficult to interpret the mixed messages issued by the prime minister representing the Slovak Government, and the foreign ministry.

On the bilateral level, Slovakia continued to support the much needed reforms in Ukraine and contributed various forms of humanitarian assistance. The sharing of know-how and experience on energy, taxes, and security sector reform are the key areas in which Slovakia could apply its best practices. Petro Poroshenko took the initiative to approach former Slovak prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda and former finance minister Ivan Mikloš to invite them to become members of a group of international advisors working with the Ukrainian Government (I. Mikloš is assisting the ministry of finance on tax reform, decentralization and the reorganization of public finances).

Slovak humanitarian aid (through the foreign, defense, interior and health ministries) reached the sum of around 800,000 EUR for Ukraine in 2014, and this year (2015) the figure is around 700,000 EUR. This aid was provided for the needs of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

In addition, a total of 100 persons who fought in the ATO (Anti-Terrorist Operation) mission will be relocated to institutions providing military health services in eastern Slovakia, in the region of Zemplín, as part of their rehabilitation program. Furthermore, 126 children so far who were evacuated from the occupied areas of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions have stayed in Slovakia for a few weeks for rehabilitation purposes. An extra 70 scholarships, bringing the total to 100, will be provided for Ukrainian students in the 2015/2016 academic year.

Ukraine is also a country of special interest in Slovakia's Official Development Assistance program. In 2014 the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation (SAIDC, a State-funded foreign affairs ministry organization, responsible for managing bilateral and trilateral development projects) had an overall budget of 5,984,864 EUR of which 2,894,394.93 EUR was earmarked for the ODA grants scheme. Two projects to be implemented in Ukraine were awarded funding of a total of 182,861 EUR. In addition,

the Slovak Foreign Ministry's Centre for Experience Transfer in Integration and Reforms implemented four projects in Ukraine. Micro-grants totaling 15,197.87 EUR were provided to Ukraine under the aegis of the Slovak Embassy in Kiev and the Consulate in Uzhhorod. SAIDC also helped provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine totaling 90,000 EUR. Of this, 30,000 EUR was donated to NATO-Ukraine trust funds, especially the NATO-Ukraine Medical Rehabilitation Trust Fund and the Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) Ukraine. Additionally, 20,000 EUR worth of humanitarian aid was donated to train Ukrainian experts in demining.

Bilaterally, however, probably the main and most important area of mutual cooperation (not directly a humanitarian aid tool, but very important for Ukraine) was the launch of a mutual project – the reverse gas flow from EU to Ukraine through Slovak territory – on September 2, 2014. The Vojany-Uzhhorod pipeline has a capacity of 27 million m³/day.¹⁴

Slovakia's efforts to support Ukraine at the multilateral level are also important. In 2014, when holding the presidency of the International Visegrad Fund, Slovakia put a lot of effort into enhancing cooperation with Ukraine, especially at the V4+Ukraine meeting attended by P. Poroshenko. This regional initiative specifically emphasized Ukrainian energy security.

Nonetheless, the main instrument through which current international crisis management efforts in Ukraine are channeled is the OSCE. OSCE participating States maintain a presence in Ukraine via their Project Coordinator in Ukraine, the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, and the Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints of Gukovo and Donetsk. Furthermore, the OSCE works through the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG). Slovakia firmly supported the establishment of the SMM through the Permanent Representation. However, in practical terms, this support is rather humble compared to that of other countries: it has only seven observers, one of whom works at the checkpoints and the other six in the SMM. At the institutional level, Ambassador Marcel Peško performed some very useful managerial and negotiation work when serving as Director of the Office of the Secretary General. In September 2015, he was appointed Director of the Conflict Prevention Center, underlining his excellent professional and diplomatic qualities. In financial terms, in 2014–2015 Slovakia provided the SMM with 10,000 EUR in extra budgetary contributions and 31,791 EUR in assessed contributions, and in 2015–2016, 102,093 EUR in assessed contributions.

¹⁴ “Vďaka reverznému toku plynu zo Slovenska prežila Ukrajina uplynulú zimu,” [Thanks to reverse gas flow from Slovakia, Ukraine survived the winter] Government Office of the Slovak Republic, September 10, 2015. Available online: <http://www.vlada.gov.sk/vdaka-reverznemu-toku-plynu-zo-slovenska-prezila-ukrajina-uplynulu-zimu/> (accessed on September 19, 2015).

Conclusion

It is evident that Slovakia is willing to contribute its specific expertise of comparative advantage in order to assist international organizations with their crisis management activities. However, there are limits to this engagement, due to limited financial and personnel resources. Blame can equally be levelled, if not more so, at a number stakeholders for their lack of strategic thinking and management at the national level, this being most visible in the military's engagement. Nevertheless, members of the Slovak Armed Forces (such as the sapper and demining units and battalions) are regarded as committed and respected contributors to military crisis management activities in various regions. There has been significant improvement in civilian expertise; however, this should be further developed, especially within the EU and OSCE. In our opinion, Slovakia has great potential and high quality personnel that can be deployed in civilian missions.

After Ukraine¹⁵...

Most academics, policy analysts and practitioners agree that the contemporary European security architecture is the result of post-Cold War developments, primarily the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty Organization, the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Central and Eastern Europe (although as yet not fully in Georgia and Moldova), and the reunification of Germany. At the institutional level, European security consists mainly of three pillars – NATO, the EU and OSCE.¹⁶ Some analysts would also add here the Council of Europe, and whilst agreeing with this, we suggest it has the lesser role to play.¹⁷ Most of the relevant research and academic articles refer to the European security architecture as including these institutions, but another essential component is found in the binding and non-binding agreements and treaties resulting from Cold War negotiations (including the Helsinki Final Act and treaties on disarmament and arms control), and the norms and standards contained within them.

The neo-realist and liberalist view is that international organizations derive their legitimacy from the sovereignty of their member States and that the scope of their activities relies on the will of these States. They differ only in the scope and depth of the mandate that the organization is given. After the Cold War, NATO, the CSCE/OSCE, and the European Community came to understand relatively quickly the resulting changes to the European security environment and thus the new security threats and challenges, which are no longer of the classical military type but are found in other sectors. The members of these organizations were also affected by the new reality, which did not (and still does not) allow them to fully and effectively respond to new security threats and challenges individually and in isolation. Thus it was logical for certain security responsibilities to be delegated to transnational (supranational) institutions such as international organizations. Let us underline, then, that the NATO, CSCE/OSCE and EU of 2000 was very different to that of the 1980s in terms of mandate, aims, membership, and so forth.

¹⁵ The modified version of the following text is also published in S. Goda, “European security architecture and the conflict in Ukraine,” *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. 24, No. 1, 2015, pp. 3-16.

¹⁶ In the 1990s, researchers also worked within the Western European Union (WEU) as part of the institutional quartet. However, the WEU officially ceased to exist on June 30, 2011. The work of the WEU was therefore transferred to the EU and especially to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as reaffirmed within the Treaty of Lisbon.

¹⁷ G. Aybet, *European security architecture after the Cold War: questions of legitimacy*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.

As mentioned above, it was inevitable that international organizations would have to adapt to the new security environment. It would have been quite naïve to think that the internal reforms within these organizations had been completed once and for all, or even to a considerable extent, given the very complex and rapidly changing nature of international relations. One could view this as a never-ending story of reform and adaptation, a view which may well be largely correct. Nonetheless, this should not stop us from dealing with issues of intra-organizational reforms, as we will show in this article.

The complexity and dynamism of international relations and regional security and internal developments within NATO, the EU and OSCE (and the UN and Council of Europe) should lead to these institutions working more closely together on regional security as their responsibilities are often very similar, sometimes overlapping. The need for cooperation was made clear during the conflicts in the Balkans and in Afghanistan and in a wide range of transnational threats – from human and drug trafficking, to environmental security and the fight against terrorism in its various forms. In fact, these organizations do not always cooperate together.

In order to best understand European security in terms of these three organizations, we need to briefly outline their roles and responsibilities. Firstly, NATO is a military and defense organization which did not turn out to be a fully political one in terms of results. This is clearly visible in the military rather than political role it adopted in former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan today. Since the Cold War, debates on the military aspect of European security have largely been reduced to NATO and its capacities. Despite the many ongoing debates, the labor division in military terms between Europe and America is more or less clear.

From the early 1990s the EU aimed at being a genuine regional security actor, and this became reality in 2009 with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, which ended the pillar system. Before that, the Petersberg tasks had established the role of the EC/EU and Western European Union (WEU) in security and military actions; however, these are now part of the Common Security and Defense Policy. The debate on whether European countries should have stronger military capacities go back to the 1950s, but has so far led nowhere. In our opinion, debates like this may, however, be taken more seriously in the future, depending on potential shifts in US foreign policy and strategic interests.

Finally the OSCE is the only organization that has sought to maintain the most comprehensive approach to security. Nevertheless, since the debates on regional security after the fall of Berlin wall, the OSCE has changed a lot. One fact, however, remains the same: Russia has participated equally alongside the other members. It should be noted that the OSCE no longer holds the same responsibilities as were envisaged for it over 20 years ago. The OSCE's mandate has considerably weakened, along with its financial resources.

And here we come to the first dilemma of the inter-institutional State of affairs regarding the European security architecture, which we can call the “internal problem of the European security architecture.” The point at which NATO, the EU and the OSCE have to engage is on conflict management, especially in the “OSCE area.” As viewed by these organizations, conflict (crisis) management is very simply a set of comprehensive activities embracing all levels (top, middle and grassroots) and sectors (military, political, economic, societal and environmental), in order to prevent or end violence. As each organization has a specific track record of lessons learned and has different comparative advantages, it is best for all the actors to adopt an effective and cooperative approach. Instead, there is a lack of coordination and labor division, and the holistic approach is fragile.¹⁸

Russian engagement

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation underwent very complicated and painful economic and political changes. Throughout the 1990s, Russia faced economic crisis as a result of economic shock therapy, accompanying political crisis and war on Russian territory. From 2000, when Vladimir Putin became president, there was economic growth and greater political stability, and Putin’s overall popularity and that of his political party, United Russia, increased. This positive economic development (considerably slower since the economic crisis struck in 2008) has had a visible impact on Russian foreign policy tactics and military capacity over the last 15 years. Moreover, this economic legacy is also one of the most important sources of Putin’s popularity. In military terms, there is one particular dilemma. From a theoretical and very reductionist point of view, Russia possesses a complete nuclear weapons system and so is considered a genuine military power. However, in 1999, during the Yugoslav war and the aerial bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia played a second range role. It was not able to convert its military capacities into real broader (political) influence over regional and European security. This could be considered a turning point in Russian foreign policy and one of its biggest frustrations.¹⁹

From the institutional point of view, as we have already mentioned, it is only within the OSCE that the Russian federation is an equal partner to Western countries. Shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, the institutional

¹⁸ D. S. Yost, *NATO and international organizations*, Rome: NATO Defence College, 2007; U. Caruso, *Interplay between Council of Europe, OSCE, EU and NATO*, European Academy, 2007.

¹⁹ A. Duleba, *Návrh Ruska na vytvorenie nového európskeho bezpečnostného paktu. Odporúčania pre slovenskú zahraničnú a bezpečnostnú politiku* [Russian proposal to create a new European security pact: Recommendations for Slovak foreign and security policy], Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 2009.

priority of Russia's new foreign policy was to introduce the OSCE, then CSCE, as the "*primus inter pares* organization" because of its internal decision making system and structure. We do not believe that this was because of the principles and norms the OSCE was built upon. The 1993 violent armed struggle between the president and parliament in Moscow sent a clear sign to Western countries that at that time Russia was not able to undergo peaceful democratic transition. Hence the West, and the US in particular, pursuing its own interests, decided to prioritize NATO as the main security organization in the European and Western security environment. At that time the EU was preoccupied with the economy and internal affairs. The Western Allies were convinced that Russia was an unpredictable partner and that NATO was the most promising project, and that therefore enlargement should follow.

The issue of who represented the interests of the Russian Federation in foreign affairs and which strategic direction was chosen (pro-European, Russian *sui generis*, or pro-Asian) was unimportant. All the foreign policy strategies, the Kozyrev strategy, the Primakov strategy, etc., differed only slightly in content, while the perception of NATO enlargement remained unchanged: it was a threat to national security.

The basis for mutual relations and cooperation between NATO and Russia is reflected in the 1997 Founding Act. "NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces."²⁰ There is disagreement over what this Statement means on account of its vague wording.

As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the European security architecture is not only about institutions but also agreements.²¹ One of the most important of these is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Russian diplomacy considered the intention to substantially revise the CFE a big success. Reducing the limits on the number of conventional forces based in each separate country would mean that NATO could not be allowed to locate (substantial) military forces in the new member States. This issue emerged during discussions on the Allies' intentions to locate forces in the Czech Republic or Poland. Moreover, because NATO continues to prosper, unlike the Warsaw Pact, Moscow wanted to maintain the limits for groups of countries. This would have raised questions over any attempts to further

²⁰ "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation," Paris, 1997. Available online: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25468.htm (accessed on July 8, 2015).

²¹ Signed on November 19, 1990 and entered into force on July 17, 1992. "Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," Paris, 1990. Available online: <http://www.osce.org/library/14087?download=true> (accessed on July 8, 2015).

enlarge NATO, since the joining of any new member would automatically entail revision of the CFE, which would be very complicated. Otherwise, each potential new NATO member would have to drastically decrease its conventional forces. This would logically lead to that potential member having a considerably lower capacity to contribute effectively to the Alliance's defense capacities and, consequently, this would diminish NATO interest in admitting that member.²²

In this section we will look at the Russian Federation's main, long-term concerns over both European security and its own. Russia's reaction to NATO's actions in former Yugoslavia had resulted in a new national strategy, foreign policy and military doctrine.²³

Shortly after September 11, bilateral relations between Russia and the United States underwent positive renewal. Vladimir Putin's public offer to help George W. Bush fight terrorism in Afghanistan was also reflected in Russia–NATO relations, with the American president afterwards making serious efforts on this within NATO. Shortly after this, the NATO–Russia council,²⁴ which replaced the former Permanent Joint Council established under the Founding Act, was created as a new platform for cooperation. NATO and Russia behaved as equal partners within this platform and joined forces in the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defense reform, and civil emergency, as well other unspecified areas.²⁵ Up until the start of the American invasion of Iraq, this period could be considered as one of the warmest in Russian–American and Russian–NATO relations.

There are evidently continual ups and downs in relations between Russia and the West. However, the first real turning point came eight years ago with Vladimir Putin's speech at the Munich conference.²⁶ This speech may be considered as step number one in Russia's foreign policy strategy, which is expressing criticism. In his address, Putin criticized the unipolar interna-

²² A. Duleba, *Návrh Ruska na vytvorenie...* [Russian proposal to create], op.cit.

²³ See A. Arbatov, *The transformation of Russian military doctrine: lessons learned from Kosovo and Chechnya*, The Marshall Center Papers, No. 2, 2000.

²⁴ "Official Statement, NATO–Russia council meeting of the heads of State and Government of NATO member States and Russia," Rome, 2002. Available online: http://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/69558/2002.05.28_nrc_official_Statement__hos.pdf (accessed on July 8, 2015).

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Of course, there are numerous other speeches, including his inaugural speech, in which Putin has expressed his views on international and national security. To gain an overall picture, all of them are important. Nonetheless, we consider his 2007 Munich conference speech to be the most coherent, clear and confrontational and thus the first and most important address regarding European security delivered by a Russian president at an international forum.

tional system leading to the emergence of the United States as hegemon; its unilateral actions around the globe; stagnation in disarmament activities; and NATO activities, especially enlargement policy. He also criticized the OSCE, stating that some people “are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one country or a group of countries. And this task is also being accomplished by the OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus, which is absolutely not connected with the State founders in any way.”²⁷ He also criticized the third dimension of the OSCE as interference in the internal affairs of participating countries. Thus, his speech included criticism of all the key areas of European security. The second step in Russian foreign policy strategy may be considered newly elected president Dmitri Medvedev’s subsequent proposal for a new “European Security Treaty,” unveiled on June 8, 2008 during his first official visit to Germany and later further elaborated in Evian²⁸ on October 8th.²⁹

²⁷ V. Putin, “Speech and the following discussion at the Munich Conference on security policy,” President of Russia, 2007. Available online: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml (accessed on July 8, 2015).

²⁸ D. Medvedev, “Speech at World Policy Conference,” President of Russia, 2008. Available online: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/10/08/2159_type-82912type82914_207457.shtml (accessed on July 8, 2015).

²⁹ The main points proposed by Medvedev were: “1 The Treaty should clearly affirm the basic principles for security and interGovernmental relations in the Euro-Atlantic area. These principles include the commitment to fulfill in good faith obligations under international law; respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, and respect for all of the other principles set out in the truly fundamental document that is the United Nations Charter. 2 The inadmissibility of the use of force or the threat of its use in international relations should be clearly affirmed. It is fundamental for the Treaty to guarantee uniform interpretation and implementation of those principles. The treaty could also cement a unified approach to the prevention and peaceful settlement of conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic space. The emphasis should be on negotiated settlements that take into account the different sides’ positions and strictly respect peacekeeping mechanisms. It would perhaps be useful to set out the dispute resolution procedures themselves. 3 It should guarantee equal security, and I mean equal security and not any other kind of security. In this respect we should base ourselves on three ‘no’s. Namely, no ensuring one’s own security at the expense of others. No allowing acts (by military alliances or coalitions) that undermine the unity of the common security space. And finally, no development of military alliances that would threaten the security of other parties to the Treaty. We need to concentrate on military and political issues because it is hard security that plays a determining role today. And it is here that we have seen a dangerous deficit of controlling mechanisms recently. 4 It is important to confirm in the Treaty that no State or international organization can have exclusive rights to maintaining peace and stability in Europe. This applies fully to Russia as well. 5 It would be good to establish basic arms control parameters and reasonable limits on military construction. Also needed are new cooperation procedures and mechanisms in areas such as WMD proliferation, terrorism and drug trafficking.” More analysis on this can be found in A. Zagorski, *The Russian proposal for a treaty on European security: from the Medvedev Initiative to the Corfu*

Thus far we have briefly summarized the main issues relating to the European security architecture and Russian views thereof. To sum up, the existing European security architecture is composed of institutional actors (NATO, the EU and the OSCE), international agreements and treaties (the Helsinki Final Act, CFE, START, SALW, Paris Charter, etc.), and the norms and principles contained therein (respect for international law, multilateralism, human rights, freedom, friendly relations among States, etc.).

What consequences?

In this section we shall argue that the Ukrainian conflict is rather a symptom of all previous disagreements, yet with the most serious consequences for the wider European security environment. We will briefly analyze the responses of key institutional actors to the conflict, and also the consequences for particular agreements, especially the Budapest memorandum, and military developments.

At the institutional level, the Ukrainian conflict subjected internal EU discussions to considerable pressure, which has had direct consequences for the EU's CFSP and CSDP. Ultimately, the EU member States agreed to introduce sanctions targeting several sectors of the Russian economy including the defense industry, and a list of individuals close to President Putin who were either directly or indirectly involved in the annexation of Crimea and in supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine. Negotiating these sanctions was not an easy business, and caused serious disagreement among member States. This was clearly visible in the very pro-active positions of the Baltic States and Poland, as well as, for instance, in Hungary's position, which suggested a degree of Russian influence. Nevertheless, at the end of the day consensus was reached. In spite of this, however, the EU's approach to Ukraine may be characterized as a story of lost opportunities. In our opinion, the 2013 Vilnius summit represented the height of EU irresponsibility towards Ukraine, when it failed to financially assist Ukraine's almost ruined economy. In this regard, the Russian proposal won out. It became clear in hindsight that the EU was not ready or able to challenge Russia's position. The EU also failed, however, in communicating with the leaders and protesting masses in Ukraine, who must quite often have had the feeling of being given false promises. In terms of the Eastern Partnership policy, the conflict in Ukraine has led to changes in perceptions, most notably in Moldova or Armenia. Coupled with the unfortunate aspects of EU policy

Process, Hamburg: CORE, 2009. Available online: <http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/09/Zagorski-en.pdf> (accessed on July 8, 2015) and P. Dunay, G. Herd, *Redesigning Europe? The pitfalls and promises of the European Security Treaty Initiative*, Hamburg: CORE, 2009. Available online: <http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/09/DunayHerd-en.pdf> (accessed on July 8, 2015).

in these countries (silent support of corrupt pro-EU elites, ineffective public relations and communication, etc.), the fear of Russian involvement such as that found in Ukraine has created an atmosphere in which the EU is losing support, and fears of a Donbass-like conflict are prevailing.

NATO also responded, relatively quickly, to the Ukrainian conflict, the most important consequence of which was the Allies' decision to establish a 5000-strong rapid reaction force in order to deter Russia and reassure the Allies of Central and Eastern Europe. Six new command posts have been established in six Eastern European countries – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.³⁰ Experts have considered this to be the closest NATO has come to establishing permanent NATO bases in Central and Eastern Europe – as advocated by the Baltic States and Poland, for instance. NATO has declared its support for the new Ukrainian Government and is calling for territorial integrity; it has refrained, however, from supporting Ukraine by providing military weapons. This is also true of the US, the main driver behind the Alliance. As a consequence of the Ukrainian conflict, NATO suspended its work within the NATO–Russia Council on April 1, 2014.

Arguably, the OSCE is the most important player involved in settling the conflict, which is reflected in the Minsk Agreements and in Statements by NATO and EU leaders. For many experts, the OSCE is a “dead ship.” In our opinion, this is simply not true: the OSCE generally deserves more attention than it gets in the expert community. The deployment of the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission is a positive step, despite its having only limited access to some areas in eastern Ukraine. Its role is to monitor the situation and facilitate dialogue on the ground. Obviously this is a very “soft” approach, but it is nonetheless a good thing that a channel for mutual dialogue exists despite there being so many challenges. Moreover, it is important to distinguish between two levels of analysis – the OSCE as such and its members. Back in Autumn of 2013, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center asked for the mission to be deployed in Ukraine as a means of preventing conflict.³¹ Unfortunately, consensus was not reached on this among its members. This is one of the limitations of organizations like the OSCE.

There have also been serious consequences in the military area. We all remember the inconsistent figures supplied by international organizations, the media, and experts on the number of Russian troops deployed close to the Ukrainian border. This uncertainty – and as Ulrich Kuhn says, “lack of transparency” – is a consequence of the failure of international agreements.

³⁰ “NATO will establish rapid reaction force to counter perceived threat of Russian aggression,” *The Guardian*, February 5, 2015. Available online: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/nato-rapid-reaction-force-counter-russia-ukraine> (accessed on July 8, 2015).

³¹ Interview with the author at the OSCE Secretariat, December 2013.

“Granted, the Vienna Document (VD), the OSCE’s most important agreement in the realm of Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), stipulates a certain set quota of international inspections with which to observe the military maneuvers of other States.” As he States further, “the VD’s inspection quota with regard to Russia was already exhausted by March 2014. In addition, Russia has split up military deployments (disguised as drills) in order to remain below the threshold for ‘prior notification of certain military activities’ under the VD.”³² The CFE treaty mentioned earlier would bring much more clarity, as it provides for a higher quota during inspections. Unfortunately, the treaty has been politically dead since 2002, suspended since 2007, with the Russian Federation unilaterally withdrawing from the treaty on March 11, 2015. The disputes between NATO and Russia over the treaty warrant their own separate analysis; the fact remains however that the dormancy of the CFE could lead to serious difficulties in monitoring the movement of conventional heavy weapons. This could have serious consequences for frozen conflicts in Eurasia and Eastern Europe. Another factor that has attracted considerable attention in expert circles is the use of “hybrid war” strategies, as evidenced in the appearance of the infamous “little green men” – irregular military forces operating without insignia. This strategy is not new per se, but its use by the Russian Federation has given it a new context. Last but not least, on the political level, there are very few calls for reconciliation. The general narrative on both sides, in the West and in the Russian Federation, has once again fallen back on Cold War terms and confrontation. All this has led to a serious crisis in the cooperative security stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and it is this that we consider the most serious impact of the conflict in Ukraine.

Signed on December 5, 1994, the Budapest Memorandum (Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America) has attracted a great deal of attention since the outbreak of the Ukrainian conflict. The memorandum’s main aim was for Ukraine to join the “Non Proliferation Treaty” (NPT) as a non-nuclear country having transferred all its nuclear warheads to the Russian Federation. The signatories of the Budapest Memorandum committed themselves to: 1. “respect[ing] the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine; 2. refrain[ing] from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and [ensuring that]

³² U. Kuhn, “Three crises threatening the European security architecture,” European Leadership Network, 2015. Available online: http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/three-crises-threatening-the-european-security-architecture_2466.html (accessed on July 8, 2015).

none of their weapons w[ould] ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; 3. refrain[ing] from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind; 4. reaffirm[ing] their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used; 5. reaffirm[ing], in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their Armed Forces, or their allies, by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; 6. consult[ing] in the event a situation arises that raises a question concerning these commitments”.³³ Russia has obviously violated several of these principles. From the Russian point of view, however, there was no violation of the Budapest Memorandum because the existing Government of Ukraine had acquired power through an armed coup d'état and is thus illegal and illegitimate. As David Yost argues, the Russian position “implies that agreements are concluded not between countries but between Governments, and that they therefore entail no enduring obligations if there is a change of Government in one of the parties.” As he writes further, “treaties and other international agreements are concluded by Governments on behalf of States. If a country’s Government changes, the State and its treaty partners are still bound by its treaties and other international agreements.”³⁴ Moreover, we can see the consequences of having an international agreement that is vague – in this case, particularly in regard to the term “assurances.” In his article, David Yost explains exactly what the consequences might be of receiving “assurances” instead of “guarantees,” and of weak, non-binding documents more generally.

Instead of a conclusion

In our view, the Ukrainian conflict is the saddest outcome of the continuing crisis of relations between the West and the Russian Federation, with seri-

³³ “Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the NPT,” Budapest, 1994. Available online: https://www.msz.gov.pl/en/p/wiedenobwe_at_s_en/news/memorandum_on_security_assurances_in_connection_with_ukraine_s_accession_to_the_treaty_on_the_npt?printMode=true (accessed on July 8, 2015).

³⁴ D. Yost, “The Budapest Memorandum and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine,” *International Affairs* Vol. 91, No. 3, 2015, pp. 505-539.

ous consequences for the existing European security architecture. The EU must fight mass propaganda whilst defending its own values and principles, in particular the principle that all countries are legally equal regardless of territorial or military potential. NATO has strongly reaffirmed its interest in not leaving Europe to fight alone, strengthening instead its Eastern European border. The OSCE has a unique chance to bring together Western countries and Russia, and to return to its roots – easing tensions between them and facilitating political dialogue. The annexation of Crimea sets a very dangerous precedent for the future security environment in Europe, and in post-Soviet space especially. The Ukrainian conflict has also exposed weaknesses in international law, agreements and treaties, as these often allow for contradictory interpretations. What is clear is that the West and Russia have very different perceptions of the European security architecture, and that consequently the security environment is becoming less predictable and less transparent. However, we do not think that all bridges have been burned, nor that all previous agreements are null and void. What is needed is a real political commitment to overcoming the current disputes. Under current conditions, any attempts to conduct a meaningful crisis management operation are hopeless. For small States, including the Slovak Republic, this is a very dangerous situation.

The crisis in Ukraine shows once again how dangerous a situation can become when you have an explosive cocktail of both internal (corruption, weak State, low respect for law, extremist views, economic decline, etc.) and external (geopolitical interests, massive propaganda, chauvinism, weak allies, etc.) factors. This situation also has certain implications for the field of crisis management and conflict prevention, and for international actors such as NATO, the EU and the OSCE. It has reaffirmed the need for inter-institutional changes and internal reforms within these organizations. As Oleksandr Tytarchuk and Maksym Khylyko argue, “(T)he remarkable thing is that the ineffectiveness of these structures and mechanisms has been identified by Ukrainian experts as being among the most serious risks, challenges and threats to which Ukraine is currently exposed, and, it seems, will continue to be exposed in the future. It may seem paradoxical, but Ukraine relies too much on international support in resolving the current crisis, this being partially triggered by the ineffective policy of the same international players that are now being called upon for support.”³⁵ We have already mentioned the issue

³⁵ O. Tytarchuk, M. Khylyko, „NATO, the EU and the OSCE in the Handling of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Competitive Synergy or “Freezing” Crisis Management?,” Presentation during NATO SPS ARW „Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Conflict Management: NATO, OSCE, EU and Civil Society,“ organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association SPPA, IFSH at University of Hamburg and Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, Bratislava, June 2015.

of overlapping in the activities of international organizations. Ukraine is still a case in point – however, we see some improvement, especially in relation to the OSCE. Concerning the internal structure and instruments possessed by particular organizations (NATO, EU, OSCE), P.T. Hopmann has stated that they “can all play an effective role in conflict management if they develop an appropriate set of ‘tools’ and are provided both the human and financial resources needed to implement these principles in the actual practice of diplomacy. Among Euro-Atlantic institutions, the OSCE would seem to be the most advanced in at least its formal capacity for conflict management.” The OSCE, he continues, “needs greater resources, both human and financial, as well as greater political support from its participating States to reach its full potential in conflict management.” As Hopmann goes on to say (and we agree), although in any case we do not disparage the role of the EU or NATO, only the OSCE offers a platform in which the US, Russia and the EU all meet together, and that possesses a network of developed institutions designed to take action in conflict management.

The development of the theory and practice of conflict (crisis) management has undergone an uneasy path over the past 50 years. The mission is still not accomplished. As we have shown, Slovakia is a dedicated contributor to crisis management activities. However, there is considerable room for improvement in this field, not only militarily but also in non-military ways. Education in conflict transformation, applied to real State-sponsored engagement, is a case in point, as is a more systematized engagement and strategic approach within organizations dealing with conflict (crisis) management. In this respect, both on the Governmental and non-Governmental level, the Slovak Republic has a lot to offer.

studies on international issues

studies on international issues are published by the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association as occasional papers in the following programs:

A – foreign policy of the Slovak Republic

B – important issues in international relations

C – translations of foreign papers

D – documents

The following studies have been published in this series:

a01

A. Duleba, *Slepý pragmatizmus slovenskej východnej politiky. Aktuálna agenda slovensko-ruských bilaterálnych vzťahov*, 1996.

A. Duleba, *The blind pragmatism of Slovak eastern policy. The actual agenda of Slovak-Russian bilateral relations*, 1996.

a02

P. Lukáč, *Súčasná podoba slovensko-nemeckých bilaterálnych vzťahov. Náčrt vývinu a stavu problematiky*, 1996.

a03

I. Samson, *Integrácia Slovenska do bezpečnostného systému Západu. Bezpečnostné špecifiká a špecifické riziká neistôt*, 1997.

a04

I. Radičová, O. Gyarfášová, M. Wlachovský, *Obsahová analýza vybranej zahraničnej tlače o dianí na Slovensku v roku 1995*, 1997.

a05

K. Hirman, *Faktor ropy a plynu v ruskej domácej a zahraničnej politike*, 1998.

a06

P. Lukáč, ed., *Kosovo 1999 a slovenská spoločnosť*, 2001.

a07

Parlamentné voľby 2002. Zahraničná politika SR vo volebných programoch politických strán, 2002.

a08

A. Duleba, P. Lukáč, eds, *Zahraničná politika Slovenska po vstupe do NATO a EÚ. Východiská a stratégie*, 2004.

a09

A. Duleba, *Kríza na Ukrajine ako impulz pre východnú politiku SR a EÚ*, 2014.

a10

S. Goda ed., *In search for greater V4 engagement in international crisis management*, 2015

b01

P. Holásek, *Mierový proces na Strednom východe a európska bezpečnosť. Východiská*

pre zahraničnú politiku Slovenskej republiky, 2000. Reflexie slovenských diplomatov

b02

V. Bilčík, *Eastern enlargement of the European Union: perspectives and role of the East and West German Länder*, 2000.

b03

I. Brocková, *Transatlantická ekonomická integrácia. Partnerstvo alebo rivalita USA a Európy?*, 2000. Reflexie slovenských diplomatov

b04

J. Grittersová, *The redefinition of the transatlantic partnership*, 2000.

b05

Sheikha Shamma Bint Mohammed Bin Khalid Al Nahyan, *Political & social security in Arabian Gulf region and United Arab Emirates (after second Gulf War). External and Internal Challenges*, 2000.

b06

I. Samson, *Medzinárodný terorizmus. Implikácie pre Slovensko*, 2003.

b07

I. Knežević, ed., *The current status quo and prospects for Serbia's European integration*, 2008.

B08

J. Osička, P. Plenta, V. Zapletalova, *Diversity of gas supplies as a key precondition for an effective V4 gas market*, 2015.

d01

A. Duleba, J. Bugajski, I. Samson, *Bezpečnostná a zahraničnopolitická stratégia Slovenska. Biela kniha*, 2001.

d02

Vyšehradské krajiny na ceste do Schengenu. Spolupráca v konzulárnej a vo vízovej oblasti medzi vyšehradskými krajinami pre obyvateľov Ukrajiny a Moldavska. Zistenia a odporúčania, 2005.



MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Published within the project "The challenges and opportunities for Slovakia's engagement in international crisis management: NATO, EU, OSCE" supported by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak republic.



Embassy of the
United States of America

Published with the support of the U.S. Embassy in Bratislava within the project "The role and perspective of Slovakia's engagement in international conflict/crisis resolution/management (CR/M): NATO, EU, OSCE."



The book also appears thanks to the kind support of the Bratislava-based office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.