

# **YEARBOOK**

**of Foreign Policy  
of the Slovak Republic**

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Slovak Foreign Policy Association**



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## Preface

Year 2006 was indeed exceptional for both Slovakia's foreign policy and the publication itself. In June, after the general elections, the new government was formed. It was the first time since 1998 the complete change of the political power took place at the same time as the change of foreign policy creator took place. It is also the first time the *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic* assesses and reflects Slovak foreign policy issues other than Dzurinda's government.

Nevertheless, the field of foreign policy was perhaps the only one within which continuity was expected. Furthermore, the Government's Manifesto does not differ that much in terms of values from the previous government's manifesto and that was further confirmed by the nomination of an experienced diplomat, Ján Kubiš, for the position of foreign minister. However, certain dissonance between the rhetoric and implementation has been provoking the discussion from the very beginning.

At the beginning of April 2007, the *Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association* (RC SFPA) attempted for the first time to assess the foreign policy direction of Slovakia after the new government came into power. RC SFPA organized its *Annual Review Conference on Foreign Policy* named *Continuities and Changes in Slovakia's Foreign Policy*. The name of the conference itself, somehow stemming from the post-election discourse, caused quite a vivid discussion. However, the individual presenters constantly substituted *and* by *or* in the title.

This also might have contributed to our decision to continue with the discussion on the pages of *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2006* in broader scope. The book analyzes the 2006 foreign policy within three main fields – EU, security policy, and regional and bilateral agenda.

The first part traditionally focuses on Slovakia's performance in the EU. It opens with the contribution of Erik Láštík from Comenius University's Faculty of Arts. In his paper, he analyzes the institutional background of Slovakia in the EU. Since this topic was not discussed in previous editions, the text goes beyond the framework of 2006. The article of RC SFPA's research fellow Aneta Világi reflects the domestic (non)debate on the issue of the *Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe*. The RC SFPA director and head of its *Eastern Europe* research program Alexander Duleba, based on his analysis of the *EU Eastern Policy*, recommends the establishment of two-level strategy and bridging ENP with Russia policy.

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The second part also partially resembles the last year's structure with its two analyses focusing on the key security policy agendas, i.e. Slovakia's performance within the UN Security Council and NATO. The former was elaborated by the head of RC SFPA's *International Security* research program Ivo Samson. His detailed analysis focuses on the scope of SR's activities in the UN SC, Slovakia's participation in creating of resolutions and voting, the presidency itself as well as the key agenda of the security sector reform. The transformation and developments within the NATO are surveyed by Matúš Korba of *Center for Security Studies*, a Bratislava-based NGO. In his study, included the analysis of Slovakia's performance in the Alliance, the participation in the crisis management missions or the challenges the SR will face.

Unlike previous years, the *2006 Yearbook* has a part dealing with regional and bilateral relations, i.e. it focuses on the priorities and tools of Slovakia's foreign policy. The chapter is opened by the article on Slovak-Hungarian relations which are, according to the author, full of 'media convenient' topics. The paper was written by Kálmán Petőcz of *Forum Minority Research Institute*, a Šamorín-based NGO. Similarly discussed and 'convenient' topic was also energy policy and security. Independent analyst, Karel Hirman, focuses his analysis on 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, new Russian strategy and its impact on Slovakia.

Slovakia's presidency over the V4 dominated the regional agenda even though the functioning of V4 was to a large extent influenced by the domestic political developments in its member states. This topic was elaborated by Juraj Marušiak of *Institute of Political Science of Slovak Academy of Science*. Milan Šagát of Bratislava-based *Pontis Foundation* prepared a contribution on a complex and complicated issue of Slovakia's policy towards the Western Balkans. In his paper, he stresses the fact that the following period will be of crucial importance for Slovakia's policy and that it needs to be more diversified and better-balanced towards the whole region. Three authors Marián Čaučík, Zuzana Krátka and Ludmila Pastorová focused on the issue of the most important bilateral foreign policy tool of Slovakia in 2006 – the development assistance. Their contribution deals with the activities of Slovak organizations within sectoral and territorial priorities as well as with the institutional and legislative changes of Slovak ODA.

Traditionally, the *Yearbook* includes annexes such as the chronology of the most important events in the Slovak foreign policy in 2006, selected political documents and other information (e.g. the structure and representatives of the MFA SR, a list of diplomatic missions and representatives of SR abroad, the SR diplomatic bodies, army missions abroad etc.).

It is up to the reader to decide whether there is continuity or discontinuity in Slovakia's foreign policy. However, I strongly believe that all texts will contribute to the debate on further direction of Slovakia's foreign policy and that the publication will find its readers.

Peter Brezáni

Slovak Republic  
in the European Union

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*Erik Láštík*

## Slovakia in the EU

After three years of EU membership, we may see Slovakia as a careful member state, which, with a few exceptions, defers rather than acts. The explanation lies not only in the change of the government in 2006, but also in worthlessness, lack of willingness and inability to create and enforce a sustainable integration strategy of the country.

### **Introduction: Opportunities for Influencing**

When it comes to member state possibilities of enforcing its strategic priorities and influence on the EU agenda, factors such as structural and institutional conditions or action capacity are particularly important for success. Slovakia's strategies are therefore dependent on:

- a. the size of the country;
- b. the level of economic development;
- c. the government's ideological and program priorities;
- d. achieved level of political consensus and
- e. the action capacity.

The research on old member states proved that they aim to influence the EU policies and rules, regulating the behavior of different national actors, from governments to individuals. The Member States have an incentive to 'upload' their policies to the European level in order to minimize the costs in 'downloading' them at the domestic

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level. The most effective are those who are most active, trying to upload their own policies in order to form European policies, which are based on the national ones. One possible way is to analyze the policy preferences, or strategies of member states when confronted with the EU integration in areas that traditionally belonged to the national governments.<sup>1</sup> Börzel distinguishes three possible strategies: *pace-setting*, i.e. actively pushing policies at the European level, which reflect a Member State's policy preference and minimize implementation costs; *foot-dragging*, i.e. blocking or delaying costly policies in order to prevent them altogether or to achieve at least some compensation for implementation costs; and *fence-sitting*, i.e. neither systematically pushing policies nor trying to block them at the European level, but building tactical coalitions with both pace-setters and foot-draggers. Fence-sitting is an ambivalent strategy, in which a specific policy is not considered to be important, usually because either no relevant domestic actors voiced their preferences, or such actors do not exist at all.

The kind of strategy a Member State is likely to adopt depends predominantly on whether a specific policy is considered a priority on the national level and whether this policy is likely to be adopted on the European level. Three Member States, Austria, Sweden and Finland, which joined in 1995, have repeatedly shaped European environmental policies according to their domestic preferences and priorities. They had a strong incentive to harmonize their high standards of environmental protection at the European level. Instead of relying on their limited voting powers, they offered their expertise and information to the European Commission in the drafting of policy proposals and made their environmental bureaucrats available in Brussels. This all led to a successful uploading of their national policies, which were adopted by the rest of the EU member states.

The level of economic development of a Member State, broadly measured by GDP per capita, plays an important role as well. "Economically advanced countries are more likely to act as pace-setters and policy-makers at the European level since they have strict regulations and a strong incentive as well as the necessary resources to upload them. Economically less advanced countries, by contrast, lack both the policies and the action capacity necessary for uploading. They are therefore more prone to engage in foot-dragging."<sup>2</sup>

Another way to look at the integration strategies is to understand European integration as a process that results in the Europeanization (Hix – Goetz).<sup>3</sup> The integration has two results, which are interconnected. On the one hand, the delegation of powers from the

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<sup>1</sup> T. Börzel, "Pace Setting, Foot Dragging and Fence Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization", *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol.40, No. 2/2002, pp. 193 – 214.

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem, p. 208.

<sup>3</sup> S. Hix, K. H. Goetz, "Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems", K. H. Goetz, S. Hix (eds) *Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems*. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 1 – 26.

national to the European level leads to the creation of legally binding political decisions, which are limiting the decision-making capacity of domestic actors. On the other hand, the establishment of a higher level of governance enables the domestic actors to overcome or skip domestic barriers and enforce or block policies on the European level. At the same time, these actors gain informational advantage over other domestic actors, which have limited access or no access to information at all.<sup>4</sup>

Two types of impacts can be distinguished when speaking about European integration and EU governance. A direct impact comes from demands to amend the national policies to be in conformity with EU norms. The market liberalization, i.e. opening a national market to goods, services, capital and people in order to create a common European market resulted, during the accession, in the establishment of several independent regulatory agencies set to monitor liberalization of the market.

The indirect influence of the European integration is visible in changes of domestic political institutions, actors and in the results of decision-making. It includes all changes, which were not explicitly demanded by EU, but are the result of a specific national reaction to EU membership. All EU member states are building institutions, organizations and norms in order to achieve an effective EU membership. Look for example at the changes that occurred in the Slovak government between 1998 and 2003.

A different intensity of diplomatic relations with the EU after the 1998 election resulted in the establishment of the *Slovakia High Level Working Group*. Between November 1998 and September 1999, the main aim of the group was to help Slovakia entering the preparation process for membership.<sup>5</sup> A specific position within the government, a deputy PM for European integration, was created in order to coordinate the ministries in the integration process. While abolishing the *Council of the Government for Integration*, the government established the *Ministerial Council for European Integration*, which performed both advisory and coordinating tasks for the government. The directors of EU integration at individual ministries and 29 directors of working groups from the negotiating team composed its subcommittee, the *Working Group*. The establishment of the position of state secretary, who also led the negotiating team, significantly enhanced the role of the Foreign Ministry. The chief negotiator also presided over the European integration section at the Foreign Ministry and the Working Group as well. A new bylaw of the *Legislative Council of the Government* (Resolution No. 60/2000) enabled the council to review proposed draft legislation and its conformity with EU law. Every law proposal had a written statement by the Institute for the Law Approximation of EU conformity attached to it. Finally, after Slovakia signed the Accession Treaty and obtained the status of observer, the government

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<sup>4</sup> Ibidem, p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> V. Bilčík *EÚ Monitoring 2003: Prístupový proces Slovenska a implikácie pre politické inštitúcie, právny štát a regionálnu politiku*. (Bratislava: Slovak Foreign Policy Association & Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2004), pp. 7 – 8.

approved (Resolution No. 431/2003) a coordination mechanism of decision-making process in EU matters and template bylaws for coordination groups at the ministries. The Foreign Ministry section for EU integration transformed into an EU matters section and respective subsections changed as well. Similar indirect impacts of EU integration are visible in the case of the Slovak legislature.

## **Indirect Impact of Integration – the Cooperation of Government and Parliament in EU Matters**

A substantial impact of the accession and the EU membership on national institutions could be illustrated in the example of the role of the National Council.

The external pressure from the EU influenced the establishment of an effective system of the EU law on transposition, as well as the 2001 constitutional amendment. In amended Art. 120, the government received power to issue approximation decrees, which authorized it to impose legal duties on individuals and legal persons, without a need for parliament's approval. Until the amendment, the strengthening of the government took place without amending formal rules; from 2001, the changed role of the government was reflected in the constitutional amendment. That is true even if such growth of the government's powers was unintentional and aimed only to decrease the workload of the parliament. One of the amendment's authors warned MPs "that once the EU accession is a real thing, the parliament has to transpose around ninety thousand pages of EU legal norms, the majority of which are technical in their character. If the parliament is to be responsible for the transposition, there will be no action capacity left for other agenda".

The implementation of the Article 120 was solved by the decree law, enumerating specific areas in which the government shall legislate. The law also introduced several control powers for the parliament over the government, i.e. an obligation of the government to inform the parliament every six months about issued/prepared decrees and a power for the parliament to ask the government to produce a decree proposal in the form of a law.

After several years since the law adoption, it is safe to reason that the parliament is not interested in exercising the control powers over approximation decrees. A decree has never been transformed into a law proposal and the plenary discussions over the decree reports are just formal. The further expansion of the government's power came with subsequent amendments to the decree law. From 2004, it includes the power to legislate in the agriculture and environment policy areas. Moreover, the EU membership did not put approximation decrees to an end. In 2004, the parliament prolonged the use of decrees in order to fulfill Slovakia's duties as laid down in Art. 7 of the Slovak constitution. The MPs continuing ignorance over the decrees is in fact influencing the balance of powers between government and parliament. The formal dominance of the

government is complemented by informal practices. It seems that decrees are considered a second rate legislation, which is not sensitive to the interests of political parties. However, one cannot rule out that this attitude will change in the future, when important political and social actors realize, that decrees may be of interest.

The last change in the Slovak parliament's position occurred when Slovakia became a member state. The transfer of powers to EU institutions, based on constitution, limits the possibilities for domestic institutions, including the legislature.

The parliament stroked back in 2004, by approving the constitutional law on cooperation between the government and the parliament on EU matters. After evaluating three years of the law's existence, we can argue that the law is not more than a symbolic gesture trying to challenge the government's omnipotence. The law drafters envisaged that parliament and its EU committee would play an equal role in EU matters. There are several reasons why it is not so. During the first year of the committee's existence there were no procedural rules implementing vague provisions of constitutional law. The parliament voted down twice the amendment on its own procedural rules that included the implementation of the constitutional law. Another decision, which limited parliament's control ability over the government, was the decision of the PCEU to limit the scope of EU draft legislation that they are going to deal with. The discretion is with individual ministries, as they are identifying the most important EU issues for PCEU. Subsequently, the PCEU may review pre-selected positions, with the possibility to bind a cabinet's minister to present parliament's position during the Council session. Out of the hundreds of resolutions approved by the PCEU, only a few changed or amended positions were prepared by the ministries. In several cases, the nonexistence of procedural rules influenced negatively the functioning of the PCEU. On November 3, the PCEU voiced its dissatisfaction with the fact that state secretaries are participating in PCEU sessions instead of the ministers. These problems exist also after the 2006 elections. The PCEU membership changed significantly, with several new members having limited or no experience with EU matters. The membership in PCEU is dual, its members serving also in other parliamentary committees. The PCEU's chair no longer belongs to the opposition, as it was in previous term, which limits the control power of the parliament. Nevertheless, for the first time several PCEU members from the opposition have executive experience with EU matters from previous terms.

As we have seen, EU membership changed priorities and positions of political, economical and social actors, and enabled them to influence decision-making in new institutional structures. The political conditionality influenced, for example, formation of a new set of players within the Slovak civic society. Several NGOs, originally involved with democracy building in Slovakia, are now actively exporting their know-how to Ukraine, Belarus and the Western Balkans.

While Börzel, as we previously showed, examined strategies of one collective actor- a member state represented by the government – Hix and Goetz are looking at the same problem more complexly. According to them, other actors, i.e. political parties, industries and NGOs, have a chance to enforce their demands without need to

take an official state position approved by the government into consideration. This is not to say non-state positions are necessarily in opposition to the official positions. The opposite is true. The more comparable positions of the government and other non-state actors are, the bigger the chance that these positions will be successful at the EU level. On the other hand, the bigger the differences on the national level, the more complicated it is for the government to be successful in Brussels. The degree of the agreement is also significant in the case of the political elite, the bigger the disagreement between coalition and opposition, the more likely we are to see changes of integration priorities with every new government. Is there a change in Slovakia's integration priorities after the change of government in 2006? Are the priorities of Mr. Fico's government different to those of Mr. Dzurinda's in 2002 – 2006?

## **Integration Priorities of the Slovak Republic in 2004 – 2006**

Slovakia's EU strategies could be analyzed within the context of the country's size, a level of economic development, government's manifesto, achieved level of political consensus and available personal capacities. None of these categories is static; they are changing over time in the relation to political development, the government's composition and the state of the economy.

Slovakia is a small member state, not only in terms of its size, but also in terms of number of votes in the Council. Together with Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Lithuania – based on the *Nice Treaty* – Slovakia falls to the 'big small state' category. During the final period of Slovakia's accession, Slovakia demanded only a limited number of permanent exceptions and temporary periods, many of which became obsolete in the following years. Because of the catching up strategy, which reflected a complicated period of 1994 – 1998, it was reasonable to expect Slovakia not to complicate the transfer of its own sovereignty in favor of EU institutions. Slovakia was simply building, quite successfully, an image of a good and unproblematic European. Other membership expectations were based on country's position of a big small state. They included support for the equal participation in EU governing through the rotating presidency, equal use of national languages in official procedures and preservation of the principle: one commissioner/ one country. In other words, the expectation was that Slovak membership priorities would not be that different from accession period.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> D. Malová, M. Rybář, "European Unions Policies Towards Slovakia: Carrots and Sticks of Political Conditionality", J. Rupnik, J. Zielonka *The Road to the European Union: The Czech and Slovak Republics*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); D. Malová, M. Rybář, "Exerting Influence on a Contentious Polity: The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Political Change in Slovakia", A. Dimitrova (ed) *Driven to Change*. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).

After the 2002 election, the new government declared its intent to finish the accession talks until the end of the year, with the aim to become a member in 2004. The government's manifesto expressed a wide support for all EU reforms not based exclusively on the country's size; for preserving the national identity in cultural and ethnic matters; for strengthening of CFSP and ESDP, for an effective use of cohesion funds in the accession period and later, for the adoption of the EURO and for the approval of necessary measures for accession into Schengen.

Later, in 2004, the preservation of selected policies on the national level and unanimous voting in the Council became the top of the government's priorities. It included a set of specific policy priorities, i.e. a preservation of veto in taxation, social policy, common foreign and security policy, defense, economic and social cohesion and family law. The government also reaffirmed its commitment to join the EURO in 2009. Slovakia supported the conclusion of accession talks with Bulgaria and Romania, as well as their opening with Croatia. In the case of Turkey, on the other hand, the cabinet was more careful and preferred to start the negotiations without guaranteeing their conclusion. The difference is visible when comparing Slovakia's position on Turkey with Croatia. After the ICTY recommendation, European Union decided to postpone the start of accession talks because of a lack of commitment on Croatia's side. It was Slovakia, together with Austria, that initiated an establishment of a special commission on Croatia to reevaluate the EU's original position. This effort was reminiscent of Finland's activity after joining the European Union, when Finland presented the Northern Dimension Initiative to integrate all north non-member states. The initiative was, however, little more than good PR for Finland.

For the second Dzurinda government the EU integration became an instrument for catching up with economical leaders of the EU. This was the reason behind the decision to oppose any harmonization efforts in exclusive national policies. The EU was not a place for uploading Slovak's policies onto a European level in order to save on implementation expenses. To conclude, Slovakia's strategies in 2004 – 2006 aimed for a future enlargement of EU on the one hand, and the preservation of the national sovereignty in policy areas as direct taxation and social policy, on the other.

## **The Sustainability of the Slovak Integration Strategies**

After two years of Slovakia's membership in EU, some authors argued that our integration strategies are vulnerable, therefore not sustainable in the longer run. There were two frameworks for EU policy articulation. First, more general, was pro-integrationist, in which Slovakia supported all important EU proposals such as the ratification of *Constitutional Treaty*, the future eastern enlargement and the start of negotiations with Turkey. Within the possibilities of a big small member, Slovakia

became an unproblematic player. The second framework of the EU policy articulation was dominated by the repeated refusal of direct taxation harmonization and the creation of EU social policy. As several government ministers pointed out, both taxation and social policy were key areas in which Slovakia was not willing to make any concessions. However, with a governing coalition, that faces a strong political opposition with completely different ideas on taxation and social policy, such strategy becomes problematic. Even if integration strategies of a second Dzurinda government were in accordance with economic policy of the government, they were hardly a basis for sustainable integration strategy of Slovakia in the EU. One of the problems of public policy formation in Slovakia is that they are not based on deliberated negotiations with relevant institutional actors. The opposite was often true, many of the policies being proposed without any public involvement and without any significant input of organized interests and with limited instruments to achieve political accountability with so many MPs being independent. Although the new government declares intention to expand consultation procedures with institutional players overlooked by the previous government, it is still possible to argue that integration priorities of Slovakia are predominantly products of political and economical elites that currently occupy ruling positions. By not being subject to coordination and consensus of all relevant actors and without having broad political and social support, these integration positions became vulnerable. Because of the logic of composition of political institutions, Slovak integration priorities so far do not represent a challenge to other players on the EU level.

The largest political party in the governing coalition, SMER, was not very specific in its manifesto as far as the EU is concerned, the same being true for the manifesto of the new Slovak government. Although the manifesto indicates basic priorities of Slovakia, characterized by ‘support for continuing EU treaty ratification’; preparedness to discuss simplification of the EU legal system, a more clear division of powers between the EU and member states or more effective system of decision making of enlarged union, none of these advances the previous EU positions of Slovakia.<sup>7</sup> In spite of a general and unspecific manifesto, we may, based on the first months of the new government, point out several moments that influenced, are influencing or may influence integration priorities of Slovakia.

Mr. Fico’s government continues to support a future enlargement of the EU, especially in the case of Croatia and Serbia. A certain level of precaution is visible when it comes to Montenegro and Ukraine. The biggest difference so far is Slovakia’s position on Turkey. The Prime Minister resolutely declared the support for Turkey’s membership, describing it an acquisition from an “economic, political and strategic point of view.” On the other hand, one has to be careful and see that the coalition

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<sup>7</sup> *The Slovak Government’s Manifesto*. <http://www-8.vlada.gov.sk/index.php?ID=1671>; V. Bilčík, “Slovensko a Európska únia”, M. Bútora, M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov (eds) *Slovensko 2006: Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2007).



party SNS is resolutely against Turkey's membership and membership of Turkey is hardly being the government's priority.

Other government steps, with considering limited time in the office, are ambiguous so far. Especially the positions of the new government on EU priorities in economic development of Slovakia are not clear enough. After some hesitation, the government approved a strict monetary plan and stayed with an original plan of joining the EURO in 2009. In September 2006, the ruling coalition voted down an opposition proposal to bind the government to refuse any future attempts over the direct taxation harmonization in EU. The confusion increased in March 2007, when the PM Fico admitted, "that powerful EU members will hardly respect tax dumping of the new member states. We will be confronted with that [harmonization], so it is nonsense to say that we will never concede".<sup>8</sup>

In January 2007, the Slovak government decided to sue the EC for lowering CO2 emission credits from 41.3 tons, demanded originally by Slovakia, to 30.5 tons per year. The government is arguing that a decrease in limits is likely to have negative effects on economic growth in Slovakia.

The (dis)continuity of Slovak integration strategies may be influenced by other factors as well. The composition of the government and limited ties of its parties to the main political platforms in the EU may complicate the building of a political support within the EU institutional framework. With what seems so far as a dominant position of the government in the parliament, we may also expect that the government's supremacy in EU matters will continue. The practice of resortism continues, with strong parties' control over individual ministries. It means that the national positions in the Council are presented without a broader coordination within the cabinet, which is defined by the constitution as a collective body. In the past, we experienced situations in which Slovak ministers in Council presented their party, not government's positions. Such division of labor means that EU positions are not being a product of a cabinet or parliamentary deliberation, but only of a respective political party, that oversees the ministry. If this tendency continues, it is very likely that Slovak positions on EU matters are not going to be sustainable, because of the products of randomness, rather than an institutional coordination on the national level. That will change only if draft EU policies influence interests represented by the parties.

Slovakia as a new and big small member state is still adapting in the EU and to its limited action capacities for influencing policies on the EU level. In most of the areas, we can describe Slovakia as sitting on the policy fence, waiting or blocking. That explains why we support predominantly broad conceptual strategies, e.g. future EU enlargement, which is not directly connected to specific financial or personal investments. Furthermore, the answer to the question whether Slovakia may successfully

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<sup>8</sup> See *Televízne noviny*, TV Markíza on March 11, 2007, *Zmierňujeme odpor* or ČTK, March 12, 2007, <http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/3190598/Fico-pripustil-harmonizaciu-dani-v-EUopozicia-je-proti.html>

promote its own national policies on the European level is limited by the degree of national consensus between as many players as possible. At this moment, with intellectual, administrative and financial sources available to Slovakia, the country cannot significantly influence the direction of the EU and its policies. However, we might define our priorities within the existing policies, which may have the biggest impact on Slovakia. Only on these priorities, Slovakia has to dedicate enough political, administrative and financial capacities to have someone who would defend national interest. Nevertheless, before that there must be a broader political agreement on Slovakia's priorities to be achieved, viable enough to outlive the changes of governments that will include a comprehensible political message for the bureaucracy on what it is we really want to achieve in the EU as a country.

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*Aneta Világi*

## Treaty Establishing Constitution for Europe

In the past few years, the issue of EU institutional reform has been somehow connected with the document called *The Treaty for Establishing a Constitution for Europe*<sup>1</sup>. As for this document, it can be said that 2005 was a year of ratification while 2006 was a year of reflection.

However, the ratification did not proceed smoothly. *The Constitutional Treaty* was turned down by the citizens of the two member states in referenda. However, the reflection period did not mark any progress either – new ideas did not appear and no acceptable solution to the ‘constitutional crises’ was developed. Thus even in 2007, the European Union rolls its institutional ‘boulder’.

### Neither Dressed Up Nor Naked

*The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe*’s overall goal is to prepare the EU institutionally to deal with the increasing number of its members without losing the Union’s momentum. Despite the generally useful aims the document was about to fulfill, the final consensus was not reached easily. Moreover, after the ‘no’ received from France and Netherlands, some other member states stopped the ratification

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<sup>1</sup> *Constitutional Treaty* or *Constitution for Europe* thereafter.

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process as it was considered meaningless. Thus the treaty which should replace current EU primary law was laid into ‘hibernation status’. It was adopted by the Head of the Member States<sup>2</sup> but not by the member states as such (i.e. not by their parliaments or citizens). Therefore, the Constitution exists and does not exist at the same time.

The ratification process of the *Constitutional Treaty* in the Slovak Republic showed the same signs as the ratification process at the European level. Slovakia ratified and did not ratify the document – it all depends on the perspective.

In May 2005 the National Council of the Slovak Republic adopted the *Constitutional Treaty* by 116 votes out of 147 present. There was only the President’s signature left to successfully finish the ratification of the international treaty. However, the President decided to wait for the Slovak Constitutional Court’s decision over 13 Slovak citizens’ claim that the *Constitutional Treaty* ratification process was a violation of their constitutional rights. They claimed such a document should have been ratified in referendum as it would change the European Union into a new political entity with the characteristics of a state. The Slovak constitution states that the creation of a union with other states must be confirmed by a public referendum. A year was apparently not enough neither for the EU nor for the Constitutional Court for the reflection and, primarily, for the decision on the future of the *Constitutional Treaty* ratification. The Parliament’s decision to enter into force was postponed indefinitely by the Constitutional Court.

The destiny of the ratification process of the EU Constitution reflects the state of the debate on EU institutional reform. European political leaders and bureaucrats identified necessary steps to make the Union more efficient. Due to a fact that such steps are part of the *Constitutional Treaty*, their implementation depends on the progress with the treaty.

## What Comes Around, Goes Around

Generally speaking, not only the issue of the *Constitutional Treaty* did not prevail in political or public discourse in Slovakia in 2006, it was not even part of significant discourse topics. Hence, it is not surprising that public interest in the *Constitutional Treaty* or the EU institutional reform was rather insignificant. Moreover, the topic did not attract the attention of the Slovak political elite either, despite the official ‘reflection period’. The issue of the *Constitutional Treaty* was not even a part of the pre-election nor of the post-election political agenda in 2006. Only the *Christian Democratic Movement* (KDH) and *Slovak National Party* (SNS) explicitly referred to the *Constitutional Treaty* out of the six parliamentary political parties. Confirming the

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<sup>2</sup> Representatives of the member states signed *Constitutional Treaty* on October 29, 2004.

thesis on the *Constitutional Treaty*, critics as the ‘islands of positive deviation’ being the only actors interested in raising the topic within the public discourse<sup>3</sup>, both political subjects deal with the future of the document and express their objections towards it in their political programs. KDH refused the document for it sees it as a “fundamental step towards the establishment of a European state and as a fundamental transformation of European integration into a form which endangers the national and economic interests of Slovakia”<sup>4</sup>. KDH also did not want the ratification process in “no” countries to be repeated. SNS underlined the principle of independent sovereign states as a core of EU architecture in its political program. SNS did not directly refuse the *Constitutional Treaty* as unacceptable, however, it clearly stated that if there was a chance “it would support the ratification via referendum before the presidential signature would be added”<sup>5</sup>. In other words, if there was a chance to postpone the finalization of the ratification process and a chance to change its result, SNS would use it. Even though SMK and SDKÚ did not explicitly mention the *Treaty* in their political programs they outlined their visions of the future EU. SDKÚ promised to “actively contribute to the process of future organization of the EU and its further enlargement and to promote its better understanding and attractiveness for its citizens”<sup>6</sup>. SDKÚ-DS also pointed on subsidiarity and reduction and increase of Brussels bureaucracy efficiency as core principles that would lead the EU into the next period. The principle of subsidiarity as a fundamental determinant of further EU operation is mentioned also in the SMK program. SMK stressed that “any cooperation among member states has to be built from bottom to top”. The party “supports further European integration in such areas that became challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and that are better managed from one European centre than from member states”. It also called for “reorientation of slightly unfruitful discussion on institutions towards the discussion on solving common European problems within the EU 27”<sup>7</sup>. The winner of general elections, SMER party, as well as its coalition partner ĽS-HZDS, did not come up with any idea that would deal with the constitutional treaty or the future of the Union. SMER in its program draft supported the revision of the EU/EC legal basis however without insisting on “accepting the current text of the so called European constitution”. In the official version of the program the reference to the EU institutional or legal set up is missing though.

At the societal level, the only wider public debate dealing with the issue of the *Constitutional Treaty* took place within the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association* project

<sup>3</sup> For more details see A. Világi, “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe”, P. Brezáni (ed) *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2005*. (Bratislava: RC SFPA, 2006), p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> <http://volby.kdh.sk/program.php>, February 15, 2007.

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.sns.sk/images/dokumenty/program\\_sns\\_2006.pdf](http://www.sns.sk/images/dokumenty/program_sns_2006.pdf), February 15, 2007.

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.sdkuonline.sk/program/index.shtml>, February 15, 2007.

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.niton.sk/documents/10-8-618-volprog\\_n\\_sk.pdf](http://www.niton.sk/documents/10-8-618-volprog_n_sk.pdf), February 16, 2007.

*National Convention on the EU*<sup>8</sup>. The event was initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic in November 2006.<sup>9</sup> The debate confirmed the assumption that the *Constitutional Treaty* is primarily a political problem. The representatives of Slovakia's Foreign Office pointed on priorities of Slovak diplomacy in regard to the Treaty. They stressed that Slovakia is in favor of continuing the ratification process in those member states which have not done so yet. They also pointed out that Slovak representatives strongly support preservation of the document in its present form. Despite the fact that the *Constitutional Treaty* did not reflect numbers of original priorities set up by the Slovak government and the situation in other member states changed dramatically, the official standpoint of the Slovak Republic supports the actual text of the Treaty. According to the Slovak diplomats, the country is not interested in revision of the document or in implementation of only those parts that are favorable for Slovakia as a small country. On the contrary, Slovakia fully supports the official standpoint of the German Presidency being the most proactive in keeping the original text of the Constitution from all 'post-referenda' EU presidencies.<sup>10</sup> The political framework of the Slovak position on the EU Constitution is given by the Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic and approved after the parliamentary elections in 2006. With regard to the *Constitutional Treaty*, the manifesto declares continuity with the direction of the previous government. According to this document, the Slovak government will support the continuation of the *EU Constitution* ratification process in the context of domestic politics as well as at the European level. The Slovak parliament ratified the document with strong political support going across the whole political spectrum and therefore the Slovak government is strongly in favor of finishing the ratification process. Regarding the European level, the Slovak government states its priority as "interest in achievement of the agreement". If such agreement required renegotiation of the Treaty, the Slovak government would not avoid the discussion on the further simplification of the European legal system. It would endorse a more precise division of power between the EU and its member states and the establishment of more effective decision-making system within the enlarged Union.

However participants from the non-governmental sector presented positions that were in contradiction to those presented by the Slovak government. It was mainly lawyers who were critical not only to the text of the Constitution as such but also to

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<sup>8</sup> The project *National Convention on the EU* was organized by the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association* in cooperation with the *Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic* and the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* of the Slovak Republic.

<sup>9</sup> The event was called *What to Do With the Institutional Reform of the EU?*. More information in Slovak language is available at: [www.eurokonvent.sk/clanok.aspx?mi=7&sy=2006&iid=331&et=1](http://www.eurokonvent.sk/clanok.aspx?mi=7&sy=2006&iid=331&et=1).

<sup>10</sup> Text refers to the period after the French (May 2005) and Dutch (June 2005) referenda. In the second half of 2005 Great Britain took over the Presidency, Austria hold the Presidency till July 2006 and in the second half of 2006 the Presidency was overtaken by Finland.

the way of ratification adopted by the government. Legal specialists pointed mainly to the fact that the *Constitutional Treaty* converts the institutional architecture to one that is very close to federative constellation of mutual relations. Driving from such presumption they stressed three key conclusions:

- A document of this kind could be ratified according to the Slovak constitution only by referendum.
- If Slovakia accepted referenda as *modus operandi* with regard to the change of any primary legislation of the EU, it would strengthen the negotiation position of Slovakia in the future and it would make it easier to enforce the *opt-outs*.
- Regarding the EU institutional reform debate, Slovakia should request a precise definition of the EU competences and the member states' competences regardless of the further development of the ratification process. The clear definition would provide conditions for strict demarcation between the union and its constitutional components (member states) and that would be applicable in the case of constitutional development towards a federation (in its open or hidden form).

Discussion provoked by the controversial opinions on the nature of the European Constitution and the European Union as such was lively however it has not spread beyond the walls of the ministerial Congress Hall. The reaction from the society (via media or public debate) was rather weak, if any.

The conference, *The EU as a Global Actor*<sup>11</sup>, organized by the *Information Office of the European Parliament* and the *Delegation of the European Commission in the SR* also dealt with the *Constitutional Treaty* even if only partially: from the perspective of the II. pillar (*Common Foreign and Security Policy*) reform. It is the area where the Constitution introduces several positive initiatives that could increase the overall efficiency of the Union in international relations and foreign policy decision-making. According to the experts the initiatives in the foreign policy decision-making of the EU, present a core of institutional reform that could gain public and political support even if the Constitution project fails. At the same time the main components of the II. pillar reform correspond with the original priorities of the Slovak government in regards to the EU institutional reform.

## Instead of Conclusion

Based on experience from the last two election years (1998, 2002) it can be concluded that the issue of the European integration played an important role that influenced voters' political preferences.

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<sup>11</sup> The conference took place in September 2006 in Trenčín.

According to some authors<sup>12</sup>, the elections of 1998 might be seen as a decisive period in which Slovakia found itself again at the ‘crossroads’ of its further development. Voters faced a dilemma to either vote for pro-democratic leaders and thus vote for the fulfillment of the country’s integration ambitions or to vote for maintaining Slovakia’s direction and thus vote for postponing (if not canceling) Slovakia’s EU and NATO integration.

The 2002 elections were crucial from the perspective of preserving the continuity of the pro-democratic orientation of Slovakia and of maintaining the gained trust of foreign partners. Continuity of the then political development and leadership was more or less directly connected with the chance to succeed in the integration process.

Last year (2006) positively showed that the European Union is no longer an interesting election issue and from this perspective, Slovakia gained its place among the ‘old member states’. As political parties (which form government and parliament) do not perceive the topic of European integration as potential political capital, they pay less and less attention to European issues. It was evident even in the election year and the ‘year of reflection’.

Therefore, during the period of reflection, *The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* has become a focus only for a limited number of diplomats, academics and people from non-governmental organizations in Slovakia.

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<sup>12</sup> For more details see: M. Bútorá, G. Mesežnikov, Z. Bútorová *Slovenské voľby '98: Kto? Prečo? Ako?* (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 1999); V. Krivý, “Výsledky volieb v rokoch 1998 a 1999”, G. Mesežnikov, M. Ivantyšin (eds) *Slovensko 1998 – 1999, Súhrná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 1999).



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## Eastern Policy of the EU under the Presidencies of Finland and Germany: Shifting Agendas and Instruments

Both Finland and Germany are countries with traditional interest in developing relations with East European neighbors. Thanks to their coordinated effort during the consequent EU presidencies in 2006 – 2007, including close interaction with the Commission, they managed to advance the strategic framework for the EU policy towards Eastern Europe. First of all, the Finnish and German presidencies made the first real steps towards addressing the main deficit of the existing strategic framework for the EU's policy on Eastern Europe.

### **Addressing a 'Regional Gap' in the EU's Eastern Policy**

The EU's key interests in the region of Eastern Europe are of a regional nature, e.g. energy security, combating illegal migration, developing transport infrastructure, improving environmental protection, etc. All agendas that challenge the EU's interests in the region extend beyond the borders of any single East European country. The EU cannot effectively pursue its regional interests in Eastern Europe without applying regional policies under the umbrella of a comprehensive, consistent and single regional strategy. Second, interrelations and interactions between East European countries,

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e.g. Russia-Ukraine, Russia-Belarus, Ukraine-Moldova, etc., do represent an important factor, affecting both the EU's efficiency and its ability to pursue its bilateral interests vis-à-vis individual countries in the region. Unless the EU is able to address both the regional framework of interactions between regional actors and country-to-country relations in Eastern Europe, it will be less effective in its separate dealings with each of them. Belarus is a good example of such a 'toothless' EU policy.

A regional strategy in Eastern Europe is needed if the EU is to effectively sustain its interests in certain sectors, e.g. justice and home affairs, energy, foreign trade liberalization, transport, environmental protection, etc. First, if the EU's eastern borders could be secured more effectively and at lesser expense, the EU could assist the East European countries in developing cooperation in the *Justice and Home Affairs* (JHA) area. The EU might expend extensive resources securing its eastern borders with Ukraine and Belarus; however, the EU's eastern borders would be far more secure if the Belarus-Russia and Ukraine-Russia borders were to be brought into line with higher security standards, not to mention improvements in cooperation between the East European countries in the area of readmission. If it serves EU interests, why not initiate cooperation in the JHA area with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and eventually other relevant countries in the region?

Second, since October 2002, the EU-Russia energy dialogue has included the issues of Russia's supply of energy resources and new oil and natural gas pipeline routes that may eventually cross the territories of Ukraine and Belarus, not to mention existing ones. Both oil and natural gas transits are highly profitable and are directly related to the strategic economic interests of transiting countries. It would be simply politically correct on the part of the EU to involve the other respective East European countries in its energy dialogue with Russia; otherwise this dialogue will take place 'over their heads', which does not make the EU a more transparent and reliable actor in the region.

There are several cases from the recent past that demonstrate the negative consequences of such a mistake. The first one was the case of the so-called *Yamal 2* gas pipeline, which was intended to bypass Ukraine and would result in the modification of Russia-Poland agreements signed in the mid-1990s on the *Yamal-to-Germany* gas pipeline crossing the territory of Poland. Referring to EU attitudes – presented as identical to those of Russia – Russian *Gazprom*, a gas monopoly concern supported by the Russian government, was trying to get the government in Poland to make compromises serving both its commercial and political interests. The 'misunderstanding' which arose over this issue between the EU and Poland, at that time an EU candidate country, could have been avoided if Poland – and other candidate countries – had participated in the EU-Russia energy dialogue. Recently, a similar situation occurred in the case of the North Baltic Sea gas pipeline and again a 'misunderstanding' arose between two EU member countries – Poland and Germany. In addition, the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine of January 2006 proved that it is in the EU's interest to develop a common and 'inclusive' energy policy towards

all East European countries relevant for EU energy security. The way forward is to regionalize the EU's energy dialogue with Russia so that it includes Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

And finally, the EU-Russia dialogue on the creation of the *Common Economic Space* (CES) addresses trade liberalization between the two partners. Both Russia and the EU are key foreign trade partners for the countries situated in between – Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Why not include them in the CES dialogue? There are also other sectoral policies where a regional approach on the part of the EU would be helpful for the EU and non-EU countries in the region alike. First, this would be a positive move by the EU in the direction of pursuing its interests in Eastern Europe and becoming a more transparent and reliable partner in the region. In sum, it is impossible to replace a complex EU regional strategy towards the East European region with bilateral strategies towards particular countries of the region. Owing to the lack of such a regional approach, the EU fails to give a clear response to questions relating to its declared goals and interests in Eastern Europe.

## Assessment of Germany's ENP Plus Proposal

Political representatives of Germany have announced four priority agendas for their country's presidency, in which they plan to undertake new initiatives and develop EU policies: first, the constitutional treaty; second, economic dynamism and social responsibility, including energy policy; third, justice and home affairs; and fourth, external relations and the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* (CFSP). As State Secretary Reinhard Silberberg has voiced it, a part of the fourth 'CFSP' priority for Germany is to develop an attractive overall policy under the name of a new EU *Ostpolitik* that would include three major components: the ENP, Russia and Central Asia.<sup>1</sup> In mid-2006 the *Planning Department* of the German MFA elaborated a proposal under the title *ENP Plus*. Even though the document has not been published officially, certain media reported *in detail* on the main theses and ideas proposed by Germany for a reshaped ENP policy.<sup>2</sup>

An assessment of the ENP Plus theses from the perspective of the existing strategic framework for the EU's relations with its Eastern neighbors allows for the following conclusion: if the ENP Plus initiative becomes a reality it should be viewed as a positive

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<sup>1</sup> Speech by State Secretary Silberberg *A Preview of Germany's EU Presidency: The Status of the Federal Government's Preparations* on October 4, 2006

<sup>2</sup> See "Berlin entwickelt neue Nachbarschaftspolitik fuer die EU", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 2, 2006; "Poyas bezopasnosti dlya suverennoj demokratiji", *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, August 9, 2006, and others.

step in the direction of a more consistent and more efficient EU policy ‘towards’ and ‘in’ Eastern Europe. However, there still remain challenges and open questions that the *ENP Plus initiative* does not address. Let us summarize the pros of the *ENP Plus* proposal.

First, Germany’s *ENP Plus* proposal makes a clear distinction between *European neighbors* in the East and *neighbors of Europe* in the South. It calls for a more robust EU policy and more engagement in its Eastern neighborhood as well as greater interaction with the countries of the region. The EU’s policy *in Europe* certainly must not be the same as the EU’s policy in Africa or Asia. From this standpoint, the *ENP Plus* initiative places the region of Eastern Europe in a qualitatively new and correct position on the EU’s political map. Moreover, one can observe that this is the first time this has happened in the present history of the EU’s external relations.

Second, the *ENP Plus* proposal addresses the weakest point of the existing strategic framework for EU policy towards its Eastern neighborhood, namely its exclusive bilateralism in relations with its Eastern neighbors. The bilateral approach has been a hindrance to the EU in dealing with both regional challenges and the regional nature of its interests in Eastern Europe. The *EU Regional policy* proposed in the *ENP Plus* concept should be viewed as a ‘revolution’ – in the positive sense of the term – in the EU’s strategic approach towards its Eastern neighbors since the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force in 1999. It comes close to closing the strategic gap in the EU’s present Eastern policy.

Third, *sectoral agreement* as it is characterized in the *ENP Plus* proposal – understood as a new instrument for the EU in its relations with its Eastern neighbors – is an excellent sample of what the substance of EU foreign policy is; it could hardly work without its ‘enlargement’ and/or ‘integration’ component. Sectoral agreement as a tool for exporting the EU *acquis* to the Eastern neighborhood would serve both the modernization of the countries concerned and the EU’s regional interests in certain key sectors. Certainly the EU’s foreign policy could not function in Eastern Europe without this component. The modernization of post-communist Eastern Europe in line with the European model is a vital interest of the EU and sectoral agreement, understood as a tool for expansion of the EU’s legal area, will serve this purpose. It should be pointed out once again that sectoral agreements as proposed by Germany’s *ENP Plus* initiative represent an exemplary case of unison between the EU’s foreign and enlargement policies as the same policy. This is very important in the context of the ongoing EU debate over where its enlargement policy ends and where its foreign policy begins.

Fourth, the *ENP Plus* and its sectoral agreement instrument assume an important change in the present EU’s *ENP* policy. The *binding* sectoral agreement is supposed to change the *voluntary* character of the ‘classic’ *ENP Action Plan* in that an *ENP* country would decide ‘how much’ of the EU *acquis* and in which sectors it will implement. What would constitute a real change in this respect is that sectoral agreements are envisaged as being binding documents *for both sides*, including the

EU. This circumstance would completely change the EU's present *voluntary* approach towards its Eastern neighbors within the existing ENP framework. It is enough to say that the European Commission is not yet ready to give its assessment on Ukraine's performance in meeting the goals set out in its *Action Plan*. Without a response from the EU, there is no way for an ENP country to know how to adjust and develop its activities in order to meet the goals of its respective *EU Action Plan*. In other words, the present ENP has created two worlds that exist in parallel or, stated differently, a single world of 'unreturned love'. On one side there is an ENP country, which appeals to the EU in order to attract its love; on the other there is an 'unresponsive' EU which merely observes the actions of an eventual suitor without any responsibility to react. The binding sectoral agreements would change this *blind alley* of the present ENP.

These are the main positive aspects of the ENP Plus proposal, providing solutions to some of the most challenging deficits of the EU's present policy towards Eastern Europe. However, there still remain questions that are not addressed by the ENP Plus proposal.

The first concerns the political geography of the ENP Plus proposal; since there is no Eastern Europe without Russia. ENP Plus does not provide a solution for how to develop a *single 'European' Eastern Policy*. As German representatives have presented it – referring to the EU's *Ostpolitik* – ENP Plus has three components: Russia, Eastern Europe/Caucasus and Central Asia. However, that contradicts their statement that the EU's approach towards its *European neighbors* must be different from its approach to *neighbors of Europe*. Central Asian countries are neither European neighbors nor neighbors of the EU at all. The EU needs a *single coherent European Ostpolitik* towards its East European neighbors. What is still missing is a single strategic framework for developing the EU's relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Russia.

The second question concerns Russia's engagement in the EU's ENP. The ENP Plus initiative calls for active and constructive engagement on the part of Russia and for an EU-Russia partnership in the common neighborhood (Eastern Europe/Caucasus); however, it says almost nothing about how to achieve such an arrangement. Russia's engagement in the EU's ENP is an important issue that sooner or later must be addressed. Nevertheless, equally challenging is the issue of "how to engage ENP countries in the EU-Russia common spaces dialogue". Why are the EU-Russia spaces not also *common* for their *common* neighbors? Neither the presented *Ostpolitik* concept nor the *ENP Plus* proposal responds to this challenge. It is important to stress that the EU has not even raised such a question yet. If the EU's Eastern policy is to be a successful project, it should first find a way to bridge its Russia and ENP policies in the region of Eastern Europe.

The third question follows the previous two. The *ENP Plus* proposal does not provide a solution for how to make the EU an actor in East European regional or country-to-country interrelations. For example, if Ukraine signs a sectoral agreement with the EU in the area of energy and implements all EU *acquis* in this sector, this

does not create a *political mechanism* enabling the EU to deal with or to prevent an eventual 'gas dispute' between Russia and Ukraine in the future that might threaten the EU's interests. On one hand, the EU has a legitimate interest in ensuring stable natural gas supplies from Russia through Ukraine; however, it does not have any political instrument to make itself a player in this Russia-Ukraine agenda, which is so important for the EU's energy security. The EU can identify its interests in the region of Eastern Europe, which is about how foreign policy begins; however, it also needs regional policy instruments to be able to assert them. Unless the EU's Russia agenda is bridged with that of the EU's ENP in the region of Eastern Europe, the EU will not become an East European player. The German proposal for an EU *Ostpolitik* does not meet this challenge.

The fourth question concerns strategic consistency between the *ENP Plus* concept and that of the present ENP. It is not clear what will happen with the 'old' ENP instrument – the *Action Plan* – if the EU opts to implement its 'new' ENP Plus instrument – sectoral agreements. What will be the relationship between them? Ukraine will complete its *Action Plan* in 2007, for example; what will its future be? Are sectoral agreements to replace the Actions Plans in the years to come? If so, the ENP Plus will become a completely new strategic framework for the EU's policy towards Eastern Europe – a third one after CFSP1999 – 2001 and ENP 2002 –2004. The EU could conclude sectoral agreements with ENP countries on energy, transport, etc. which might be helpful for ENP countries in their sectoral modernization. However, how can one conclude a sectoral agreement on democracy building or the *political modernization* of the ENP countries? The *Action Plan* might not be the best instrument for the EU, but it addresses the principal political agenda in the EU – the ENP country relationship; it is not clear how the ENP Plus is to handle this. What to do with Action Plans is a crucial question for the EU's ENP, and there is no clear answer on this in the *ENP Plus* proposal. Is the EU to retreat from its task of assisting ENP countries in their political modernization? Should the ENP Plus introduce a new instrument (sectoral agreements) and ignore the main instrument of the present ENP (the *Action Plan*)? If so, there is already a precedent in the recent past when the EU developed its ENP concept in 2002 – 2004 with the *Action Plan* as the new instrument when it ignored the existing instrument (TACIS) of the previous CFSP 1999 – 2001 concept. In following this route, the EU would introduce its third strategic framework for relations with its Eastern neighbors in the last eight years. In order to prevent 'never-ending' strategic inconsistency in this area, the *ENP Plus* needs to be adjusted to accommodate the present ENP.

The fifth question has to do with what seems to be an incorrect assumption in the ENP Plus proposal, namely that there is a threat of an emerging integration and security vacuum in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. First, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will be ready to sign a package of 85 agreements establishing a customs union within the *Common Economic Space* (CES) at the beginning of 2007. Ukraine is under pressure from Russia to join the CES, including the customs union, before it

enters the WTO. If Ukraine agrees, Moldova and other countries in the region will not have so many options for maneuvering. In other words, there is no integration vacuum in Eastern Europe, but rather an ongoing process of integration within the CES. If this were to happen, the EU and an ENP country could not negotiate a free trade agreement. At the same time, such an agreement is considered, e.g. in the case of Ukraine, to be essentially a key aspect of the new 'enhanced' EU-Ukraine agreement. How could the sectoral agreements of the ENP Plus function as *modernization* instruments in Eastern Europe if the main incentive of the ENP – access by ENP countries to the EU's common market or part thereof – were to become impossible? If this happens, there will be two integration spaces in Europe, the EU and the CES, or in the future a 'Eurasian Union'. Perhaps sectoral agreements could help to implement certain large EU-Eastern neighbor infrastructure projects, but they would nevertheless lose their *political* modernization purpose and would no longer strengthen the EU's role in Eastern Europe.

Finally, the sixth question concerns the ENPI in the context of the ENP Plus proposal. The *ENP Plus Initiative* does not elaborate how to use the ENPI instrument to meet the EU's goals in Eastern Europe. The EU should learn from its experience with TACIS if it intends not to repeat old mistakes. First, the structure of the ENPI's budgeting and its program priorities should be adapted to the EU's value-centered foreign policy goals in the region of Eastern Europe; second, the ENPI must allow for flexible planning of EU policy responses to its Eastern neighbors in the years to come. Germany will be the first EU member country to assume the EU presidency in the new financial 2007 – 2013 budget period. It is the right time to start planning for the years to come.

## What Has Been Achieved in the End?

In politics it happens that the distance between policy planning and its implementation is not easy to overcome. Even though the rhetoric of German politicians became much more modest in the first half of 2007 than it has been in 2006, thanks to their coordinated efforts with Finns and the Commission, one can easily register important shifts in the EU's Eastern policy that has been taking place over 2006 – 2007. Let's summarize the main achievements of both Finnish and German presidencies in the field.

First, Finland during its presidency in the second half of 2006 managed to adjust the EU's Northern Dimension initiative to the cooperation structure within the EU-Russia Common Spaces. The Northern Dimension established in 1997 aims to address the special regional development challenges of Northern Europe. The Northern Dimension, in the external and cross-border policies of the European Union, reflects the EU's relations with Russia (and particularly North-West Russia) in the Baltic Sea region and Arctic Sea region. It addresses the specific challenges and opportunities arising in those

regions and aims to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its member states, the northern countries associated with the EU under the EEA (Norway and Iceland) and the Russian Federation. Even though the Northern Dimension does not include, apart from Russia any other non-EU country, the Finnish initiative of 2006 was extremely important since it outlined a model for the future adaptation of the ENP framework in Eastern Europe to the EU-Russia Common Spaces.

Second, at the end of the Finnish presidency the Commission issued its *Communication on Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy* on December 4, 2006.<sup>3</sup> The Communication reflects the main ideas of Germany's *ENP plus* proposal, including sectoral agreements as a new instrument for the ENP. The Communication calls for building a *thematic dimension* into the ENP, which has a bit of a different name, however with the same substance, for a regional and sectoral cooperation framework for the EU's interaction with ENP countries. The Communication also states that there is an urgent need in a multilateral agreement between the EU and ENP countries especially in energy and transport sectors. It proposes that the way to achieve such an arrangement would be to extend the *Energy Community Treaty* to ENP countries that are both willing and ready to adopt respective EU sectoral acquis. Another new element of the ENP following the Communication is a possibility for the ENP countries to participate in respective Community agencies and programs. In the end, the Communication lays foundations for developing the EU's regional policy and cooperation framework in its Eastern neighborhood.

And finally, during Germany's presidency on April 11, 2007 the Commission published its *Communication on Black Sea Synergy – a New Regional Cooperation Initiative*.<sup>4</sup> The new initiative is the first attempt at all in the modern history of the EU's Eastern policy, which is aimed at establishing regional format for political dialogue between the EU, ENP countries in the EU's Eastern neighborhood, including Russia and Turkey. Following the Communication via the *Black Sea Synergy* initiative the EU aims at improving coordination of its following three policies: the pre-accession process with Turkey, five East European countries participating in the ENP, and the strategic partnership with Russia. In other words, the *Black Sea Synergy* is a test case for exploring further possibilities to overlap the EU's ENP policy in its Eastern neighborhood with a strategic partnership with Russia and develop the EU's regional policy towards East European countries. This is the only way to make the EU a real actor capable to enforce its interests in Eastern Europe.

Finland and Germany put the EU into a right direction.

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<sup>3</sup> European Commission *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy*. (Brussels: European Commission, December 4, 2006, COM(2006)726 final).

<sup>4</sup> European Commission *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Black Sea Synergy – A New Regional Cooperation Initiative*. (Brussels: European Commission, April 11, 2007, COM(2007)160 final).



## Perspectives: Policy Recommendations

The following are two main policy recommendations based on the above analysis and aimed at improving the strategic framework for the EU's policy towards Eastern Europe:

1. A two-level strategy; The EU needs to develop a *two-level strategy* for its policy towards its Eastern neighborhood. The existing *bilateral framework* should represent the first level for the EU's relations with individual East European countries and a *new regional framework* and/or frameworks for the EU's policy towards the Eastern European region should represent the second one. The ENP should preserve and further develop the existing instrument for its bilateral interaction with Eastern ENP neighbors (*the Action Plan*). The Action Plan should be viewed primarily as an instrument facilitating collaboration between the EU and a respective ENP country in the area of *political modernization* and democratic institution building, while a new instrument proposed by the ENP Plus initiative (*sector agreements*) should serve both the EU's *interests in the region* and sectoral modernization of ENP countries. The bilateral EU-ENP country framework must be open to the eventual integration of an ENP country into the EU, while the regional framework should serve the EU's foreign policy interests in the region. In this way, the ENP Plus initiative will represent an important development and follow-up to the present ENP. The *combination of the EU's foreign and enlargement/integration policies* (at least an 'open door' policy) within such a *two-level strategy* is the only way for the EU to both assist its Eastern neighbors in their post-communist modernization along the lines of a *European model* as well as strengthen its role and/or presence in the region of Eastern Europe.

2. Bridging ENP with Russia policy; The EU should aim at finding a way to *bridge its ENP policy in Eastern Europe with its common spaces agenda with Russia*. Otherwise, the EU will not become a real player capable of pursuing its own interests in the region and addressing country-to-country relations that have an important impact on EU interests. Regional policy instruments and/or cooperation formats with participation of the EU, ENP countries and Russia are still missing. A workable way to develop these could be the ENP Plus initiative. The regional sectoral policies proposed by the ENP Plus initiative and based on sectoral agreements with ENP countries could lay the foundations for *institutionalized regional sectoral dialogues with ENP countries plus Russia* as their superstructure. Another way would be by creating such a regional format for a dialogue between the EU, ENP countries and Russia along the lines of the EU-Russia common spaces. Many would say that Russia would never accept such an expanded and regionalized format for its dialogue with the EU. It is up to Russia to decide on its position; first, however, it is more important to determine what the EU considers essential from the point of view of its own interests. This is about how foreign policy begins and what it is in the end. It is up to the EU to pursue its interests in the region if it wants to be a foreign policy player in

Europe. Russia cannot decide for the EU what is better or worse for the Union and its member states. Moreover, the German ENP Plus initiative calls for a constructive engagement with Russia in the EU's ENP policy in Eastern Europe without any specifications. Such *institutionalized regional 'EU plus ENP countries plus Russia' dialogues*, at least in sectors where the EU has a vital interest (e.g. energy security, combating illegal migration, etc.) could be a way to overlap the EU's ENP with its common spaces agenda with Russia.

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## The Performance of the SR in the UN Security Council

From January 2006, Slovakia has been carrying out its two year mandate as a non-permanent member of the *UN Security Council* (UN SC). It bears – in accordance with the *UN Charter* – still an exclusive responsibility for international peace and security, despite an increasing number of surfacing opinions about the failure of the initial hope (in the intentions of chapter VII. of the *UN Charter*), that “the new world order could be founded on the UN” and its “centre” (i.e. the UN SC).<sup>1</sup> This doubt represents (quite rightfully), that the UN has simply not become a binding warrantor of the post-war world order, as spoken of in the *UN Charter*. Nevertheless, the exclusive position of the UN (especially the UN SC) is still formally in force and the Slovak republic (SR) officially considers its membership in this exceptional body as “something that increases the prestige of the country”.<sup>2</sup>

The *Basic framework for the operation of the Slovak Republic in the United Nations Security Council in 2006 and 2007*<sup>3</sup> became the basis for the activities of the SR in the

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<sup>1</sup> D. M. Malon, “Chapter VII of the UN Charter”, D. M. Malone (ed) *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. (London: Boulder, 2004), p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Speech of the Foreign Affairs Minister Ján Kubiš at the *Annual Review Conference on Foreign Policy of the SR 2006*, which took place on the premises of the MFA SR on April 2, 2007 under the title *Continuities and Changes in Slovakia’s Foreign Policy*.

<sup>3</sup> *Základný rámec pre pôsobenie SR v Bezpečnostnej rade OSN v rokoch 2006 – 2007. (Basic Framework for the Operation of the Slovak Republic in the United Nations Security Council in 2006 and 2007)*, [http://www.vlada.gov.sk/infoservis\\_archiv.php?adm\\_action=13&ID=292](http://www.vlada.gov.sk/infoservis_archiv.php?adm_action=13&ID=292). (According to this material, the selection of the SR for a member of the UN SC confirmed that the international community perceives Slovakia as “an active and predictable member state of the UN”).

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UN SC. The main interests of the SR gained a new dimension in the UN SC, which has broadened the foreign policy priorities of the SR, as they are seen by Europe or the EU. In the global dimension, the areas of Slovakia's main interest are "the territories of the Western Balkans"<sup>4</sup> (especially the question of the future status of Kosovo), the generally defined "Eastern Europe" (in the practice of Slovakia's activities in the UN SC, including a specific part of the post-soviet region – Georgia and its security problems) and the Middle or Near East (the SR actually had to focus on the narrowed Middle East, that is the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict including its Lebanese 'dimension', which appeared after the 'summer war' between *Hezbollah* and Israel in 2006).

At the time of admission of the SR as a member of the UN SC and the commencement of its performance, the progress in the activities of the multinational task force in Afghanistan and Iraq was among the top priorities. Even though the SR continues to participate in fulfilling its duties, posed by the corresponding resolutions of the UN SC on Afghanistan and Iraq in the year 2007, the scope for this area (the Middle East generally) and the so called broader Middle East, has narrowed after the withdrawal of the main Slovak contingent from Iraq in the beginning of the year 2007<sup>5</sup> and the conditionality of the deployment of the Slovak contingent to the south of Afghanistan. In the year 2006 the new Slovak government first refused to fulfill the request of the NATO Secretary General to relocate its troops to the south of Afghanistan (Kandahar area), but eventually accepted this request.<sup>6</sup> The exercise of Slovakia's mandate in the UN SC took place in the background of these security policy reorientations in transatlantic relations.

## The Scope of Activities of the Representation of the SR in the UN SC

Throughout the year 2006 the permanent representative of the SR, Peter Burian, acted as chairman of the *Resolution 1540 Committee (2004)*<sup>7</sup> as well as co-chairman of the *Ad hoc committee on mandate review*. From October 2006 the SR also assumed the position

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<sup>4</sup> "Prioritné záujmy SR", <http://unnewyork.mfa.sk>.

<sup>5</sup> A military contingent of more than 100 troops was withdrawn from Iraq, but „the Slovak flag stays in Iraq in a symbolic way, due to the continued presence of six officers in the commands of the coalition operation *Iraqi Freedom*. In: <http://www.mosr.sk/ine-misie>. Another five Slovak officers continue to participate in MTI (training mission in Iraq).

<sup>6</sup> "Slovenskí vojaci v Kábule odídu na juh krajiny", <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=203&type=news&id=9&method=main&art=5504&PHPSESSID=de4157d52e75cce19f1a3e33fb0c70a3>.

<sup>7</sup> "Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons", *Press Release SC/8076*, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8076.doc.htm>.

of chairman in the *Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718* (2006), which adopted the sanctions against South Korea. This position corresponded well with the priorities of the SR in the UN SC and the professional expertise which Slovakia could offer in this field. At the beginning of 2007 the UN SC deliberated on the chairmen of its subsidiary bodies for the year 2007. The Council decided that the SR will continue to preside over the committee concerned with the questions of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is said that this committee along with the other counter-terrorist committees is among the most important and at the same time the most demanding subsidiary bodies of the SC. The SR remains along with South Africa the co-chairman of the *Ad hoc Committee on Mandate Review* for the year 2007.<sup>8</sup>

During the year 2006 Slovakia generally accentuated the following elements of the Slovak foreign policy in the UN SC:

- the implementation of the 2005 UN World summit outcome document on the complex reform of the UN;<sup>9</sup>
- effective multilateralism and the strengthening of the role of the UN as the main normative actor in the field of international law; and
- close coordination of the joint procedure of UN member countries.

The statistically still absolute agenda in the issue of Africa can be viewed as a certain deficit in the performance of the SR in the UN SC. Due to the limited capacities of Slovak embassies on the African continent the 'coverage' of this agenda proved to be more demanding compared to other issues as Georgia, the Middle East, Iran or weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

## Resolutions of the UN SC in 2006

Partaking in the creation process of the resolutions and voting is to be seen as a test of responsibility of every single member country of the SC. In the year 2006 the UN SC has adopted the highest number of resolutions from the year 1993, totaling at 87.<sup>10</sup> Throughout the year 2006 the SR acted as the so called 'cosponsor' of 10 resolutions, primarily concerning:

- the non-proliferation of WMD in reference to the Iranian nuclear program (S/RES/1696/2006);
- the solutions of the conflict between Israel and Lebanon (S/RES/1701/2006); and

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<sup>8</sup> "Slovensko ostáva v predsedníctve Výboru BR OSN", *Sme* January 12, 2007.

<sup>9</sup> "World Summit 2005", [http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/fact\\_sheet.pdf](http://www.un.org/summit2005/presskit/fact_sheet.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> For comparison: 71 resolutions were adopted in the year 2005, 59 in the year 2004, 67 in the year 2003 (92 resolutions were adopted in the year 1993). *UNSC Resolutions*. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.

- the nuclear program of the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (S/RES/1718 /2006).

The geographical specification of the UN SC resolutions logically overlaps with the main centers of tension and security crises in the world. Even though the African continent continued to be, according to expectations, the most critical area throughout the year 2006, the ratio of resolutions explicitly dealing with particular African states or African sub-regions represents less than 60% of all the resolutions (46 out of the total of 87 resolutions<sup>11</sup>), taking into account that some of the cross-section resolutions, e.g. the Protection of civilians in armed conflict, are more or less aimed at the African region in the first place. From this quantificational point of view the most observed African states were Sudan (8 resolutions), the Democratic republic of Congo (7), Côte d'Ivoire (7), followed by Liberia (6), the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict (5), Somalia (3) and Sierra Leone (2 resolutions). The Middle East and specifically the Arab-Israeli conflict were traditionally the next vast agenda in the UN SC resolutions (8 resolutions). The UN SC dealt separately with Afghanistan (3) and of course Iraq in November 2006, when it unanimously extended the mandate of the multinational forces on Iraqi territory by one year, at the request of the Iraqi government. The Slovak delegation voted for this proposal, although the SR eventually withdrew its main contingent from Iraq.

Besides these two areas of traditionally long-term tensions, the security situations in East Timor (4) and Georgia (3 resolutions) required greater attention. Europe itself was not left out of sight of the UN SC, due to two resolutions dedicated to Cyprus and one to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The following list of adopted UN SC resolutions for the year 2006 is to emphasize the security policy scope of a member country (especially a small one) and the vastness and depth of the expertise and agenda that the relevant representation must encounter.

**Table 1:** *List of adopted resolutions in the year 2006*<sup>12</sup>

<b>S/RES/1738 (2006)</b>	Protection of civilians in armed conflict
<b>S/RES/1737 (2006)</b>	Non-proliferation <sup>13</sup>
<b>S/RES/1736 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>S/RES/1735 (2006)</b>	Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts
<b>S/RES/1734 (2006)</b>	The situation in Sierra Leone
<b>S/RES/1733 (2006)</b>	Tribute to the out going Secretary-General
<b>S/RES/1732 (2006)</b>	General issues relating to sanctions
<b>S/RES/1731 (2006)</b>	The situation in Liberia
<b>S/RES/1730 (2006)</b>	General issues relating to sanctions
<b>S/RES/1729 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1728 (2006)</b>	The situation in Cyprus
<b>S/RES/1727 (2006)</b>	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire

<sup>11</sup> UNSC Resolutions. <http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> A resolution on WMD, especially on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in connection to Iran.



<b>S/RES/1726 (2006)</b>	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire
<b>S/RES/1725 (2006)</b>	The situation in Somalia
<b>S/RES/1724 (2006)</b>	The situation in Somalia
<b>S/RES/1723 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning Iraq
<b>S/RES/1722 (2006)</b>	The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>S/RES/1721 (2006)</b>	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire
<b>S/RES/1720 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning Western Sahara
<b>S/RES/1719 (2006)</b>	The situation in Burundi
<b>S/RES/1718 (2006)</b>	Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea
<b>S/RES/1717 (2006)</b>	International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994
<b>S/RES/1716 (2006)</b>	The situation in Georgia
<b>S/RES/1715 (2006)</b>	Recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
<b>S/RES/1714 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1713 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1712 (2006)</b>	The situation in Liberia
<b>S/RES/1711 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>S/RES/1710 (2006)</b>	The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia
<b>S/RES/1709 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1708 (2006)</b>	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire
<b>S/RES/1707 (2006)</b>	The situation in Afghanistan
<b>S/RES/1706 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1705 (2006)</b>	International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between January 1, and December 31, 1994
<b>S/RES/1704 (2006)</b>	The situation in East Timor
<b>S/RES/1703 (2006)</b>	The situation in East Timor
<b>S/RES/1702 (2006)</b>	The question concerning Haiti
<b>S/RES/1701 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1700 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning Iraq
<b>S/RES/1699 (2006)</b>	General issues relating to sanctions
<b>S/RES/1698 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>S/RES/1697 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1696 (2006)</b>	Non-proliferation
<b>S/RES/1695 (2006)</b>	Letter dated July 4, 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2006/481)
<b>S/RES/1694 (2006)</b>	The situation in Liberia
<b>S/RES/1693 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>S/RES/1692 (2006)</b>	The situation in Burundi
<b>S/RES/1691 (2006)</b>	Admission of new Members

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<b>S/RES/1690 (2006)</b>	The situation in East Timor
<b>S/RES/1689 (2006)</b>	The situation in Liberia
<b>S/RES/1688 (2006)</b>	The situation in Sierra Leone
<b>S/RES/1687 (2006)</b>	The situation in Cyprus
<b>S/RES/1686 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1685 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1684 (2006)</b>	International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994
<b>S/RES/1683 (2006)</b>	The situation in Liberia
<b>S/RES/1682 (2006)</b>	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire
<b>S/RES/1681 (2006)</b>	The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia
<b>S/RES/1680 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1679 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1678 (2006)</b>	The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia
<b>S/RES/1677 (2006)</b>	The situation in East Timor
<b>S/RES/1676 (2006)</b>	The situation in Somalia
<b>S/RES/1675 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning Western Sahara
<b>S/RES/1674 (2006)</b>	Protection of civilians in armed conflict
<b>S/RES/1673 (2006)</b>	Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
<b>S/RES/1672 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1671 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>S/RES/1670 (2006)</b>	The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia
<b>S/RES/1669 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>S/RES/1668 (2006)</b>	International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
<b>S/RES/1667 (2006)</b>	The situation in Liberia
<b>S/RES/1666 (2006)</b>	The situation in Georgia
<b>S/RES/1665 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1664 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1663 (2006)</b>	Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan
<b>S/RES/1662 (2006)</b>	The situation in Afghanistan
<b>S/RES/1661 (2006)</b>	The situation between Eritrea and Ethiopia
<b>S/RES/1660 (2006)</b>	International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991
<b>S/RES/1659 (2006)</b>	The situation in Afghanistan
<b>S/RES/1658 (2006)</b>	The question concerning Haiti
<b>S/RES/1657 (2006)</b>	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire
<b>S/RES/1656 (2006)</b>	The situation in Georgia
<b>S/RES/1655 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Middle East
<b>S/RES/1654 (2006)</b>	The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>S/RES/1653 (2006)</b>	The situation in the Great Lakes region
<b>S/RES/1652 (2006)</b>	The situation in Côte d'Ivoire

The member countries of the UN SC were not able to agree upon a consensus in two cases during the year 2006. The UN SC proceeded to a vote, but the resolutions were not adopted due to the vetoes of one of the permanent members of the UN SC. In both cases the resolutions concerned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and both were vetoed by the USA. Slovakia abstained on the first as well as the second vote. The SR substantiated its reserved position by the fact that the resolutions were not sufficiently balanced. Peter Burian explained the position of the SR after the first vetoed resolution on July 13, 2006 stating that the draft resolution does not adequately condemn the terrorist attacks carried out by the Palestinian side and that “the Palestinian government created and lead by *Hamas* hasn’t yet committed itself to abide by the three principles defined by the *Quartet*, in its statement from the 30<sup>th</sup> of January”.<sup>14</sup> He later replied to the posed queries whether Slovakia was non-critically inclining to the positions of the USA, that the SR is striving for independence and the representation of its own ‘values’, and that it is not standard for the Slovak delegation to automatically agree neither with the position of allies in the EU nor the allies in the USA.<sup>15</sup>

**Table 2:** Resolutions vetoed in the UN SC in the year 2006<sup>16</sup>

Date of vote	Vetoing member state	Vote yes – veto/no or abstain	SC official record	Draft text no.	Subject
11. 11.	USA	10-1-4	S/PV.5565	S/2006/878	1) on the Israeli military operations in Gaza, the Palestinian rocket fire into Israel 2) the call for immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip 3) the cessation of violence from both parties in the conflict. <sup>17</sup>
13. 7.	USA	10-1-4	S/PV.5488	S/2006/508	1) on the demand for the unconditional release of an Israeli soldier captured earlier 2) Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Gaza <sup>18</sup> 3) the release of dozens of Palestinian officials detained by Israel.

<sup>14</sup> “Security Council Sixty-First Year”, 5488. *Assembly* July 13, 2006, New York.

<sup>15</sup> “Slovenská ruka v OSN je samostatná” (“The Slovak Hand in the UN is Independent”), *Pravda* January 31, 2007, [http://servis.pravda.sk/pda\\_art.asp?cl=A070131\\_091637\\_sk\\_svet\\_p23&o=sk\\_spravy&obr=1](http://servis.pravda.sk/pda_art.asp?cl=A070131_091637_sk_svet_p23&o=sk_spravy&obr=1).

<sup>16</sup> “Subjects to UN Security Council Vetoes”, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto/vetosubj.htm>.

<sup>17</sup> Ten countries voted in favor of the resolution. Four member states abstained: Great Britain, Peru, Denmark and *Slovakia*. The USA utilized the right of a permanent member of the UN SC and vetoed the resolution.

<sup>18</sup> The vote ratio for this resolution was 10:1, USA being the vetoing country. Great Britain, Denmark, Japan and *Slovakia* abstained.

## The Presidency of the SR in the UN SC

The SR held the presidency of the UN SC in February 2007 according to the internal system of member rotation. This has been and it will remain the only presidency during Slovakia's tenure in the UN SC as well as the first presidency on this position in the history of the SR.<sup>19</sup>

The role of the presidency consists of the presiding country directing the activity of the UN SC for one month, acting in the name of the SC after reaching a consensus with the other members. As the presiding country, Slovakia's responsibility was to prepare the monthly program of work of the UN SC, preside over its individual sessions and act on its behalf in relation to the Secretary-General of the UN as well as other bodies and member states. The proposition of draft statements on current world events is also a part of the presidential responsibilities.

Slovakia went through a sort of preliminary training to the presidency in the UN SC, having presided over some of the subsidiary bodies of the SC, namely the *Resolution 1540 Committee* created in 2004 (on the non-proliferation of WMD), before assuming this tenure. The Slovak representatives also drew their experience from the UN committee on mandate review and the sanction committee on the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of North Korea). It was Slovakia's role, as the presiding country of the UNSC, to provide a detailed program of work for this body for February 2007. The SR had to cope with the preparation of the content for all February sessions, which also involved the proper timing, form and focus of the sessions. The task of ensuring consensus before the very sessions, by bilateral negotiation with the interested parties, negotiation with other member states of the UN SC, with individual departments of the UN Secretariat and non-governmental organizations, which represent a very influential force in the UN SC, may have been even more demanding. The purpose of this preliminary "lobbying" is to eliminate the friction points of negotiations in advance and avoid unnecessary misunderstandings and conflict situations. As a result, practically all of the negotiations of the UN SC under the Slovak presidency had a smooth course and the Slovak diplomacy received a general appreciation of its performance.<sup>20</sup>

The outcome of Slovakia's performance as the president of the UN SC is summed up in the *Information on Slovakia's performance of the presidency of the UN Security Council* from February 2007.<sup>21</sup> The Information states that three open debates on key

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<sup>19</sup> "Information on Slovakia's Performance of the Presidency of the UN Security Council", (February 2007), [http://www.rokovanie.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4745B1AFAAFB9D70C12572A3004D5813/\\$FILE](http://www.rokovanie.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4745B1AFAAFB9D70C12572A3004D5813/$FILE).

<sup>20</sup> P. Demeš, "Bola to lekcia diplomacie", *Hospodárske noviny* March 1, 2007.

<sup>21</sup> "Information on Slovakia's Performance of the Presidency of the UN Security Council", (February 2007), [http://www.rokovanie.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4745B1AFAAFB9D70C12572A3004D5813/\\$FILE](http://www.rokovanie.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4745B1AFAAFB9D70C12572A3004D5813/$FILE).

issues took place during the presidency of the SR, two of which were thematic, initiated by Slovakia, and an open debate on the current situation in the Middle East, primarily concerning the Palestinian problem. This was followed by one public meeting on the issue of East Timor, with its prime minister present and eight private consultations on the general agenda of the UN SC, specifically the issue of African conflicts. During Slovakia's presidency these proceedings were accompanied by two working lunches of the UN SC members with the new Secretary-General of the UN Ban Ki-moon (one of which was devoted to a high-priority agenda of security sector reform, with the foreign affairs minister of the SR Ján Kubiš present) and four votes on draft resolutions. In February 2007 the SR thus presided over the adoption of four resolutions, two presidential statements, initiated by the SR (on security sector reform and on the non-proliferation of WMD) and seven press statements (two of which were proposed by the presiding country) on Somalia, on the Democratic republic of Congo, two on Lebanon, on Côte d'Ivoire on the terrorist attack in Iran and the terrorist attack in India.

Security sector reform (SSR) became the main contribution of Slovakia's membership in the UN SC, the rumored *niche*, a cross-section agenda with which Slovakia wished to fill its presidency in the UN SC from the start. It was assumed that the agenda is global, due to the security hazards of some regions (primarily in Africa) and that it will gain a universal response, especially in the environment of countries that are in the process of post-conflict reconstruction.<sup>22</sup>

## Security Sector Reform

Security sector reform (SSR) became the key agenda of Slovakia's presidency in the UN SC in February 2007. The SR has been preparing itself for the presentation of this agenda from the beginning of 2006 and the MFA SR has cooperated particularly with the expert support of the *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces* (DCAF). The presentation of the core document of the Slovak presidency in the UN SC was preceded by several specialized initiatives. The expert workshop, *Developing a Security Sector Reform*, which took place in July 2006 at the MFA under the auspices of the MFA SR, DCAF and the MoD SR, was the first major international initiative.<sup>23</sup> The general basis, that was eventually presented by the SR during its presidency in the UN SC in February last year, was formed at this meeting.

<sup>22</sup> "Slovenské predsedníctvo v BR OSN", *Slovensko v Bezpečnostnej rade OSN*, <http://www.unnewyork.mfa.sk/App/WCM/ZU/NewYorkOSN/main.nsf?Open>.

<sup>23</sup> *Developing a Security Sector Reform (SSR): Proceedings of the Expert Workshop held in Bratislava, Slovakia July 7, 2006* (independent publication).

The meeting was dominated by a broad consensus on the fact that the UN SC should make a universal effort in the field of the SSR and define general principles and rules which would respect the specifics of individual countries.<sup>24</sup> The OECD, EU, OSCE and NATO are considered to be the UN's closest partners in the framework of a multi-institutional approach. In regard of the fact that the concept of the SSR should be primarily implemented in developing countries and some African regions may serve as the main recipients, organizations like the African Union or ECOWAS – organizations that were able to evolve proper initiatives or were capable of applying instruments and mechanisms allowing democratic control of the security sector – are addressed as the most important partners in Africa. The representatives of the SR proposed the development of a SSR concept for the UN SC, supposing that the SR can apply its transformation experience from its transition from a non-democratic model of the armed forces to a democratically controlled one.

The Roundtable which took place in November 2006 in New York was the second major expert event.<sup>25</sup> The scope of this expert meeting was principally focused on specific countries (Sierra Leone, Haiti and East Timor) and the event brought a consensus on the necessity of developing a 'post-conflict strategy' of the SSR. The respect for regional specifics is demanded (Western Africa, Western Balkan<sup>26</sup>). A structuralized approach of the entire concept is set on the elaborated principles – strategy, coordination, resources and the regional dimension. It is said that the SSR is part of the so called grey zone and is complementary to peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building activities. The role of the SSR is to be seen somewhere in between the traditional peace-keeping and peace-reconstruction. This of course requires long-term investments into human and financial resources.<sup>27</sup>

The Roundtable organized by the MFA SR in cooperation with the permanent mission of the SR to the UN and foreign partners, which took place in December 2006, in New York under the title *Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept*<sup>28</sup>, was the major event. This expert meeting defined the axioms for the development of the SSR which were eventually found in the report of the SR on the SSR during Slovakia's presidency in February 2007:

- comprehensiveness and a holistic approach to the SSR;

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<sup>24</sup> Ibidem., p. 7.

<sup>25</sup> *Report from the Roundtable co-organized by Slovakia and the Netherlands (The Role of the United Nations in Post-Conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR))*. November 3, 2006, <http://www.unnewyork.mfa.sk/App/WCM/ZU/NewYorkOSN/main.nsf?Open>.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, p. 5.

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, p. 4 – 5.

<sup>28</sup> "Multilateral and Regional Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Lessons for the Development of a UN SSR Concept", *UN SC*, December 8, 2006, <http://www.unnewyork.mfa.sk/App/WCM/ZU/NewYorkOSN/main.nsf?Open>.

- democratic governance with regard to gender equality and human rights;
- national ownership;
- long-term perspective of issue management;
- key role of the UN<sup>29</sup>.

All of these activities and the drafts which they proposed eventually culminated in the core document *Maintenance of International Peace and Security – Role of the Security Council in Supporting Security Sector Reform (SSR)* presented by the Slovak delegation to the UN SC during its presidency in February 2007.

## Conclusion

The fact that the new Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has personally committed himself to dedicate priority attention to this agenda and to present a comprehensive report on the issue to all relevant bodies of the UN by the summer of 2007, serves as proof of the success of Slovakia's membership in the UNSC, its presidency in this body and the correct choice of the agenda (SSR). The president of the General Assembly – H. Sheikha Rashed Al Khalifa – took part in the open debate on SSR alongside Ban Ki-moon, which is considered to be positively unusual.<sup>30</sup> It is necessary to say, that Slovakia was a bit 'lucky' during its presidency tenure because the UN SC did not negotiate on any resolutions that would lack the consensus of all permanent members (Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Kosovo). It is probable that during the course of the year 2007, the SR as a non-permanent (not presiding) country of the UN SC, will have to face the dilemma between the loyalty towards its individual allies in the EU/NATO and the domestic political constellation precisely in this question. Even though the UN SC had not adopted any resolutions in the question of Kosovo in the year 2006, Kosovo has become a priority agenda in the discussions in which the representatives of the SR took part. The Ambassador of the SR to the UN SC Peter Burian expressed Slovakia's full support to the *Ahtisaari proposal*, which virtually anticipates the limited independence of Kosovo in December 2006.<sup>31</sup> The situation of their respective positions will probably be complicated by the debate on Kosovo which took place in the National Council of the SR at the end of March 2007. The resolution on Kosovo, consensually adopted in its course, is a product of controversial original

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<sup>29</sup> Ibidem, p. 5 – 6.

<sup>30</sup> *Information on Slovakia's Performance of the Presidency of the UN Security Council* (February 2007).

<sup>31</sup> "Statement of H. E. Peter Burian, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations in the Debate of the UN Security Council on Kosovo – UNMIK", December 13, 2006), <http://www.mzv.sk/servlet/newyorkosn?MT=/App/WCM/ZU/ne>.

positions of individual parties on the future of Kosovo and the character of its expected autonomy or independence.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Although the NR SR declaratively opted against the independence of Kosovo, it adopted a text stating it actually agrees with the independence as long as it is not “absolute and unlimited”. The NR SR thus more than identified itself with the so called *Ahtisaari proposal*, which leads to the (initially) limited independence of Kosovo.



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*Matúš Korba*

## NATO and Slovakia

The shifts in the global security environment and new security threats have brought a deepening of intergovernmental cooperation within the existing integration groups. Besides the reform of NATO, they have also brought about the strengthening of the security and defense dimension of the European Union. On the grounds of their experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 1995), Kosovo (from 1999), and Afghanistan (from 2003) and under the pressure of the current security threats, the member states of NATO are gradually coming to terms with the fact that the deployment of military instruments of crisis management represents the most effective means in the case of extensive future crises and high-intensity conflicts, if diplomatic efforts were to fail. Appropriate attention is also dedicated to civil instruments of crisis management considering that their coordinated deployment along with military instruments represents the most effective means of prevention and elimination of security crises and conflicts. The Slovak Republic began to materialize these current trends which were taking place in NATO after its accession. NATO and the EU have become the most important platforms for the realization of Slovakia's foreign, security and defense policies as well as instruments for the implementation of Slovakia's interests and goals. In these terms, it is the prime interest of the Slovak Republic to contribute to the effective distribution of work between both organizations and prevent their mutual competition and subsequent weakening. From Slovakia's point of view the rivalry between individual member states of NATO and the EU, which could lead to the paralysis of their operability and a loss of credibility of both organizations, represents the greatest threat.

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## The Transformation of NATO

The Alliance successfully concluded the first part of its transformation by adopting the *NATO Strategic Concept* and admitting three new member countries from middle Europe in the year 1999. After the resolution of the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, in 1999, it seemed that the Alliance had definitely coped with all the challenges brought by the end of the Cold War. This situation was fundamentally altered after the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001. These attacks demonstrated the graveness and urgency of asymmetric security threats and lead to a change in the perception of the global security environment. From the end of the year 2001 this event became a substantial factor determining NATO reforms and initiated the second phase of its transformation. After September 11 NATO once again faced a challenge very much like after the Cold War, to adapt to the altered security conditions, however this time not only in the regional scope of Europe but on the global scale of the entire world.

This challenge brought forth a complicated question for the member states of NATO on how to reform the Alliance, so as to preserve its political relevancy and military operability. The Iraqi crisis in the year 2003 complicated the debate on the military transformation of NATO, and lead to a delay in the political dimension reforms. This was caused by the difference in the strategic visions and opinions of individual member countries on the role of the Alliance in international security. In regards to the fact that the achievement of compromises and consensus in political questions is a lengthy and demanding process, the transformation of NATO after the year 2003 was primarily focused on the military dimension. In this dimension the political representatives of member states came to a relatively quick consensus on the fact that the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance relies on its military capabilities. They built on the universally applicable rule, that the efficiency of diplomacy is much higher when backed up by adequate military power.<sup>1</sup>

The transformation progress of NATO's military dimension (the creation of the *NATO Response Force* – NRF and the implementation of the *Prague Capabilities Commitment* – PCC) was limited by the low amount of political consensus on key questions of strategic importance, like the role of the Alliance in global security, prerequisites for the use of force or the concept of deployment of the NRF. The compromise of member countries only concerned the reform of the armed forces and the improvement of military capabilities without solving the political questions linked to their actual utilization in countering current security threats. While this compromise was sufficient for all the members of the Alliance in the period following the Iraqi crisis, the need to open a debate on the sensitive political questions rose over time. As a result, in the year 2006, the transformation of NATO's political dimension became an agenda as debated as its military dimension.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> J. Shea *NATO Going Global – or Almost*. (Transatlantic Security Issues Project 2005), [www.ataedu.org/article\\_new.php?id=109](http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109).

<sup>2</sup> F. Hye, *Demystifying Transformation*. (Clingendael Institute), [www.clingendael.nl/cscsp/events/20051214/speech\\_Hye.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/cscsp/events/20051214/speech_Hye.pdf).

This was confirmed by the Alliance summit in Riga on November 28 – 29, 2006 which focused on the political questions of NATO's strategic role in the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Despite attained compromises, the summit in Riga was not able to work out a consensus in the pivotal political problem. The achievement of a position in which NATO would be utilized as the first possible institutional option not only for transatlantic consultation, but for the coordination of a joint expeditionary deployment of American and European allies as well, is a requirement for the successful progress of the transformation of NATO's political dimension. For the sake of this position, some European countries have to abandon the concept that they could first determine their politic within the EU and then present it to the USA in NATO, asking that the USA only accept or reject it without being able to participate on its constitution. For the same sake, the USA as well will have to abandon the idea that they could always individually work out a policy on the resolution of a specific international problem and then just ask their European allies to join them in the framework of an ad-hoc coalition of the 'able and willing'.<sup>3</sup>

The particular interests of some member countries are the greatest obstacle to the development of a political debate in the Alliance, which could help solve these issues. Countries like France for example, are forestalling the strategic dialogue on important issues with a goal to prevent NATO from increasing its political significance and gaining more relevance in the relations between the USA and European countries.<sup>4</sup> This position is motivated by a strategic vision in which Europe would represent a counterbalance to the USA and one of the centers of power in the multipolar system of world security. This particular concept arose from the traditions of French foreign and security policies<sup>5</sup>, other European countries have a differentiated opinion of it (the support of the French concept depends on the influence of those domestic parties and movements, which are against American 'hegemony').

Most of the politicians and experts in European countries realize that there is no other country in the world, which would have more in common with Europe in the

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<sup>3</sup> K. Naumann, "Speech at the first of the SHAPE Lecture Series", *NATO Speeches*, [www.nato.int/shape/opinions/2005/s050510a.htm](http://www.nato.int/shape/opinions/2005/s050510a.htm).

<sup>4</sup> K. H. Kamp *NATO Summit 2006 – The Alliance in Search of Topics*. (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2006).

<sup>5</sup> France has traditionally been against the increase of NATO's role as an international security actor. France sees this as an instrument of the further strengthening of the USA's position of a superpower as well as an instrument to the realization of its concept of the EU, as a substitution for NATO in ensuring the security of Europe. This approach is based on the traditions of the politics of President Charles De Gaulle from the 1960s and does not correspond to the reality of the security environment in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Due to the outcome of the Second World War and the defeats in Vietnam and Algeria, France has lost its position as a world power and hasn't been able to cope with this process in a rational way, like Great Britain, ever since. The French political elites are, regardless of party membership, all attempting to apply the principles of 'Gaullist politics', which holds the self-opinion of France as a world power, as the key element of French foreign and security policy identities.

political, economical and cultural field than the USA. Any policy threatening transatlantic relations is against their interests, because it could lead not only to the disintegration of the alliance between the USA and the European countries, but most importantly to a cleavage in Europe itself. A divided and incompetent Europe will never be viewed as an equal security partner by the USA, which would eventually lead to the prevalence of unilateral tendencies in American politics and a strong reduction in Europe's influence on the activities of the USA.<sup>6</sup>

The debate on how to make the political dialogue in NATO more efficient was and is in progress on the other side of the Atlantic as well, and American experts have also reacted to the existing issues. They mostly expressed an opinion that the USA must find a means which would enable them to negotiate different strategic questions in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) before they pass through the interdepartmental amendment procedure and approval in the Congress. They also stressed the need for a change in the approach of those European countries which are traditionally the least willing to admit, that the NAC would discuss strategic questions that are considered to be an internal issue of the EU. These states should accept the interest of the USA in discussing, for example, the space program *Galileo* or the weapons embargo against China and cease considering the security dialogue on these questions as an 'illegitimate interference' from NATO.<sup>7</sup>

## Development in NATO and the Performance of the Slovak Republic

The political dimension of NATO's transformation did not remain just a subject of expert and political debates, but was also projected into the development within NATO itself. This issue was mostly discussed in connection to the requests of higher-ranking military officers. They have been calling for the composition of a political document updating the strategic goals and interests of NATO, over an extended period of time. The reform process could then be adjusted to the new conditions on its premises. Even though the *Strategic Concept of the Alliance* from the year 1999 represents a summary of the Alliance's security policy principles, it is too general for the needs of defense planning. On this account, the preparation of the *Comprehensive Political Guidance* – CPG was accelerated through the year 2006. It is a compromise. Its goal

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<sup>6</sup> K. Naumann, "Speech at the first of the SHAPE Lecture Series", *NATOSpeeches*, <http://www.nato.int/shape/opinions/2005/s050510a.htm>.

<sup>7</sup> R. Bell, "Ako prebieha transformácia NATO", *NATO Review* No. 1/2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/slovak/art3.html>.

was to prevent ideological and 'theological' debates on the purpose of the Alliance and the concept of its activities in the future.<sup>8</sup>

The *Comprehensive Political Guidance* was adopted at the NATO summit in Riga. Its political significance is underlined by the fact that every definition was extensively discussed and adopted only after achieving a compromise. This lengthy procedure assured the inner consensus of the Alliance members on one hand, but on the other hand it resulted in a vague and formal nature of the *CPG*<sup>9</sup>: instead of a strategic vision and political guidance, the document focuses on military and technological aspects.

Throughout the year 2006, Slovakia has taken part in the debates on the political and military dimensions of NATO's transformation. Political representatives along with experts from the departments of Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministry participated in the session of those bodies, charged with the preparation of the Riga summit agenda. This debate was not covered by the media or reflected upon in public discussion and stayed in the shadow of the domestic political situation due to the election campaign atmosphere in the first half of the year 2006. The weakening interest of the public in NATO issues may have played a certain role as well. NATO has not been a subject of a broad information campaign since 2004. As a result little has been written or said on NATO's account and the public opinion considers NATO to be the third warrantor of Slovakia's security in a row (after the UN and the EU).<sup>10</sup>

The NATO summit in Riga in November 2006 focused on three main agendas. The first part of the agenda was dedicated to the military dimension of NATO's transformation and involved the operations of the Alliance with emphasis on Afghanistan. The second part of the agenda belonged to the political dimension of the transformation, and focused on the development of partnerships with non-member countries and the preparation of, the so called training initiative, for the countries of the *Mediterranean Dialogue* and the *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*. Last but not least, this part of the summit agenda also concentrated on the questions of energy security. The third part of the agenda was traditionally focused on the question of military capabilities and the PCC. Great emphasis was laid on the NRF, which officially declared the achievement of full operational capability on the occasion of the summit.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> J. Kriendler, *NATO Headquarters Transformation – Getting Ahead of the Power Curve*. (Shrivenham: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005).

<sup>9</sup> This criticism is endorsed by the fact that the *Comprehensive Political Guidance* once again repeats the commitment to keep the military expenditure at a minimum of 2% of the Gross Domestic Product. This commitment was adopted at the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002 and repeatedly at the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 2004, however only seven member countries of the Alliance respect it. The other 19 members of NATO, including Slovakia, have not been fulfilling this commitment systematically.

<sup>10</sup> O. Gyárfášová, "Verejná mienka a médiá", Speech at the MoD Review Conference, Bratislava April 25, 2006. [http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/konf/mosr\\_hodnotiaca\\_konferencia1.pdf](http://www.mosr.sk/dokumenty/konf/mosr_hodnotiaca_konferencia1.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> *Riga Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006*, <http://www.nato.int>.

Negotiations of the Slovak representatives with the Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, on questions related to this agenda, were held before the summit itself during Scheffer's visit to Bratislava on October 30, 2006. On behalf of the Alliance he declared the ongoing interest in the performance of Slovak troops in Afghanistan, where the Alliance would welcome their relocation from the capital city of Kabul to Kandahar in the south of the country. On this occasion the Foreign Affairs Minister of the SR, Ján Kubiš, declared Slovakia's support for the open door policy of NATO and designated the awaited assumption of the Contact Point Embassy of NATO's position in Kiev, as a very important contribution of the SR.<sup>12</sup>

At the Riga summit the Slovak republic was represented by President Ivan Gašparovič, Defense Minister František Kašický, Foreign Affairs Minister Ján Kubiš and the Chief of the General Staff of the AF SR, general Ľubomír Bulík. I. Gašparovič was pleased that the final declaration of the summit spoke of the NATO as an organization which should continue to be the warrantor of world peace and the war on terrorism. According to his statements, the SR confirmed its past position on this summit.<sup>13</sup>

In the course of the year 2006 the SR participated in the activities of five NATO agencies and program, including the *NATO Investment Program*. It is primarily focused on improving the infrastructure of the AF SR, namely on the reconstruction of the air base in Sliač to meet the NATO standards. The Alliance has allocated 26 million Euro. The reconstruction consists of the realization of the take-off and landing runways reconstructions, modernization of the test area for motors, reconstruction of the operational equipment of the squadron and the modification of hangars for repair and maintenance (totaling 12 modernization project altogether).<sup>14</sup> Slovakia's participation in the *Strategic Air Lift Interim Solution – SALIS* was another important form of cooperation with NATO. The memorandum on cooperation was signed by the Chief of the General Staff of the AF SR general Ľ. Bulík on March 24, 2006 in Leipzig. The participating countries<sup>15</sup> of the SALIS project have six Antonov AN-124 airplanes at their disposal for rental. The SR prepaid 20 flying hours for the transportation of the equipment, weaponry and materials of its units deployed in operations under NATO or the EU. By signing the *Letter of Intent* in 2006, Slovakia joined NATO's initiative aimed at the joint acquisition of C-17 strategic military transport airplanes.

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<sup>12</sup> *Správy MO SR* October 30, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=294&type=news&id=16&method=main&art=5643>.

<sup>13</sup> *Správy MO SR* November 30, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=288&type=news&id=23&method=main&art=5773>

<sup>14</sup> *Správy MO SR* April 28, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=288&type=news&id=23&method=main&art=4947>.

<sup>15</sup> Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Canada, Luxembourg, Hungary, Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Great Britain.

Unlike the SALIS project, which uses civilian aircrafts, the C-17 is a specialized military aircraft capable of operating under combat conditions anticipated during the deployment of the *NATO Response Force*.

The accession of the *Air Force* of the AF SR into the NATO integrated air defense system on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2006 was one of the significant milestones in Slovakia's performance in the Alliance. By the means of the so called transfer authority, the Slovak military pilots were moved under the competency of the NATO Combined Air Operations Centre located in the German town of Messtetten. This centre secures the defense of the airspace above the southern part of Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The functionality of the system of permanent readiness was practically verified on August 15, 2006, when a Slovak supersonic jet fighter MiG-29 took off to a suspicious transport aircraft Boeing 757 not communicating with the Slovak air traffic control bodies. The request for take off was issued by the NATO centre in Messtetten and the MiG-29 was in the air within six minutes of the alarm. The jet fighter found and identified a transport aircraft of the German company *Condor* and escorted it until it left the airspace above Slovak territory.<sup>16</sup>

## **The Participation of the Slovak Republic in NATO Reforms**

After Slovakia's accession to NATO, its attention, regarding the security and defense policy, was primarily focused on integration into the existing structures and programs of the Alliance. In the years 2005 – 2006, unlike in the transition year 2004 with finishing pre-accession programs like NP PRENAME, Slovakia was fully integrated into NATO's defense planning. The realization of the *Force Goals*, which represent the military commitments of the SR towards the Alliance, continued during the past two years. These commitments are adjusted to the size, human resources and the economic potential of every member country and represent the basis for the defense planning and expenditures of the Slovak Republic. Through the *Force Goals*, the SR committed to assign selected military units to operations under NATO command; to train, equip and prepare them in a set time frame and to ensure their compatibility and interoperability with military units of other member states of the Alliance. This concerns the light mechanized units, the radiological, chemical and biological protection units (RCBP), the engineering units and the military police units. The reform process of the Armed Forces of the SR has been adjusted to these commitments, by laying

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<sup>16</sup> *Správy MO SR* August 15, 2006. <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=294&type=news&id=16&method=main&art=5325>.

emphasis on selected units and their training for deployment into the complete array of multinational expeditionary operations of crisis management. The performance of the selected units will be supported by the combat and logistic support units, set up according to the requirements of particular missions.

The *Armed Forces of the SR* are defined by the *Security Strategy of the SR* (2005) and the *Defense Strategy of the SR* (2005) as one of the most important instruments for the realization of foreign and security policies. Due to current international conditions, this instrument can only be effective if it has adequate military capabilities at its disposal. To ensure the achievement of these capabilities, the AF SR is going through a professionalization and modernization process, making use of the advantages granted by NATO's collective defense. In the case of a threat against the SR the Alliance guarantees to provide help, but it also requires the AF SR be prepared to help their allies in case of a threat aimed at them. According to Article 5 of the *Washington Treaty* from 1949 this involves help during a direct threat to the territory of member states. The *NATO Strategic Concept* from 1999 also includes help during indirect threats evolving outside of the territory of member states. Slovakia must therefore be prepared to offer military aid by deploying its military units into multinational expeditionary operations, which will face both direct and indirect security threats abroad. These operations may be executed not only under NATO command, but the command of the EU or other international organizations and ad-hoc coalitions as well.

On a politically-declarative platform at the Riga summit, the highest political representatives of member states of the Alliance, including the Slovak ones, confirmed the commitment to transfer funding from the old and redundant structures and programs of territorial defense to the development of currently essential expeditionary military capabilities. The abilities to use, deploy and sustain military units in multinational expeditionary out-of-area operations have become the most important criteria in the reform of NATO member states' armed forces. As a result the SR must reform its armed forces in such a manner, as to increase their strike force, flexibility, mobility and the capability of long-term deployment out of home territory.

The key indicator of the success of reforms set by NATO is the requirement for 40% of the ground forces personnel to be prepared and equipped for multinational expeditionary operations of crisis management and 8% of ground forces personnel to be sustainable at any one time. With the exception of the USA, Great Britain and France, the member states of the Alliance are currently incapable of fulfilling this crucial criterion and must therefore reform their armed forces in order to sufficiently increase their military capabilities. The Slovak republic will fulfill this criterion if it manages to prepare and equip 3600 members of the ground forces of the AF SR (40%) while 720 soldiers out of this number will be sustainable at any one time (8%) – permanently deployed in the location of the operation with a periodic rotation of replacements.



Because the SR considers NATO to be the most important framework of its security and defense policies, the reform of the AF SR and the augmentation of military capabilities are carried out in accordance with the requirements of NATO. Through the *Force Goals*, the SR committed to assign selected military units to operations under NATO command; to train, equip and prepare them in a set time frame and to ensure their compatibility and interoperability with military units of other member states of the Alliance. A mechanized battalion with adequate logistic and combat support elements, a battalion of radiological, chemical and biological protection and two smaller units will be assigned as the main contribution in the short-term horizon of the year 2007. A mechanized brigade with complete logistic and combat support elements along with other smaller units in the size of a company will be assigned as the main contribution in the mid-term horizon of the year 2010.<sup>17</sup>

Parliamentary elections were held in Slovakia in June 2006, but domestic political development did not have a greater impact on the performance of the SR in NATO. Only one particular agenda linked to the security and defense policy of the SR became a part of the election campaign. This agenda concerned the question of the withdrawal of the Slovak military contingent from Iraq, which has been performing its duties in the allied operation *Iraqi Freedom*. Statements of the representatives of political parties and movements on questions of the strategic orientation of the SR, the issue of relations within NATO and the EU as well as questions related to the transformation and operation of the armed forces occasionally surfaced on the background of this agenda. The security and defense policy had not become a profile agenda and therefore had no greater influence on the decision of the voters.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Press conference of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the SR general Lubomír Bulík on April 4, 2005, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=161&type=news&id=8&method=main&art=1254>.

<sup>18</sup> After the election victory and the constitution of the government coalition in July 2006 František Kašícký was appointed as the Defense Minister and Jaroslav Baška as the State Secretary (representatives of the Smer-SD party). The new Ministry of Defense declared the preservation of all commitments arising from the membership of the SR in NATO and declared the continuity of the security and defense policy of the Slovak republic. In the priorities of his tenure Minister F. Kašícký stated the complex audit of the Ministry including an audit of economic relations. In the mid-term horizon, he wants to focus on the personal stabilization of the department and the retention of professional soldiers. The role of the Armed Forces of the SR should be reinforced in the field of non-military threats as well as in the coordination between the defense and the interior departments, intelligence services and other state bodies involved in security. The support of the domestic defense industry should also become a priority. The new Minister also wishes to put emphasis on communication with the President and the Parliament. (July 6, 2006).

## **The Participation of the SR in Expeditionary Operations under NATO Command**

The participation of the SR in missions of crisis management under the command of NATO, the EU and other international organizations or state coalitions is a natural reaction to current security threats. Slovakia has opted for the proactive approach to the solution of security problems, because it responds the best to its state interests and strategic orientation. The government of the former Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda identified itself with the positions of NATO and the EU that military units capable of expeditionary deployment, rapid response and long-term sustainability in operations of crisis management are necessary for the prevention and elimination of security threats and the projection of stability out of the area of member countries. On a declaratory platform, these principles have been taken over by the cabinet of the Prime Minister Robert Fico which supports the deployment of the members of the AF SR into foreign missions, with the exception of the operation in Iraq. In the year 2006 Slovak soldiers took part in two operations of crisis management under NATO command (Kosovo and Afghanistan) and they also participated in the work the NATO headquarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina through several Staff Officers. Several Slovak military instructors participated in the NATO training mission in Iraq.

The mission KFOR, operating from June 1999, is presently the second most demanding NATO operation after Afghanistan. In its case all of the goals still have not been reached and the military presence of the Alliance in Kosovo is necessary for the sake of post-conflict stabilization and economic reconstruction of the region. Last but not least it represents a prerequisite to the political solution of the question on the status of Kosovo. The Slovak military presence in Kosovo was reinforced by a logistic support platoon of 35 soldiers deployed on the resolution of the National Council of the SR in January 2006. This unit has joined the company of 100 members operating in the joint Czech-Slovak KFOR battalion. A tragic plane crash occurred during the rotation of the soldiers participating in the KFOR mission. The military aircraft AN-24 with 43 crew members crashed on January 19, 2006 near the village of Hejce in Hungary.<sup>19</sup> 42 of the Slovak soldiers returning from Pristine to Košice did not survive the crash.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Press conference of the Defense Minister and the Air Force Commander on the AN-24 crash. January 20, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=161&type=news&id=8&method=main&art=4463>.

<sup>20</sup> The AF SR is traditionally the most trustworthy state institution according to public opinion polls and is trusted by 71% of citizens according to the polls in May 2006. The positive opinion of the public was not significantly changed by the tragic plane crash of the AN-24 military aircraft. O. Gyárfášová states, that this public reaction documents the fact, that „one of the most tragic events in our modern history, was handled with dignity, in all graveness and regard to the victims; the spirit of humanity and not policymaking prevailing”.

The ISAF mission (*International Security Assistance Force*) in Afghanistan, running from August 2003, is the most important and most demanding allied operation of crisis management under NATO command. Concerning this mission, the Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that it remains the main priority for the Alliance and himself, as far back as at the assumption of his tenure in the beginning of 2004.<sup>21</sup> The meeting of the Defense Ministers of NATO member countries in Brussels on December 8, 2005 brought a significant milestone in the form of the adoption of the updated operational plan. The number of soldiers under NATO command then rose to 33 000 (in December 2006) from the end of July 2006, while expanding the operation to the south of Afghanistan. Their task is to assist the Afghan government in exercising its authority in the provinces and to ensure the security and stability in cooperation with the military and police government bodies.<sup>22</sup>

In January 2006 upon the resolution of the Slovak Parliament, our unit operating in ISAF merged with another Slovak unit deployed in Afghanistan in the coalition operation, *Enduring Freedom*. The engineering platoon which previously operated on the Bagram airport reinforced the unit in Kabul. A multifunctional engineering company of 57 soldiers charged with the reconstruction of the airport surface and engineering tasks was created by the merger. In addition to this the SR offered Afghanistan technical aid and donated redundant military material of the AF SR to its government in April 2006.<sup>23</sup> Altogether Slovakia provided 2200 tons of military material.<sup>24</sup>

Missions under NATO command represent a crucial part of the operational deployment of units of the AF SR abroad. Their political significance was confirmed by the new government. On September 6, 2006, during their visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, the Prime Minister R. Fico and the Defense Minister F. Kašícký met with the Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. They emphasized the interest of the government on enforcing the participation in Afghanistan and declared the preparedness to contribute to the *NATO Provincial Reconstruction Teams*.

Last but not least they expressed the will to contribute to the *NATO Trust Fund for the Balkans*.<sup>25</sup> The active steps of the government towards Afghanistan were closely

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<sup>21</sup> J. de Hoop Scheffer, "Speech at the National Defence University", <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040129a.htm>.

<sup>22</sup> I. Samson, "Ako NATO stráca víziu: NATO po summite v Rige", *Strategické štúdie* No. 6/2006, p. 7 – 8. In: *Zahraničná politika* Vol. X, No. 6/2006.

<sup>23</sup> The military material was in the net worth of 455 million crowns – 94 heavy and 513 light machine guns, 103 anti-tank weapons, 24 howitzers, 790 pistols, and 40 thousand pieces of ammunition. The transportation to Afghanistan was ensured by the USA at their own expense by C-17 Globemaster III transport airplanes.

<sup>24</sup> *Správy MO SR* April 4, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=294&type=news&id=16&method=main&art=5022>.

<sup>25</sup> *Správy MO SR* September 7, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=288&type=news&id=23&method=main&art=5387>.

linked to the decision on the withdrawal of the AF SR unit operating in Iraq. The strengthening of Slovakia's military presence in Afghanistan could compensate for the political consequences of the withdrawal from Iraq and preserve the reputation of the SR as a trustworthy partner. This was indirectly confirmed by Defense Minister, F. Kašický, during the negotiation of the defense ministers of NATO member countries in the Slovenian town of Portorož on September 28, 2006, where he presented plans for the reinforcement of the Slovak contribution to the ISAF mission and declared that the government of the SR will analyze the possibility of deploying an engineering unit for demining and construction tasks into Kandahar, in the south of the country, where the central NATO operation has shifted.<sup>26</sup>

However a debate was stirred up later on around the operation of the Slovak unit in Afghanistan in connection to the mission's security aspects. Some of the political representatives of the SR started to accentuate particularly this aspect. The situation was escalated by the statements of the Prime Minister, R. Fico, who declared that no appeal, not even the one of the Secretary General of NATO, will make him change his mind – that is to deploy Slovak soldiers into the Kandahar area in the south of Afghanistan only under the condition that the Alliance will ensure secure conditions for their operation. The objective aspect of the operational deployment of the Slovak unit, specifically its readiness to handle non-standard situations and the request to ensure the broadest possible range of security for the operation of Slovak soldiers<sup>27</sup> – was overcast by political arguments, which may have complicated Slovakia's final contribution to the security and stability of Afghanistan. The deployment of the expert team of the Ministry of Defense of the SR, which gathered information on the conditions in the Kandahar area throughout November 2006, proved to be a very useful step. This was to be the new location for the operation of the Slovak contingent in the ISAF mission. The government of the SR eventually decided on the relocation on February 28, 2007.

The decision on the further operation of the Slovak unit within NATO forces in Afghanistan and the debate preceding it represented one of the important political signals sent out to the allies in NATO by Slovakia after the elections. The opinion on the continuity of the security and defense policy of the SR as well as the international reputation of the SR were consequently formulated on its basis. In this situation, the political leadership of the Slovak republic was faced with the same dilemma as the governments of other member states. It is the dilemma between the military-operational requirements and the purposeful deployment of soldiers on one hand and the political requirements to prevent casualties of the deployed soldiers. This dilemma represents a serious handicap for all the operations of crisis management under NATO command.

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<sup>26</sup> *Správy MO SR* September 28, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=294&type=news&id=16&method=main&art=5536>.

<sup>27</sup> *Správy MO SR* November 30, 2006, <http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=288&type=news&id=23&method=main&art=5773>.

Security and military experts from member states of the Alliance particularly warn of the disputability in the practice of the so called 'national caveats'. These criteria are used by the governments of some member states to limit the activities of their contingents operating in NATO missions. These limitations come in a wide variety (e.g. interdiction of terrain operations after sunset, operation in a maximum of 80km radius from the base or the interdiction of involvement in the suppression of public riots etc.). Their goal is to decrease the probability of criticism from domestic political opponents and media, which the government would be subject to in case of casualties.<sup>28</sup> According to the experts however, this approach may lower the effectiveness of that particular national contingent and even discredit the purposefulness of its deployment. If the national caveats are so extensive that they virtually paralyze the operation of the military contingent of that country, the deployment of troops changes into a mere formal political gesture, which represents a very weak contribution to the joint effort of the Alliance from the military operational aspect.<sup>29</sup> Due to current international security conditions, the potential politically motivated blocking of the full deployment of Slovak troops into the complete specter of NATO operations could lead to serious doubts about the credibility of the Slovak republic as a fully-fledged ally. Thus the discussion if the expeditionary deployment of members of the AF SR should remain non-combat or if they may be involved in combat activities loses its purpose. The commitments of the SR towards NATO and the EU simply imply the involvement of our soldiers in combat operations whether it will be in the NATO Response Force or the EU Battle Groups.<sup>30</sup>

## Current Challenges Arising from NATO Membership

The effort to become a contributor to regional and global security rather than just its consumer should be the most important principle of the foreign, security and defense

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<sup>28</sup> J. Miranda-Calha (ed) *Lessons Learned from NATO's Current Operations*. (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2006), <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=920>.

<sup>29</sup> According to a study elaborated for the NATO Parliamentary Assembly by a group of experts under the supervision of Julia Miranda-Calha extreme cases have been noted, such as a national contingent which was forbidden to leave the base where it was located and its performance in the NATO mission was limited to activities within the base. Field commanders of NATO member country units operating in the ISAF mission consider the so called national caveats to be one of the greatest problems of the mission (according to some of them the list of all the national caveats would have the volume of a telephone directory of a medium sized city). Jamie Shea the Director of Policy Planning in the Office of the Secretary General expressed the same sentiment in his analysis, where he stated that in the case of the abolition of national caveats, the number of units in the KFOR mission could be halved while fully preserving its effectiveness.

<sup>30</sup> T. Valášek, "Bojovať či nebojovať? O duši ozbrojených síl", *Euro-Atlantic Quarterly* No.1/2007.

policies of the SR. This is the only way that Slovakia can become a respected international actor and a trustworthy ally. Memberships in NATO and the EU have substantially increased the security of the SR and its citizens. However the effective use of the framework of these organizations for the promotion of Slovakia's national interests requires the existence of a domestic consensus and coherent foreign policy.

In the case of NATO, this will require the fulfillment of several prerequisites from the Slovak republic. The first of them being the definitive finalization of the security and strategic culture transformation. In today's global international environment, it is not possible to face security threats in the same manner as in the past and concentrate on the territorial defense of the state. On the contrary, the armed forces must be prepared for the deployment into foreign expeditionary operations of crisis management everywhere, where phenomena threatening the territory or citizens of the Slovak republic or its allies are arising. In order to prevent and eliminate these threats and project stability beyond the boundaries of the SR, the reform of the AF SR must lead to the capability of generating an adequate number of military units capable of expeditionary use, rapid response and long-term sustainability.

The support of multinational military cooperation and joint financing of the missing military capabilities represents the second prerequisite for the effective performance of the SR in NATO. The Slovak republic is, like the majority of the Alliance members, a small country with limited human resources and economic potential. Only through the financing of joint NATO projects can it have access to sophisticated and operationally expensive military capabilities. Co-financing is therefore one of the best methods of investing the limited budget resources assigned for the defense of Slovakia.

The revision of the defense expenditure structure is the third prerequisite for the SR to stay in the mainstream of NATO's transformation. In the case of an unforeseen deployment of expeditionary units of the AF SR, due to the rapid escalation of an unpredicted security threat, the operational expenses of these units are financed from other parts of the defense department budget. This diverts the resources mainly from modernization and acquisition programs and paralyzes the long-term defense planning system. The Slovak republic faces a challenge to reform its system of financing in the near future and add a supplementary entry to the budget reserve of the Ministry of Defense, or the reserve of the government directly, designated for the financing of foreign missions.

Current mid-term trends put the Slovak republic in front of a line of challenges concerning its foreign, security and defense policies as well as the heading of its strategic orientation. The question on the use of military force for the prevention and elimination of those security threats to the Slovak republic and its citizens originating abroad is one of the key issues to be discussed on the expert and political level. The fact that the post-modern model of interstate conflict resolution, applied by the European countries during their integration process, is definitely not applicable for the whole world and every single case, should be the basis for this debate. This

implies the need to reflect the realistic nature of current international relations based on the principles of structured anarchy<sup>31</sup> and accept the inevitability of the use of force in those cases, where diplomacy and all other political and economical instruments fail to eliminate the threat to NATO member countries and their citizens.

Military force remains a legitimate instrument of the foreign and security policy of a state and the Slovak republic, as well as its allies in NATO and the EU, should answer the question of its proper use. In this context we can speak of three main alternatives for the use of the *Armed Forces* of the SR – the deployment of the AF SR only with the mandate of the UN Security Council; the deployment of the AF SR pursuant to a resolution of the North Atlantic Council (i.e. the mandate of all NATO members), or the deployment pursuant to a resolution of the European Council (i.e. the mandate of all EU members); the deployment of the AF SR without regard to other states in an ad-hoc coalition, with the mandate of the allied governments.

Due to the transformation of NATO, the Slovak republic is faced with long-term decisions of strategic importance, which will influence the security of its citizens for the next 10 – 15 years. On account of this situation, it is necessary to look for answers to the existing questions in an open and intensive expert and political debate, which should result in a consensus above party lines on the nature of Slovakia's performance as a security actor and the role of NATO in ensuring world security. The unification in the perception of global security threats and their urgency or latency to Slovakia and its citizens should be the first step of this debate.

The domestic expert and political debate on the future direction of the Slovak foreign, security and defense policies should also bring answers to particular questions on the political and military dimension of NATO's transformation. With a certain amount of generalization we can say that in the case of the political transformation of NATO, Slovakia will have to evaluate whether it is in its interest to support the

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<sup>31</sup> The system of international relations after the end of the Cold War has the same nature as it did in the past – the nature of a structured or organized „anarchy“. Individual states continue to be the most important actors of international relations. They do not respect any outside authority and there is no higher sovereign power above them. The role of international organization, like the UN, can only be viewed as the role of a coordinator, because their influence is based on the decisions of individual member states. In a global scale these factors produce an uneven and spontaneous development, which represents the natural operation of international relations. Structured anarchy is therefore the objective reality of the global and regional security environment of every state. In individual areas it is manifested in many different manners, due to the fact that its nature is dependent on many variables. Even though this is a universal principal of international relations and international security, its particular form depends on the distribution of power and the security interests of the specific states. In some regions the mutual relations of states have reached such intensity and mutual dependence (interdependence), that the security of one state is a condition for the security of other states (Europe and North America). In other regions the nature of the structured anarchy remains in its traditional form of mutually threatening and rivaling states.

transition of the Alliance to a political-security organization with a worldwide field of action. The strategic role of such an Alliance would lie in ensuring global stability through partnerships, military and civilian interventions and if necessary through its own enlargement. In the case of the military transformation of NATO, the SR must evaluate whether it is in its interest to support the ambition of NATO to carry out all types of crisis management missions from humanitarian aid to combat deployment of high intensity everywhere, where threats to member countries and their citizens arise. The fulfillment of this ambition would require further improvement of the operational capabilities of military as well as civilian instruments of crisis management.

The debate on these questions must be kept free of ideological or populist interpretation. The transformation of the Alliance doesn't want to convert NATO into a 'world policeman' or a 'world humanitarian service'. As in the era of the Cold War and the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Alliance will continue to be an exclusive organization founded on the common principles of democratic values and security interests. The strengthening of military capabilities of the armed forces of member countries does not represent a militarization of their societies. It is only a natural reaction to the instable and turbulently changing global security environment, which produces serious threats. The retention of the global military superiority of democratic countries is a vital interest of the Slovak republic and other members of NATO and the EU. Although this statement may seem 'politically incorrect', it is surely strategically correct as well as the only realistic one.<sup>32</sup>

The transformation of NATO requires not only the improvement of the military interoperability of the armed forces of member countries but the improvement of the political interoperability in the key questions of strategic significance as well – relations between NATO and partner countries, relations between NATO and other organizations and relations between NATO and non-state actors. The political interoperability between North America and Europe in sharing a common position on the international security issues and the will to carry the joint responsibility for their solution remains the most important strategic question.<sup>33</sup> The Slovak Republic is an internal part of these processes and has the opportunity to influence them. Its membership in NATO allows it to partake in the decisions on the military and political transformation. The activation of a domestic expert and political debate leading to the strengthening of a consensus above party lines on the future direction of the foreign, security and defense policies of the SR is a necessary condition.

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<sup>32</sup> J. Lindley-French, "Big World, Big Future, Big NATO", *NATO Review* Winter 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/english/opinion.html>.

<sup>33</sup> J. Shea, *NATO Going Global – or Almost*. (Transatlantic Security Issues Project, 2005), [www.ataedu.org/article\\_new.php?id=109](http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109).



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# The Key Issues of the Slovakia's Bilateral and Regional Relations

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*Kálmán Petőcz*

## Slovak-Hungarian Relations: What Next?

The spring 2006 – spring 2007 period of Slovak-Hungarian relations was packed with issues that had the potential to quickly catch the attention of the media. In spite of the fact, that these included a few constructive and positive moments indeed<sup>1</sup>, the media and public showed interest mainly in the conflicting events.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in the memory of an independent observer, the previous year rests as a year of deterioration of Slovak-Hungarian relations and at the same time as a year, when open questions and unresolved problems in mutual relations became a tool of a domestic political fight on both sides of the border.

### Political Tension after Formation of the New Slovak Government in June 2006

Overemphasizing negative aspects of mutual relations in the media compelled president Sólyom to make the following appeal in his speech in Banská Bystrica: “I beg representatives of the press in both countries, to inform the public also about those

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<sup>1</sup> An example of this would be common presentation of presidents Ivan Gašparovič and László Sólyom for students of universities in Banská Bystrica and Piliscaba on the November 16 and 17, or meeting of the V4 ministers of foreign affairs on September 5 in Bratislava, during which they agreed to increase contributions to *International Visegrad Fund*.

<sup>2</sup> A brief overview of various incidents on both sides can be found in J. Marušiak, Z. Bates, A. Duleba, T. Strážay, J. Žemlová-Shepperd, “Zahraničná politika – hlavné trendy, dvojstranné vzťahy a regionálna spolupráca”, M. Kollár, G. Mesežnikov, M. Bútora (eds) *Slovensko 2006. Súhrnná správa o stave spoločnosti*. (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2007), p. 336 – 337.

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facts and events, that belong to the world of reality and normality, and are not of a sensational character”<sup>3</sup>. His appeal however remained without an addressee, since the media treated the common initiative of the president quite unconvincingly and the public did not learn almost anything about it.

Ever since relations started to sharpen, following the formation of the new Slovak government with participation of the *Slovak National Party* (SNS), diplomacies of both countries invested an effort to comeback to a world of reality and normality. The events embarked on a rapid succession especially after an interview with Ján Slota was published in Czech daily *Lidové noviny*, in which he indirectly expressed pity over the fact, that after World War 2 the Hungarians were not removed from Czechoslovakia together with the Germans (*Lidové noviny* July 22, 2006). On the other hand, the constructive positive steps of both diplomacies respectively political representatives not always met in time and space. Initiatives often encountered phase delays, which resulted in misunderstandings. Moreover, diplomatic efforts have not always corresponded with pronouncements and deeds of other high-level representatives of the states, and above all, the prime ministers.

Slovak diplomats felt that Hungary does not sufficiently appreciate their effort and constructive positive approach, which they believe was expressed for example by the fact, that the first foreign visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš led to Budapest, or that the reception at the occasion of state holiday of the Hungarian Republic was attended by Prime Minister Robert Fico himself accompanied by minister Ján Kubiš (something in diplomacy not common indeed), or that vice-premier Dušan Čaplovič sent a complimentary letter to the ambassador, in which he endorsed the legacy of St. Stephen. The *Report on implementation of the objectives of foreign policy of the SR in 2006* describes this disappointment in the following words: “Despite the fact, that the new government of the SR, from the beginning, declared interest in cooperation with HU, which is evidenced by the fact, that the first foreign visit of the minister of foreign affairs J. Kubiš led to Budapest, HU started to put SR under inadequate diplomatic and political pressure, abutting even with interference into domestic affairs, and proceeded towards internationalization of our relations”<sup>4</sup>.

At this point it is necessary to hint at the fact, that concern for Hungarians living abroad is the constitutional duty of the Hungarian state and together with Euro-Atlantic cooperation and good neighborly relations it represents one of the three equal dimensions of foreign policy of the Hungarian Republic. The fact, that the government of the neighboring country, where there lives a numerous Hungarian community, includes a political party, the functioning of which is associated with anti-Hungarian rhetoric and this was also confirmed by political practices in the period

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<sup>3</sup> *Speech by President László Sólyom at the Matthias Bel University of Banská Bystrica*. [www.keh.hu/keh\\_en/speeches/20061116banska\\_bystrica\\_slovak.html](http://www.keh.hu/keh_en/speeches/20061116banska_bystrica_slovak.html).

<sup>4</sup> *Správa o plnení úloh zahraničnej politiky SR v roku 2006*. (Bratislava: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR, 2007), <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/pk/mat/159-sprava.htm>, p. 40.

1994 – 1998, simply cannot leave any Hungarian political representation calm. It is questionable, whether criticism towards participation of SNS in the government can be under these circumstances considered as attacks against the Slovak Republic as such, or as inadequate interference in internal affairs of the state. Post-election development got yet another flavor also due to the fact, that SNS was invited to participate in the government by the SMER party, which claims to represent social democracy. This is against the code of conduct of the grouping of European social democratic parties. Moreover, this act weakened also the advantages resulting from the fact, that after a longer period in both countries political power was at the same time won by parties of the same ideological focus (SMER and *Hungarian Socialist Party*), integrated in the same international party groupings.

The reactions of Prime Minister Robert Fico during last summer, but sometimes also those of other high-level representatives of the SR, whether intentionally or not, were reminiscent of the infamous period 1994 – 1998, when some parties and some politicians identified themselves with the state and they considered any criticism of their political steps by other subjects to be an attack on state interests. At the same time, they used to label criticism raised by international institutions and foreign partners as a result of bad-mouthing by political opposition. As if the foreign partners didn't have their own value systems, their own information or own judgment.

The author of this article is far from trying to suggest, that the result of expression of concern or criticism either from the side of the Hungarian Republic or for example the *Party of European Socialists* (PES), that in the end proceeded to the suspension of SMER's membership in its structures till June 2007, should have been a reconstruction of the Slovak government. Legitimacy of the Slovak government, formed on the basis of results of free and democratic elections, is undoubtful. Moreover, its composition is a logical consequence of political developments before the elections.

In this context it is useful to remind ourselves about the conduct of current opposition parties in Slovakia and Hungary in 2000 – 2001, when the *Free Party* of Jörg Haider, known for its xenophobic rhetoric towards foreigners and minorities, became a part of the governing coalition in neighboring Austria. The Central European candidate countries did not accept the policy of isolation of Austria within the EU, which was in the end revoked by Brussels as inefficient. The author of this study himself witnessed a quaint situation during the election of the chair of the *European Economic Committee of the UN (EEC UN)* in Geneva in the spring 2001. The Austrian candidate was in the absence of support of 'old' EU member states 'saved' by the votes of the EU candidate countries, as well as those of other EEC UN countries, including the *Commonwealth of Independent States*.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The first politician to defy the isolation of Austria in 2001 was Viktor Orbán, currently a chairman of opposition Hungarian party FIDESZ, at that time Hungarian prime minister. His party colleague Zsolt Németh by the end of the summer 2006 labeled the Slovak government as 'semi-fascist'. FIDESZ did not consider Schüssel's government with Haider to be semi-fascist.

The Slovak government however should not downplay neither the concern of the Hungarian side nor that of the *Party of European Socialists*. In contemporary Europe it is just not fashionable to invite a nationalist party into government. Symbolic in this respect is the attitude of the *Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ)*, a smaller government coalition party in Hungary. Namely, SZDSZ MP's were the only ones in 2001, who did not vote in the Hungarian parliament in support of the *Law on foreign Hungarians*, which caused such controversial reactions in Slovakia. Similarly, in 2004 they opposed to solve the question of double citizenship of foreign Hungarians through the means of referendum. They substantiated these attitudes in the fact, that even though these steps might lead to partial fulfillment of one of the priority dimensions of Hungarian foreign policy, on the other hand, they disrupt – especially in relation to Slovakia, partner candidate, and later EU member country – the dimension of a good neighborhood, which can have impact on the Hungarian minority as well. Politicians from the SZDSZ party were, because of these positions, labeled by some Hungarian circles home and abroad almost as traitors of the Hungarian nation.

But when commenting on the new political situation in Slovakia, also the SZDSZ politicians, especially the chair of the parliamentary committee for the EU affairs Mátyás Eörsi, used sharp words. It was Eörsi, considered to be one of the Hungarian politicians with the most constructive approach towards Slovakia, who did not rule out the possibility of initiation of such measures towards Slovakia, as were those adopted by the EU in 2001 in the case of Austria. In the article published on July 12, 2006 in *Népszabadság* daily, he discourages Prime Minister Gyurcsány from active initiation of contacts with Prime Minister Fico.<sup>6</sup> He expresses the opinion, that the „Hungarian prime minister should suggest to his partners, to avoid any bilateral meetings with the Slovak prime minister during the existence of the current Slovak governing coalition“. According to Eörsi, Slota is even worse than Haider. The EU was supposed to continue with the boycott till the end also in the Austrian case, but this was precluded exactly by Viktor Orbán's invitation for Chancellor Schüssel to visit Budapest. It is clear, that Eörsi in his article interprets certain facts in a flawed way<sup>7</sup> and his reactions are exaggerated. On the other hand it should not go without notice that participation of SNS in the government incited dismay even in liberal Hungarian circles of democratic conviction.

Gradually, in the eyes of the Hungarians and sensitively perceiving foreign observers, the irritating part was not so much the presence of the SNS in government, but that prime minister Fico never really distanced himself either from expressions of Ján Slota or from anti-Hungarian incidents. Neither did he do it in the case of the

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<sup>6</sup> M. Eörsi, „Haider után Slota“, *Népszabadság* July 12, 2006.

<sup>7</sup> Orbán could not have precluded the EU boycott, since Hungary at that time was not a member state. EU simply revoked the boycott by its own decision, as inefficient and from the beginning flawed policy.



attack on a student at the University in Nitra Hedviga Malinová on August 25, 2006. In this case it is irrelevant, whether in the end it will turn out that the attack was set up by the student herself or whether she was really beaten up because she spoke Hungarian in the street. The common declaration of the National Council of the Slovak Republic against expressions of extremism and intolerance<sup>8</sup>, adopted after a difficult process of drafting it, could not replace a clear statement as head of the executive power in the state. Even in this declaration, similarly as in the case of a statement of the government's program, there is obvious reservation and carefulness, which is present in positions of Slovak political parties and public actors in general at times, when they have to address positively the so called Hungarian issue. Distancing one from the anti-Hungarian expressions or incidents would be more comprehensible, if it was not combined with remembrance of the Holocaust and general abstract denunciation of extremism and racial violence.

At the time of Slovak-Hungarian diplomatic shouting matches, the National Council of the Slovak Republic approved on August 2, the *Program Statement of the Government*, text of which shows constructive positive approaches towards national minorities but, similarly as other passages of this strategic document, it is not very specific. The program statement speaks specifically about Roma and about programs for the Roma community but it lacks an explicit mention of the Hungarian community. With regard to the fact, that the latter one is the biggest and the most organized national community in Slovakia, and with regard to circumstances of formation of the government coalition, an explicit mention would be justified. To quote the part on *Local and Minority Culture*: "The government of the SR will, by the means of a grant system, provide for the support of the culture of national minorities, ethnic groups and disadvantaged groups of population. At the same time it will support also the development of Slovak culture in linguistically mixed territories". The program statement further presupposes establishment of *Office for the Minorities*, without providing more details on it. The idea of 'gleichschaltung' of autochthonous national communities, ethnic groups (migrants?) and vulnerable, disadvantaged social groups under one bureaucratic institution does not invoke pleasant feelings among the Hungarian minority and its political elite. The intention to support Slovak culture in linguistically mixed territories is commendable, but without giving more details it just arouses concern among the representatives of the Hungarian minority, which is further reflected in bilateral relations.

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<sup>8</sup> "Spoločné vyhlásenie Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky k pamätnému dňu obetí Holokaustu a rasového násillia a proti prejavom extrémizmu a neznášanlivosti", *Resolution NR SR No 57*. (Bratislava: National Council of the SR, September 6, 2006).

## Bilateral Meeting of the Prime Ministers Called Off

The nervous atmosphere in Slovak diplomatic circles was partly exacerbated also by the fact, that Hungary kept postponing calling the summit of the V4 prime ministers, which according to custom practice always takes place at the beginning of summer. At this summit Slovakia was supposed to take over the V4 presidency from Hungary. Moreover, the meeting was supposed to have also a more ceremonial character, with regard to the fact that the *Visegrad Four* was celebrating its 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The reasons for postponement of the summit by the hosting party were apparently related also to domestic policy (the public learned about the tensions within the governing Hungarian socialist party – MSZP only later, in the Fall), but on the other hand it needs to be objectively stated, that all four countries were in June (that is at the time when the summit is usually held) going through significant political changes, or were even convulsed with political crises. The situation in Poland resulted, at the beginning of July, in the resignation of Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. In the Czech Republic, after the stalemate June election in was not possible to form a government for couple of months. And finally, the post-election developments in Slovakia did not confound only the Hungarian minority and the electorate of parties that formed previous government, but the international community as well. Slovak diplomacy and political representation however considered even postponement of the official handover of the V4 presidency to be a part of the “negativist approach of Hungary towards Slovakia”<sup>9</sup>.

Besides all these facts, it is necessary to point out, that by canceling the bilateral meeting of Ferenc Gyurcsány with Robert Fico planned to take place during the summit, and eventually taking place only on October 10, the Hungarian side greatly overstepped. Almost all quality media in Slovakia and Hungary found a rare consensus on this issue. *Új Szó* daily in its editorial expressed quite unfavorable opinion on Gyurcsány's advisors: “[The] Hungarian department of foreign affairs simply is not able to pursue a correct position towards Fico's government, it proved it again. It either overreacts, or makes the wrong step”<sup>10</sup>. Out of Hungarian quality dailies, only the socialist-liberal *Népszabadság* does not evaluate Gyurcsány's step in a pronouncedly negative way.<sup>11</sup> The conservative *Magyar Nemzet*, expressing stances close to those of FIDESZ condemned Gyurcsány as well, though for reasons a bit different. The opinion of the daily is perhaps in the best way encapsulated by the title of the commentary published on October 12: “The one who himself lies should not moralize”<sup>12</sup>. Slovak

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<sup>9</sup> *Správa o plnení úloh zahraničnej politiky SR v roku 2006*. (Bratislava: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR, 2007), <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/pk/mat/159-sprava.htm>, p. 40.

<sup>10</sup> N. Molnár, “Vakvágány”, *Új Szó* October 12, 2006.

<sup>11</sup> T. Kis, “Bárho! és bármikor”, *Népszabadság* October 11, 2006.

<sup>12</sup> S. Neszméri, “Ne moralizá!ljon, aki hazudik”, *Magyar Nemzet* October 12, 2006.

quality press was in judging the event completely unified: it considered calling off the meeting to be an insult not only against Robert Fico but also against the Slovak Republic as such.<sup>13</sup>

At the same time, the Hungarian prime minister, already on September 3 in an extensive interview for a renowned program of Hungarian public television MTV1 *A szólás szabadsága (Freedom of Speech)*, suggested that he is ready to meet his Slovak partner. "...We need to sit next to each other. ... In Europe, it is not possible to solve the problems in different way, even the French and the Germans, burdened by much deeper historical wounds, came to an agreement in the end ..." <sup>14</sup>, Gyurcsány in this interview expressed deep regret over the fact, that during the one and half year since his appointment in the office, the Slovak PM Dzurinda was the only prime minister of a neighboring country, with who he did not meet bilaterally. In his opinion, the responsibility for a situation that emerged after Slovak elections cannot be divided equally among both sides. The primary cause of the tension is apparent, but a responsible politician's task is not to balance the past on apothecaries' weights, but to concentrate on the essence of issues, and mainly to think of the future.

As we already mentioned, the meeting of the V4 foreign ministers took place on September 5 in Bratislava. The ministers decided to increase contributions to the budget of the *International Visegrad Fund* to 3 million euro, to launch a new V4 website and to intensify cooperation and joint promotion of tourism, supported by the new website. At the same time, ministers of foreign affairs of the SR and HR held a bilateral meeting and confirmed the preparation of a bilateral meeting of the prime ministers.

The meeting did not take place probably due to various factors. One of them was also a new development on the Hungarian political scene. In mid-September a series of unrests and anti-government demonstrations started in Budapest and the domestic political crisis deepened. The unrests lasted until November 4, the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the day when Soviet tanks suppressed the Hungarian anti-communist revolution. The unrests were ignited by the publishing of a part of a recorded speech by Prime Minister Gyurcsány to his party colleagues on meeting of inner gremium of MSZP by the end of May in Balatonöszöd. At this meeting Gyurcsány warned against self satisfaction and said that the Hungarian economy is in a very bad condition, and all Hungarian governments in the last 6 – 8 years contributed to this, because they were hiding from voters the real state of the economy, competing in promises and lying. Also the socialist-liberal government before the elections in April 2006 lied. "We lied in the morning, at noon and in the evening", said Gyurcsány. The opposition FIDESZ, led by Viktor

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<sup>13</sup> See e.g. P. Schutz, "Visegrádská aféra", *Sme* October 12, 2006.

<sup>14</sup> F. Gyurcsány, "Előbb-utóbb le kell ülni a kibeszéletlen konfliktus megvitatására Szlovákiával", Transcript of the interview of the PM of the HR for MTV1 television, September 3, 2006, [www.miniszterelnok.hu](http://www.miniszterelnok.hu).

Orbán, immediately launched a massive anti-government campaign, which had the claim that the government is illegitimate, because it came to power with lies. The prime minister, who is a liar, should step down, because he does not have the moral right to lead the country. If the government does not itself resign, the citizens should call it off. The upcoming regional and local elections should be the best opportunity for this. If the governing parties suffer a defeat in these elections, the government should resign.

In the given situation, Gyurcsány and his advisors looked for a certain way of distracting the attention from their own problems by calling off a meeting with Robert Fico. This aspect of the problem, however in our opinion, should not be absolutized. For in the meantime there occurred a couple of events worth of attention also on the Slovak side and they made Gyurcsány's situation more difficult. Robert Fico together with the Minister of the Interior Robert Kaliňák declared in a press conference that the attack against Hedviga Malinová did not happen and, at best, she invented the whole story. In the worst case that there are Hungarian circles behind the whole affair,<sup>15</sup> Slovak prime minister did not cease his efforts to prove that SMK is pursuing 'anti-Slovak' activities. Robert Fico was not willing to acknowledge that presence of SNS in the government simply does not contribute to non-problematic development of Slovak-Hungarian relations. Although SNS released a statement by the end of September, in which it distances itself from extremism, this did not prevent the Party of European Socialists (PES) to suspend SMER's membership in its structures.

A coincidence of the planned bilateral meeting of Gyurcsány – Fico and the expected decision by PES could have been a reason for the cancellation of the meeting. Gyurcsány simply did not want to 'legitimize' SMER so shortly before the PES meeting.<sup>16</sup> After a partially calming down of the situation in Hungary and after the adoption of the state budget and publication of news about positive developments in the Slovak economy it seemed, that also Slovak-Hungarian relations will return to a normal track. Various initiatives of non-governmental organizations and civic activists took part on this. A group of intellectuals issued a *Statement against Extremism and National Malice (Vyhlásenie proti extrémizmu a národnostnej nevráživosti)* on September 4. Signatories of the statement were received also by minister Kubiš. Events and projects on the improvement of Slovak-Hungarian relations under the name *Slovak-Hungarian European Forum* and *Slovakia – Hungary: the Art of Cultured Communication* were organized by SFPA together with RaRa Musica agency. This project that is to last three years started with a concert in the Slovak National Theatre on November 26,

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<sup>15</sup> See Transcript of the joint press conference of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Robert Fico and Vice-Premier and Minister of Interior Robert Kaliňák on clarification of the case of *alleged attack on student of Hungarian nationality in Nitra*. Office of the government of the SR, September 12, 2006. [www.government.gov.sk](http://www.government.gov.sk).

<sup>16</sup> Also Béla Bugár inclined to this opinion *Sme* October 14, 2006.

2007 and continued with a conference *Slovakia and Hungary in the EU: Looking For Common Interests* at the Slovak MFA on February 26, 2007. On the level of civil society, the effort to start up dialogue was undertaken by Kalligram publishing house and Friedrich Ebert Foundation by a symposium named *Nationalism Today* on November 16, 2006 and Forum institute with a conference *Slovak – Hungarian Relations: What Next?* on December 8 – 9, 2006.

After a partially calming down of the situation, a new buzz occurred in relation to debate that evolved on the Slovak political scene regarding the status of Kosovo, and the proposal of UN envoy, Ahtisaari. Marián Leško, commentator of *Sme* daily, concluded that the Slovak political parties presented in this issue attitudes as if this was a question of southern territories of Slovakia (*Sme* February 12, 2007). A disturbance on the Slovak domestic political scene was caused also by a campaign before the congress of the *Hungarian Coalition Party (Strana maďarskej koalície – SMK)* on March 31, 2007. After 16 years of chairmanship (1990 – 1998 of MKDH party), Béla Bugár was ‘dethroned’ from the top of the party and was replaced by Pál Csáky. Expressions of Miklós Duray, who again revitalized the theme of autonomy and who is, by a majority of the Slovak media considered to be the source of nervousness on the Slovak domestic political scene, are believed to be the cause of Bugár’s defeat.

## What Next?

Slovakia and Hungary as EU and NATO member states, and as members of the V4, have a number of common attitudes and interests. These need to be further developed and jointly fulfilled.

## Economic and Cross-Border Cooperation

Fortunately, tension in political relations did not so far have an impact on the conduct of economic subjects. It can be stated that the level of economic cooperation is in general satisfactory. Republic of Hungary by December 31, 2005 ranked fourth among countries investing in Slovakia. Total investments (property share and invested profit) from Hungary reached 29.33 billion Sk, what constituted 7.8% of total foreign investment in Slovakia. Although by December 31, 2005 Hungary fell to the fifth rank with a 6.1% share, there was not any significant change in absolute numbers: the volume of foreign investment from Hungary constituted 29.18 billion Sk. When it comes to investment drain, Hungary ranks fifth among the countries, to which flows investment from Slovakia. Volumes are however considerably lower than other way

round: by December 31, 2005 it was 1.1 billion Sk, which constituted 4.7% of the total drain.

In foreign trade balance the situation of Hungary is similar as in the case of FDI. In the volume of exports Hungary ranks 6<sup>th</sup>: in 2005 export to Hungary reached 56 billion Sk in value. Import from Hungary had a volume of approximately 39 billion Sk (5<sup>th</sup> rank). Foreign exchange with Hungary thus had from the point of view of the SR, a positive balance in volume of more than 17 billion Sk.<sup>17</sup> While Hungarian businesses are attracted to Slovakia by a more advantageous tax system, Slovak citizens from southern districts are attracted to Hungary by bigger work opportunities. Decrease in unemployment in districts of Komárno, Nové Zámky and Dunajská Streda after the EU accession has been caused by the fact that from these districts people commute to factories in Győr, Komárom, Esztergom and Dorog estimated 20 000 people. It needs to be stated, that cross-border economic migration is more or less limited to western part of the territory.

Both countries however struggle with the biggest structural problems mainly in areas along the common frontiers from Šahy to Čierna nad Tisou. It is in these regions where more common initiatives would be necessary, connected perhaps also with better harmonization of regional development plans for utilization of the EU structural funds. Even utilization of the potential of the cross-border cooperation program EU *INTERREG* in period 2004 – 2007 was not as efficient as it could have been. Overall conduct of participating subjects can be characterized by weaker interconnection of project activities and actual needs of target groups, with low added value of cross-border effects, with low involvement of partners from the second country on planning and implementation of the projects. The assistance was aimed at joint, mirror, complementary and individual projects. Most of the proposed projects however (57%) were individual (though in the end committees selected joint or complementary projects). This can have various causes: low skill in proposing joint projects, inability to identify common interests and look for synergies, but obviously also a fact, that most partners struggle with problem of basic financing of their activities, and thus considers *INTERREG* primarily as another form of institutional financing. From this example it is clear that EU structural funds simply cannot replace regional development policy of the state.<sup>18</sup>

Along the Slovak-Hungarian border operates as much as nine Euroregional groupings. Even here however applies the same pattern as by the above mentioned forms of cooperation. Active are first of all those regions, placed in the west (especially regions Ister – Granum and Dunaj – Váh – Ipeľ need to be brought to attention), while activity of Euroregions along the central and eastern part of the common border is less visible.

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<sup>17</sup> See [www.sario.sk/?vyvoj-zahranicneho-obchodu-sr](http://www.sario.sk/?vyvoj-zahranicneho-obchodu-sr).

<sup>18</sup> For evaluation of the cross-border cooperation see *Program cezhraničnej spolupráce Maďarská republika – Slovenská republika 2007 – 2013. Operačný program*. Governmental material, November 2006.

## Open Questions

Besides common interests and initiatives two fundamental questions, where opinions differ, need to be mentioned. It is a question of what should be the next steps taken in implementation (and interpretation) of verdict of *International Court of Justice* from 1997 in the case of Gabčíkovo – Nagymaros dam<sup>19</sup> and a question of rights and status of Hungarian minority in Slovakia. It is evident that without a common opinion on the question of Hungarian minority, which is also related to the interpretation of common history, also interstate Slovak-Hungarian relations will always be burdened by a certain moment of misunderstanding (or miscomprehension). The key to Slovak – Hungarian relations rests in the relationship of Slovaks and the ‘Slovak’ Hungarians, as is often emphasized by Rudolf Chmel, the first ‘post-revolutionary’ Slovak ambassador in Budapest.

Prime ministers of course play a big role in the development of mutual relations. After the new Hungarian ambassador, Antal Heizer, was received by Prime Minister Fico, information appeared in the press, that preparation of the bilateral meeting is again on the table and it could take place even before the next summit of the V4 prime ministers in June (*Új Szó* January 26, 2007). Chairwoman of Hungarian parliament Katalin Szili after her negotiations with Slovak partner, Pavol Paška, on April 22 indicated for *Új Szó* that the meeting could take place in the Fall. The Hungarian ambassador however, in an extensive interview for the same daily on January 23, 2007, that is closely before he was received by the Slovak prime minister, said, that it is suitable to organize a bilateral meeting on the level of prime ministers only then, once it will have the potential to lead to concrete results.

As examples he mentioned bridges over Ipeľ, motorway Košice – Miskolc, cross-border cooperation, or eventually common projects from the EU structural funds. It is questionable, whether such a strategy is the most correct one. Prime ministers of two neighboring countries should not meet only when they have ‘something tangible’ at hand – moreover, if those issues are within competence of specific ministers. Meetings of prime ministers of two neighboring countries have also symbolic meaning and they should also have effect as a political impulse for other compounds of executive power. Prime ministers of two neighboring countries cannot behave as ‘little boys’. Looking for pretexts and reasons for not meeting is in a given situation worse than to meet and perhaps hold different opinions on certain issues.

Vice-Prime Minister of the SR Dušan Čaplovič last year again revitalized the idea of a common Slovak-Hungarian declaration, adopted by both parliaments, about common past and mutual relations. This initiative again fell on unfertile soil. It is however necessary to ask if such a common declaration has a sense indeed. It would

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<sup>19</sup> Due to the specific character of the issue, this study will not deal with Gabčíkovo.

have sense only in case, if both sides would sincerely start with constructive, open dialogue about open questions of past, present and future. This declaration could be adopted in two stages: firstly in a very simple form, as a gesture of goodwill, without pointing to concrete historical events. In this form it could serve as an impulse to start up the dialogue. After clarification of the basic problem issues on the level of politicians, academics and civic society, which would certainly take a few years, the next step could be to proceed towards formulation and adoption of a declaration in a more substantial form, which would react also to concrete historical events, resp. to open questions of today. Without a serious, intense dialogue however the adoption of a common declaration in such a meaningful form remains illusory.

## **Slovak-Hungarian Mixed Commission for Minority Issues**

In this context it is necessary to mention also the status of the mixed commission for minority issues, politically the most sensitive one out of the twelve joint mixed commissions, constituted within the frame of the Basic treaty on good neighborhood and cooperation between Slovakia and Hungary from 1995. According to our opinion such commission could work more intensely and it could play a more important role in the process of Slovak-Hungarian rapprochement. Since its establishment on February 8, 1999 the commission met only five times, the last meeting was held on September 22, 2006.

Paradoxically it did not meet exactly at times when it was necessary to solve significant questions on a bilateral level. The years 2001 – 2002 were marked with disputes on interpretation and realization of Hungarian law in support of Hungarians in neighboring countries, the commission did not meet at all. Summoning the commission meeting in September 2006 from the initiative of the Slovak party was peculiar exactly because of the fact that it took place in the time of the sharpening of mutual relations. It is however questionable, whether the *modus operandi* of the commission is a guarantee of its ability to effectively contribute to the solution of the open questions in mutual relations.

While the proceedings of the commission are approved by the government (and it usually takes a few months), there is no binding mechanism for the implementation of the recommendations adopted.

Another problem is the representative nature of the composition of the commission. At the last session of the commission, there were two representatives of representative organs of the Slovak minority in the Hungarian delegation: chairman of the *Nationwide Slovak Self Administration* and chairman of the academic council of *Research Institute of the Slovaks in the HR*. In the Slovak part of the commission however there were no representatives of Hungarian minority. Neither chairman of parliamentary human



rights committee, even if it is an MP for SMK, nor mayors of towns in southern Slovakia, can be considered as representatives of Hungarian minority in Slovakia. From this it is obvious that representation of interests of the minorities in Slovakia is taken care for neither legislatively nor practically. The *Hungarian Coalition Party* is a political party which is represented in parliament on the grounds of the right to free association and on the grounds of the right to vote and to be elected. Slovak public (including the expert public and politicians) perceive SMK in a contradictory way: on one hand they criticize the SMK for being ethnic, on the other they are convinced that its presence in parliament is the fulfillment of the right to participation of minorities on decision-making in issues that concern it (in spirit of art. 34, point 2c of the Slovak constitution). The fact however remains, that for implementation of this constitutional principle there are no adequate institutional mechanisms in Slovakia. In the given case that the result is thus a situation, that legitimate representatives of the Slovak minority in Hungary lack their counterpart in sessions of the mixed commission. A counterpart for the representative of *Research institute of Slovaks in Hungary* should be a representative of a similar research institute in Slovakia, who would represent the opinion of community of Hungarian intellectuals in Slovakia. It would be proper if the Slovak Republic considered institutional support for such a research institute. Regarding the fact that national minorities constitute approximately 15% of the Slovak population, it is a paradox that no organization that is either a direct part of the state budget or at least received regular contribution deals with the subject of minorities systematically.<sup>20</sup> One of the recommendations of the mixed commission<sup>21</sup> suggests a possibility of regular state support for the *Research Institute of Slovaks in Hungary* by the Hungarian party and expert organizations, conducting research in the field of regional education system by the Slovak party. Research in the field of regional education is important without doubt, the Slovak party should however consider expanding the institutional support of research of minority issues also to organizations with a wider scope.

It is difficult to determine who should be the counterpart of the chairman of *Nationwide Slovak self government* in the commission. If the Slovak party “pretends” that a mayor of a town in southern Slovakia represents municipalities with majority

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<sup>20</sup> Marginally the given subject is addressed by the Museum of Jewish Culture and Museum of Hungarian culture, some institutes of Slovak Academy of Sciences and some universities. The only non-budgetary (i.e. not included in the state budget) organization that deals with the subject systematically is *Forum Minority Research Institute in Šamorín*. Partial pedagogic and linguistic research is carried out by *Spoločnosť Katedra* and in *Language byro Gramma* (Dunajská Streda), sociological research is carried out by *Mercurius* research group, *Pedagogical institute Comenius* in Komárno deals with pedagogic and a few years ago, partial research was carried out by *Kalligram Foundation*, especially in the field of legal analyses.

<sup>21</sup> See: “Odporúčanie č. 5”, *Správa o priebehu a výsledkoch VI. zasadania Zmiešanej slovensko-madarskej komisie pre záležitosti menšín*. (Bratislava, 2006), [www.mfa.sk](http://www.mfa.sk).

Hungarian population and thus „Hungarian“ territorial self-governments, this is a clearly non-systematic solution and mistaken opinion. A mayor of any municipality represents the interests of all citizens belonging to the competence of the territorial administration and thus cannot be an official representative of Hungarian minority in a mixed commission. Under the given legislation, the only legitimate representative could be a common nominee of a forum of Hungarian minority interest and civic associations and organizations from southern Slovakia.

Also this example clearly suggests that the question of representation and pursuance of minority interests is not fully solved in Slovakia. On the state level all the actors can at least pretend that this representation is taken care for by the *Hungarian Coalition Party*. On the local and regional level however the problems are more visible. In this case a systematic solution would be if a local minority (which according to circumstances could be Hungarians, Roma, other minorities but also Slovaks) had at its disposal mechanisms, through which it could influence those decisions of general territorial administration (which is, due to electoral system, ruled by representatives of local ethnic majority), that concern preservation of its ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity. To discuss such a form of solution a much bigger openness of both partners would be necessary.

One of the sensitive questions of mutual relations however is the question of differing interpretation of some periods and events in the common history. The mixed commission recommends “to create conditions to finalize and publish alternative textbook for history teaching“. Historians and teachers from both states have worked on this textbook already for couple of years, they still however did not manage to come to a final text. According to our opinion, such a textbook will never be written if both parties approach it as some canonic text that cannot be changed. Even this textbook should be understood in context of content reform of the education system. It could serve as one of the textbooks that the school selected for its curriculum as a supplementary text. It is not necessary that this book reveals a complete concordance of opinions of both parties: the textbook should give basic facts and in case their interpretation varies, also an interpretation of the second party should be offered and reasons should be explained, that lead historians to such an interpretation. There is no reason to a priori expect renowned historians to be treacherous falsifiers of history, and there is also no reason to be afraid of judgement of the teacher or a student.

There are however more prosaic obstacles to a smooth Slovak-Hungarian communication than non-existence of a common history textbook. A big password Slovak-Hungarian and Hungarian-Slovak dictionary still does not exist. We can only hope that it will be finalized and published next year. There is also a great lack of Slovak-Hungarian and Hungarian-Slovak translators and interpreters and a truly professional expert preparation of translators and interpreters in this field is lacking. Both parties should devote more attention to this problem.

This observation is valid – maybe to an even larger extent – for the request to introduce intercultural education as a cross-subject theme to curricula of elementary

and high schools. Recommendations towards inclusion of topics of history, culture and traditions of national minorities to general school curriculum is present in all international norms and documents related to status and rights of national minorities. In the most pregnant form they are formulated in the so called Hague recommendations of the *OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities*.<sup>22</sup> The most recent clear and specific recommendation related to the Slovak Republic in this issue was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on February 21, 2007.<sup>23</sup>

Intercultural education as a means to mutual understanding, respect and living together should be included in the new content reform of the education system, that is being prepared in Slovakia already for a few years. It is however necessary to point out, that inclusion of intercultural elements to the schools without involvement of minority communities in the process of curricula creation would not lead to desirable effects.

Slovakia should reevaluate also its relationship to Slovaks in Hungary. It should clearly formulate, if it considers preservation, development and in many cases revitalization of the Slovak community in Hungary to be a value which is worth supporting. Without a more massive support of the Slovak Republic the Slovak community in Hungary is not able to revitalize itself – it lacks a sufficient number of qualified teachers with sufficient competence in language and direct access to Slovak media. A mechanism of minority self-governance for revitalization of Slovak minority is however not sufficient. If Slovakia would not show a sincere interest in Slovaks in Hungary, this would also point to its relationship to minorities in Slovakia. It would mean, that eventhough Slovakia tolerates its minorities, it is not sincerely interested in their development and in such form of their integration to Slovak civil society, which would at the same time guarantee also preservation of their identity in a long-term horizon.

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<sup>22</sup> “From the point of view of importance and values, that international documents ascribe to intercultural education and explanation of history, culture and traditions of minorities, the state institutions should make sure that generally binding curriculum contains teaching of history, cultures and traditions of respective national minorities. Encouraging members of majority society to learn languages of national minorities living in the state would contribute to strengthening of tolerance and multiculturalism in the state. Content of curriculum related to minorities should be developed with active participation of organizations and institutions representing given minorities. States should make possible creation of centers for development and evaluation of school curricula for language education of minorities. This centers could be interconnected with existing institutions provided that these can adequately facilitate reaching of the goals related to curricula.”, *Hague Recommendations Related to Right to Education of National Minorities*. (OSCE, 1996), points 19 to 21).

<sup>23</sup> *Recommendation RecChL(2007)1 of Council of Ministers on Implementation of European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages (adopted by Council of Ministers on February 21, 2007 at 988. Session of Committee of Minister delegates)*, point 4, [www.mfa.sk](http://www.mfa.sk).

Diplomacies of both countries could play a more significant role in the sensitive issue of minorities. It is desirable to develop more joint initiatives, focused on support of human rights and rights of national minorities – within the EU, Council of Europe and the UN, especially so if both countries like to present themselves in international forums as champions in the field of guaranteeing rights of national minorities. This image can however be disputed in many cases. In the case of Hungarian initiatives for the strengthening of protection of national minorities, presented in the international forums, it is clear on the first sight, that their primary subject is Hungarian minorities living beyond the borders of the Hungarian Republic. In the case of Slovakia, the obstinacy with which a country, that declares to be observing rights of national minorities on „above standard level“, refuses any new initiatives in this field in the EU and puts itself in the same row as countries that do not recognize the existence of national minorities at all, is often incomprehensible for an independent observer.

The question of Kosovo paradoxically could (and still can) bring Slovak and Hungarian positions in the minority issue closer together. Both countries have a big interest in the stability of the Western Balkans. In the case of Hungary, this is because it directly neighbors this area and there are numerous Hungarian minorities, of which the biggest one lives in Serbia. Slovakia then has traditionally good relations with the nations of former Yugoslavia and a relatively numerous Slovak minority lives in Serbia as well. Slovak diplomacy has done in recent years a great deal of meritorious work in the Western Balkans – in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo. Slovak diplomats got a firsthand experience from what does it mean to be a minority in a state but also what does it mean to be a minority within a minority. The situation in southern Slovakia is almost idyllic when compared to Kosovo. But the patterns of determining relations are similar: ethnic minorities must find its adequate status within the state and the same is valid for members of the nation that constitutes the majority, who live as a minority on territories populated by ethnic minority. Empathy and goodwill are not enough here – what is necessary are also clearly defined rules of living together.

It is not so unambiguous, that Hungary would rejoice over Kosovo independence. Hungary understands Serbia very well, since the Hungarian nation and Hungarian political representation encountered a similar fate in the past centuries a few times. Moreover, independence of Kosovo will apparently cause an exodus of Serbs from this area. They will move to the north and many of them will settle in Vojvodina. This will even more change the ethnic composition of this province, which already changed as a result of a few Balkan wars and conflicts in the past decade.

Hungary and Slovakia should learn from their 'Kosovo' experience. For Slovak diplomacy the upcoming period offers great opportunities to be even more active in pursuing human rights and rights of national minorities. Since the Fall 2007 SR will for six months chair the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and since 2008, if it will take seriously its announced candidature, it can serve for three years in the UN Human Rights Council.

## Conclusion

Slovakia's diplomatic efforts in the previous year clearly indicated that Slovakia has a serious interest to prevent SNS participation in the government from harming Slovak-Hungarian bilateral relations. It would not be good to dispute sincerity of this effort. Upholding a good level of bilateral relations however cannot be harmonized with the situation, when official state representatives put minority Hungarians in Slovakia and their political representatives to the position of a fifth column, which harms the interests of the Slovak Republic. A serious dialogue with the Hungarian Republic is not possible if, in adequate form, representatives of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Slovak minority in Hungary will not be involved in it. It would be useful, if ideas and opinions of both minorities were listened to primarily on domestic forums so that they didn't have to be presented by official representatives of the neighboring state.

Both diplomacies should take advantage of their experience in involvement in the Western Balkans to bring into their own policies towards national minorities new elements and approaches, in which empathy will go hand in hand with expertise and responsibility. They should develop in this area also various joint initiatives. Chairmanship in the Council of Europe and likely membership of the SR in the UN Human Rights Council puts Slovakia in this sense into a nice yet difficult and responsible role.

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## Energy as the International Security Factor

In 2006, the issue of global energy policy became one of the most important and most debated topics of international politics. It was also one of the key issues on the agenda at the St. Petersburg's G8 summit. At the same time it dominated the agenda of the EU member states and European Commission inside the EU as well as in relations towards third states, especially towards Russia, the countries of Central Asia and Northern Africa. In 2006, the United States and Japan traditionally focused their attention on the issue and were followed by emerging economic powers such as China, India or Brazil. The problems connected with oil production being the determining energy raw material became a strategically important aspect of international political, security and domestic crisis in the Persian Gulf, some African countries (Sudan, Nigeria) and South America (Venezuela, Bolivia).

Thus, in 2006, an unstable and unclear situation at the international energy markets continued. In the second half of the year the situation calmed down and even the prices of oil and other raw materials decreased after the long-term period of continual growth. Considering the ongoing security crisis in the Middle East concerning the Iranian nuclear program or 'complicated' Russia – USA relations or EU – CIS relations the uncertainty at the markets will go along with 2007. Thus, despite the positive economic signals and energy consumption trends, it could lead to the oil and other raw materials price increase.

### **Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute Hit the EU**

The beginning of 2006 was accompanied in Slovakia and other EU countries by the 'gas shock'. The dispute which lasted several months between Russia and Ukraine

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concerning gas distribution and transit culminated on New Year's Day and Russia shut down its gas pipelines to Ukraine.

Russia's natural gas monopoly *Gazprom* (controlled by Kremlin) cut Ukraine off from Turkmen gas being transited through the territory of Russia as well. While winter was reaching its peak, Ukraine depended on domestic sources which covered only one fifth of its overall consumption. Although *Gazprom* declared that it supplied Ukraine with gas for transit (mostly to the EU) in its full amount, most of the EU consumers claimed a significant decrease in supplies. It was also confirmed by measures taken at the transfer station in Veľké Kapušany, the entering point of Russian gas to the EU markets. Russia immediately accused Ukraine of stealing the transit gas. European Commission summoned the special crisis session. EC as well as the individual EU countries called on Moscow and Kiev to solve the dispute as soon as possible and ensure the gas delivery to Europe in its full amount. Russia and Ukraine reached the agreement on Russian gas supplies and its transit via Ukraine after four days of intensive negotiations, very shortly before the EC session. Russia 'turned the taps on' and Europeans calmed down.

Ukraine and Russia kept accusing each other for responsibility of the situation. Especially in relation with the EU they want the other to look guilty. Ukrainians pointed to the August 2004 treaty. According to this document, both sides (Russia and Ukraine) set the privilege prices for the Russian gas supplies to Ukraine (50\$ per 1000 m<sup>3</sup>) and at the same time the price for Russian gas transit to Europe (cca 1\$ per 1000 m<sup>3</sup> per 100 km). At the time of signing, these prices were about half of the average European prices. Thus Ukrainians had cheap gas and Russians paid little for transit via Ukraine being the world's biggest transit country. On the other hand, Russians claimed that they did not want to 'donate' to the Ukrainian economy with low gas prices growing significantly in 2005 and 2006 and reaching the level of 250\$ per 1000 m<sup>3</sup> (which was more than 2.5 times higher than the price set in 2004). At the same time they insisted on the division of supplies and transit contracts. Russia stressed that the 2004 deals assumed annual approval of both governments. Moreover, Russians accused Ukrainians of stealing transit gas. In an attempt to defend, the Ukrainians claimed that after the Russian and Turkmen gas cut off, the Ukrainian gas system collapsed and it was not possible to keep the transit system working.

As a matter of fact, the shut down of the Russian gas pipelines was an unprecedented event in the 30 year long history of gas supplies from Western Siberia to Europe. However, *Gazprom* must have been aware of the fact that cutting off Ukraine from gas in the middle of winter would lead to the transit problems from Ukraine considering the technological conditions and interlinked Russian and Ukrainian gas pipeline networks.

In February 2004, a similar case occurred. As well as during the 2006 crisis, the dispute over the price and conditions of gas supplies with Belarus resulted in shutting down the gas pipelines to Belarus for several hours which was also reflected not only in transits to Lithuania and Russian enclave Kaliningrad but also to Poland and Germany. Therefore, *Gazprom* must have known what was going to happen after doing the



same thing with Ukraine. In the end, *Gazprom*'s measures affected and scared the Europeans as well as Ukrainians. This might not have been the goal of the Russian gas 'giant', however, it revealed the significant energy vulnerability of key EU countries such as Germany, Italy, France, and Austria including the new member states of V4 being the biggest consumers of Russian gas.

## New Russian Strategy

Russians legitimately pinpoint the fact that they have been a stable and trusty gas supplier for more than 30 years and that there had not been a serious delivery failure before. Not even during the Cold war, the fall of the Berlin Wall or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russian gas and oil producers also managed, with honor, the complicated period of numerous domestic political and economic crises at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century including the 'wild' privatization. On the other hand, it must be stressed that the regular Siberian raw materials deliveries would not be possible without the responsible approach of the transit countries, mainly Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. Hence, why did all of these problems occur when there were not similar crises in previous decades, neither in Russia nor in the transit countries? There are political and economic reasons for that. Russia became stabilized under Putin and thanks to the record oil and natural gas and other raw materials price increases it became financially and politically stronger and self-confident. In March 2000, at the nation-wide meeting of the Western Siberia oil metropolis Surgut, Putin defined the key role of the energy sector in the foreign policy of Russia by saying: "In our work (oil and gas export – author's note) we must consider geostrategic interests of the Russian federation"<sup>1</sup>. Just as Putin entered the Kremlin, Putin's doctrine was formed defining energy policy (being based on the key role of Russia as the oil and gas exporting country) as one of the main foreign policy tools of Moscow. Not only towards the post-Soviet countries but also towards Russia's main partners including the EU.

As stated in one of the documents of the Russian Ministry for Energy: "The global character of the energy problems and their 'politization' as well as the influential position of the Russian energy sector in the system of world energy, highlight the energy factor as the element which Russian diplomacy relies on in attempting to strengthen the real participation of Russia in world processes... Moreover, currently and during the decades to come the energy factor and active energy diplomacy remain the most important instruments of real Russian influence on foreign policy realities in its surroundings".<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> [www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2000/03/28480.shtml](http://www.president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2000/03/28480.shtml).

<sup>2</sup> "Vnešneekonomičeskoje satrudničestvo 1999 – 2000. Vnešnepolitičeskoje obespečenie energetičeskoj strategii i bezopasnosti Rossii", TEK, *Federalnyj spravočnik* No.8/2000.

In 2000 *Gazprom* also defined its long-term strategy. “*Gazprom*’s strategic aim is to cut the gas transit by one track at 30 or 40% of overall amount of supplies... Therefore *Gazprom* aims at decreasing the transit via Ukraine by two thirds within six – eight years” the then vice-chairman responsible for export Jurij Komarov stated.<sup>3</sup> Three years later the long-term goals of Russian oil export appeared defining the main role in decreasing the transit to Europe via Belarus and Ukraine significantly. Still, these long-term strategic materials were formed at the time when the relations between Moscow and Kiev or Moscow and Minsk were more than standard thanks to the then pro-Russian governments in both countries. The Kremlin, the Russian government, *Gazprom* as well as *Transneft* were aware of the fact that the dependence is of bilateral character – the transit countries need Russia for raw materials and Russia and its businesses need these countries for transit to the EU. Moreover, the transit fees helped to eliminate the negative financial balance in relations with Russia consisting mostly of payments for raw materials. Therefore, if Moscow wants to use oil and gas in its foreign policy effectively and if the Russian monopolies want to enter the EU markets they have to bypass these countries.

Thus, in an effort to convince the EU about the necessity to build the new pipelines which will be, by the way, paid for by European customers in gas and oil prices, Russians need to question the credibility of the transit countries. They are very successful in their efforts with the apparent help of Ukrainians and Belarusians. On one hand, these two countries have been very naïve during the past few years and on the other hand their unprofessional behavior in the field of investments into the transit networks made European gas companies feel worried.

## Implications for Slovakia

The abovementioned strategy touches also on the interests of Slovakia as it has been the ‘main gate’ of Russian to the EU.<sup>4</sup> The one-sided dependence of Slovak energy in covering its own oil, gas and nuclear consumption on Russia was as in the case of Ukraine compensated by being positioned on the key transit track to Europe. Therefore every pipeline from Russia to the EU bypassing Ukraine will bypass Slovakia as well. Hence, the Russian long-term strategy collides with the interests of Slovakia as a transit country and significant consumer of the Russian energy raw materials. Slovakia experienced the impacts of such developments at the beginning of 2007. Due to the

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<sup>3</sup> L. Romanova, “Pokupateľ gaza na skvažine eto mečta našich konkurentov”, *Nezavisimaja gazeta*, February 24, 2000.

<sup>4</sup> According to the Slovenský plynárenský priemysel (Slovak Gas Industry) 1/6 of overall gas consumption in the EU is covered by the Russian gas supplies being transited via Slovakia.

Russian-Belarusian price and transit condition dispute, Russians shut down the supplies via the Belarusian part of the *Druzhba* pipeline to Europe. Slovakia as well as the other V4 countries was left without oil for several days. Some German refineries at the territory of the former GDR experienced the crisis as well. Consequently, Russian state oil transport company *Transneft* came up with a project for pipeline interconnection redirecting more than 50 million tons of oil transited via *Druzhba* (out of overall 80 million tons) to the Russian terminal *Primorsk* at the *Baltic Sea* shores to be transported further by tankers. As it would be solely on the territory of Russia, it should be built within two years for approximately 2.5 billion USD.<sup>5</sup> In this case, *Druzhba*, being half-empty at the present, will become a very unstable delivery channel. Moreover, *Druzhba* will be jeopardized not only by political disputes but also by technological damages as Russians declared that they would prefer investments to the new pipelines rather than to put money into the maintenance and repairs of *Druzhba*. This all endangers oil deliveries to Slovakia and the other V4 countries being dependent on Russian supplies. Therefore they have to find new tracks.

As for Slovakia, the *Adria* pipeline going from the Croatian terminal of Omishail on the *Adriatic Sea* shores through Hungary to Slovakia could be the solution. The second possibility is the Ukrainian pipeline *Odesa-Brody* connected to the Southern *Druzhba* in Western Ukraine going to Slovakia. Through these pipelines oil could be transported from different suppliers as they start at the *Adriatic Sea* and *Black Sea* shores where oil of different origins (Russian, Caspian Region, Northern Africa or Persian Gulf) is traded.

The second Russian project which could significantly weaken the energy security of Slovakia is the planned construction of the new gas pipeline through the *Baltic Sea* (*Nord Stream*). Initially, when the Russia-Germany treaty on its construction was signed, it was declared that it should serve the increase of Russian gas supplies over the present framework of the long-term contracts, i.e. to the countries with negligible Russian gas consumption such as *Benelux* and Great Britain. It would mean that the present transit pipelines including the Ukrainian-Slovak one would be in full operation. The construction of its sea part should cost from 5 to 6 billions EUR. Next, billions are needed for the construction of feeding gas pipelines at the continent mainly in Russia and Germany. The first line of the gas line with the capacity of 27.5 billion m<sup>3</sup> should start to operate in 2010 followed by the second one two years later. Thus its capacity will increase to 55 billions m<sup>3</sup>. However, by the end of 2006, only two thirds of their capacities were sold<sup>6</sup> which is very unusual in the European gas industry as

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<sup>5</sup> N. Gorelov, "Pojekt 'Trubaltika'", *Vremja novostej* February 2, 2007; [www.vremya.ru/2007/18/8/170791.html](http://www.vremya.ru/2007/18/8/170791.html).

<sup>6</sup> I. Reznik, "Operator vseгда prav", *Vedomosti* September 4, 2006. [www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2006/09/04/12020](http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2006/09/04/12020).

the long-term contracts are signed first and then the pipeline construction begins. However, the key intention of the original concept – the Russian gas export increase via these lines to the EU – remained questioned. Preliminary data on 2006 consumption shows that there was no growth in consumption as expected. As for example, due to economic measures and gas import from Norway increase in Great Britain, the expected deficit was eliminated and no space for Russian gas was created. However, there is a more serious problem on the part of Russia. According to the data and statements of Russian governmental officials, the stagnant gas extraction in Russia does not cover domestic consumption which could be reflected in the export to the EU in the future. After the governmental commission for the development and energy complex session in October 2006, energy minister Viktor Christenko stated that gas exports will increase from 154 billions m<sup>3</sup> in 2005 to 173 billions m<sup>3</sup> in 2015.<sup>7</sup> Thus, the 20 billion increase is less than the planned capacity of the *Baltic Sea* gas pipeline. Therefore there is a risk that Russians will redirect the significant part of the Ukraine-Slovakia corridor transit to the new pipeline and the amount of transit via Slovakia would mark a 30 or 40% decrease by 2010. Moreover, Russia declared its plans to construct the second line of the *Blue Stream* pipeline from the Black Sea to Turkey eventhough its second line operates only at one quarter after several years of operation. “Now we think about the construction of the second line to either Southern or the Northern Europe, eventually to Hungary or other Central European countries perhaps even to Austria, Italy or Israel,<sup>8</sup>” Putin said. The Hungarian company *MOL* of which gas division should get *Gazprom* from German *E.ON Ruhrgas* within the assets exchange is supposed to be partner in this project. This project, if it is aimed at gas transport to Central Europe, would reduce the transit via Ukraine and Slovakia. Furthermore, it would jeopardize the realization of the other gas project named *Nabucco* being determined to transit gas from the *Caspian Sea* via Turkey and Greece to Italy and the countries of Central Europe. It has been initiated by Austrian *OMV* and would pose a new gas source for the EU. Thus, the European gas market would be more diversified and secure. Therefore its realization is in Slovakia's interest.

## Problems in EU-Russia Energy Dialogue

The new gas pipeline plans from Russia to Europe together with the growing gas extraction problem in Western Siberia lead to tensions in relation between Russia and

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<sup>7</sup> Christenko: “K 2015 rossijskie gazovie exportnie možnosti vyrastut na 52%”, *IA NGV* October 10, 2006, [www.ngv.ru/lenta/lenta\\_sign.hspl?id=89022](http://www.ngv.ru/lenta/lenta_sign.hspl?id=89022).

<sup>8</sup> N. Gorelov, “Pojekt ‘Trubaltika’”, *Vremja novostej* February 2, 2007; [www.vremya.ru/2007/18/8/170791.html](http://www.vremya.ru/2007/18/8/170791.html).

the EU as well as amongst the EU members themselves. The objection of Poland and the Baltic states to the Baltic Sea pipeline is widely known. Sweden raised the criticism of the projects as well. The project's advantages and sense of its realization in the current scope and deadlines become questionable also from the point of view of Germany and other EU countries including Slovakia.

In 2006, due to the new treaty on partnership and cooperation preparations, the EU – Russia dialogue became complicated. Germany and France, the key EU countries and Moscow partners, being supported by other countries, and the EC as well, insist on conditionality of further deepening of energy cooperation by the Russian ratification of *Energy Charter*, *Energy Charter Treaty* and *Transit Protocol*. However, the Kremlin and Russian companies do not principally accept it. The *Energy Charter*, which Russia signed at the end of 1991 but has not ratified yet, is the document of declarative character with no legal obligations. However, the *Energy Charter Treaty* signed in 1994 commits the signatories to adhere to the five principles: the energy investments protection, state sovereignty over the natural resources, free access to the energy market, free transit and free movement of capital. The main problem for Russia, however, is the fact that after the ratification of the *Treaty* it would have to open its own raw materials reservoirs to foreign investors. As for *Transit Protocol*, Russia would have to ensure the free access to its transit oil and gas network from Central Asia to Europe which is absolutely unacceptable for Moscow.

On the contrary, during 2006 Russia made several steps being in the contradiction to the *Charter code*. The Russian parliament accepted a law securing the absolute gas export monopoly to *Gazprom*. The Russian company, effectively supported by the Kremlin and the government threatening the foreign share-holders and investors to the project of gas and oil extraction *Sachalin-2* with license withdrawal, forced *Shell* and Japanese companies *Mitsubishi* and *Mitsui* to sell their stakes for a 'good' price. Moreover *Gazprom* canceled the international tender on partner selection for extraction within the gas reservoirs *Shtokman* in *Barents Sea* and thus delay its operations beyond 2015. If we take into consideration the stagnant preparation of the new gas fields at *Yamal* it might lead to serious problems in gas extraction in Russia after 2010. According to *Gazprom*, current fields' production – Yamburg, Medvezhie and Urengoi – definitively decreases. The decrease reached approximately 25 billion m<sup>3</sup> in 2006. However, in 2010, it will be reduced by an additional 100 – 110 billions m<sup>3</sup> comparing to 2005.<sup>9</sup> *Gazprom* plans to replace the domestic extraction outage by gas from Central Asia, namely Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. On the other hand, *Gazprom* and other Russian oil companies feel discriminated in their efforts to supply the EU directly and in energy assets purchased by Europeans.

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<sup>9</sup> A. Grivač, "Čistaja matematika. Gazprom priotkryl evropejcam plany po dobyče", *Vremja novostej* June 14, 2006, [www.vremya.ru/2006/101/8/154129.html](http://www.vremya.ru/2006/101/8/154129.html).

Russia's considerations of the possibility to create the biggest gas supply cartel (similar to OPEC) cause anxiety amongst Europeans. When these fears occurred in European newspapers, the Kremlin said they were myths and denied them. However, an influential person, the Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on Energy, Transport and Communication Valery Yazev (author of the law on *Gazprom's* export monopoly) openly presented the abovementioned idea even in the past and in 2006 it became a public issue as well. According to Yazev, the EU is united as a consumer and defends its interests towards energy raw materials suppliers such as OPEC. "I asked myself too: why there is no 'gas OPEC'? There are not so many gas producers, only Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia, Algeria, Norway, Qatar, Indonesia. These countries can have common positions. For the EU, it is absolutely not desirable as it prefers individual negotiations with each state and thus agrees upon the best prices... I guess there is a need to establish a gas alliance at the level of countries and their companies. In an alliance, the countries would agree upon the price policy, pace and deadlines for opening the new fields, new transport corridors and would negotiate the rules with the biggest consumer including Europe," said Yazev.<sup>10</sup> These thoughts were publicly supported by the Russian president Vladimir Putin during his visit to Middle Eastern countries. In Qatar, the world's second biggest natural gas producer and exporter, the Russian president marked the idea as an 'interesting offer'. "Just because we are gas producers, we are competitors, they say. It is not true that our markets are divided", said Putin.<sup>11</sup> From the EU's perspective being the *de facto* dependent upon the three countries – Russia, Norway, Algeria –, such statements sounds disturbing. Yet, the Union considered the natural gas the best and the most ecological alternative for its energy development recently. More ecological than coal and more secure than nuclear energy. However, also because of these statements the pressure on reevaluation of these efforts is growing. It would lead to the withdrawal of the plan to close the nuclear power plants in Germany. The governments of other countries started to reevaluate their strategic efforts in the energy sector, and in Great Britain and Czech Republic besides the renewable resources the only suitable variant is nuclear energy.

Slovakia's plans to develop nuclear energy are parts of these European trends. Moreover, Ukraine, having a nuclear energy production surplus, can be a very significant partner in energy sector. After the construction of the needed transit networks and solving the technological problems concerning the quality of transfer in Ukrainian lines and their connection to the European ones, Ukraine can also be

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<sup>10</sup> V. Solovjev, "Ja protivnik ratifikacii Energetičeskoj chartii", *Kommersant-Guide* (Rossija i Evropejskij Sojuz), November 15, [www.kommersant.ru/application.html?appname=Guide%20%20](http://www.kommersant.ru/application.html?appname=Guide%20%20)

<sup>11</sup> B. Grozovskij, V. Kašin, F. Sterkin, "Gazovaja diplomatia", *Vedomosti* February 15, 2007. [www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2007/02/15/120801](http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2007/02/15/120801).

a very significant partner and electric energy supplier not only for Slovakia but also for other EU countries. Slovakia could therefore play the key role of the 'energy bridge' between the Ukraine and the Union.

## Global Energy Market

2005 posed a breakthrough in the world's energy market development dominated by oil. The continual oil price growth stopped at 75 USD per barrel and the price decreased to 60 USD by the end of the year, while at the turn of 2007 it dropped under 55 USD because of the unexpectedly warm winter in the USA and the EU. It was caused by several factors. As for political issues, the tension in the Persian Gulf (Iranian nuclear program and instability in Iraq) continued, however, it did not get worse. The most important factors were of economic character though. In 2005, the USA and the EU marked a historical decrease in oil consumption only by 0.1 to 0.2%, however, the demand stagnation at these markets automatically reduced the tension at the oil markets. According to preliminary information, in 2006 the world's oil consumption increased only by 1%. It would confirm the decrease in the US and the EU, and at the same time the consumption slow down in China and India. It was the sudden consumption growth in China in 2004 (by more than 15%) and other Asian and Pacific countries (by 9.5%)<sup>12</sup> that caused the price panic at the oil markets, for the extraction capacities could not cover the dramatically increased demand. Last year global consumption stabilized, or stagnated respectively, while new fields and lines started to operate, especially in Africa, the Caspian Sea region and in South America. It made OPEC limit the quotas for its members. Paradoxically, it can be considered good news as it contributed to the creation of the strong free extraction capacities which could be, in case of need, put into operation as soon as possible and thus stabilize the world's markets. According to the International Energy Agency, the free extraction capacities of OPEC (without Iraq and Nigeria) reached 2.4 millions of barrels per day which is 2.8% of the world's consumption. Comparing to 2005, it poses an increase by one third. At the turn of 2007, the capacity increased to almost 3 million barrels being approximately 3.5% of the world's consumption. The president of the Russian Institute of Energy Policy stresses, that "the oil prices did not pass 30 USD per barrel if the overall free extraction capacity reached 5% and more during the last 15 years."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*. <http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6842&contentId=7021390>

<sup>13</sup> V. Milov, "Nikogda ne govori 'navsegda'", *Kommersant* December 21, 2006, [www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=732254](http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=732254).

Therefore one can expect that the economic factors will push the oil prices down. Only the serious crisis in the Persian gulf which would jeopardize the extraction and smoothness of the oil supplies to the world's markets or the outbreak of the other unexpected political crisis of global significance or other catastrophes such as hurricanes in the Mexican gulf in 2005 could lead to an oil and gas price increase in 2007.

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*Juraj Marušiak*

## Slovak Presidency – Second Breath of Visegrad?

As for Slovakia's perspective, the most dominant role was played by the *Visegrad Four* (V4) when speaking about the numerous international structures aimed at supporting the cooperation in the region of Central Europe. Moreover, the *Regional Partnership* played an important role as well and its work marked the close cooperation of V4 states with Slovenia. Compared to previous years, a substantially less important role was played by the *Central European Initiative* (CEI) partially due to the indistinctive activity of the Albanian presidency.

### **Main Trends in Visegrad Cooperation**

For Slovakia, the most important moment was taking over the V4 Presidency from Hungary in the second half of 2006 for the period of one year. At the same time, 2006 Visegrad got the opportunity to review 15 years of its existence and to look for new forms of action. Visegrad confirmed its role as a consulting mechanism within the EU framework. Similarly to the previous year, in 2006 the most pressing issues on the V4 agenda were those connected to the deepening of the integration of its member states in the EU as well as regional priorities such as the formulation of a common policy toward the states of Eastern Europe, predominantly towards Ukraine and Belarus. Cooperation between the V4 and Ukraine has been developing

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continuously. The intensity of contact with Benelux weakened due to, reasons such as the parliamentary election in the Netherlands which reduced it to informal meetings of Prime Ministers on the eve of the European Council in December 2007, on the other side the cooperation with *Baltic Three* (B3) has become a new element in V4 activities.

## **V4 Domestic Political Development and Its Impact on V4 Work**

Progress of Visegrad cooperation throughout 2006 was substantially influenced by the domestic political development in the V4 member states carried in the name of parliamentary election. A super-election marathon started with parliamentary (September 2005) and presidential (October 2005) elections in Poland and was followed by a parliamentary election in Hungary in April 2006. It was closed by elections in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia in June 2006.

Elections, the consultations on forming the new government, and the resignation of the Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz represented the reason of rather "insufficient" involvement within the Visegrad agenda of either states at least at the political elite level, between April and September 2006.

In all V4 states, except for Hungary, the power was taken by the political opposition thus replacing the government's bringing of the respective states into the European Union (EU). As for Visegrad's future cooperation, the fact that political parties (which won the elections), stressed during their election campaigns or in the past the national – state interests, not emphasizing universal values, could raise the concerns. Development after the elections and complicated pursuance of the parliamentary majority confirmed a high level of polarization in the societies in each Visegrad state. Slovakia was an exception, taking into consideration the time needed for the new government to be formed, Hungary was an exception due to the government continuity. In the case of Slovakia, however, the centre-right opposition started immediately to doubt the dedication of new elites to the principles of democracy, and on the soil of the Council of Europe, the opposition suggested to establish a 'monitoring group that would follow the development of the political situation in Slovakia. Radicalized opposition in Hungary has doubted the legitimacy of the Prime Minister Ferencz Gyurcsány's government. Furthermore, the government coalition was then confronted with strong pressure from nationalistic forces in the form of street protests.

The abovementioned domestic development influenced the course of the V4 summit in the Hungarian city of Visegrad on October 10, 2006 when Slovakia officially took over the V4 presidency from Hungary. Premier Gyurcsány unexpectedly cancelled

the planned bilateral meeting with the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, Robert Fico. The Hungarian Prime Minister explained his decision by the existence of the different opinions on the participation of extremists in the Slovak government. Conflict, apparently affected by the tensions in Hungary, evoked media reactions doubting the complete functioning of cooperation between the Visegrad states..

For the first impression, political crises in the V4 states as well as the tension between Slovakia and Hungary in the summer and fall of 2006 are not in line with the common declaration of the V4 Prime Ministers adopted on the occasion of 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary during the October summit. The declaration declared the *Visegrad Four* a 'useful and viable bloc'. This is just the opposite. The above-mentioned events looked as if they confirmed the concerns of US Senate Foreign Affairs Committee indirectly by describing the Visegrad region as a possible place of destabilization in December 2006.

## European Dilemmas of Visegrad

V4 traditionally attempted to narrow the differences between the old and the new member states within the EU. The *Declaration of Chairmen of the Parliament of V4 Countries in Prague* adopted on February 3 – 4, 2006 called for the free movement of labor for citizens from the new member states. The ministers of foreign affairs devoted their discussion to this issue during their meeting on March 8, 2006 in Budapest as well.

Ministers also managed to find common position expressing the support to the EU enlargement for Romania and Bulgaria in the field of further EU enlargement. The V4 countries having appealed to the values of European solidarity (e.g. in the field of opening the labor market) were about to solve a similar problem in 2007, with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. However, contrary to the EU member states' position in 2004, the V4 majority decided in favor of opening its labor markets for both accessing countries. The only exception was Hungary that introduced some measures.

The Western Balkans agenda, however, was put aside eventhough it was the subject of the V4 representatives' consultations. On the one hand, the October summit declared its support for further accession talks with Croatia and Turkey; depending on progress though. On the other hand, in the case of Kosovo, a common position, was not reached due to the different view of Poland.

In the case of the *Constitutional Treaty* and opinions about its next development, the Visegrad states decided to take individual actions. However, after the new right-wing government of Mirek Topolánek was formed, the Czech Republic launched close cooperation with Poland. Both countries refuse to support the current proposal.

Poland and the Czech Republic cooperate closely also on the issue of the US anti-missile shields on their territories. Prime Minister Fico explicitly denied this possibility in the case of Slovakia.

Despite the different standpoints on the issue of the EU financial framework for 2007 – 2013 presented after the meeting of the V4 heads of government with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on December 2, 2005 leading to a certain cooling of mutual relations, the Finance Ministries went on to look for the intersection of common interests. The negotiations between the respective ministries' representatives with the EU Commissioner for Taxation and Customs Union, László Kovács, held on March 6, 2006 initiated by the Hungarian V4 presidency resulted in the support for the simplification of the tax system within the EU.

In the second half of the year the topic of opening the Schengen area occupied the forefront of the V4's attention. In this matter the V4 coordinates its activities. This topic dominated also the September negotiation of the Presidents of the V4 countries in the Czech town of Láň. The presidents expressed disagreement with postponement of the accession to the Schengen area there. The need to access the Schengen area by a set date was emphasized also by the V4 Ministers of Foreign Affairs during negotiations in Bratislava on September 5, 2006. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Alexander Vondra put stress on the need of accession for V4 member states into the Schengen area in October 2007 as originally planned. Vondra also suggested leading the negotiations in a way so that the responsibility for the delays in accession would not be the only one of the V4 countries where the deadline would not be met. The declaration approved during the V4 Prime Ministers meeting in Visegrad carried a similar message i.e. "if this target date that was set and reaffirmed at the level of heads of state and government at the European Council in June 2006 was to be delayed for technical reasons it could result in a serious crisis of confidence from the populations in the new EU Member States. If the process of Schengen accession should be delayed, it will have an impact on the trustworthiness of European institutions". In reference to Schengen enlargement, Visegrad countries found supporters in the *Baltic Three* and in Slovenia.

The V4 states' cooperation in the field of the Schengen area accession was strengthened, and also within the *Regional Partnership*. During the negotiations of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on September 14, 2006, Heads of Ministries questioned the opinion that the original accession date was postponed exclusively due to technical reasons. According to the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinga Göncz's real reason was 'the question of politics and trust toward new EU members in the matter of safeguarding the EU's external borders.

The original date scheduled for Schengen enlargement was not successfully met. However, a common action of the new EU member states initiated by the V4 contributed to the fact that the European Council on December 14 –15, 2006 accepted

a compromise decision regarding which controls on internal EU borders will be abolished between March 2007 and March 2008 until new member states fulfill required criteria.

## The US Visa Requirement

In 2004 and 2005 Slovakia perceived, rather skeptically, a possible joint cooperation with the V4 states in an effort to bring about abolishment or liberalization of the US visa requirement for V4 citizens traveling to the United States. The Slovak Republic did not support the initiatives of Poland and the Czech Republic repeatedly bringing up the issue during bilateral negotiations with the US as well as with the EU up.

Rather characteristically, was the position presented by that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs of SR Eduard Kukan. During the President Ivan Gašparovič's visit to Warsaw on November 18 – 19, 2004, Kukan claimed that he does not expect any progress in the visa regime issue any time soon.

The new Slovak government formed after the parliamentary election in June 2006 re-evaluated this approach. The change in rhetoric was evident already during the summit of V4 Prime Ministers in Visegrad in October 2006. It was Prime Minister Fico who indicated the possibility of introducing the reciprocal steps toward the United States, there: "I hope that also the V4 countries come one day to a conclusion and say – there is no way to continue with negotiations this way." Based on common negotiations of their heads of diplomacy at the occasion of the 61<sup>st</sup> UN General Assembly in New York, the *Baltic Three* joined the *Visegrad Four* in their efforts and together they introduced the informal *Coalition for Visa Equality*. Consequently, further joint V4 and B3 Foreign Ministers negotiations in Brussels on November 13, 2006 led to the adoption of a common declaration calling for the abolishment of visa requirements for citizens of respective countries when traveling to the United States. Two members of the US Congress, John Shimkus and Dennis Kucinich, supported the joint action of Visegrad and Baltic countries by initiating the letter of 25 members of the House of Representatives. The letter demanded enlargement of the visa waiver program for the V4 and B3 states and it was addressed to Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice.

The principal change in the approach of the US toward visa requirements occurred in the course of 2006 and the beginning of 2007. The President of the United States, George W. Bush, envisaged the intention to extend the visa waiver program for new allies from Central and Eastern Europe during his visit to Tallinn on November 28, 2006. The US Senate supported the proposal of the particular bill in March 2007.

## European Neighborhood Policy and Energy Security

Likewise in the past, in 2006 the impulses from abroad also contributed to the Visegrad cooperation. In January 2006 such an impulse emerged with the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine followed by a cut off of gas supplies. The issue also affected the countries on the Eastern border of the EU. Hungary was the first country to respond. It suggested that the V4 countries position on gas deliveries from Russia through Ukraine should be united. Consequently, Polish Prime, Minister Marcinkiewicz, took the initiative for forming a common energy policy of the EU. Mr. Marcinkiewicz gained support of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia for his plan during his visits to those countries on January 16 – 18, 2006.

However, this initiative was not turned into a viable reality. The Polish proposal for a so-called 'Energy NATO' was based on a commitment to mutual assistance in the case that energy security of any of the signatories is jeopardized. The plan gained unofficial support from the V4 countries, Baltic States, the US and Austria. However, it failed because of the rather reserved attitude of Germany and Great Britain.

Consultations on energy security keep continuing on the level of experts as well as on a bilateral level. At the same time the V4 Prime Ministers' summit in Visegrad put emphasis on the strategic role of energy security for sustainable development and called for more coordinated action.

Diversification of energy resources and transit routes are also in the forefront of the Slovak V4 presidency agenda. Considerably, preparation and implementation of particular projects in the area of energy security collides with the interests of individual member states. As a matter of paradox, the Prime Minister of Hungary initiating the negotiations on coordinated V4 action in energy security at the beginning of 2006, in March 2007 he gave preference to the rival Russian gas pipeline project, *Blue Stream*.

Particular interest of V4 states was, however, dedicated to Ukraine as well as to Belarus in relation to its presidential election in March 2006 at the time. Cooperation with Ukraine advanced in format V4+. On January 19, 2006 Ukrainian Minister of Defense, Anatoliy Hrytsenko, took part in the negotiations between V4 Defense Ministers. V4 member states went on with policy of bonding Ukraine with Euro-Atlantic structures. Further progress in the development of relations with Ukraine is a relevant point on the agenda of the Slovak V4 presidency. During his visit in Kiev on August 19, 2006, Slovakia's Foreign Minister Ján Kubiš pledged that representatives of Ukraine would be regularly invited to negotiations in the V4 format.

Consequently, Ukrainian Chief of Diplomacy took part in negotiations of V4 Foreign Ministers on September 5, 2006 in Bratislava. Ministers discussed the domestic political situation in Ukraine after forming a so called anti-crisis coalition as well as differing approaches to the foreign policy strategy of President Viktor Yushchenko

and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. In fact in the year 2007 the Slovak embassy in Kiev has been performing the role of the NATO contact embassy which gave importance to Slovakia when formulating policies towards Ukraine from the position of the V4 chairing state.

The activities of the V4 towards Moldova have been up until the present rather inconsiderable, despite being mentioned as one of the Visegrad priority states. One of the activities was the international conference *Heading towards the EU: The progress of Moldova from Reforms to an Effective Transformation* being held in Chisinau on November 24 – 25, 2006. Conference was initiated by the *Polish Institute of International Relations* and the think tank, *Institute for Development and Social Initiatives* based in Moldova aiming at finding the V4 potential for supporting the reform process in Moldova and bringing it closer to the EU. State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Oľga Algayerová represented the Slovak government at the conference.

Another new initiative of the Slovak chairmanship was launching the cooperation between the V4 and the GUAM initiative gathering together Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The discussion space for mutual cooperation occurred during the meeting of Slovak Foreign Minister Ján Kubiš with the Foreign Ministers of the respective countries on March 2, 2007.

## Sector Dimension of Visegrad Cooperation

Successful Visegrad cooperation with increasing tendency seemed to develop on the level of individual resorts. In the area of military cooperation, worthy of attention are the negotiations among Defense Ministers. Negotiations are dedicated to the common financing of air transport of foreign military missions which can enable further effectiveness when reaching the aims of EU and NATO operations.

The Slovak presidency supported meetings of national directors for armament which took place on December 10 – 11, 2006 in Trenčianske Teplice. Negotiations focused on the exchange of information on the main programs in the area of armament equipment and military research, as well as to the possibilities of strengthening the mutual cooperation in the area of defense industry.

Ministers of Agriculture also agreed upon a common action. They refused to pay the penalty requested by the European Commission because of excessive supplies of agricultural and food commodities.

Cooperation in the area of culture is an important factor in building a common Visegrad identity. The program, *Visegrad Library*, contributes to the fact that there are 4 – 12 books of contemporary authors published annually in the network of publishing houses *Host* (Czech Republic), *Pesti Kalligram* (Hungary), *Pogranicze*

(Polsko) and *Kalligram* (Hungary). The Slovak Minister of Culture, Marek Maďarič, again came up with the idea of the Polish producer Mirosław Chojecký to create a common digital TV channel with participation of public broadcasting stations of V4 states.

## Civic Dimension of Visegrad Cooperation

Within the regular rotation on the position of the *International Visegrad Fund* director, Hungarian diplomat Kristóf Forrai replaced the Polish representative Andrzej Jagodziński who held that position for the three previous years. The decision of the V4 Ministers of Foreign Affairs to increase the budget fund from 3, 2 million Euro to 5 million Euro in year 2007 showed the appreciation for work of fund as well as of interest in deepening the Visegrad cooperation. One of the new tools for deepening the civic dimension is the program for art scholarships (*Artist Residency Program*) oriented on providing study trips for artists coming from V4 countries.

V4 tries to improve the quality of communication with citizens also through publishing an electronic Newsletter, albeit not on a regular basis yet. On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the existence of the V4, The *International Visegrad Fund* prepared a comprehensive representative publication that maps historical roots and the contemporary history of Visegrad. WebPages of V4 went through profound change aimed at strengthening the 'Visegrad' character of analytical Internet portal *Visegrad.info* financed by the *International Visegrad Fund*. The main guarantor of the project for the Internet portal is the Czech think tank *Association for International Affairs* (AMO) together with the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association*, *Batthyány Lajos College Fund* (Hungary) and Polish *Stowarzyszenie Willa Decjusza* Kraków taking part in its realization.

Aiming at improving the work with the public, in May 2006 V4 National Coordinators established a position of a responsible person for communication with the public as well as for updating the internet presentation of the V4 grouping. The position is subordinated to Fund management and to the member states' ministries of foreign affairs. The new design of the V4 Internet web page offers an English version in addition to versions in the member states' national languages having the positive effect on strengthening the internal V4 functioning.

In Spring 2006 the Polish governmental political party *Law and Justice* (PiS) attempted to bring a new dimension to Visegrad cooperation with an unsuccessful proposal for the establishment of a common secretariat for central European right-wing political parties. The uniting platform should have been based on a common historical experience, interest in the formulation of a common policy toward Russia as well as on negative position towards the deepening of the European integration,



which put given parties further away from the *European People's Party*. This attempt was related to efforts of the leader of *Election Action Solidarity (AWS)* Marian Krzaklewski to create the *Union of Centre European Right* from year 1999, which also ended up as a failure.

## **Regional Partnership in the Shadow of Visegrad**

In 2006, V4 member states took over the agenda of *Regional Partnership* and together with Slovenia, they criticized the position of Austria towards the enlargement of the Schengen area during the meeting of Foreign Ministers of *Regional Partnership* member states. Unlike the V4, *Regional Partnership* provided a larger space for discussion on the Western Balkans issues. On September 14, 2006 heads of diplomacy discussed the Schengen area enlargement together with the possibilities of improving the relations between Serbia and the EU through the simplification of the visa procedure, contact between the citizens of Serbia and EU citizens and through the mobilization of pro-reform oriented parts of Serbian society. Possibilities of similar programs with Ukraine were also discussed.

## **Slovakia's V4 Presidency – Continuity or Change?**

The official inauguration of the Slovakian V4 Presidency was postponed from summer to October due to the 'inactive' Visegrad cooperation and domestic political tensions in the V4 states connected to parliamentary elections and governmental crises. Slovakia's new government took on the task of presidency with great responsibility. In its governmental declaration it confirmed that the government considers the Visegrad cooperation the most important platform for regional cooperation in pursuing common interests. At the same time the Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico, accepted a program for the Slovak Presidency prepared by the former government of Mikuláš Dzurinda: "Although the government changed, the commitments will be taken over".

The sector dimension of Visegrad cooperation restoration was the new element brought into agenda. This trend had already started in the second half of 2006, however it significantly intensified within the first months of 2007 when it began to address the projects which were not part of the debate at the time e.g. establishment of a common battle group within the *EU Rapid Reaction Force*.

Although V4 members refuse to discuss the establishment of permanent secretariat, designation of one person responsible for working with the public subordinated

exclusively to the V4 national coordinators shows 'silent institutionalization' of the grouping.

Despite the fact that V4 has not always been successful in reaching its political aims, intensive cooperation in the area of culture proves that Visegrad by its stroke exceeds a character of 'ad hoc alliance' created for use of its individual member states.

However, the economic agenda remains to be the weak point of the Visegrad cooperation. Success in economic issues could be encouraged by establishing the particular tools such as a fund for the promotion of building a cross-border and communication infrastructure. Although the Visegrad space does not pose such an economic cooperation space such as the Baltic States or the Black Sea does, cooperation of its members can be strengthened by the establishment of a council of entrepreneurs or a common bank which would support commercial projects. There are reserves existing also in the information interconnection about Visegrad's activities, mainly on the lower level of sector dimension cooperation.

In the political and economic area Visegrad cannot repeat the success of Benelux, which developed models of integration later used within the whole EU. Therefore Visegrad remains, to a significant extent, in the position of the intellectual construct. The above-mentioned representative publication reminds and confirms this while putting emphasize on the roots of the grouping which is based in a tradition of resistance against the communist regimes before year 1989.

But Visegrad cooperation showed its potential not only in strengthening the links between member states, but also in wider forums, mainly within the EU or in relations toward third states, for example when promoting culture or possibilities for tourism.

Accumulation of common Visegrad agenda supported by political elites is, as the matter of paradox, accompanied by verbal conflicts or gestures such as Hungarian Prime Minister Gyurcsány performed during the Visegrad summit in Visegrad when he refused to meet the Slovak Prime Minister, Robert Fico. Rivalry is a part of the mutual V4 relations. An example is the Slovak – Hungarian dispute over the brand 'Tokaj', or Slovak – Polish dispute over brand name of cheese 'oštiepok' or 'oscypek'. Existence of such disputes is an evident sign of deepening globalization and integration processes, when the institutions of national state attempts to compensate part of the loss of its sovereignty exactly through increasing emphasis on the cultural and identity aspects of the statehood, expressed often in the form of similar symbolical gestures. Such scandal when promoted in media often provides a deformed picture about the real nature of the Visegrad cooperation or of the bilateral relations among its members.

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*Milan Šagát*

## Slovakia's Foreign Policy Towards The Western Balkans in 2006

The foreign policy of the Slovak Republic (SR) towards the Western Balkans in 2006<sup>1</sup> did not differ in its orientation from the previous year. Not even early parliamentary elections in June 2006 caused a drift in the direction of foreign policy towards the Western Balkans<sup>2</sup> and the region, despite certain vagueness in the document *Aims of foreign policy of the SR in 2006*, remained one of the strategic priorities of foreign policy and Slovak development assistance. On the other hand, the year 2006 was a special period for foreign policy towards the region and Slovak diplomacy achieved a number of successes, the process of a declaration of independence by Montenegro, directed and controlled by Slovak diplomats, being the most significant of them.

A phenomenon of priority focus on Serbia and Montenegro prevailed in 2006 in foreign policy towards the Western Balkans, despite some shifts in relations to other countries of the region. This trend was similarly as in the previous years balanced by strong support of the SR to Croatia in its EU accession negotiations process and as already mentioned above, this vector, though in lower intensity, was preserved also

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<sup>1</sup> For more see: *Zameranie zahraničnej politiky SR na rok 2006*. p. 30. [www.mfa.sk](http://www.mfa.sk).

<sup>2</sup> This thesis was repeatedly confirmed by the new minister of foreign affairs Ján Kubiš. Thesis about unchanged priority of the Western Balkans was stated also during his visit to Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo in August 2007.

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after the change of government. Prioritization of Serbia in Slovakia's policy in the Western Balkans has several objective reasons:

- stability of the whole region depends on the stability of Serbia, as the biggest and at the same time the most problematic state in the region;
- all key problems of the region and at the same time great challenges for the international community<sup>3</sup> have been directly or indirectly linked to Serbia.

The main determining factors of foreign policy towards the Western Balkans in 2006 consisted of closely interconnected, and to a certain extent, mutually conditioned *exogenous* and *endogenous* factors. Chief exogenous factors include Slovakia's membership in the European Union (EU), which enriches relations with the region by multilateral dimension through the optics of *Common Foreign and Security Policy* of the EU (CSFP); Slovakia's membership in the *Security Council of the United Nations* (UN SC) and other international organizations, especially the *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD), binding the SR to provide development assistance. Chief endogenous factors include the general scope (aims) of foreign policy of the SR, especially concurrence of its ideological and economic-pragmatic level, deepened after the parliamentary elections, strategic aims of the SR in the region of Western Balkans, quality of domestic Slovak dialogue about the Western Balkans and the so called *comparative advantages* of the SR, discussed in the following part of this article.

It is obvious that in the course of 2006 Slovak foreign policy achieved, in regards to the Western Balkans, several positive results, especially concerning the question of the independence of Montenegro, which further strengthened the reputation of the SR in EU institutions and added to Slovakia's credentials as a regional expert. The SR however once again did not take full advantage of the inner potential, capacities of the Slovak diplomacy and tools of foreign policy of the SR towards a faster and more positive influencing of internal developments in the countries of Western Balkans. Moreover, dynamics of internal dialogue about foreign policy towards the Western Balkans was very confusing, and in the last quarter of 2006 it suggested the existence of more than one central theme in Slovakia's foreign policy<sup>4</sup>, or at least nonexistence of coordination among the key institutions of central state administration.

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<sup>3</sup> These are:

- a) future or final status of Kosovo respectively;
- b) internal reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- c) cooperation with the *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*

<sup>4</sup> Clear evidence of this were, for example, statements of three actors – Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR, president of the Slovak Republic and prime minister of the Slovak Republic – on Kosovo during working visit of Serbian PM Vojislav Koštunica in Slovakia in October 2006.

## Slovakia and the Western Balkans

Looking at the history of Slovakia's foreign policy it is clear that the Western Balkan region has been its stable priority. Slovak foreign policy and Slovak diplomats have in fact been influencing the course of events in the region since the 90's of the previous century, and names such as Miroslav Mojžita, former ambassador of the SR to the former Yugoslavia, or Eduard Kukan, former Slovak minister of foreign affairs, who served as the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans, created a positive image of Slovak diplomacy.<sup>5</sup>

In other words, even before its EU accession in 2004, Slovakia profiled itself as a country with the intention to actively influence the course of events in the western part of the Balkans, and after EU accession Slovak diplomacy started to actively consolidate these positions. The fact that the Western Balkan region is a priority of Slovakia's foreign policy has a very rational base, that can be summarized into few points. These represent the so called *comparative advantages of the SR* over other European states and determine operation of foreign policy in the Balkans. Comparative advantages of the SR include similar *historical experience*, *good understanding of the region*, *presence of minorities*, *cultural and geographic proximity* and the fact that the issue *is not controversial* in Slovakia.<sup>6</sup> The last reason, but not a comparative

<sup>5</sup> As Eliška Sláviková points out, the so called Bratislava process came to be known as a unique model „in which in effort to contribute to unification of the opposition in Serbia in 2000 complementary activities of Slovak diplomacy and nongovernmental organizations took place.“ (E. Sláviková, “Slovakia's Policy towards the Western Balkans”, P. Brezáni (ed) *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2005*. (Bratislava: RC SFPA, 2006). This model was unique exactly in the complementarity of governmental and non-governmental level and it offered to nongovernmental organizations a good starting position for future work in the region.

<sup>6</sup> The first reason is similar *historical experience* with authoritarian regime, process of state dissolution and process of building up of new democratic institutions. This comparative advantage enables Slovakia to be a more relevant partner for former Yugoslav countries and Albania in the process of their democratization. The second reason is a *good understanding of the region* and its peculiarities and its petite nuances, which is however approaching its limits. In Slovakia expert capacities and educational institutions about the Western Balkans are lacking and there is neither diplomatic academy nor institutions that would, from a long term strategic perspective, prepare experts for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The third reason is the *presence of minorities*, and not just the Slovak minority in Serbia and Croatia, but also of the Croat minority in Slovakia. This factor can however be of maximum advantage for Slovakia only in case that it does not reduce its foreign policy to an issue of Slovak minority. The fourth reason is *cultural and geographic proximity*, manifested in traditional linkages and not only those from the period before 1989, but also in a more distant past. Traditional linkages are strengthened also by the fact that current Slovakia together with a relatively big part of the Western Balkan territory (whole territory of Vojvodina, big parts of Croatia and Slovenia and for a very short period also Bosnia and Herzegovina) belonged to Austria-Hungary. The fifth reason is the fact that the issue is not a matter of domestic political conflict – the Western Balkans as a priority of Slovakia's foreign policy is not an internally disputed theme.

advantage for the Western Balkans being a priority of Slovak foreign policy, is *geopolitical and strategic interest* of the SR, since the Western Balkans represent a key partner for Slovakia in regard to economic and political cooperation.

The stated arguments very clearly imply rational and logical pre-conditions for the Western Balkans being Slovakia's long-term foreign policy priority.<sup>7</sup> As we already mentioned, an important dimension is SR's membership in the EU and other international organizations that bind us to participate in concrete decisions concerning Western Balkans and to adopt a real responsibility for development in the region. In this respect the Slovak foreign policy should however achieve more positive results, concerning mainly Serbia. Slovak diplomacy should consider the EU membership as another comparative advantage and use it to stimulate positive processes of political, social and economic stabilization of countries of the region and be for them a relevant partner in the process of integration to the EU and NATO. Slovakia would thus create an enormous capital for future strengthening of economic and political relations with the region.

## Montenegro

Even though *Aims of foreign policy of the SR for 2006* do not define specific aims of Slovak foreign policy towards or in Montenegro and do not even reflect ongoing processes that have led towards referendum on independence, it was exactly Montenegro where Slovak diplomacy achieved its greatest and most visible successes in the Western Balkans.

Based on the so called *Beograd agreement*<sup>8</sup> of March 3, 2003 Serbia and Montenegro agreed not only on cessation of the third Yugoslavia but also on its replacement by a very loose, real union. The agreement created the *State union of Serbia and Montenegro*, drafted its institutions and their competences and also time horizon of three years, during which a new political future of this state formation should be defined. It was clear to political analysts from the very beginning that after signing this agreement both Montenegro and Serbia are not on their way to mere *de facto* independence but also to a *de iure* one.

Since the very beginning of the year 2006 an important question has been standing out in European foreign policy: how and under what conditions should a referendum

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<sup>7</sup> For more see: *Strednodobá stratégia zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky do roku 2015*, p. 6. [www.mfa.sk](http://www.mfa.sk).

<sup>8</sup> As of this agreement both republics existed as almost independent, with only five common ministries, together with the prime minister, who was at the same time chairman of the Union, constituted the executive of the state.



take place in Montenegro which would decide about its independence? In the given situation Slovak diplomacy maximized all its comparative advantages and the whole referendum about Montenegro's independence took place under its scrutiny. The process of a controlled declaration of independence of Montenegro was one of the biggest successes of the EU's policy in the region, and Slovak participation in it strengthened Slovakia's reputation as a regional expert.

As early as on December 15 Javier Solana, the EU's High representative for CSFP selected Miroslav Lajčák, former ambassador of the SR in Belgrade and currently a director general of the political section at MFA in the SR, as his personal representative for facilitation of political dialogue of political parties in Montenegro related to the preparation of the referendum. Mr. Lajčák's and Slovak diplomacy's assignment was to negotiate the conditions and oversee the whole course of the referendum on independence. On Lajčák's proposal and after its approval by members of the Montenegrin parliament, Slovak diplomat František Lipka was appointed the chair of Montenegrin referendum committee on March 15, 2006. A transparent and professional process of negotiating the conditions of referendum, in which a quorum of 55% was set as a criterion of validity of results, strengthened the positions of the Slovak diplomacy and the EU. The referendum took place in May 2006 and almost 90% of all eligible voters in the country took part. Out of those, who participated, 55.5% voted for independence and despite the protest of pro-Serbian opposition, in fact all EU member states accepted the legitimacy and the result of the referendum. Also Karsten Friis appreciates activities of Slovak diplomacy in Montenegro.<sup>9</sup> He speaks about 'postmodern diplomacy'<sup>10</sup>, and argues that talks before the referendum succeeded thanks to the expertise of the Slovak diplomacy.

An important part of formation of negotiating team was the involvement of diplomats from Hungary, for example, József Pandur, former Hungarian ambassador to Belgrade. Involvement of Hungarian diplomats created space for new quality of bilateral relations of the SR and HR and brought constructive impulses. The referendum in Montenegro was at the same time a unique example of a concrete leadership position of the SR within the Visegrad group towards the Western Balkans, and an example of how Slovakia has been opening positions in the region not only for the EU but also for the V4 countries.

Slovakia by applying European standards in the Western Balkans contributed to the creation of a possible model of conflict solution and regulation. It is very unfortunate that it did not further take advantage of this capital for the reaching of specific benefits for the SR. There are at least two reasons that can lead us to doubt

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<sup>9</sup> The author is a senior political officer of the OSCE mission in Belgrade. He served as a member of Miroslav Lajčák's negotiating team.

<sup>10</sup> K. Friis, "The Referendum in Montenegro: The EU's Postmodern Diplomacy", *European Foreign Affairs Review* Vol.12, No.1 (Spring 2007), pp. 67 – 88.

the seriousness of the claim of Slovak diplomacy that the Western Balkans is its priority. Firstly, Slovakia, as distinguished from Slovenia, did not open an embassy in Podgorica and Montenegro continues to be covered from Belgrade, even though Slovak diplomacy to a large extent helped to bring about positive results of the referendum. Very unfortunate and mistaken was the economic argument, based on the new Slovak government's priority of emphasis on saving resources. This argument however seems to be oblivious to the fact, that Slovakia has embassies in countries that are of lesser priority. Secondly, Slovak support to Montenegro in negotiations with the EU about *Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)* was, from the summer 2006, insufficient. Opinions could be heard among rows of Slovak diplomats that Podgorica should not be rewarded for breaking away from Serbia and that the EU itself should not widen the gap in accession process between Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, Podgorica did not receive any significant support from Bratislava neither in the EU Council, nor in the European commission. The question of development aid, bilateral relations with Montenegro and their equilibration in respect to Serbia remains a great challenge for Slovak diplomacy also in the upcoming period.

## Serbia

The document *Aims of Foreign Policy of the SR in 2006* defines the agenda for Serbia in the following areas:

- strengthening of bilateral relations of both countries;
- continuation of dominant support of Serbia within the frame of Slovak Official development assistance (ODA);
- innovation of support of Slovaks from Vojvodina;
- support of Serbia's EU and World Trade Organization (WTO) integration efforts;
- active contribution to the resolution of the issue of Kosovo's status.

As we already mentioned, Slovak foreign policy towards the Western Balkans is a foreign policy mainly towards Serbia. Serbia has repeatedly failed to cooperate with the *International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)* and for this reason negotiations about SA A were suspended in May 2006. A reform of security forces still hasn't taken place in Serbia, although it is key in inevitable decriminalization of politics and society and coming to terms with the recent past. At the same time, Serbia is the only country in the region, in which a far-right, anti-system political party has the support of one third of the electorate.<sup>11</sup> Among the most important domestic political events of the

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<sup>11</sup> Proof of this are the last parliamentary elections in Serbia, which took place on January 21, 2007. The winner was *Srpska radikalna stranka* with 28.7% of votes. More information can be found at <http://www.cesid.org/eng/index.jsp>.

past year is the adoption of a new constitution, which was firstly approved in the Serbian parliament and at the end of October 2006 it was approved in referendum.

There is no doubt that out of the whole region it was Serbia with which Slovakia in 2006 had the most active bilateral relations, starting with the visit of Svetozar Marović, president of what was at that time Serbia and Montenegro, who visited Slovakia on invitation by the president of the SR, Ivan Gašparovič in February 2006, ending with the visit of Serbian prime minister Vojislav Koštunica, who during an official visit of Slovakia in October the same year met with various state representatives. Slovak diplomacy, during the meetings, repeatedly stressed the issue of Kosovo's full support in the legitimacy of the plan of Marti Ahtisaari, the UN GT's special envoy for Kosovo, at the same time it claimed with one voice that the solution cannot be forced on any of the parties involved and it will have to bring stability to the region. Slovak diplomacy allowed for only a small part of the proceedings to focus attention on domestic reforms and cooperation with ICTY. Support of the integration efforts of Serbia, especially to the EU as a priority of Slovak diplomacy thus seems very unconvincing. Slovak diplomacy was at the same time one of the proponents of offering the Western Balkan countries membership in the *Partnership for Peace* (PfP) program, which is considered as a first step towards potential NATO membership. At the Riga summit at the end of November 2006, membership was offered, despite loud protests from the ICTY and thanks to support of Slovak diplomacy, not only to Serbia but also to Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Diplomats argued that accession to PfP will enable it to better oversee the fulfillment of necessary conditions and demands related to NATO membership, and thus better to enforce the principle of conditionality than in the situation when countries would not be PfP members. If Slovak foreign policy wants to preserve the image of 'honest broker'<sup>12</sup>, which is pragmatic, predictable and reliable also for the period to come, it should pay more attention to compliance with the conditionality for potential member states of NATO but also of the EU, both on multilateral and bilateral levels.

No analysis of foreign policy towards the Western Balkans can avoid the issue of *Official Development Assistance* (ODA) as an important tool of foreign policy. Especially not so when Serbia (and Montenegro) is the program country of the Slovak ODA system, which means that the biggest ratio of finances were directed to Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. From this total of approximately 161 million SK budget of the Slovak ODA for the year 2006<sup>13</sup>, 50 million SK was earmarked to cover assistance

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<sup>12</sup> This was stated by Maroš Šefčovič, ambassador of Permanent representation of the SR in the EU in an interview *Sme čestným hráčom* for Euractiv on February 14, 2006.

<sup>13</sup> This information should serve only as an illustration, since it states only the finances granted for development assistance subprogram (O5T0A), which is directly provided for by the MFA of the SR, and not the finances that were contracted to other parties. Source: *Národný program oficiálnej rozvojovej pomoci na rok 2006*, p. 12. <http://www.slovakaid.sk/index.php/filemanager/download/373/NP2006.pdf>.

for Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo as one item. Within the fourth call for proposals for Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo, which is administered by *Civil Society Development Foundation*<sup>14</sup>, 27 subjects applied. The *Steering Committee* selected in the end only seven projects totaling 34 million SK, whereas applicants were not only non-governmental organizations but also businesses and state institutions. Thematically the development assistance to Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo in 2006, similarly as in the previous years, was focused on three main areas:

- civil society, social revitalization and regional development;
- renewal of infrastructure and development of small and medium businesses;
- integration of Serbia (and Montenegro) into international organizations.

Stimulation of civic participation and transfer of the Slovak experience from the process of EU integration represents an important area of assistance. Projects focused on transfer of Slovak know-how were implemented for example by the *Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA)*<sup>15</sup> or *Pontis Foundation*.<sup>16</sup> Projects of social revitalization and infrastructure renewal were carried out by many institutions, for example the *Adventist Development Organization (ADRA)*<sup>17</sup> or *Integra Foundation*.<sup>18</sup> After political changes that took place in the region (independence of Montenegro) and that are expected in 2007 (Kosovo status) and after the expiration of the midterm strategy of ODA for the years, 2003 – 2008, an important task for Slovak diplomacy will be to redefine a midterm strategy of priorities of ODA for the Western Balkans, its methodology and tools.

Innovation of support of the Slovak community, living mainly in the northern Serbian autonomous province Vojvodina, remains an unfulfilled priority of foreign policy towards Serbia in the previous year. According to official data<sup>19</sup> approximately 60 000 Slovaks live in Vojvodina, settled in a few municipalities and the Slovak minority represents a territorially homogenous part of Serbian, respectively Vojvodin society. The support of the Slovak minority in Serbia in 2006, however, did not show any innovation as compared to the previous year.

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<sup>14</sup> More on *Civil Society Development Foundation* at [www.npoa.sk](http://www.npoa.sk).

<sup>15</sup> For more information see [www.sfpa.sk](http://www.sfpa.sk).

<sup>16</sup> For more information see [www.nadaciapontis.sk](http://www.nadaciapontis.sk).

<sup>17</sup> For more information see [www.adra.sk](http://www.adra.sk).

<sup>18</sup> For more information see [www.integra.sk](http://www.integra.sk).

<sup>19</sup> Source: *Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije*, Census 2002. <http://webrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/Zip/NEP1.pdf>.

## Kosovo

There is an assumption, that political and social stability of the Western Balkans is conditioned by the solution of two principal questions. While the first one concerns internal reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the second is a question of the future or final status of Kosovo. Priorities of Slovak foreign policy related to Kosovo in 2006, similarly as in 2005, were based on the premise of security priorities. Slovakia thus supports such a solution of the status of Kosovo, that will “secure implementation of democratic standards and functioning of multiethnic society without problems and at the same time will strengthen regional stability and security”. (MFA, 2006 : 31).

In spite of this, it is very difficult to define foreign policy towards Kosovo in 2006 and find in it a real trend and a value orientation. The situation, in which various actors of foreign policy present different opinions<sup>20</sup>, was in 2006 amplified by the change in the Slovak government. After the change discrepancies among the actors gained prominence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the horizon of 2005 – 2006 relatively clearly profiled its position towards Kosovo, especially by the end of 2006 (with overlap to following period) arrived at an uneasy situation, in which it operated as the one who explains positions of other actors and advocates its own. MFA SR in the issue of Kosovo acted in a balanced way – the already mentioned visit of the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica was followed by a visit of the Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Çeku, accompanied by Joachim Rucker, UN GT special envoy in Kosovo, in November 2006.

In contrast to Koštunica, the highest state representative of the SR to meet Çeku was Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš, who visited Kosovo personally in August. Regarding the status, Martti Ahtisaari, special envoy of UN GT to Kosovo, visited Slovakia more times, and this might serve as evidence of a good outer image of Slovak foreign policy.

An important step towards balancing Slovak optics towards the Western Balkans and strengthening of bilateral relations was the establishment of a diplomatic representation of the SR in Kosovo<sup>21</sup>, which was officially opened by the Minister of Foreign Affairs during his visit to the region in August 2006. Slovakia was actively involved also on a multilateral level, taking part in the EU decision making process towards Kosovo. For example, the key decision of the previous year was the November postponement of the presentation of Martti Ahtisaari’s plan in the UN SC. Slovak diplomacy was very involved in internal EU debate and the presentation was postponed

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<sup>20</sup> For example the Ministry of Interior of the SR successfully enforced that Slovakia also in 2006 does not recognize documents issued by *United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo* (UNMIK), as the only EU country.

<sup>21</sup> So called *Interest representation of the SR in Kosovo (Zaujmové zastúpenie SR v Kosove)*.

so that it took place after Serbian parliamentary elections in January 2007. Another important indicator, that strengthens bilateral and multilateral relations of the SR and Kosovo, is the participation of 132 Slovak troops<sup>22</sup> in NATO's *Kosovo Force* (KFOR) mission.

In the field of Slovak development assistance, the ODA projects for Kosovo are only a small part of the total package for Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Out of a total 65 approved projects in the history of Slovak ODA, only 3 took place in Kosovo, while 34 were carried out in the Serbian autonomous province of Vojvodina. Moreover, all three projects were proposed by one NGO – *Človek v ohrození*<sup>23</sup> (ČvO – People in Peril). Also these reasons lead us to assume that when it comes to Kosovo, there exists a big space for deepening the extent of development aid provided, and the involvement of a bigger number of applicant organizations.

The year 2007 will probably be a year of solution for Kosovo's status. Slovak diplomacy should, in the upcoming period, build upon its own results in 2006 and further strengthen not only bilateral relations with Kosovo and thus reflect the clear dynamics of development in Kosovo, acting together with partners from NATO and the EU, but also strengthen its positions in the domestic environment, as a main actor of foreign policy and establish a new criteria of provision of development aid for Kosovo.

## Croatia

Slovak foreign policy, established in 2006 towards Croatia, mainly had two relatively interconnected goals, which are:

- strengthening of bilateral relations; and
- transfer of Slovak experience from EU integration to Croatia.

Slovak and Croatian diplomacies have had traditionally good relations and in certain aspects relations went above standard. The change of the Slovak government in 2006 brought about certain questions and fears from disruption of this trend. From an analytical point of view, if a cooling down of Slovak-Croatian relations really occurred, then this was caused more by internal consolidation of the new Slovak government as such, its preoccupation with domestic politics and the taking over of management of state and its institutions, than by conscious strategy of weakening of Slovak support to Croatia's Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Support to Croatia continued also after the change in government, which is clearly evident for example by the visit

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<sup>22</sup> Source Ministry of Defense of the SR, [www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=80](http://www.mosr.sk/index.php?page=80).

<sup>23</sup> For more information see: [www.clovekvohrozeni.sk](http://www.clovekvohrozeni.sk).

of the new Slovak foreign minister Ján Kubiš to Croatia at the end of October and by visit of Prime Minister Fico in January 2007. On a bilateral level, which is relatively functioning on all its strata, certain stagnation could have occurred also due to an end of the diplomatic mission of Andrea Gustović-Ercegovac, Croatian ambassador to Slovakia, at the end of 2006.

It needs to be emphasized that foreign policy towards Croatia has objectively different determinants than in contrast to other countries of the region. On the question of EU integration, Croatia has gone the furthest after the EU ended stabilization and accession talks, and in the fall 2005 opened accession negotiations with Croatia. This fact gives bilateral relations a wider European dimension. Croatia is at the same time the only country of the region, which due to the level of economic development is not a recipient of Slovak ODA. Croatia is also Slovakia's biggest trading partner from the Western Balkans in mutual trade balance.

For Slovak foreign policy it will be very important in the upcoming period to further strengthen Euro- Atlantic ambitions of Croatia and assist by important internal reforms (especially the fight against corruption) that are awaiting the country.

## **Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia**

Despite the fact that Slovak foreign policy sets, for 2006, clear priorities related to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, on bilateral and multilateral level it reached only a few visible results. Although internal priorities of both countries differ, Slovak diplomacy had a unified priority towards both countries in 2006: transfer of experience from the EU integration process and strengthening of European prospects. Both countries (the last countries of former Yugoslavia in the region) have at the same time, due to ethnic heterogeneity, in common the question of internal arrangement and rights of national groups. Another thing these two countries have in common is that they lack diplomatic representation in Bratislava. Slovak positions are stronger in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Slovakia has its embassy in Sarajevo, it participates in the *European Union Police Mission (EUPM)* and in *European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)*<sup>24</sup> and it has a liberalized visa regime with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Despite good starting positions Slovakia does not fully take advantage of its potential and does not play a visible role in pursuing constitutional reform of the country, even though this was one of the priorities of the Slovak foreign policy towards Bosnia and

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<sup>24</sup> Slovakia's participation in the *European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM)* is practically negligible. Slovakia has only one territorial observer stationed in Belgrade.

Herzegovina in 2006.<sup>25</sup> Reform of the *Dayton system* at the same time represents the basic premise for the overcoming of national at the expense of the civic functioning of the state and its institutions and thus bringing the stability in. Eleven years after the end of civil war Bosnia and Herzegovina remains divided and poses a serious security risk. A shift in this area was not brought about even by the parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 1, 2006. If Slovakia defines itself as a responsible actor of international relations, which considers the Western Balkans its priority, it has to, despite limited capacities, more constructively and systematically initiate steps leading to internal reform of the country, deepen bilateral cooperation and initiate domestic dialogue about developments in the country, which was almost absent in 2006.

The goals set for Slovak policy towards Macedonia in 2006 included, besides the transfer of Slovak experience from the process of EU integration, strengthening of bilateral relations and continuity in provision of the ODA. On all three levels however the results did not reach expectations. In the case that the MFA does not have sufficient capacities for reaching them, it remains a paradox that within the Slovak ODA did not delegate these tasks on non-state subjects. Macedonia remains in the rear and despite strong similarities with Slovakia it cannot be considered a priority country.

## Albania

Albania is another country of the Western Balkans group and, besides Kosovo, it is the only non-Slavic country of the region. Slovakia has traditionally had only minimum contacts with Albania. The only priority towards Albania in 2006 was a reevaluation of its status as a recipient of Slovak ODA, but no progress has been achieved even in this area. This issue, related to the issue of the Slovak ODA priorities in Albania can be dominant also in the following year with regard to institutionalization of the Slovak ODA into *Slovak Agency for International Development Assistance*.

## Conclusions

Analysis of Slovak foreign policy towards the Western Balkans is a complex and complicated topic which cannot be confined within the limits of one year, since it represents a certain continuum. It chronologically follows upon the previous period

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<sup>25</sup> For more see *Zameranie zahraničnej politiky SR na rok 2006*, p. 31. [www.mfa.sk](http://www.mfa.sk).



and reaches into the year 2007. This article presents the basic theses of this policy. Firstly, the change in government in June 2006 did not bring about any shift in orientation of foreign policy towards the Western Balkans. Secondly, without a doubt the greatest success of Slovak diplomacy regarding the region has been the negotiation of conditions of the referendum on independence in Montenegro and management of the whole process. Thirdly, Slovak diplomacy played a more active role on the European level compared to the previous year (2005) and fostered a European perspective in countries of the region, though not completely efficiently. Fourthly, similarly to the previous year, even in 2006 Slovak diplomacy could not fully take advantage of its comparative advantages and concrete successes did not materialize into follow-up activities.

For the upcoming period it is very important for Slovak foreign policy towards the Western Balkans to diversify and, despite the dominance of Serbia, become more balanced towards the whole region. Slovakia could focus more on Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia and diversify as well its ODA. Slovakia should capitalize on its effort during the pre-referendum process in Montenegro and strengthen bilateral and economic relations with this country. Slovakia should remain an active player in international relations, pursuing its agenda and initiating themes on the European level, that concern the Western Balkans, with the MFA as a main actor in the foreign policy of the SR. Slovakia should continue building upon its comparative advantages and focus on fostering the European perspective in the region, strengthen stability and at the same time fully address the needs and problems of citizens of the Western Balkan countries. In this respect it is also clear that Slovakia must further remain as the V4 leader towards the Western Balkans. The MFA should, in the period to come, further and foster its expert and analytical capacities for the Western Balkans and give impetus to the domestic expert debate on orientation of Slovakia's foreign policy towards the Western Balkans. And above all, Slovak foreign policy should in 2007, also regarding the discrepancies occurring by the end of 2006, be ready to participate in solution of the Balkan problem number one, which is the question of Kosovo.

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*Marián Čaučík, Zuzana Krátka, Ludmila Pastorová*

## Slovakia and Development Assistance in 2006

The co-shared responsibility of developed countries for global development makes countries like Slovakia consider the *Official Development Assistance* (ODA), an official component of its foreign policy. The issue of fulfilling the *Millennium Development Goals* became the agenda of the international community once again after the September 2005 UN summit in New York. The highest officials of Slovakia expressed their commitment to these goals at the summit. Thus as a member of the donor community, Slovakia is willing to contribute to solving the global issues i.e. to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, to achieve the universal primary education, to promote gender equality and empower women, to reduce child mortality, to improve maternal health, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, to ensure environmental sustainability and to develop a global partnership for development.

Moreover, the development assistance is also declared the EU's external relations priority. The EU committed itself to reach the collective level of ODA expenses at 0.51% GNI<sup>1</sup> and made clear that individual member states of the EU15 would reach the level of 0.58% GNI by 2010 and 0.7% by 2017. Having in mind the limited resources of the new member states, Commission set the individual goals for them – 0.17% ODA/GNI by 2010 and 0.33% by 2015.

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<sup>1</sup> GNI – Gross National Income

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## Slovak ODA in Numbers

In 2006, Slovakia provided ODA with 1.64 billion Slovak Crowns (0.10% ODA/GDP). In absolute numbers, however, the ODA decreased by 101 million compared to the previous year (1.74 billion). In 2006, the overall ODA consisted of multilateral (55.1%) and bilateral (44.9%) assistance. The increase in bilateral assistance was caused by adding the forgiveness of debts of developing countries. The bilateral assistance realized via development projects of the Slovak subjects remained more-or-less the same, i.e. 160 million while its share percentage (9.8% in 2006) has been decreasing for three years. Despite the fact that the development assistance realized via development projects and their concrete impact on eradication of world poverty (as the main goal of the development assistance as such) is accepted amongst the Slovak public, there is still lack of political will to increase the financial allocations. Yet, the development projects pose a possibility on how to influence, very concretely, the lives of people and communities in developing countries while providing direct feedback and a real picture of populations in their respective countries. They are also of complementary character in that the ODA realized via direct financial support of the developing countries' state budgets. Moreover, development projects are the only bilateral tool of Slovakia's foreign policy. Projects also use Slovak experience, deepen the relations with the developing countries and, last but not least, effectively assist Slovakia in building good relations in the developing countries. Notwithstanding the fact that the *2006 ODA National Program* declared the increase of the funds for bilateral assistance and despite the effort and support of the NGDO Platform, in 2007 the amount increased only insignificantly to 168,744 million.

**Table 1:** *Actual and Estimated Development of ODA share in GDP – (2010 and 2015 development assumes 5% annual GNP growth)*

Year	In Absolute Numbers (SKK)	% ODA/GNI
2002	257 600 000	0,024
2003	553 500 000	0,048
2004	910 500 000	0,072
2005	1 739 551 000	0,120
2006	1 638 118 000	0,103
Target Year 2010	3 200 000 000	0,17
Target Year 2015	7 800 000 000	0,33

## Regional and Sectoral Priorities in 2006

According to the *2006 ODA National Program* the regional priorities of Slovak ODA were: Serbia and Montenegro, Kenya, Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and

Belarus. The cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro focused primarily on three sectoral priorities: strengthening the civil society, development and renewal of basic infrastructure and Support for Serbia and Montenegro's Integration into International Groupings and Organizations. The projects for African countries – Kenya and Sudan – aimed at technical infrastructure (water management, roads, electrification) and social animation (primary education and basic healthcare, micro loans, promotion of small and medium-sized businesses and increased food self-sufficiency). The activities in the Central Asian Republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan concentrated on building democratic institutions and promoting a market environment, and building local infrastructure with focus on energy infrastructure and water management. In Ukraine, Slovak organizations supported reforms, democracy building and strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law while in Belarus they supported the development of civil society and promoting the participation of citizens in the decision-making mechanism through non-governmental organizations. In other project countries – Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Mongolia, Mozambique and Senegal *Slovak Aid* endeavored to promote all three sectoral priorities of Slovak ODA set in the *Medium-Term Strategy for ODA: 2003 – 2008*.

All bilateral projects were administered by the *UNDP Trust Fund* and the *Bratislava-Belgrade Fund*.

## **Slovakia's Development Assistance – Territorial and Sectoral Focus**

The number of organizations working in Africa grows every year. The activities within the poorest continent focused on Kenya, Southern Sudan, Mozambique and Malawi. Slovak organizations are also very active in the Western Balkans or in Eastern Europe. A few of them work in Asia, the Middle East and Cuba.

In 2006 the overall goal of the Slovak organization's projects – eradication of poverty – was implemented in the programs focused on health care and social care, education, water accessibility, fair trade and supporting small and medium size businesses as well as democracy promotion or know how sharing.

### ***Slovak organizations in Africa***

As for the field of health care, the *College of Health Care and Social Work of St. Elizabeth (Vysoká škola zdravotníctva a sociálnej práce Sv. Alžbety)* and Trnava University has been running clinics for the poor in Kenya and Sudan with Slovak

doctors and medicines. The program of prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV is implemented by the civic association *MAGNA Charity – Children at Risk*. Three health projects of the local partners were supported by *eRko* in Sudan and Uganda. *eRko* works also within educational and social programs realizing projects in Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Madagascar.<sup>2</sup> *College of Health Care and Social Work of St. Elizabeth* opened a social center in Kenya and in Malawi, *Ecumenical Churches Council (Ekumenická rada cirkvi)* supports food centers for orphans whose parents died of AIDS. The *Slovak South African Society (Slovensko-juhoafrická spoločnosť)* provided schools in the Nuba Mountains in Sudan with educational supplies. Several NGOs, such as the *Ecumenical Churches Council* in Malawi, *PLOP* in Mozambique, *ADRA Slovakia* in Southern Sudan and *eRko* in Kenya dealt with the projects related to the accessibility of water – water well construction. Furthermore, *PLOP* coordinated the project aimed at the electrification of the Mozambique countryside, *eRko* implemented the project of agricultural farm in the Northern Sudan, *Integra Foundation* realized the project of corporate social responsibility for small businesses in Kenya and established the basis for a micro-credits program in Southern Sudan.

### ***Slovak organizations in Asia***

In Cambodia, two Slovak NGOs covered health care related projects (*MAGNA Charity – Children at Risk* and *College of Health Care and Social Work of St. Elizabeth*) by administrating child HIV centers as well as running the HIV mother-to-child transmission prevention programs. The civic association *People in Peril* implemented a project concerning the education and employment of Afghan girls and women. In Jakutsk, the *SAVIO* association realized social care programs. The same program was implemented in cooperation with *Slovak Catholic Charity* in Azerbaijan. The project of democracy institution building in Afghanistan was realized by *Institute for Public Affairs*.

### ***Slovak organizations and their Activities in the Western Balkans***

The majority of Slovak projects in the Western Balkans are focused on civil society development, inter-ethnic relations building, local communities, youth, social services, employment and small and medium business promotion as well as promotion of cooperation between NGOs and state institutions.

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<sup>2</sup> In Kenya, the project of Nairobi Slums Social Rehabilitation, 10 projects supporting the education of children, youth and adults, 4 projects building finalization of elementary and high schools in Kenya, Uganda, Southern Sudan and Madagascar and 2 projects focused on community development in Ethiopia and Kenya.

Amongst the Slovak NGOs being actively engaged in the Balkans are:

*People in Peril* (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo), *Pontis Foundation* (Serbia), *Integra Foundation* (Serbia), *ADRA* (Serbia), *Evangelic DIAKONIA* (Serbia), *Slovak Foreign Policy Association* (Serbia), *Civic Eye* (Montenegro), *Slovak Catholic Charity* (Albania).

### ***Other Regions***

Besides the regions of the highest priority for Slovakia's ODA, Slovak NGOs also work in Cuba. Two organizations, *People in Peril* and *Pontis Foundation*, assist the families of Cuban political prisoners.

Slovak NGO activities in the region of Eastern Europe (Ukraine and Belarus) aimed mainly at democracy promotion. The *Pontis Foundation* focuses on civil society development, strengthening the domestic analytical community and preparing reforms after the fall of the Lukashenko's regime. Providing the Slovak know-how, *Pontis* initiated the establishment of two working groups – WG for economic reforms and WG for civil society being established in cooperation with the *Institute for Public Affairs*.

In Ukraine, Civic Eye coordinated a mission of 41 election observers during the March parliamentary elections. Additionally, it did organize round tables on election legislation in Ukraine. Two observers from Slovakia observed the fall local elections. *People in Peril* implemented a project supporting NGOs in the eastern part of Ukraine through trainings, capacity building and study trips. *Slovak Red Cross* provided Ukraine with material aid. *Pontis* was also involved in projects dealing with Iraq NGO capacity building and *Slovak Catholic Charity* was engaged in a project of distance adoption in India.

### ***Volunteers and Development Assistance***

Due to the legal issues, the engagement of volunteers in Slovak ODA is not sufficient. Notwithstanding this fact, there are programs involving volunteers run by the non profit organization, *Tabita* in Kenya, Mozambique and Cambodia. *Slovak Catholic Charity*, *SAVIO*, *Slovak Red Cross*, *eRko* and *People in Peril* work with volunteers as well.

### ***Humanitarian and Post-Humanitarian Assistance***<sup>3</sup>

In 2006 several public fundraising campaigns appeared:

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<sup>3</sup> In April 2006, the document *Mechanism for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by the Slovak Republic to Foreign Countries* was adopted by the Government presenting the basic principles, financing and procedures of provision of humanitarian assistance financed from the state budget.

- for the victims of Romanian floods (*ADRA Slovakia*);
- for the victims of the earthquake in Java (*Slovak Catholic Charity, UNICEF, ADRA, Slovak Red Cross, People in Peril, Ecumenical Churches Council, Evangelic DIAKONIA*) and;
- for civilians suffering from the conflict in Lebanon (*People in Peril and Slovak Catholic Charity* – material aid).

Within post-humanitarian aid, projects for tsunami victims were realized as well.<sup>4</sup> In 2005 after the earthquake in Pakistan *Slovak Red Cross, People in Peril, Slovak Catholic Charity* and *ADRA* provided their assistance.

## Development Education

Education on development and awareness raising about development issues pose an absolutely necessary part of the state's development policy. Thus, development activities could gain public support for development assistance and the state can succeed in building a society of solidarity. Therefore, at the end of 2006, *UNDP Trust Fund* announced the call for proposals for development education projects aimed at children and youth, pedagogical and methodical staff. The overall goal of the call was to support the interactive seminars, trainings, lectures and preparation of methodical materials on development assistance.

In 2006, one call for proposals was announced also within the *Regional Partnership Program (RPP)*<sup>5</sup>. As a result one project aimed at the development of education in the region of the Western Balkans was supported (*Pontis Foundation*).

Also the cooperation with the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic within the project *Implementation of Development Assistance into the Educational Process* was more intense. The project focuses on continuous education of teachers, trainings and preparation of educational materials. In the second half of 2006, the staff of five methodical-pedagogical centers, trained teachers in five of Slovakia's regions and the first Slovak web-site on development assistance was established ([www.rozvojovevzdelavanie.sk](http://www.rozvojovevzdelavanie.sk)). Moreover, besides the translations of foreign

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<sup>4</sup> *People in Peril* – construction of a village of 35 houses in Sri Lanka for 150 tsunami victims; *MAGNA Charity – Children at Risk* – construction of a cultural center in Sighartop in India; *Slovak Catholic Charity* – construction of houses in Banda Aceh; *Slovak Red Cross* – educational complex for 350 children (orphans) in Banda Aceh at Sumatra.

<sup>5</sup> *Regional Partnership Program* is aimed at strengthening capacities and awareness on development assistance in the states of Central Europe (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Slovenia). Grant rounds open to NGOs focused on supporting the projects of development cooperation and development education are part of this program.



materials on development assistance, the materials of Slovak NGOs were published to be used during trainings.

## **Institutional and Legislative Changes in the System of Slovakia's ODA**

At the turn of 2007, Slovak *Official Development Assistance* underwent significant changes. The Slovak Republic re-institutionalized the whole system and on January 1, 2007 the *Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation* came into existence. The Agency replaces the existing mechanism of two administrative and contracting units. This significant step is followed by the preparation of the law on ODA planned to come into force on January 1, 2008.

The agency's goal is to make the process of providing the ODA more efficient from financial, political, legal, institutional and economic points of view as well as to improve cooperation and coordination between the individual representatives of the NGO, academic, business, state and public sectors in providing the ODA.

As mentioned above, the agency took over the responsibilities of the former ACUs – *UNDP Trust Fund* and *Bratislava – Belgrade Fund*. It will start its work by implementing the *2007 ODA National Program* (preparation, call, and evaluation of the grant rounds). During 2007 it will also take over the responsibility for the monitoring and evaluation of *2003 – 2006 ODA National Program* projects. Therefore in 2007, there will be three ACU existing.

## **Instead of Conclusion**

Despite a decrease in the absolute amount of the overall development assistance, the new MFA SR highest officials showed interest in the topic by speeding up the process of establishing the new legal and institutional system which is still in the process of shaping. The Government's 'sympathies' for international commitments, Slovakia took as the member of the donor community would be tested over 2007. It is necessary to stress, that only a few projects implemented by Slovak NGOs were realized thanks to the Slovak ODA support. Most resources were raised via different foundations, businesses, grants and last but not least, public fundraising campaigns confirming the interest of the Slovak public in helping in cases of development assistance or humanitarian crisis.

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## Annexes

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## Chronology of the Important Foreign Policy Issues in 2006

*January 1.* The Slovak Republic became a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council (SC) for the years 2006 – 2007. On its first session on January 4, the Council decided that Slovakia represented by the Permanent Representative to the UN Peter Burian would preside over the committee established pursuant the Resolution 1540 (2004) about weapons of mass destruction. The SR also took the function of vice-chair in three other committees.

*January 16.* The UN Security Council's first session, featuring Slovakia's active participation, took place in New York. Its subject was the UN's cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In his speech, the SR's permanent representative to the UN Peter Burian advocated a deeper cooperation between organizations in the area of international peace and security and declared it a priority of the SR's membership in the UN SC in the years 2006 – 2007.

*January 16. – 17.* State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Magda Vášáryová paid a working visit to the Kingdom of Norway. With the State Secretaries of the Norwegian MFA Monica Bargem Stubbholt and Kjetil Skogrand and the vice-chairwoman of Storting's foreign affairs committee, she held talks on energy policy, security, the partnership within the NATO, the NATO-EU agenda, the current development in the Western Balkans, and on the SR's priorities in the UN Security Council.

*January 17.* Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda negotiated with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in Bratislava. With respect

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to bilateral relations, they addressed the questions of strengthening cross-border cooperation, trade exchange, and closer cooperation in the infrastructure buildup. They also considered options for common action on the European forum and in other international organizations.

*January 19.* A Slovak Air Force airplane AN-24 crashed near Hejce, Hungary, taking lives of 42. Most of the victims were soldiers returning from the KFOR mission in Kosovo. The gravest airplane tragedy in Slovakia's history had one survivor.

*January 24.* State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR, József Berényi, and the executive director of the governmental Austrian Development Agency, Michal Linhart, signed a memorandum of understanding between the two institutions in Bratislava. The cooperation of Slovakia and Austria in providing development aid in the years 2006 – 2008 will manifest in three areas: implementation of common projects, transfer of Austrian experience with building the mechanism and personal resources, and joint action in applying for finances from the development funds and European Commission tools.

*January 30.* On their Strasbourg session, the MPs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to end the postmonitoring dialogue with Slovakia. The postmonitoring dialogue pursued the accomplishment of a 1999 resolution based on the monitoring of the SR in the years 1995 – 1999. The resolution called on the SR to pass measures improving the situation in the parliament and in the areas of ethnic minorities, justice, and public administration. Following her September 2005 visit to Slovakia, the vice-chairwoman of the Monitoring Committee Hanne Severinsen observed remarkable progress and recommended to end the postmonitoring.

*February 3 – 5.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Eduard Kukan participated on the 42<sup>nd</sup> *Munich Conference on Security Policy*. The relations between the EU and the US and the restoration of the Transatlantic partnership were the central topics of the conference. More than 40 ministers of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the NATO Secretary General and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy attended the conference.

*February 4 – 10.* State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR József Berényi paid a visit to Sudan and Kenya. Both countries were recipients of Slovakia's development aid and the main point of the trip was to increase the SR's effectiveness as a donor. Accompanied by representatives of non-governmental organizations and business, Mr. Berényi visited places receiving the aid and met with Sudan and Kenya's top officials.

*February 17.* President of Serbia and Montenegro Svetozar Marović paid an official visit to Slovakia. The main point of the Bratislava meeting with President of the SR

Ivan Gašparovič was the situation in Serbia and Montenegro prior to the referendum on the division of the country and the European perspectives of the Western Balkans. Regarding the question of Kosovo, S. Marović said a solution that can satisfy all concerned parties was necessary.

*February 20.* In Bratislava, Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda received the Deputy Prime Minister and the Head of the Government Office of the Russian Federation (RF) Sergey Yevgenyevich Naryshkin. The negotiations addressed the question of mutual economic relations and their further development. Mr. Naryshkin arrived in Slovakia to attend the session of the intergovernmental committee for trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation between the SR and RF.

*March 1.* The Slovak Republic replaced Serbia and Montenegro as the chair of the Eastern European Group in the UN. During the chairmanship throughout March, the Permanent Mission of the SR to the UN led by Peter Burian organized a UNAIDS briefing, coordinated the group's candidacies, and organized events addressing the question of the group's chairmanship in UN's bodies.

*March 8.* Budapest hosted the meeting of the Visegrad Group ministers of foreign affairs. With his counterparts, Minister Eduard Kukan commemorated the 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Visegrad cooperation and discussed the current events in international politics. The ministers reaffirmed the significance of energy security and the Lisbon Strategy, especially free movement of the new EU members' labor force. They also exchanged their opinions on the post-election situation in Belarus and Ukraine and the development in the Western Balkans. They tackled various aspects of the Visegrad cooperation and the Hungarian party announced its candidacy on the seat of executive director of the *International Visegrad Fund*.

*March 9 – 10.* Prime Minister of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Tony Blair paid a working visit to the SR. President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič and Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda accompanied the British premier during his first ever visit of independent Slovakia. They addressed various European and international questions, including the European constitution and the EU's common energy policy.

*March 12 – 14.* Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard of the SR Kukan paid an official visit to the US at the invitation of President George W. Bush. At the meeting, they reaffirmed the high level of bilateral relations and discussed the option of relaxing the US visa system for Slovak nationals. They also talked about the War on Terror, the situation in Iraq, and the development in Belarus, with G. W. Bush appreciating the Slovak expertise there. The prime minister and foreign minister also met with the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Senate and with representatives of the non-governmental organization Friends of Slovakia.

*March 17.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Borys Ivanovich Tarasyuk arrived for an official visit to Slovakia. With President Ivan Gašparovič and Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Kukan, he discussed the bilateral relations in economic, energy, and cross-border matters and especially the reestablishment of the intergovernmental committee for economic, industry, and science and technology cooperation.

*March 22.* Upon his official visit to Slovakia, President of the Republic of Poland Lech Kaczyński met with President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič and Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda. Mr. Kaczyński and Mr. Gašparovič highlighted the positive balance of trade between the countries and called for closer cooperation in highway construction. Regarding regional cooperation and the European agenda, both presidents backed strengthening the V4 bonds and replacing the original text of the European constitution by a new one, respectively. Mr. Kaczyński and Mr. Dzurinda discussed the Polish support for Croatia's ambitions to integrate into the EU and the post-election development in Ukraine, and agreed to support democracy and civil society in Belarus.

*March 23 – 24.* Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the SR Ivan Mikloš, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Eduard Kukan took part on the meeting of the European Council in Brussels. The EU's further economic progress in the light of the Lisbon Strategy, investment into education and research, creating favorable business environment, employment with emphasis on youth, and the EU's common energy policy comprised the main points of the negotiations.

*April 2.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Eduard Kukan met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia Urmas Paet in Bratislava. They talked about strengthening the economic cooperation, especially in the domain of information technologies and, regarding the European agenda, about the future of the European constitutional treaty.

*April 5.* Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Eduard Kukan received Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Ivanovich Lavrov. They negotiated about the bilateral relations between Slovakia and Russia – about economic cooperation in the domain of energy and about restoring the intergovernmental committee for trade, economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. They also exchanged opinions on post-election developments in Ukraine and Belarus.

*April 4.* The Government of the SR passed a proposal by the Ministry of Defense to conclude *Treaty between Slovakia and Iraq about donating military material*. The aid comprised of about five thousand pieces of tank ammunition no longer needed by the Slovak Armed Forces and worth the book value of approximately 67 million Slovak



Crowns. The aid flow is coordinated by NATO within its project of Iraq's security sector reform.

*April 12.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Eduard Kukan took part in an official meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea Ban Ki-Moon. They expressed hope that the successful economic cooperation would lead not only to an increase in mutual investment, but would be coupled with a more intensive cooperation in the political and cultural arenas.

*April 12.* The Government of the Slovak Republic passed *The National Program of Official Development Aid for the year 2006*. The Program listed seven recipients of the Slovak development aid: Serbia and Montenegro, Kenya, Sudan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. The document described specific steps for improving the efficiency of the development aid mechanism and highlighted the aid's role as an instrument of Slovakia's foreign policy.

*April 20.* The National Council of the SR passed the proposal sponsored by Minister of Defense Martin Fedor to broaden the mandate of the Slovak engineering unit in Iraq. The 110 troops, up to date focused on cleaning mines, started to accomplish a new task – training the Iraqi security forces in the areas of mine cleaning and ammunition destruction.

*May 2.* At the invitation of President Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda paid an official visit to the French Republic. The talks evolved around evaluation of the achieved level of cooperation and perspectives of bilateral relations, the main points of the European agenda, and important issues in international politics.

*May 4.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič received Minister of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia Dimitrij Rupel. Mr. Gašparovič the Slovenian partner on the Slovak experience in reforming taxes, pensions, healthcare, and education. The presidents also discussed EU's decision to interrupt the association talks with the Union of Serbia and Montenegro and other issues in international politics.

*May 11.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič and Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda received Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Angela Merkel. They talked about the issues such as the European constitutional process and EU enlargement into the Balkans, as well as the economic and security dimensions of Slovak-German relations.

*May 12.* In Tirana, Deputy Prime Minister of the SR Pál Csáky met with the Albanian minister for integration, Arenca Troshani. With respect to the country's integration

into the EU, they agreed on the significance of initialing a Stabilization and Association Agreement between Albania and the European Commission and P. Csáky reaffirmed Slovakia's offer to provide its expertise to Albania. Both officials designated mutual relations as traditionally good and the deputy prime minister appreciated Tirana's balanced position in the process of Balkan conflict resolution.

*May 13.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič met with President of the United Mexican States Vincent Fox Quesada. The first ever visit of a Mexican president to Slovakia was dedicated to considering options for cooperation in the economic, energy, cultural, and tourism sectors. The presidents also discussed the proposal to establish an inter-governmental Slovak-Mexican committee responsible for suggesting specific forms of cooperation.

*May 18.* In Riga, President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič attended an official meeting with President of Latvia Vaira Vike-Freiberga. They talked about the future of the European constitutional treaty and expressed support for Turkey's bid to enter the EU.

*May 19.* *The Central-European Initiative's* (CEI) 13<sup>th</sup> summit, attended by President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič, took place in Varna, Bulgaria. The presidents of Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Moldavia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Ukraine talked about experience sharing between the members and nonmembers of the EU and about the options of establishment and institutionalization of bonds between the CEI and the EU.

*May 24.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič and Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda received Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia Ivo Sanader. The Slovak officials reassessed Slovakia's readiness to share its experience from integration into the EU and NATO with Croatia and together with the Croatian counterpart, they reviewed the current cooperation in the economic area, in international organizations, and in development of tourism between the two countries.

*May 31.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič paid an official visit to the Czech Republic (CR). With President of the CR Václav Klaus, he held talks on the upcoming parliamentary elections in both countries, further cooperation within the Visegrad Group, and about the conclusions of the 13<sup>th</sup> summit of the Central European presidents. The two presidents issued a joint statement calling for further enlargement of the EU by other countries of the region. They also exchanged opinions on the future of the EU and its constitutional treaty.

*June 14.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič visited the members of the Slovak KFOR unit in Kosovo. He met with the commander of the Slovak KFOR unit Gabriel

Kerekeš and the commander of the KFOR contingent Guiseppe Valotto, who briefed him on the current situation in Kosovo and KFOR's priorities. The president placed flowers on the memorial to the victims of the Slovak airplane An-24 crash.

*June 15 – 16.* Prime Minister of the SR Mikuláš Dzurinda and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Eduard Kukan attended a European Council session in Brussels. The session was dedicated to reviewing the elapsed phase of reflection on the constitutional treaty and to enlargement, sustainable development, energy policy, and crisis management.

*June 28.* State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the SR József Berényi received Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Sudan Mohamed E. Elsamani. The partners talked about the humanitarian crisis in Sudan's Darfur region and considered further options for bilateral cooperation and specific projects of development aid provided within Slovakia and UN's development programs.

*June 28.* Slovakia established diplomatic relations with the Republic of Montenegro. Following the SR's decision to recognize a sovereign and independent Montenegro, on the day of its admission into the UN, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Eduard Kukan positively responded to his counterpart's written proposal to establish diplomatic relations between Slovakia and Montenegro on the level of ambassadors.

*July 1.* Slovakia replaced Hungary as a chair of the Visegrad Group. The agenda of the Slovak chairmanship features three priorities: turn the V4 into a dynamic regional platform within the EU, strengthen the coordination and consultation mechanism in pursuit of common positions, and help to improve the public's awareness about the V4.

*July 4.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič appointed members of the new cabinet. He appointed Mr. Robert Fico a prime minister, who – as well as Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš and Minister of Defense – is nominated by the party SMER-SD.

*July 6 – 7.* President of the Republic of Latvia Vaira Vike-Freiberga paid a working visit to Slovakia. With the Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico, she held talks on the cooperation of Slovakia and Latvia within the Euro-Atlantic structures. They declared a common interest in deepening the contacts with an emphasis on trade and investment.

*July 11.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš traveled on his first visit abroad to Hungary. With the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, Kinga Gönöcz, he talked about the future agenda of Slovak-Hungarian relations and cooperation within the EU and the V4.

*July 15.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico's first trip abroad led to the Czech Republic (CR). He met with Prime Minister of the CR Jiří Paroubek, at whose invitation

he arrived, and with President of the CR Václav Klaus. The talks focused on bilateral cooperation in the EU, NATO, the V4, and other international organizations.

*July 20.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš paid an official visit to Italy and The Vatican. With Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic Massimo D'Alema, he talked about the current Slovak-Italian relations and expressed an interest in a more frequent opinion exchange on the current international issues in 2007. With the Vatican Secretary for Relations with States Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, Mr. Kubiš discussed the current Slovak-Vatican relations and the latest development in the Middle East and the Balkans.

*August 17.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico, accompanied by Minister of Defense of the SR František Kašický and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš, made an unexpected visit to Iraq. After meeting the members of the Slovak contingent, Mr. Fico said they were not pursuing the task which brought them there and reaffirmed his decision to withdraw them. In the negotiations with the Iraqi prime minister and vice-president, the Slovak officials discussed further options for military and nonmilitary cooperation.

*August 18 – 19.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš paid a working visit to Ukraine. In the talks with his counterpart Borys Tarasyuk and the acting Prime Minister Mykola Azarov, Mr. Kubiš expressed his support for Ukraine's admission into the World Trade Organization and its integration into NATO and the EU. Mr. Kubiš simultaneously declared an interest to engage the Slovak experts in twinning projects and to intensify the Slovak-Ukrainian cooperation in the economic and energy sectors.

*August 21 – 23.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš paid a working visit to Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The talks with his counterparts were dedicated to the issues of bilateral relations and the Western Balkans. Mr. Kubiš also visited the KFOR unit in Kosovo.

*August 28.* From the decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš, Slovakia's Ambassador to Hungary Juraj Migaš paid a working visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary. Mr. Migaš reported that all relevant political parties, including the Slovak National Party, strongly and unambiguously denounced manifestations of extremism and intolerance which had recently taken place in Slovakia and Hungary. Simultaneously, he expressed discontent that the Hungarian party ignored the Slovak bodies' effort to curb the manifestations of extremism, increased the tensions by inadequate reactions, and conveyed the issue on the international forum thereby damaging Slovakia's reputation. Mr. Migaš voiced Slovakia's interest in a calm-down and continuation of good neighborly relations with Hungary.

*September 5.* Bratislava hosted the first meeting of ministers of foreign affairs during the Slovak presidency of V4. Minister Ján Kubiš introduced the agenda of the presidency and, with his counterparts, discussed the V4's readiness to enter the Schengen space, future NATO enlargement, current development in the Western Balkans, EU enlargement by Bulgaria and Romania, and an increase of the *International Visegrad Fund's* budget. Borys Tarasyuk, the Ukrainian minister of foreign affairs, attended the Bratislava meeting to deliver and hear views of further V4-Ukraine cooperation.

*September 7.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico paid a one-day working visit to Brussels. He negotiated with the Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt about Slovak-Belgian relations and cooperation of the two within the EU, NATO, and other international organizations. Mr. Fico discussed the new Slovak government's priorities with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and the European Commission President José Manuel Barroso.

*September 8.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič received Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq Hoshyar Zebari. The Iraqi minister appreciated Slovakia's military presence in the country and willingness to participate on its economic reconstruction and democratization.

*September 10.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico took part at the 6<sup>th</sup> *Asia-Europe Meeting* (ASEM). The top EU and Asian officials negotiated about multilateral cooperation in the pursuit of security in Asia, deepening of the dialogue between the European and Asian cultures, and the areas of environment and energy security. At the summit, Mr. Fico also attended bilateral meetings with the representatives of China, Finland, Poland, Portugal, and Thailand.

*September 14.* In Austria, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš negotiated with his counterparts from the countries of the *Regional Partnership* (Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). The talks focused on development in the Western Balkans, accomplishment of the Budapest Forum conclusions, and relations with Ukraine from the viewpoint of the region and the EU's interests.

*September 14.* Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Mirek Topolánek arrived for an official visit to Slovakia. With his Slovak counterpart, Robert Fico, he discussed the bilateral relations and cooperation within the V4, the EU, and the NATO.

*September 20.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš took part at the 61<sup>st</sup> session of the General Assembly (GA) of the UN in New York. Mr. Fico gave a speech before the GA on Slovakia's position on the current issues of international security and the reform of the UN. Mr. Kubiš held talks with his counterparts from the V4 countries on the options of joint action in lobbying to the US to abolish its visa requirement.

*September 26.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico, accompanied by Minister of Interior Robert Kaliňák and Minister of Defense František Kašický, made an unexpected visit to Afghanistan. In Kabul, he met with the 57 members of the Slovak Armed Forces who work under the NATO leadership. Mr. Fico was also received by the Afghan vice-president Ahmad Zia Massoud. The Slovak prime minister supported the troops' further presence in the country.

*October 2.* Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia Vojislav Koštunica arrived to Slovakia. The talks with President Ivan Gašparovič, Prime Minister Robert Fico, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš focused on the status of Kosovo. According to Mr. Koštunica, Kosovo should have gained the highest degree of autonomy save international legal sovereignty. Mr. Kubiš underscored that Slovakia supported Marti Ahtissari's position. Mr. Gašparovič said Slovakia supported a solution which would preserve the integrity of Serbia's territory. All three Slovak officials voiced their support for the Serbian ambitions to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

*October 6.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš received Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus Yiorgos Lillikas. The talks were dedicated to the current EU issues and the partners exchanged their opinions on the resolution of the Cyprus question.

*October 10.* Visegrad, Hungary, hosted a summit of prime ministers of the Visegrad Group. Prime ministers Robert Fico (Slovakia), Ferenc Gyurcsány (Hungary), Jarosław Kaczyński (Poland) a Mirek Topolánek (Czech Republic) reviewed the 15 years of the Visegrad cooperation and the Hungarian presidency, adopted the Slovak presidency's agenda, and discussed an increase of the *International Visegrad Fund* to 5 million Euro starting in 2007.

*October 11 – 19.* The Slovak delegation led by President Ivan Gašparovič visited Singapore and Vietnam. The first ever visit of a Slovak head of the state to these countries centered on economic issues. Minister of Economy Ľubomír Jahnátek signed with the Singaporean counterpart an agreement about mutual support and protection of investment. With the Vietnamese minister of trade, he signed an agreement aimed at boosting mutual trade exchange.

*October 18.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico received the Deputy Managing Director of the *International Monetary Fund* (IMF) Takatoshi Kato. Mr. Fico underscored that the Slovak government had committed to adopting a mid- to long-term strategy of Slovakia's development as required by the IMF and would submit it for a discussion in two years. The meeting further addressed the issues of synchronizing the government economic program with the criteria for adopting the Euro in 2009 and curing inflation by the means of fiscal policy.

*October 20.* Prime Minister of the SR Róbert Fico left for an informal European Council session in Lahti, Finland. The meeting attended by President of the Russian Federation (RF) Vladimir Putin, focused on the EU-RF energy partnership and the issue of more effective energy consumption. Should the import of Russian fuels keep increasing, the European firms must access the Russian oil and gas pipelines, claimed the European leaders.

*October 23.* The UN Security Council (SC) elected Permanent Representative of the SR to the UN Peter Burian a chairman of the sanction committee against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The committee was set up to supervise the observance of sanctions imposed on the DPRK by the UN SC pursuant the resolution 1718 (2006).

*October 23.* At the invitation of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš, his Moldavian counterpart, Andrei Stratan, paid an official visit to Slovakia. Mr. Kubiš voiced Slovakia's readiness to share its experience from the integration process with Moldavia, as well as to help any country in a difficult economic situation. The meeting also addressed the issue of illegal Moldavian migrants passing through Slovakia to Western Europe.

*October 30.* Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer paid an official visit to Slovakia. He met with President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič, Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš. The talks were dominated by NATO's November summit in Riga and its agenda: the Alliance's reform and enlargement, Kosovo's status, and the situation in Eastern Europe.

*November 2 – 3.* State Secretary of the MFA Oľga Algayerová took part on the 100<sup>th</sup> special session of the Executive Committee of the OECD. The session tackled issues such as the current economic situation in the member and some third countries, aging of the population in the context of public finances sustainability, enlargement of the organization, China's role in the global economy, and cooperation between OECD and Russia.

*November 6.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš received for a working breakfast Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and head of the UNMIK in Kosovo Joachim Rucker accompanied by the Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku. Mr. Rucker appreciated the constructive role Slovakia had played in the Western Balkans, including the process of determination of the future Kosovo status. Mr. Ceku asked the minister to support Kosovo's bid for independence. Mr. Kubiš reaffirmed that Slovakia would support a solution that would contribute to regional stability and allow for a successful accomplishment of the integration processes in the region.

*November 6 – 10.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič paid an official visit to the Russian Federation (RF). He was accompanied by the ministers of foreign affairs and economy, state secretary of the ministry of education, and representatives of Slovak business. Mr. Gašparovič and President of the RF Vladimir Putin agreed that it is necessary to boost mutual trade exchange, prolong the agreement about Russian gas import to Slovakia beyond 2008, and intensify technical cooperation in the energy and arms industry sectors. In the cities of Moscow, Omsk, and Krasnojarsk, the Slovak delegation met and concluded agreements with other Russian officials as well.

*November 8.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico received Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic Konstantinos Karamanlis in Bratislava. The talks centered around the Slovak-Greek relations and cooperation within the European and Transatlantic structures. On the same day, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš met with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodora Bakoyianni in Athens.

*November 12 – 13.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico paid a working visit to the Republic of Ireland. During the meeting with President Mary McAleese and Prime Minister Bertie Ahern, Mr. Fico stressed the high quality of the Slovak-Irish relations and sketched out the options for their further development, especially in the economic area. The talks also focused on further EU enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy.

*November 13 – 14.* Director-General of the UN Industrial Development Organization Kandeh K. Yumkella paid an official visit to Slovakia. He negotiated with the state secretaries of the MFA SR Diana Štrofová and Oľga Algayerová and with the representatives of the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Environment about the Slovak-UNIDO cooperation.

*November 14.* State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense of the SR Jaroslav Baška signed in Brussels a document obliging Slovakia to join the Polish-German-Latvian-Lithuanian-Slovak combat group under the Polish command. Slovakia committed to provide 200 troops in 2010 for the group. Setting up combat groups which can be sent to crisis regions is one of the EU's priorities.

*November 20 – 21.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico paid an official visit to Portugal. With his Portuguese counterpart José Sócrates, he discussed Slovakia's accession to the Schengen space and thanked him for the decision to open the labor market to Slovak citizens. The prime ministers agreed on cooperation of Portuguese and Slovak experts in drawing from the EU funds – in a domain where Portugal has a longtime experience.

*November 22.* President of the Republic of Austria Heinz Fischer received President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič in Vienna. The talks focused on post-election development



in both countries, transport routes between Austria and Slovakia, the impact of Slovakia's admission into the EU, the European Neighborhood Policy, Turkey's integration ambitions, as well as the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.

*November 24.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš gave a speech on the summit of the *Central European Initiative* (CEI) in Tirana, Albania. He expressed full support for the Balkan CEI members' bid to enter the EU and underscored CEI's role in the integration process and for cooperation in the region of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe. Mr. Kubiš also pointed to the need to reform some of CEI's bodies and increase its funding, so that it could work more efficiently.

*November 27.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš negotiated with Senior Minister of the Republic of Singapore Goh Chok Tong. They talked about the current issues in international politics, the integration process in Europe and Asia, and bilateral relations with emphasis on the development of economic cooperation. Mr. Goh also met with President Ivan Gašparovič and Vice-Chairwoman of the National Council of the SR Anna Belousovová and other ministers in the Slovak government.

*November 27 – 29.* The Slovak delegation led by President Ivan Gašparovič and featured by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš, Minister of Defense František Kašický, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lieutenant-general Ľubomír Bulík, attended the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia. The summit marked restoring security and stability in Afghanistan the key priority.

*November 30.* President of the SR Ivan Gašparovič, Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš received Prime Minister of Romania Mihai Razvan Ungureanu. Both parties agreed that mutual relations were traditionally good and expressed support for their further deepening in all areas, especially in trade. Mr. Ungureanu thanked the Slovak partners for support during the integration efforts and for the pledge to open the labor market for Romanian citizens after the country's admission into the EU.

*December 1.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš paid a working visit to Switzerland. The common talks of Mr. Kubiš and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Swiss Confederation Micheline Calmy-Rey assessed the level of bilateral relations and experience sharing from the countries' integration with the EU. They also addressed the issue of transfer of Switzerland's contribution to the 10 new EU members to help close the social and economic gap in the Union.

*December 4 – 5.* Brussels hosted the 14<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial Level attended by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš on behalf of Slovakia. In his speech, Mr. Kubiš pointed to OECD's long-term missions (especially in Kosovo and Central Asia), underscored its role in strengthening the regional security and resolving

the so-called frozen conflicts, and supported the efforts to reform the organization to boost its efficiency.

*December 5.* In Bratislava, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš met with State Minister and Turkey's leading negotiator with the EU Ali Babacan. On the meeting which is part of Mr. Babacan's tour around some of the EU countries, Mr. Kubiš expressed his conviction that the European Commission's recommendations were good foundations for a reasonable compromise. He stressed the need to meet obligations of contract on Turkey's part and simultaneously EU's interest in keeping up with the accession process which has a positive impact on the reform process in Turkey.

*December 8.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš opened the second roundtable on the security sector reform in New York. The expert discussion was prepared by the Permanent Mission of the SR to the UN in cooperation with the Canadian partners as a part of Slovakia's preparation to preside the UN Security Council in February 2007. Slovakia's ambition was to initiate a process which would result in the elaboration of a common advancement of the UN in the security sector.

*December 10.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš received the leader of the Belarusian opposition and a former presidential candidate Alexander Milinkevich. On the meeting, he underscored Slovakia and EU's interest in developing comprehensive relations with Belarus which is, however, conditioned by the country's democratization. The minister reaffirmed support for the Belarusian democratic forces and the Slovak government's interest in further cooperation with them in close partnership with the civil society in Belarus and Slovakia.

*December 11 – 12.* Bratislava hosted the conference of the V4 countries and Slovenia on official development aid (ODA). The conference organized by the Slovak Platform of Non-Governmental Organizations in cooperation with the MFA SR discussed the current stage of preparation of development legislative and institutional changes in the participant countries and presented ODA management systems in Western European countries.

*December 13.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš received chairman of the committee for foreign relations and national security of the parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran Alaeddin Boroujerdi. The meeting reviewed the Slovak-Iranian relations concluding that they were left behind their potential. In respect to Iran's nuclear program, Mr. Kubiš underscored that Slovakia supported peaceful use of nuclear energy but rejected a technology buildup damaging the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The minister further expressed serious discontent upon the Tehran holocaust conference and stressed that Slovakia rejected any efforts to question holocaust.

*December 14 – 15.* Prime Minister of the SR Robert Fico and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš attended the European Council session in Brussels. The negotiation's main agenda listed the EU enlargement, the revival of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, and the upcoming German presidency. The Council also discussed the Union's energy, environment, and security policies.

*December 19 – 21.* Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš paid an official visit to the People's Republic of China. With his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi, he negotiated about EU-China cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, and human rights matters. The ministers exchanged their opinions as members of the UN Security Council, especially on the issue of North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs, on the status of Kosovo, and the situation in Sudan. The Slovak prime minister's visit to Beijing in 2007 was also a subject of the talks.

*December 20.* The North Atlantic Council decided that the Slovak embassy in Kiev would serve as a NATO Contact Embassy for Ukraine starting January 2007. For two years, Slovakia should represent the Alliance in Ukraine and serve as a source of information about it. The mission should focus on improving NATO's stereotypical image in Ukrainian public opinion and on utilizing Slovakia's experience from the period prior to the accession into NATO for the benefit of Ukraine's integration bid.

*December 28.* In Cairo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the SR Ján Kubiš met with Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt Ahmed Aboul Gheit. They negotiated about the situation in the Middle East and bilateral relations and Mr. Kubiš reported on Slovakia's activities as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.

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# List of Treaties Concluded between Slovakia and Other Countries in 2006

## **Presidential Treaties**

1. Legal Instrument between the Slovak Republic and the United States of America according to the Article 3 paragraph 3 of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States of America and the European Union signed on June 25, 2003 (Bratislava, February 6, 2006)
2. Legal Instrument on Extradition between the Slovak Republic and the United States of America according to the Article 3 paragraph 2 of the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the European Union signed on June 25, 2003 (Bratislava, February 6, 2006)
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III) (Bern, April 25, 2006)
4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Income Tax (Bratislava, May 13, 2006)
5. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of India on Support and Mutual Protection of the Investments (Bratislava, September 25, 2006)

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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

6. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Singapore on Support and Mutual Protection of the Investments (Singapore, October 13, 2006)
7. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on Cooperation in Avoiding the Cross-Border Crime and in Fighting the Organized Crime (Bratislava, October 2, 2006)

## **Intergovernmental Treaties**

1. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Mutual Protection and Exchange of Classified Information (Bratislava, February 3, 2006)
2. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Indonesia on Economy Cooperation (Jakarta, May 2, 2006)
3. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Moldova on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Custom Matters
4. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Iraq on the Donation of the Military Material (Baghdad, May 7, 2006)
5. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Hungary Concerning the Crossing the State Border on Tourist Trails (Budapest, May 10, 2006)
6. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of South Africa on Co-operation in Science and Technology (Pretoria, May 15, 2006)
7. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania on the Restructuring and Repayment of the Republic of Albania's Debt towards the Slovak Republic (Bratislava, May 26, 2006)

8. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Cabinet of ministers of Ukraine on Mutual Protection of Classified Information  
(Bratislava, June 22, 2006)
9. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria on Readmission of Persons  
(Bratislava, May 22, 2006)
10. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on Cooperation at the Joint Contact Points  
(Bratislava, October 2, 2006)
11. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Swiss Federal Council on the Readmission of Persons Residing without Authorization  
(Bratislava, October 12, 2006)
12. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Vietnam on Economy Cooperation  
(Hanoi, October 16, 2006)
13. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Vietnam on Mutual on Abolition of Visa Requirements for Holders of Diplomatic Passports and Facilitation of Issue of Visa for the Holders of Official/Service Passports  
(Hanoi, October 16, 2006)
14. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the United Nations Development Program on Providing the Support Service  
(Bratislava, October 26, 2006)
15. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Safeguarding of Mutual Interests in the Use and Distribution of Intellectual Property Rights.  
(Moscow, November 7, 2006)
16. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation on Mutual Protection of Classified Information  
(Moscow, November 7, 2006)
17. Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of Romania Concerning the Military Tombs  
(Bratislava, November 30, 2006)

## Ministerial Treaties

1. Plan of Cooperation between the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Health of the Peoples Republic of China in the field of the Health-care for 2006 – 2009  
(Beijing, January 19, 2006)
2. Plan of Cooperation between the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Bulgaria for 2006 – 2008  
(Bratislava, April 27, 2006)
3. Memorandum on Understanding between the Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Economy of the United Mexican States on Establishment of the Joint Economy Commission  
(Bratislava, May 13, 2006)
4. Protocol on Cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro  
(Podgorica, August 22, 2006)
5. Agreement between the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the field of Education  
(Moscow, November 7, 2006)
6. Memorandum on Understanding between the Ministry of Health of the Slovak Republic and the State Secretariat for Economy Affairs of Switzerland on Providing the Financial Support for the Project “Hospital Waste Incinerator” in Trnava as a part of the Program “Hospital Waste Incinerators in Trnava and Čadca”  
(Bratislava, November 28, 2006)

## Multilateral Treaties

1. Convention for the Establishment of a European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) as amended by the EUMETSAT Council in Resolution EUM/C/Res. XXXVI of 5 June 1991  
(Geneva, May 24, 1983)  
entered into force on June 19, 1986  
deposited with: Government of the Swiss Confederation

the Slovak Republic accession document deposited on January 3, 2006  
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on January 3, 2006  
published under the No. 97/2006 Z. z.

2. Acts of the Universal Postal Union consisting of Seventh Additional Protocol to the Constitution of the UPU, UPU General Regulations, Universal Postal Convention, the Letter Post Regulations and the Parcel Post Regulations (Bucharest, October 5, 2004)  
deposited with: DG Universal Postal Union  
instruments of ratification deposited on January 4, 2006  
published under the No. 160/2006 Z. z.
3. Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Amendment Protocol to the Agreement between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Implementation of Article III (1) and (4) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Brussels, April 6, 1973)  
Deposited with: DG IAEA, January 3, 2006  
Document No. 36/2006 Z.z.
4. Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) as Edited and Ammended on December 3, 2002  
deposited with: Government of the Swiss Confederation  
the Slovak Republic accession document deposited on January 24, 2006  
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on February 23, 2006  
published under the No. 98/2006 Z. z.
5. Protocol Drawing Up on the Basis of the Article K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union on the Interpretation of the Convention on the Uses of Information Technology for Customs Purposes by way of Preliminary Rulings of the Court of Justice (Brussels, November 29, 1996)  
deposited with: SG of the Council of the EU  
the Slovak Republic accession document deposited on May 6, 2004  
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on December 25, 2005  
published under the No. 286/2006 Z. z.



Slovak Republic's Statement to the Protocol deposited with the SG Council of the EU on February 23, 2006  
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on February 23, 2006  
published under the No. 286/2006 Z. z.

6. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (Paris, October 17, 2003)  
deposited with: DG UNESCO  
instruments of ratification of the Slovak Republic deposited on March 24, 2006  
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on June 24, 2006  
published under the No.. 375/2006 Z.z.
7. Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (Strasbourg, May 19, 2006)  
deposited with: SG CoE  
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on May 19, 2006  
CETS No.: 197
8. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (Strasbourg, May 19, 2006)  
deposited with: SG CoE  
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on May 19, 2006  
CETS No.: 196
9. United Nations Convention against Corruption (New York, October 31, 2003)  
deposited with: UN SG  
signed on behalf of the Slovak Republic on December 9, 2003  
instruments of ratification of the Slovak Republic deposited on June 1, 2006  
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on July 1, 2006
10. International Coffee Agreement 2001 (London, September 28, 2000)  
deposited with: UN SG  
the Slovak Republic accession on June 1, 2006
11. The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO) (Paris, October 20, 2005)  
deposited with: DG UNESCO instruments of ratification of the Slovak Republic deposited on December 18, 2006  
entered into force for the Slovak Republic on March 18, 2007

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# Selected Documents with Foreign Policy Impact Submitted to Sessions of the SR Government in 2006

## I. Strategies and Programs

### *1.1. Basic Framework Documents of Slovakia's Foreign Policy*

*Draft Manifesto of the Government of the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/944CC49745DF10C1C12571B90029F259?OpenDocument>

*Draft National Official Development Assistance Programme 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/45B1A1D9DBBDBF3EC1257149003D0AB5?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Institutionalise the System of the Slovak Development Assistance*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/399629FD02203762C12571F50034DA75?OpenDocument>

### *1.2. European Union*

*Proposal for Slovakia's Participation in the European Union's European Year of Equal Opportunities for All (2007) – Towards a Just Society*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D7A22CEF1CBF5A5AC125717200416E90?OpenDocument>

*Draft National Plan of Implementation of the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All 2007 – Towards a Just Society and the participation of a Slovak delegation at the opening conference of the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All 2007 – Towards a Just Society.*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/65505026AD5A8562C12572420049D896?OpenDocument>

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Elaborated by Tomáš Siviček, M.E.S.A. 10 (sivicek@mesa10.sk). Based on Information of the Government Office of the Slovak Republic. Documents available in Slovak only.

*The Renewed Sustainable Development Strategy of the European Union*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/713D8F884394DBD2C12571B7002D5FA2?OpenDocument>

### ***1.3. Knowledge Based Society***

*Draft Innovation Strategy of the SR*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3019124E98E4CC4BC12571450044084D?OpenDocument>

### ***1.4. Euro***

*Convergence Program of Slovakia for the 2006-2010 period – the 2006 update*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8EBDA47F681846E9C125722F0034A45A?OpenDocument>

### ***1.5. V4***

*Draft Program for the Slovak Presidency of the V4*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/46F8E2532C42528BC12571720040308D?OpenDocument>

## **II. Standpoints and Positions of the SR**

### ***2.1. European Union***

*Information on the Assessment of the Initial Position of the Slovak Republic on the Proposals of European Commission Regulations Concerning Structural and the Cohesion Funds*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/01BD57D68591E3DBC12570FF0036D488?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Assessment of the Initial Position of the Slovak Republic on the Drafts of European Commission Regulations Concerning Structural and the Cohesion Funds – Final Assessment*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/543B89CE7C5D4D25C12571860041606F?OpenDocument>

*Initial Position of the Slovak Republic on the Evaluation Report on Compliance of Provisions on the Protection of Personal Data with the Provisions of the Schengen Acquis*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9621E1807FF961F8C12571800039E203?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Position of the Slovak Republic on the Commission Proposal to Transfer Third Pillar Activities (Article 29 of the Treaty on European Union) under the Legal Framework of the First*

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*Pillar (Title IV of the Treaty establishing the European Communities) Using Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/DA23A614AE75E01DC12571E7003DC4F4?OpenDocument>

*Monitoring of the Developments in the Slovak Republic's Positions on Draft Legal Acts of the European Union*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A0722DC63B94F607C125723B003597AC?OpenDocument>

*Draft Governmental Resolution concerning the Letter of the European Commission Of 22 November 2006 in the Matter of U.S. Steel's Sales Quotas on the Markets of Romania and Bulgaria*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A4AAA2B382137432C125724A0043AA3A?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Open the Labor Market of the Slovak Republic to Nationals of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D98C6719F7C3EC99C12572030033A66B?OpenDocument>

*Proposal Related to the Preparation of the Slovak Government's Offer to Host the Seat of the European Institute for Gender Equality in the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/31437C7FDDE8DC67C125720B003CAA8C?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Slovak Republic's Decision to Support Ireland in the European Court of Justice Case brought by the Republic of Ireland for Annulment of Directive 2006/24/EC on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks on Grounds of Incorrect Legal Basis*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/FC534C9E1CC4E8C7C1257211002A6596?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Submission of the National Quota Allocation Plan to the European Commission in accordance with Act No. 572/2004 Coll. on Emission Allowance Trading (National Allocation Plan).*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/21D0A9C4EFDB49EBC125722000311795?OpenDocument>

*Draft Steps to be taken by Slovakia in connection with Commission Decision of November 29, 2006 relating to the National Quota Allocation Plan submitted by the Slovak Republic in accordance with European Parliament and Council Directive No. 2003/87/EC*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/6426C24DE7D9C211C125723C0029E125?OpenDocument>

*Information on Possible Steps that Can be Taken by Slovakia in Connection with Commission Decision of 29 November 2006 relating to the National Quota Allocation Plan submitted by the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8BDAB2819A55A301C12572430036C2B0?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for Further Steps to be Taken by Slovakia in Connection with EC Decision K(2006)5616 of November 29, 2006 relating to the National Quota Allocation Plan submitted by the Slovak Republic in accordance with European Parliament and Council Directive No. 2003/87/EC*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9BACF63EA11B6A01C12572490041623D?OpenDocument>

## **2.2. Knowledge Based Society**

*Draft Steps to ensure Balanced Financial Support for Research and Development from the Resources of the European Regional Development Fund between 2007 and 2013 throughout the Whole Territory of the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/43B5EBB783B7AE9B4125711D003F80B8?OpenDocument>

## **2.3. Others**

*Proposal for the Participation of a Delegation of the Slovak Republic at the 61<sup>st</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly and the Guidelines for the Delegation*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/CAC619BCE5F4D98BC12571D40031E6AC?OpenDocument>

*Second Periodical Report of the Slovak Republic to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/13EAE00D857CEFC8C125723D003A29B8?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Host the TER Project Central Office in Bratislava*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/77F842C49D039C4AC12572480037C5E0?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for the Slovak Republic's Contribution to the Western Balkans Fund Managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9AAFBE0976280FF2C125724800443DE8?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Join the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative of the International Development Association*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/475ABE5240331B8AC12572480044A7CC?OpenDocument>

# **III. Reports on the Results of the International Conferencies and Negotiations**

## **3.1. European Union**

*Report on the Course and Results of the European Council in Brussels on December 15 and 16, 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/2295B64DDA3DC9D6C125710600492C01?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course and Results of the European Council in Brussels on March 23 and 24, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/77876DE8DB11EE4AC125715A003A0BF4?OpenDocument>

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*Information on the Course and Results of the Participation of the Slovak Delegation led by Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda at the Fourth EU – Latin America/Caribbean Summit Held in Vienna between May 11–13, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C5AE918817AF9358C125718E00408F12?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course and Results of the European Council in Brussels on June 15–16, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A10365391192EED7C12571B20031EAEB?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Foreign Working Visit by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic to Brussels on September 7, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/67E332B674E8D830C12571F0003D893A?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Participation of a Delegation of the Government of the Slovak Republic led by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Robert Fico at the Sixth Asia-Europe Meeting held in Helsinki, Finland, on September 10–11, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/431BC422CAF0AF4AC12571F500346BA9?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Meeting of the Council for General Affairs and External Relations, Luxembourg, October 16–17, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/CFF7D1B453AE7C19C125721F002B5CE7?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Slovak Republic's Participation at the Informal European Council in Lahti on 20 October 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/E30FCD03B3B45BBDC125722C004B97DF?OpenDocument>

### **3.2. V4**

*Information on the Course and Results of the Meeting of Visegrad Group Foreign Ministers in Bratislava on September 25, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/2347B61606AA3392C12571E6004A7823?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Summit of Visegrad Four Prime Ministers in the Republic of Hungary (Visegrad, October 10, 2006)*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/154C49C82CDA6378C125720A002F8982?OpenDocument>

### **3.3. CEI**

*Information on the Review of the Slovak Republic's Presidency of the Central European Initiative in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8FEC16D3FA8CA8ACC125710D0047F0F9?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Conference of Agriculture Ministers of the Central European Initiative on November 3–4, 2005 in Sliach – Sielnica, Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/29A17ECE3E61D754C125711C004CA821?OpenDocument>

### **3.4. UN**

*Information on the Course and Results of the Autumn part of the 60<sup>th</sup> Session of the United Nations General Assembly*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F80F759EB2B49572C125711E0043D82B?OpenDocument>

*Information – Sixth Report on the Implementation of the Program of Action of the UN International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo 1994) and the Key Actions adopted at the 21<sup>st</sup> Special Session of the UN General Assembly (New York 1999) in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A335F06669B7F366C1257110003CD291?OpenDocument>

*On the 66<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN ECE Committee on Human Settlements*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/FC29B40537C45C88C12570F3003A6EB0?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the 33<sup>rd</sup> Session of the Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations – FAO*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/08C8E153FE0CBB46C12571230037F2C6?OpenDocument>

*Draft Informational Report on the Participation of a Slovak Delegation at the World Summit on the Information Society (November 16–18, 2005, Tunis)*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/1913FA07A577FBB6C125711D0045DFE3?OpenDocument>

### **3.6. Other Multilateral Negotiations**

*Information on the Course and Results of the Participation of the Delegation of the Slovak Republic led by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda at the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED) Conference in Barcelona on November 27–28, 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9E4E16A84E619205C12570EA0048D9B1?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the 13<sup>th</sup> Session of the OSCE Ministerial Council, Ljubljana, December 5–6, 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8A3703120E905B40C12570F900452D4F?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the 6<sup>th</sup> WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/0FD7010AA160C6E9C125711C0034F479?OpenDocument>

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*Information on the Course and Results of the Meeting of Working Table II of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/B26BE9518CC76DE0C125711B003D91C1?OpenDocument>

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/7395C3C636F5B26FC12571AF0042C1E7?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the 50<sup>th</sup> General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/16A2B5DB3426C4D0C1257213003586D7?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course and Results of the 95<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation held between May 31, 2006 and June 16, 2006 in Geneva*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/84FB4B12213CB70FC1257237003D87A1?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course of Negotiations and Conclusions adopted by the 16<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of the World Tourism Organisation held in Dakar, Senegal, between November 25 and December 2, 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4047338B90A6738DC12571330044FA05?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the 9<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties to the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/48C7E622F8754B10C125711C0033191B?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Eighth Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/B045FBF08F028D68C12571F40031CC7A?OpenDocument>

### **3.7. Bilateral Negotiations**

*Information on the Course and Results of the Visit by Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China Wen Jiabao to the Slovak Republic on December 7–8, 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/BD8C937E1DF9BCFCC125710200489684?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Working visit by Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz to the Slovak Republic on January 17, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/612C2000D8D27FCFC1257116003FB57C?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Tony Blair to the Slovak Republic on March 9–10, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/04D6483C86DE502AC1257140002AA5C4?OpenDocument>



*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda to the United States of America between March 12–14, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/2C8D02989E4E1DDCC125714C004C8DF4?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Angela Merkel to the Slovak Republic on May 11, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/6B04A09FBD4A7870C1257180003A33B8?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Visit by a Delegation of the Government of the Slovak Republic led by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda to the Republic of France on May 2, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C9080E1745B3DB37C1257184003B49C3?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Robert Fico to the Czech Republic on July 15, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/B1441D4A6981A1F0C12571D1002E5ABF?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by a Delegation of the Government of the Czech Republic led by Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Mirek Topolánek to the Slovak Republic on September 14, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3AEC9AE7AC92B248C12571F500342165?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia Vojislav Kostunica to Slovakia on October 1–2, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/EF032500D8A63A27C1257209003A83FE?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Working Visit by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Robert Fico to the Republic of Italy on October 3, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/34B9B2874194EAF3C125720A002EFBB9?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Robert Fico to the Republic of Poland on October 5, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A80421CAA4BAFA83C125721200386C5E?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course and Results of the Visit by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to the Slovak Republic on October 30, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/CE41CD7B297F2606C125722700465604?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Working Visit by Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Robert Fico to Ireland on November 12–13, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/180DB693DE9AC7FC41257236003C7C27?OpenDocument>

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*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by a Delegation of the Government led by Prime Minister Robert Fico to the Republic of Portugal on November 20–21, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4915B702A8D63FDCC12572420040681F?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ján Kubiš to Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo between August 21–23, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8FCA610E7360D84CC12571E6004B20B1?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Working Visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Ján Kubiš to the Republic of France on October 16, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/54E32C925D6D8075C12572120030CA62?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Working visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Ján Kubiš to the Republic of Croatia on October 30–31, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/88C4B2CD51E01F6BC125722700311AD5?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Ján Kubiš to the Hellenic Republic on November 8–9, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/747D34741A84D4C8C1257234002F626D?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Official Visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus Yiorgos Lillikas to the Slovak Republic on October 5–6, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8B69A6F2A825D7B3C1257212002EEB4B?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Course and Results of the Working Visit by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldavia Andrei Stratan to the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/056CF76E69311894C12572200031971D?OpenDocument>

*Information on the visit of the Slovak Ambassador to the Republic of Hungary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary on August 28, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/149245492D6A3878C12571DA0038D934?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course and Results of the 5th session of the Joint Slovak-Hungarian Commission for Minority Affairs*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/7592EC6405FF7891C1257164004142CE?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course and Results of the 6th session of the Joint Slovak-Hungarian Commission for Minority Affairs*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/71EAFCDFF2CDBF6EC12572420031C1C8?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Results of the Negotiations between the Governmental Delegations of the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary on the Implementation of the International Court of Justice Judgement on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks case*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/97440DACEA610353C125722C003A425A?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Results of the Negotiations between the Governmental Delegations of the Slovak Republic and the Republic of Hungary on the Implementation of the International Court of Justice Judgement on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros System of Locks case – supplement*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8C605F5254C3F074C125722E003BF703?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Preparation of the 11<sup>th</sup> Session of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Co-operation and Co-operation in Science and Technology between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8EDC4B93969D264DC12570FB004CC6C8?OpenDocument>

## **IV. Other Reports, Assessments and Proposals**

### ***4.1. Reports on the Basic Framework Documents***

*Report on the Fulfilment of Slovak Foreign Policy Tasks in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3A5FA775538FC063C125711C003216B3?OpenDocument>

*Information on Official Development Assistance Provided by the Slovak Republic in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/B239EF4AE0A378C5C1257149003C4448?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Establishment of the Slovak Agency for International Development Co-operation – new version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/78BB37F34BAE5257C125723400366905?OpenDocument>

### ***4.2. European Union***

*Summary Report on the Second Year of the Slovak Republic's Membership of the European Union May 1, 2005 – April 30, 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/E9E265CA7D711595C12571700041554A?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Slovak Republic's Participation in European Union Community Programs in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/33A7272A7FC6D117C12571F80047A112?OpenDocument>

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*Report on the Personnel Representing the Slovak Republic in European Union Institutions*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/BA5949615857D767C12571A000389682?OpenDocument>

*Assessment of the Impact of the Application of the EU Common Trade Policy on Slovakia*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3D5C0FEFE0CC3DBAC12570EA003DFABB?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Developments in Slovakia's Foreign Trade and its Position within the EU*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/49B9B64D5CEBAD14C1257179003DD362?OpenDocument>

*National Convention on the European Union – Assessment of Activities in 2005 and Focus of Activities for 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3F0103CBBFB44726C125716200310701?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Impacts of the Introduction of European Union Format Identity Documents on the State Budget*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/E886D5538CBFB231C125714700317E1E?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Changes in the Composition of the Slovak Delegation on the Committee of Regions of the European Union*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9D85BB76D0F07142C1257123003877D4?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for Slovakia's Candidate for the Post of Advocate General of the Court of Justice of the European Communities*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3A9A32B6ADEB5E28C12571320042EC09?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Nomination of Members and Substitutes of the Slovak Delegation to the European Economic and Social Committee for 2006–2010*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/6ECA14F29C88A515C12571CC0046FA04?OpenDocument>

*Draft Statute of the Office of the Slovak Republic's Representative in Proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/5CD7FEEEEAD7D77DAC12571D40034D9B5?OpenDocument>

### **4.3. Knowledge Based Society**

*Report on the Implementation of the Competitiveness Strategy for Slovakia until 2010, its Action Plans and the National Programme of Reforms in Slovakia – new version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/CC597604E08AC189C125712B003121F3?OpenDocument>

*Report on Progress in the Implementation of the National Program of Reforms in the Slovak Republic for 2006–2008*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/51D71B8EEE2C96E5C1257202004E7C08?OpenDocument>

*Draft Supplement to the National Program of Reforms in the Slovak Republic for 2006–2008*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/EE86CF7281D2DD36C125724200324A1E?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Implementation of Selected Tasks under the Education and Employment Action Plan of the MINERVA Program*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/616A18AB5C3A53F9C12571400043274D?OpenDocument>

*Proposal Concerning the Implementation of the European Youth Pact in the Context of the Slovak Republic and its Integration into Slovakia's Competitiveness Strategy until 2010 – Action Plans*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F161511CCABFD4D2C12570EA0041BAC4?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for the Strategic Priority “Human Resources and Training” for the Objective Regional Competitiveness and Employment funded from the European Social Fund – new version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9C9EA5509B19EE22C12570DD00410DBA?OpenDocument>

*Draft Statute of the Knowledge Society Commission*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/7A55CC33113C6C4EC1257249003BFF54?OpenDocument>

*Draft Programme of the Research and Development Support Agency to Promote the Human Resources in the Area of Research and Development and Popularisation of Science*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A56768B9B1C3BD56C125712500432591?OpenDocument>

#### **4.4. Euro**

*Report on the Implementation of the National Plan for the Introduction of the Euro in the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9BCC72C8DEB7BEE9C1257123004B9B65?OpenDocument>

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/8E46D336EA3ED143C12571BC00425ACA?OpenDocument>

*Draft Declaration of the Slovak Republic to Designate Europol as the Central Office for Combating Euro Counterfeiting*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/62F13E7DC6AA3A80C12571540041DD74?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Recall the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Slovak Republic for the Introduction of the Euro*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/228EC9873450F138C12571C3002E6331?OpenDocument>

#### **4.5. EU Legislation – approximation, transposition**

*Information on Approximation Ordinances of the Government of the Slovak Republic Issued in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2006 and Plans for the Adoption of Approximation Ordinances of the Government of the Slovak Republic in the 1<sup>st</sup> half of 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/29F4B25880CB89FCC12570F9003F525D?OpenDocument>

*Information on Approximation Ordinances of the Government of the Slovak Republic Issued in the 1<sup>st</sup> half of 2006 and Plans for the Adoption of Approximation Ordinances of the Government of the Slovak Republic in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/5748A97B31B50CFBC12571B6003D3214?OpenDocument>

*Report on Letters of Formal Notice and Reasoned Opinions Sent by the European Commission to the Slovak Republic under Article 226 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/1A2877792052EF11C12570FC00461D3B?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Transposition Deficit of the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/DF50992941FE4C30C12571DA002EA86D?OpenDocument>

*Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2007 and the Report on the Priorities Arising from the Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2007 for the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/B30370920B8F2721C12572330043729D?OpenDocument>

*Information from an Inspection of the Implementation of Tasks Arising from Governmental Resolutions Scheduled for the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2005 at Ministries and Other Central State Administration Authorities, with a view to the Implementation of Governmental Resolution No. 70/2005 Concerning the Review of the Timetable*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/955B91F67E991E2BC125710E004917FB?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Specify the Central State Administration Authorities Responsible for the Transposition of Directives and Framework Decisions*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/37FA855939A3F762C125714500439E6E?OpenDocument>

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/FF9DBF7E699F10D8C12571F80049652D?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Define the Responsibility of Ministries and Other Central State Administration Authorities for the Adoption and Application of Measures Related to Regulations and Decisions of the European Communities at the National Level*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/5A8179F1B8993EDFC1257209002E95C8?OpenDocument>

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/43B89115DD8575EBC12570EA004932AB?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Assign Responsibility for the Implementation of the Articles of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/650B950D96DE8E7CC125716B0041F42B?OpenDocument>

#### **4.6. Financial mechanisms / EU Funds**

*Draft Update of the National Strategic Reference Framework of the Slovak Republic for 2007 – 2013*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A88171CC1842FF7BC12571F80043F1EA?OpenDocument>

*Proposal of Innovative Financial Instruments for the National Strategic Reference Framework 2007 – 2013 (stage 2)*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/7EAD7E3F162D5930C12571ED002FD18B?OpenDocument>

*National Strategic Reference Framework of the Slovak Republic for 2007 – 2013*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/959FAC53573BF132C12572370037D331?OpenDocument>  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/1295B724B88E6A14C125716F0043AD95?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Comprehensive Assessment of the Relations Between the Budgets of the EU and Slovakia in 2005 (including the actual net position)*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/95AD0F58ABA51013C125713700466A52?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Assessment of the Functionality and Effectiveness of Having a Single Payment Agency for Structural Funds for 2004 – 2006 at the Ministry of Finance*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D73817197E0F0372C12570EA004A5DA8?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Determine the Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic as the Responsible Authority for the European Refugee Fund*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9A24C238B2E5D13CC12570FB004579BB?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Implementation and Use of Pre-accession Instruments and Structural and the Cohesion Funds as of December 31, 2005*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/E14F9557D6449E16C125713000450B4C?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Operation of the National Fund in 2005*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4A9DA15DB1AE8E5CC125713300386558?OpenDocument>

*Supplement to the Concept for the Financing of Projects Supported from Structural Funds for 2004 – 2006*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/2EE926EC701B0855C125716F0041ECDE?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Implementation and Use of Pre-accession Instruments and Structural and the Cohesion Funds as of 30.04.2006*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/B6576F0A716D0745C1257180003AF3F9?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Assessment of Bilateral Assistance Provided to the Slovak Republic by European Union Member States in 2005*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C23CC6AA32FABCB3C12571810039C4DF?OpenDocument>

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*Report on Progress in the Implementation of the EEA Financial Mechanism and the Norwegian Financial Mechanism*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/0D35900B1C3BB77FC1257184003BE517?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Implementation of the PHARE Program and the Transition Facility in the Slovak Republic in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/81EF454ACC039078C125718B003E4259?OpenDocument>

*Deposit of 20,000 to the credit of the Multidonor Trust Fund of the Decade of Roma Inclusion*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/465F6FEC7F572377C1257184003B985D?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Completion of Transition Facility Programing for 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/49E5974918C6D2C9C125719500408970?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Use of Funding from the European Union Solidarity Fund*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/E9E990B8BA619FC9C12571B600404767?OpenDocument>

*Use of the Government's reserves for EU-related operations and contributions to the European Union*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D37C8C951F67F50CC12571DF0039B647?OpenDocument>

*Draft System of Management of Structural and the Cohesion Funds in the 2007 – 2013 Programing Period – basic version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D17625629CD2AC2EC12571DF0036107B?OpenDocument>

*Draft Strategy for the Financing of Structural and the Cohesion Funds in the 2007 – 2013 Programing Period*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/908C37A65D6D586DC12571DB003B348E?OpenDocument>

*System of Financial Management of Structural and the Cohesion Funds in the 2007 – 2013 Programing Period*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/907CF6F8CCBC52DBC12571DF00356AB1?OpenDocument>

*On the Readiness of the Slovak Republic to use Structural and the Cohesion Funds in the 2007 – 2013 Programming Period (situation as of November 15, 2006)*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C30EC02CC0D200B5C1257237003CC677?OpenDocument>

*Review of the Implementation of the Timetable for the Publication of Calls for Projects in 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D9B4A763E86B7841C1257244003EBD7E?OpenDocument>



#### **4.7. Schengen**

*Report on the Assessment of the Implementation of Tasks Arising from the Updated Schengen Action Plan of the Slovak Republic and the Draft Fifth Update of the Schengen Action Plan of the Slovak Republic*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3C251518621E132CC12571F0003DE588?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to appoint the Plenipotentiary of the Government of the Slovak Republic for Accession to the Schengen Area*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D0B4C9019E4ABDE9C12572350036B0C9?OpenDocument>

*Report on Adherence to the Timetable for the Schengen Information System II*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4D27903C76596E74C12570EA004A9C51?OpenDocument>

#### **4.8. Security Dimension of the Foreign Policy**

*Proposal to Amend the Mandate of the Demining Engineering Unit of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic Operating in the Iraqi Freedom Operation*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/3607397080608BAEC125713B003EEFA6?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Timetable for the Withdrawal of Members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic from the Iraqi Freedom Operation*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C33CF98D79B9076BC125720B003D0109?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to withdraw Members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic from the EU's Action to Support the African Union's AMIS II Mission in Sudan/Darfur*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/11607964007AC4E9C1257227003BB053?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to pay the Slovak Republic's Contributions to the Budget for the Construction of the New NATO Headquarters – new version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/175A1B24D7B0FBEBEC125715C003A134C?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to amend Governmental Resolution No. 41 of January 15, 2003 Concerning the Proposal for the Share of the Slovak Republic's Contributions to Common Budgets of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/279D4FC95F76AB57C125718D003B9145?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for the Slovak Republic's Accession to the Agreement between the Parties to the North-Atlantic Treaty for the Security of Information*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/398D8081B8F77B49C12571D800352498?OpenDocument>

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*Draft Assessment of the Operation of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in International Crisis Management Operations in 2005, including a Draft Participation Plan for 2006 and 2007*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/005295E3F0292C1EC1257177003AEE6C?OpenDocument>

*Organization of Slovakia's Preparations for the NATO CMX 06 Crisis Management Exercise between March 1–7, 2006*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/0B371C717A2C9362C125710E003995E6?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for the Expression of Agreement with the Presence of Foreign Armed Forces in the Territory of the Slovak Republic and the Deployment of Members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic Abroad for the Purposes of a Military Exercise*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/21B61F5AF03FBCE1C1257195003D3869?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for the Expression of Agreement with the Presence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Slovenia in the Territory of the Slovak Republic for the Purposes of a Military Exercise*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/1F18373AA98958A4C12572110030AF9C?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course of the NATO CMX 06 Crisis Management Exercise*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/7145181375D7BFCDC12572170030B3D2?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Provide Over Flight and Landing Clearance for Canadian Forces Aircraft in the Territory of the Slovak Republic in the Period until December 31, 2006*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/220AA9382A3C8988C125714C004C0E9A?OpenDocument>

*Draft Programme of Military Exercises in 2007 and the Related Deployment of Members of the Slovak Armed Forces Outside the Territory of the Slovak Republic and Presence of Foreign Armed Forces in the Territory of Slovakia*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/19B4341E0E909C32C12572420032A02A?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Slovak Armed Forces' plane accident (January 19, 2006)*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9E3815FAC9121C03C12570FC003F6602?OpenDocument>

*Report on compensation to Survivors of the Victims of the Slovak Armed Forces' AN-24 plane accident*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A99D4602A7F54B9AC1257108003371D8?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Use Funds from the Government's Reserves to Compensate the Survivors of a Civil Servant who Died in the Slovak Armed Forces' AN-24 Plane Crash*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A512EEA0B8AAD838C125710F003C7690?OpenDocument>

*Preliminary Information on Progress in the Expert Investigation of the AN-24 Plane Crash of January 19, 2006*  
<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/30B957CE13E3CA4CC125712300366E8F?OpenDocument>

*Draft Declaration of the Slovak Republic in Accordance with Article 3 (2) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/7872F0B53382C1A2C1257141003241D0?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Draft Final Account of the Budget Chapter of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic for 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F5C40F07BDA8302CC12571460036BE7E?OpenDocument>

*Draft Act on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons and on Supplementation of Certain Laws*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9F35285F0A8F5B01C125723D0047B14D?OpenDocument>

*Draft Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic Amending Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 397/2005 Coll. Declaring International Sanctions to Ensure International Peace and Security – new version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/78E6A81AC584207FC125714100304D3C?OpenDocument>

*Draft Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic Amending Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 397/2005 Coll. Declaring International Sanctions to Ensure International Peace and Security as Amended by Ordinance of the Government of the Slovak Republic No. 209/2006 Coll.*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/CC2F0A7D4D16C40EC12571AF003A920F?OpenDocument>

#### ***4.8. Development Assistance and Other Forms of Support***

*Draft Mechanism for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance by the Slovak Republic to Foreign Countries*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/1323A136A72EC6F7C1257149003C8F9B?OpenDocument>

*Review of Governmental Resolution No. 1053 of 13.11.2003 Concerning the Granting of Government Scholarships and the Draft Procedure for the Provision of Development Assistance by Slovakia to Developing Countries and Slovaks Leaving Abroad in 2007-2010*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C3ACCB68644901FAC1257249003F893E?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Conclude the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Donation of Military Material*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/AFF3A708997AC4CDC12570F8004A141D?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Conclude the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Republic of Iraq on Military Material Donation*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/65DBD47E53FC5F13C12571410031FE28?OpenDocument>

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*Proposal to Allocate Funds from the Government's Budgetary Reserves for Humanitarian Aid to Lebanon*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/92BAA8181ED7F1FDC12571D8002ED56F?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Allocate Resources from the Government's Budgetary Reserves to Provide Humanitarian Aid to Indonesia*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/309E12655FA88FF1C12571850044491E?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Recall and Appoint the National Foreign Assistance Co-ordinator*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/7E006731EEBA2B85C12571B0003E9DC3?OpenDocument>

### **4.9. Slovak Expatriates**

*Information on the Implementation of the Long-term Concept for the Operation of the General Secretariat for Slovak Expatriates in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/413F08EE5442B8A8C12570FA00444763?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Extend the Competencies of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic for Knowledge Society, European Affairs, Human Rights and Minorities to Include the Area of Slovak Minorities and Communities Abroad*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D09F2AB4E410D0A6C12571B60040B587?OpenDocument>

*Draft Report on the State Policy on Slovaks living Abroad and on State Support Provided to Slovaks living Abroad in 2005, together with the Draft Programme of State Policy on Slovaks Living Abroad for 2007, Containing an Estimate of the Budgetary Resources Needed for the Implementation of the Policy*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/2291BE92846572CDC12571CA002EA605?OpenDocument>

### **4.10. Visa**

*Proposal to Amend Governmental Resolution No. 310 of April 27, 2005 Concerning the Unilateral Abolishment of Visa Charges for the Granting of Transit Visa (type B) and Short-term Visa (type C) to the Nationals of Ukraine*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/FAE9325623814C18C125716B003F2426?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Extend the Period for the Unilateral Suspension of Charges for Granting Visa to Nationals of Serbia and Montenegro – new version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/21EF7F5F7F8C3F0DC125719200389A16?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for the Unilateral Suspension of Charges for Granting Visa to Nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/C38D438D0885BC6FC1257192003859CF?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Suspend Charges for Granting Visa to Nationals of the Republic of Macedonia*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/38FB96EF4B83FC17C1257194004144E5?OpenDocument>

#### **4.11. Others**

*Proposal to Allocate Budgetary Resources to Cover Expenditure Related to Slovakia's Position of a Non-permanent Member of the UN Security Council in 2006 and Other Expenditure Items*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F077CD851178C685C1257138003F5677?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Financial Aspects of the Slovak Republic's Membership of International Organisations and Proposal to Modify the Method of Payment of Membership Fees to International Organisations – new version*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/430FD4F963F86F9BC12571370045FD75?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Amend Annex No. 4 to the Report on the Financial Aspects of the Slovak Republic's Membership of International Organisations and Proposal to Modify the Method of Payment of Membership Fees to International Organisations*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/BA18B96330A054BFC125715B003CD4FF?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Situation in the Implementation of International Treaties in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F49340226DACEB41C125713A0046FA00?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Programme of Co-operation for 2006 and 2007*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4B2486B1DAF72447C125713B00361D8B?OpenDocument>

*Second Periodic Report of the Slovak Republic on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/025CAC167AC93803C1257180003A8D71?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to conclude the Agreement on the Provision of Support Services Between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the United Nations Development Program*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/4F6E1CD9E7476373C12571D10033A828?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Developments with Regard to Individual Complaints against Slovakia within the UN System in the Area of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/06B49D50FD4B25C9C12571D10032CB3A?OpenDocument>

## Annexes

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*Report on the Activities of the Slovak Republic's Agent in Proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/A54BF1D0E602DD0FC1257140002BB528?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Activities of the Chief Border Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic in 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/D89A6E7CB3BA9B4CC1257134003485FA?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Draft Final Account of the Budget Chapter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 2005*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/E33B6882C252D71FC12571470042D771?OpenDocument>

*Assessment of International Co-operation in Sport between 2002 and 2006*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/59C3D726D460AB84C12571EE00210C32?OpenDocument>

*Draft Second and Third Periodic Report of the Slovak Republic on the Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1998 – 2006)*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/2FAE408E4D417FACC12571FC004F2773?OpenDocument>

*Report on the Course and Results of the Second Round of Monitoring of the Implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Slovakia*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/9ED3F013DFA833E8C125721700351844?OpenDocument>

*Information on the Operation of the Bohunice International Decommissioning Support Fund*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/EE9C224CD0D96057C12572450043BA9B?OpenDocument>

*Report on the International Year of Planet Earth*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/E29C9515BF3FBF01C125713700481F3C?OpenDocument>

*Proposal to Modify the Method of Calculation of the Slovak Republic's Contribution to the Budget of the Wassenaar Arrangement*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/F38DDD1D9FE5710CC125711C0036ABBC?OpenDocument>

*Proposal for the Method of Payment of the Slovak Republic's Membership Fees to the International Seed Testing Association*

<http://www.rokovania.sk/appl/material.nsf/0/BD0E4A891CEFAE16C125716F004233B3?OpenDocument>

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# Structure of the State Administration Authorities Acting in International Affairs and European Affairs

## **President of the Slovak Republic**

Ivan Gašparovič

*Office of the President of the Slovak Republic*

Štefánikova 2, 810 00 Bratislava 1

tel.: 02/ 5933 3319

[www.prezident.sk](http://www.prezident.sk)

## **Department of Foreign Affairs and Protocol**

*Department of Protocol*

Head of the Department: Peter Priputen, tel. 02/ 5933 3339

*Department of Foreign Affairs*

Head of the Department: Ján Foltín, tel. 02/ 5720 1139

## **National Council of the Slovak Republic**

Nám. Alexandra Dubčeka 1, 812 80 Bratislava 1

tel.: 02/ 5972 1111

[www.nrsr.sk](http://www.nrsr.sk)

## **Chairman of the National Council of the SR**

Pavol Paška

*Foreign Affairs Committee*

Boris Zala, chairman, tel. 02/ 5972 1233, [zv@nrsr.sk](mailto:zv@nrsr.sk)

*Committee for European Affairs*

Milan Urbáni, chairman, tel. 02/ 5972 2751, oez@nrsl.sk

*Committee for Human Rights, Minorities and the Position of Women*

László Nagy, chairman, tel. 02/ 5972 1699, lpn@nrsl.sk

*Defence and Security Committee*

Rudolf Pučík, chairman, tel. 02/ 5972 1225, vob@nrsl.sk

**Office of the Government of the Slovak Republic**

Nám. slobody 1, 813 70 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5729 5111

www.government.gov.sk

**Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic**

Robert Fico

**Deputy Prime Minister for the Knowledge-Based Society, European Affairs,  
Human Rights and Minorities**

Dušan Čaplovič, tel. 02/ 5729 5318

**European Affairs and Knowledge –Based Society Section**

Director General: Pavel Holík, tel.: 02/ 5729 5500

*Department for European Affairs*

Head of the Department: Daniel Ország, tel.:02/ 5729 5503

**Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic**

Hlboká cesta 2, 833 36 Bratislava 37

Tel.: 02/ 5978 1111

www.foreign.gov.sk

**Minister**

Ján Kubiš

*Office of the Minister*

Head of the Office: Peter Kmec, tel. 02/ 5978 3003, Peter\_Kmec@foreign.gov.sk

**State Secretary**

Oľga Algayerová, tel.: 02/ 5978 3201, stat1@foreign.gov.sk

**State Secretary**

Diana Štrofová, tel.: 02/ 5978 3101, stat2@foreign.gov.sk

**Head of the Civil Service Authority**

Marcel Peško, tel. 02/ 5978 3301, vedu@foreign.gov.sk

*Department of Analyses and Planning*

Head of the Department: Marianna Oravcová, tel.: 02/ 5978 3581, anap@foreign.gov.sk

**Political Division**

Director General: Miroslav Lajčák, tel.: 02/ 5978 2401, pols@foreign.gov.sk

*Common Foreign and Security Policy Department*

Head of the Department: Anna Tureničová, tel.: 02/ 5978 3181, szbp@foreign.gov.sk



*Department of Security Policy*

Head of the Department: Monika Tomašovičová, tel. 02/ 5978 3481, obep@foreign.gov.sk

*3. Territorial Department – States of CIS and Balkan States*

Head of the Department: Štefan Rozkopál, tel.: 02/ 5978 3551, 3teo@foreign.gov.sk

*4. Territorial Department – States of the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Oceania*

Head of the Department: Marián Tomášik, tel.: 02/ 5978 3531, 4teo@foreign.gov.sk

*5. Territorial Department – States of America*

Head of the Department: Dušan Krištofík, 02/ 5978 1111, 5teo@foreign.gov.sk

**Division for European Affairs**

Director General: Ján Kuderjavý, tel.: 02/ 5978 3461, seza@foreign.gov.sk  
*Department for Coordination of Sectoral Policies*

Head of the Department: Dušan Bella, tel.: 02/ 5978 3111, okse@foreign.gov.sk

*Department of Internal Affairs and Institutions of the European Union*

Head of the Department: Róbert Kirnág, tel.: 02/ 5978 3161, ovz@foreign.gov.sk

*1. Territorial Department – States of Western and Southern Europe*

Head of the Department: Ján Voderadský, tel.: 02/ 5978 3411, 1teo@foreign.gov.sk

*2. Territorial Department, States of Central and Northern Europe*

Head of the Department: Jozef Drapecký, tel.: 02/ 5978 3441, 2teo@foreign.gov.sk

**Division for International Organizations and Development Cooperation**

Director General: Roman Bužek, tel.: 02/ 5978 3601, smop@foreign.gov.sk

*Department of the UN and UN Specialised Agencies*

Head of the Department: Hana Kováčová, tel.: 02/ 5978 3501, osno@foreign.gov.sk

*Department of the OSCE, Disarmament and Fight against Terrorism*

Head of the Department: Karol Mistrík, tel. 02/ 5978 3141, obot@foreign.gov.sk

*Department of Development Cooperation*

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*Department of International Economic Cooperation*

Head of the Department: Dagmar Repčková, tel.: 02/ 5978 3561, omes@foreign.gov.sk

**International Law and Consular Division**

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Head of the Department: Milan Kollár, tel.: 02/ 5978 3711, mepo@foreign.gov.sk

*Consular Department*

Head of the Department: Ľubor Bystrický, tel.: 02/ 5978 3256, konz@foreign.gov.sk

*Human Rights Department*

Head of the Department: Emil Kuchár, tel.: 02/ 5978 3731, olrp@foreign.gov.sk

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www.economy.gov.sk

**Minister**

Lubomír Jahnátek

**State Secretary**

Peter Žiga, tel.: 02/ 4333 1783

**State Secretary**

Ivan Rybárik, tel.: 02/ 4333 1944

**Section for European Affairs**

Director General: Jana Sermeková, tel.: 02/ 4854 2204, sermekova@economy.gov.sk

**Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic**

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**Defence Policy, International Affairs and Legislation Department**

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*Department of Defense and Security Policy*

Head of the Department: Július Demetrian

**Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic**

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**Minister**

Robert Kaliňák

**State Secretary**

Jozef Buček, tel.: 02/ 5094 1111

**State Secretary**

Vladimír Čechot, tel.: 02/ 5094 1111

**Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic**

Štefanovičova 5, 817 82 Bratislava

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[www.finance.gov.sk](http://www.finance.gov.sk)

**Minister**

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**State Secretary**

Peter Kažimír, tel.: 02/ 2958 2100

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tel.: 02/ 5939 1111

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**Minister**

Marek Maďarič

State Secretary for Media and Audiovision

Ivan Sečík, tel.: 02/ 5939 1101

State Secretary for Minority and Regional Culture

Augustín Jozef Lang, tel.: 02/ 5939 1215

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**Minister**

Ivan Valentovič

**Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic**

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**State Secretary**

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*Department of International Cooperation and Protocol*

Head of the Department: Štefan Lednický, tel. 02/ 5975 1621

**Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic**

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**State Secretary**

Jozef Habánik, tel.: 02/ 5477 5524

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**State Secretary**

Daniel Hudák, tel.: 02/ 5935 4583

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*Department of International Law*

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*Department of Foreign Relations and Human Rights*

Head of the Department: Jana Vnuková, tel.: 02/ 5935 3473, [jana.vnukova@justice.sk](mailto:jana.vnukova@justice.sk)

**Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic**

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Jaroslav Izák

**State Secretary**

Jaroslav Jaduš, tel.: 02/ 5956 2012

**State Secretary**

Dušan Muňko, tel.: 02/ 5956 2490

**Section for Foreign Assistance and International Relations**

*Department of European Union Affairs*

Head of the Department: Gabriela Štefková, tel. 02/ 5956 2124

**Ministry of Agriculture of the Slovak Republic**

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[www.mpsr.sk](http://www.mpsr.sk)

**Minister**

Miroslav Jureňa

**State Secretary**

Vladimír Palša, tel.: 02/ 5926 6111

**State Secretary**

Viliam Turský, tel.: 02/ 5926 6111

**Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications of the Slovak Republic**

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[www.telecom.gov.sk](http://www.telecom.gov.sk)

**Minister**

Lubomír Vážny

**State Secretary**

Milan Mojš, tel.: 02/ 5273 1462

**State Secretary**

Dušan Švantner, tel.: 02/ 5244 2301

**Section for European Union and Foreign Affairs**

Director General: Dušan Rizek, tel. 02/ 5273 1446, [dusan.rizek@telecom.gov.sk](mailto:dusan.rizek@telecom.gov.sk)

**Ministry of Construction and Regional Development of the Slovak Republic**

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[www.build.gov.sk](http://www.build.gov.sk)

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**State Secretary**

Martin Glváč, tel.: 02/ 5831 7250

**State Secretary**

Daniel Ács, tel.: 02/ 5244 2301

**Supreme Control Office of the Slovak Republic**

Priemyselná 2, 824 73 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5542 3069

[www.controll.gov.sk](http://www.controll.gov.sk)

Head: Ján Jasovský, tel.: 02/ 5542 4189

**Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic**

Drieňová 24, 826 03 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 4333 7305

[www.antimon.gov.sk](http://www.antimon.gov.sk)

Head: Danica Paroulková, tel.: 02/ 4333 7305

**Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic**

Miletičova 3, 824 67 Bratislava

tel.: 02/ 5023 6111

[www.statistics.sk](http://www.statistics.sk)

Head: Ľudmila Benkovičová, tel.: 02/ 5542 5802

## List of the Embassies EU, NATO countries and Some Other Countries

The Embassies in the Slovak Republic and their Heads as of February 2007

Country	Start of Diplomatic Relations	Address of Embassy	In charge of Embassy (LoC – Letter of Credence)
Bosnia a Herzegovina	01/01/1993	Opletalova 27 110 00 Praha Česká republika	<b>Ivan Orlić</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 3, 2006
Canada	01/01/1993	Muchova 6 160 00 Praha 6	<b>Michael Calcott</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: December 11, 2006
Delegation of the European Commission		Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	<b>Andrea Elscheková-Matisová</b> <i>ambassador of EC to SR</i>
European Parliament Information Office		Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	<b>Robert Hajšel</b> <i>executive director</i>
Ireland	01/01/1993	Carlton Savoy Building Mostová 2 811 02 Bratislava	<b>Declan Connolly</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 28, 2004
Japan	01/01/1993	Hlavné nám. 2 813 27 Bratislava	<b>Makato Washizu</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: November 15, 2005
Romania	01/01/1993	Fraňa Kráľa 11 811 05 Bratislava 1	<b>Valerica Epure</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: September 3, 2002
Russian Federation	01/01/1993	Godrova 4 811 06 Bratislava 1	<b>Alexander Udaltsov</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: August 23, 2005
The Republic of Serbia	01/01/1993	Búdkova 38 811 04 Bratislava 1	<b>Mirjana Nikolić</b> <i>chargé d'affaires a.i.</i>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

## Annexes

continued

Swiss Confederation	01/01/1993	Tolstého 9 811 06 Bratislava 1	<b>Josef Aregger</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: February 14, 2005
The Arab Republic of Egypt	01/01/1993	Ferienčiková 14 P.O. Box 322 814 99 Bratislava	<b>Elsayed Ramzy Ezzeldin Ramzy</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: September 9, 2004
The Czech Republic	01/01/1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 8 811 02 Bratislava 1	<b>Vladimír Galuška</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 4, 2004
The Federal Republic of Germany	01/01/1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 10 811 02 Bratislava 1	<b>Jochen Trebesch</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: August 23, 2005
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	01/01/1993	Wallnerstrasse 2/1/2 1010 Viedeň	<b>Marc Thill</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: May 9, 2006
The Hellenic Republic	01/01/1993	Hlavné námestie 4 811 01 Bratislava 1	<b>Constantin Karabetis</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 4, 2005
The Holy See	01/01/1993	Nekrasovova 17 811 04 Bratislava 1	<b>Henryk Józef Nowacki</b> <i>apostolic nuncio</i> LoC: May 10, 2001
The Kingdom of Belgium	01/01/1993	Fraňa Kráľa 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	<b>Alain Cools</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 3, 2006
The Kingdom of Denmark	01/01/1993	Panská 27 816 06 Bratislava	<b>Jorgen Munk Rasmussen</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: November 15, 2005
The Kingdom of Netherlands	01/01/1993	Fraňa Kráľa 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	<b>Rob Swartbol</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: September 11, 2006
The Kingdom of Norway	01/01/1993	Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	<b>Brit Lovseth</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: July 22, 2004
The Kingdom of Spain	01/01/1993	Prepoštská 10 811 01 Bratislava 1	<b>Miguel Aguirre de Cárcer</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: June 14, 2005
The Kingdom of Sweden	01/01/1993	Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava 1	<b>Mikael Westerlind</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: September 11, 2006



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The Peoples Republic of China	01/01/1993	Jančova 8 811 02 Bratislava 1	<b>Zhogpo Huang</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: September 23, 2003
The Republic of Angola	30/09/1993	Štefánikova 6/A 811 05 Bratislava	<b>Alberto Correia Neto</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
The Republic of Austria	01/01/1993	Ventúrska 10 811 01 Bratislava 1	<b>Helmut Wessely</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: September 11, 2006
The Republic of Belarus	01/01/1993	Kuzmányho 3/A 811 06 Bratislava 1	<b>Viktor Navrotsky</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
The Republic of Bulgaria	01/01/1993	Kuzmányho 1 811 06 Bratislava 1	<b>Ognjan Garkov</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: June 13, 2006
The Republic of Croatia	01/01/1993	Miškova 21 811 06 Bratislava 1	<b>Tomislav Car</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: January 16, 2007
The Republic of Cuba	01/01/1993	Somolického 1/A 811 05 Bratislava 1	<b>David Paulovich Escalona</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: November 11, 2006
The Republic of Cyprus	01/01/1993	Parkring 20 A - 1010 Viedeň	<b>Kornelios Korneliou</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: May 9, 2006
The Republic of Estonia	01/01/1993	Wohlebengasse 9/13 A - 1040 Viedeň	<b>Katrin Saarsalu</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 30, 2003
The Republic of Finland	01/01/1993	Palisády 29 811 06 Bratislava	<b>Ravno Tapio Viemerö</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: April 4, 2004
The Republic of France	01/01/1993	Hlavné námestie 7 P.O.Box 152, 810 00 Bratislava 1 812 83 Bratislava 1	<b>Henry Cuny</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: January 16, 2007
The Republic of Hungary	01/01/1993	Sedlárska 3 814 25 Bratislava 1	<b>Antal Heizer</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: January 16, 2007
The Republic of India	01/01/1993	Dunajská 4 811 08 Bratislava	<b>Mysore Kapanaiah Lokesh</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: June 23, 2003

## Annexes

continued

The Republic of Indonesia	01/01/1993	Mudroňova 51 811 03 Bratislava 1	<b>Lutfi Rauf</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: November 21, 2006
The Republic of Italy	01/01/1993	Červeňova 19 811 03 Bratislava 1	<b>Antonino Provenzano</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: July 22, 2004
The Republic of Korea	01/01/1993	Ostravská 17 811 04 Bratislava	<b>Yong-kyu Park</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: February 22, 2007
The Republic of Latvia	01/01/1993	Stefan Esders Platz 4 A - 1190 Viedeň	<b>Aivars Groza</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: May 9, 2006
The Republic of Lithuania	01/01/1993	Löwengasse 47/4 A - 1030 Viedeň	<b>Jonas Rudalevičius</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: July 4, 2002
The Republic of Macedonia	01/01/1993	Maderstrasse 1/10 A - 1040 Viedeň	<b>Vesna Borozan</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: March 21, 2007
The Republic of Malta	01/01/1993	MFA Palazzo Parisio Merchants Street CMR 02 Valletta	<b>Francis Cachia</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: May 31, 2004
The Republic of Moldova	01/01/1993	Lowengasse 47/10 1030 Viedeň	<b>Victor Postolachi</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: June 13, 2006
The Republic of Poland	01/01/1993	Hummelova 4 811 03 Bratislava 1	<b>Zenon Kosiniak-Kamysz</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: August 26, 2003
The Republic of Portugal	01/01/1993	Moskovská 10 811 08 Bratislava 1	<b>José Ernst Henzler Viera Branco</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: Februar 14, 2005
The Republic of Slovenia	01/01/1993	Moyzesova 4 813 15 Bratislava 1	<b>Maja Marija Lovrenčič Svetek</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 4, 2004
The Republic of Turkey	01/01/1993	Holubyho 11 811 03 Bratislava 1	<b>Tunç Ügdül</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: August 22, 2006
Sovereign Military Hospitaller Order of St. John of Jerusalem Of Rhodes and Of Malta	01/01/1993	Na Vřšku 8 811 01 Bratislava 1	<b>Mariano Hugo princ Windisch-Graetz</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: October 23, 2003

continued

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	01/01/1993	Panská 16 811 01 Bratislava 1	<b>Judith Anne MacGregor</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: June 3, 2004
The United States of America	01/01/1993	Hviezdoslavovo námestie 5 811 02 Bratislava 1	<b>Rodolphe Vallee</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: August 23, 2005
Ukraine	01/01/1993	Radvanská 35 811 01 Bratislava 1	<b>Inna Ohnivec</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i> LoC: January 10, 2006

# List of Consulates in the Slovak Republic

The Heads of the Consulates as of February 2007

Country	Address of the Consulate in the SR	Consul
Grenada	Priemyselná 6 824 90 Bratislava 2	<b>Juraj Široký</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	Čajakova 26 831 01 Bratislava	<b>Štefan Žiak</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Malaysia	Jašíkova 2 821 03 Bratislava	<b>Igor Junas</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Salvador	Zahradnícka 62 821 05 Bratislava	<b>Igor Moravčík</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	Podunajská 24 821 04 Bratislava	<b>Lubomíra Károlyiová</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	Obchodná 6 Pasáž Zlatý Jeleň 811 08 Bratislava	<b>Štefan Rosina</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Botanická 27 841 01 Bratislava	<b>Štefan Ižold</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	Hodálová 1 841 05 Bratislava	<b>František Fitoš</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Hlavná 75 040 01 Košice	<b>Dany R. E. Rottiers</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Denmark	Letecká 10 831 03 Bratislava	<b>Michal Lörincz</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Kingdom of Morocco	Krajná 86 821 04 Bratislava 2	<b>Lubomír Šídala</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Hutnícka 1 040 01 Košice	<b>Daniel Lučkanič</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Lermontovova 15 811 05 Bratislava	<b>Ruben Kemény</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Kingdom of Thailand	Viedenská cesta 3 851 01 Bratislava	<b>Alexander Rozin</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Košická 44 P.O. BOX 21 080 01 Prešov	<b>Matúš Murajda</b> <i>honorary consul</i>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

continued

The Republic of Albania	Púpavová 61 841 04 Bratislava	<b>Juraj Kolesár</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Bangladesh	Juraja Hronca 44 841 01 Bratislava	<b>Štefan Petkanič</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Colombia	Nadácia Slovak Gold Dostojevského rad 3 814 99 Bratislava	<b>Miroslav Behúň</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Costa Rica	Palisády 56 811 06 Bratislava	<b>Tomáš Chrenek</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Finland	Moyzesova 5 811 05 Bratislava 1	<b>Karol Kállay</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Guinea	Devínska cesta 108/A 841 04 Bratislava	<b>Ľubomír Schweighofer</b> <i>honorary viceconsul</i>
The Republic of Hungary	Hlavná 67 040 01 Košice	<b>János Czibula</b> <i>consul</i>
The Republic of Chile	Laurinská 2 815 08 Bratislava 1	<b>Jaroslav Šoltys</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Iceland	Mlynské nivy 42 821 09 Bratislava 2	<b>Otto Halás</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Kirgizstan	Miletičova 1 821 08 Bratislava	<b>Tibor Podoba</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Kongo	Na Hrebienku 30 811 02 Bratislava	<b>Soňa Klimeková</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Korea	Hviezdoslavovo nám. 20 811 02 Bratislava 1	<b>Marián Mojžiš</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Nicaragua	Stredný hon 430 900 43 Hamuliakovo	<b>Vladimír Kašťák</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Paraguay	Prepoštská 8 811 01 Bratislava	<b>Martin Šamaj</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Peru	Tuhovská 5 831 07 Bratislava	<b>Andrej Glatz</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Nám. osloboditeľov 1 031 01 Liptovský Mikuláš	<b>Tadeusz Frackowiak</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Senegal	Na kopci 24 010 01 Žilina - Trnové	<b>Souleymane Seck</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Seychelles	Beblavého 4 811 01 Bratislava 1	<b>Andrej Hryc</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Sierra Leone	Partizánska 16 A 811 03 Bratislava	<b>Branislav Hronec</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of South Africa	Révova 27 811 02 Bratislava	<b>Milan Lopašovský</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Syrian Arab Republic	Vysoká 15 811 06 Bratislava	<b>Mustafa Lutfi Al Sabouni</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Ukraine	Plzeňská 11 080 01 Prešov	<b>Yevgen Perebyinis</b> <i>general consul</i>
Ukraine	Budovateľská 29 093 01 Vranov nad Topľou	<b>Stanislav Obický</b> <i>honorary consul</i>

## List of the Embassies of the Slovak Republic, Permanent Missions, Consulates General, Slovak Institutes Abroad

The Embassies of the Slovak Republic, Permanent Missions, Consulates General, Slovak Institutes and their Heads as of February 2006

<b>Embassy</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>In charge of the embassy</b>
Abuja	Abuja Nigeria	<b>Igor Hajdušek</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Ankara	Atatürk Bulvarı 06692 Ankara Turkey	<b>Viktor Bauer</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Astana	Sary-Arka, Karatökef 5 010000 Astana Kazakhstan	<b>Dušan Podhorský</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Athens	Paleo Psychiko 154 52 Athens The Hellenic Republic	<b>Jaroslav Chlebo</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Baghdad	Street 37 P.O.Box 2038 Bagdad Iraq	
Bangkok	No. 21/144, South Sathorn Road Bangkok 101 20 Thailand	<b>Vasil Pytel</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Belgrade	Bulevar umetnosti 18 New Belgrade 110 70 Serbia and Montenegro	<b>Igor Furdík</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Berlin	Friedrichstrasse 60 10117 Berlin Germany	<b>Ivan Korčok</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Bern	Thunstrasse 3006 Bern Switzerland	<b>Štefan Schill</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

continued

Brasilia	Caixa postal 70359-970 Brasilia Brazil	<b>Marián Masarik</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Brussels	Avenue Moliere Brusel-Ixelles Belgium	<b>Peter Sopko</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Budapest	Stefánia út. 1143 Budapest XIV Hungary	<b>Juraj Migaš</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Buenos Aires	Figuroa Alcorta 1425 Buenos Aires Argentina	<b>Vladimír Gráčz</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Bucharest	Strada Otetari 702 06 , Bucuresti Romania	<b>Ján Šoth</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Canberra	Culgoa Circuit, O' Malley 2606 Canberra Australia	<b>Peter Procházka</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Damascus	East Villas - Mezzeh 331 15 Damascus Syria	<b>Oldrich Hlaváček</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Delhi	New Delhi 110021 New Delhi India	<b>Alexander Ilaščík</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Dublin	Clyde Road, Ballsbridge Dublin Ireland	<b>Ján Gábor</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Haag	Parkweg 2585 Haag The Netherlands	<b>Oksana Tomová</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Havana	Calle No. 521 Havana Cuba	<b>Ivo Hlaváček</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Helsinki	Annankatu 00100 Helsinki Finland	<b>Viera Štupáková</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Jakarta	Jalan Profesor Mohammad Yamin 29 1368 Jakarta 103 10 Indonesia	<b>Peter Holásek</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Cairo	3, Adel Hosein Rostom 450/11794 Cairo Egypt	<b>Jozef Cibula</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Copenhagen	Vesterled 2100 Copenhagen Denmark	<b>Lubomír Golian</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Kuala Lumpur	11, Jalan U-Thant 55 000, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia	<b>Milan Lajčiak</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Kuwait	Block No.2, Street No.16, Villa No 22 26222 Kuwait	<b>Ján Lišuch</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>

## Annexes

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Kiev	Jaroslavov val č. 34 010 34 Kiev Ukraine	<b>Urban Rusnák</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Lisbon	Avenida Fontes Pereira de Melo 19, 7. Dto 1050-116 Lisbon Portugal	<b>Radomír Boháč</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
London	Kensington Palace Gardens W8 4QY, London The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	<b>Radovan Javorčík</b> <i>chargé d' affaires</i>
Ljubljana	Tivolská cesta 4, P.P.395 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia	<b>Roman Paldan</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Madrid	del Pinar 28006 Madrid Spain	<b>Ján Valko</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Mexico City	México 11 560 Julio Verne 35 Mexico	<b>Jozef Adamec</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Minsk	Vostočnaja 220113 Minsk Belarus	<b>Lubomír Reháč</b> <i>chargé d' affaires</i>
Moscow	J. Fučíka 17/19 Moscow Russia	<b>Augustín Čisár,</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Nairobi	Milimani Road 30204 Nairobi Kenya	<b>Igor Líška</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Nicosia	4, Kalamatas St., Acropolis, Strovolos 2002 1165 Nicosia Cyprus	<b>Ján Varšo</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Oslo	Thomas Heftyes gate NO-0244 Oslo Norway	<b>Dušan Rozbora</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Ottawa	Rideau Terrace K1M 2A1 Ottawa Canada	<b>Stanislav Opieła</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Paris	rue du Ranelagh 75016 Paris France	<b>Mária Krasnohorská</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Beijing	Jianguomenwai, Ritan Lu 100 600 Peking China	<b>Žigmund Bertók</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Prague	Pod Hradbami 1 160 00 Prague Czech Republic	<b>Ladislav Ballek</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Pretoria	930 ARCADIA Street 12736 Pretoria The Republic of South Afrika	<b>Pavol Ivan</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>



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Riga	Smilšu iela 8 1050, Riga Latvia	<b>Ivan Špilda</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Roma	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 00194 Roma Italy	<b>Stanislav Vallo</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Sarajevo	Skopljanska br.7 710 00 Sarajevo Bosnia and Herzegovina	<b>Miroslav Mojžuta</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Sofia	Blv. Janko Sakazov 1504 Sofia Bulgaria	<b>Michal Kottman</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Seoul	389-1 Hannam-dong, Yongsam-gu 140-210 Seoul South Korea	<b>Pavol Hrmo</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Stockholm	Arsenalsgaten 2/3 TR P.O.Box 7183 Stockholm Sweden	<b>Alojz Mészáros</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Tashkent	18 Yakkasaroy Street 700121 Tashkent Uzbekistan	<b>Jozef Mačisák</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Tehran	No.38, Sarlashgar Fallahi Street P.O.Box.11365-4451 Tehran Iran	<b>Anton Hajduk</b> <i>ambassador</i>
Tel Aviv	Jabotinsky 37 P.O.Box 6459 Tel Aviv Israel	<b>Milan Dubček</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Tokyo	2-11-33, Motoazabu, Minato-ku 106-0046 Tokyo Japan	<b>Peter Vršanský</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Tripoli	Hay Al-Andalus, Gargaresh Street, 3 km P.O.BOX 5721 Tripoli Libya	<b>Ján Bóry</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Warsaw	ul. Litewska 6 00-581 Warszawa Poland	<b>František Ružička</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Vatikan	Via dei Colli della Farnesina 144 00 194 Roma Italy	<b>Dagmar Babčanová</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Vienna	Armbrustergasse 24 A-1190 Wien Austria	<b>Jozef Klimko</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Washington	3523 International Court, NW 20008 Washington D.C. United States of America	<b>Rastislav Káčer</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>
Zagreb	Prilaz Gjüre Deželica br. 10 10000 Zagreb Croatia	<b>Ján Báňas</b> <i>extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador</i>

## Permanent Missions

Permanent Mission	Address	Head of the Mission
PM EU Brussels	Avenue de Cortenbergh 79 1110 Brussels Belgium	<i>Maroš Šefčovič</i>
PM NATO Brussels	Boulevard Leopold III, NATO HQ 1110 Brussels Belgium	<i>Igor Slobodník</i>
PM UN New York	Second Avenue 10017 New York USA	<i>Peter Burian</i>
PM UN Geneve	9,chemin de l' Ancienne Route 1218 Grand Saconnex Switzerland	<i>Anton Pinter</i>
PM Council of Europe Strasbourg	Rue Ehrmann 67000 Štrasburg France	<i>Anna Lampérová</i>
PM OECD Paris	28,avenue d'Eylau 750 16 Paris France	<i>Jana Kotová</i>
PM OSCE Vienna	Blaasstraße 34 A-1190 Vienna Austria	<i>Peter Lizák</i>
PM UN Vienna	Blaasstraße 34 A-1190 Vienna Austria	<i>Juraj Macháč</i>

## Consulates General

Country	Name and address of the Consulate General of the SR	Consul General
The Czech Republic	Vodová ul. 10 612 00 Brno	<i>Ivan Nejeschleba</i>
The People's Republic of China	Shanghai, Qi Hua Tower 1375 Huai Hai Yhong Lu 200031 Shanghai	<i>Igor Pacolák</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Vollmannstrasse 25 d. 819 25 Munich	<i>Peter Mišík</i>
The Republic of Hungary	Derkovits sor 7 5600 Bekescsaba	<i>Ján Sülli</i>
The Republic of Poland	sw. Tomasza 34 31 027 Cracow	<i>Ivan Horský</i>
The Russian Federation	ul. Orbeli č. 21/2 194 223 Sankt Peterburg	<i>Ivan Horvat</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Aci Su Sokak, Arzu Ap. No. 15/3,7 806 80 Macka Istanbul	<i>Katarína Smékalová</i>
The United States of America	10 940 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 2030 CA 90024 California, Los Angeles	
The United States of America	801 Second Avenue, 12th Floor New York, N.Y. 10017	<i>Ivan Surkoš</i>
Ukraine	Lokoty 4 880 17 Uzhhorod	<i>Anton Lukačovič</i>

**Slovak Institutes**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Address</b>
Slovak Institute Berlin	The Federal Republic of Germany	<i>Zimmerstrasse 27D-10117 Berlin</i>
Slovak Institute Budapest	The Republic of Hungary	<i>Rákóczi út. 15, H-1088 Budapešť</i>
Slovak Institute Prague	The Czech Republic	<i>Jilská 450/16, 110 00 Praha 1</i>
Slovak Institute Moscow	The Russian Federation	<i>ul. J. Fučíka 17/19RF-123 056 Moskva D-47</i>
Slovak Institute Paris	The Republic of France	<i>125, rue de RanelaghF-75016 Paris</i>
Slovak Institute Roma	The Italian Republic	<i>Via dei Colli della Farnesina 144I-00194 Roma</i>
Slovak Institute Vienna	The Republic of Austria	<i>Wipplingerstrasse 24-26A-1010 Wien</i>
Slovak Institute Warsaw	The Republic of Poland	<i>ul. Krzywe Kolo 12/14a, PL-00 270 Warszawa</i>

# List of the Consulates of the Slovak Republic headed by the Honorary Consuls

The Heads of the Consulates as of February 2006

Country	Consulate	Consul
The Republic of Albania	Tirana	<b>Faik Dizdari</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Argentine Republic	La Plata	<b>Eduardo Kabát</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Commonwealth of Australia	Melbourne	<b>Vojtech Michael Markuš</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The People's Republic of Bangladesh	Dhaka	<b>Reza Ali</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Antverpy	<b>Gunar Riebs</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Gent	<b>Arnold Vanhaecke</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Belgium	Namur	<b>Fernand Halbart</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Medjugorje	<b>Rajko Zelinka</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Belo Horizonte	<b>Gécio Cardoso de Britto</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Joinville	<b>Ernesto Heinzelmann</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Recife	<b>Joao Alixandre Net</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federative Republic of Brazil	Sao Paulo	<b>Peter Pulíček</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Republic of Cyprus	Limassol	<b>George Vassos Hadjitheodossiou</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The People's Republic of China	Hongkong	<b>Willy Sun Mo Lin</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Denmark	Aarhus	<b>Štefan Peto</b> <i>honorary consul</i>

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic

continued

The Arab Republic of Egypt	Alexandria, Port Said	<b>Ibrahim Ahmed Gomma El Zeiny</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Finland	Teerijärvi	<b>Mikael Albäck</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Philippines	Cebu City	<b>Antonio N. Chiu</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Philippines	Manila	<b>Robert Chin Siy</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The French Republic	Lyon	<b>Kathy Bayoud-Vidal</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The French Republic	Nantes	<b>Philippe Pouquet</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The French Republic	Saint Pol De León	<b>Yan Méllenec</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Guinea	Conakry	<b>Boubakar Lombonna Diallo</b> <i>honorárny konzul</i>
The Hellenic Republic	Thessaloniki	<b>Konstantinos Mavridis</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Amsterdam	<b>Marc Jan Bolland</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of the Netherlands	Rotterdam	<b>Jacob Ten Hoop</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of India	Calcutta	<b>Patra Sadham Bosé</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Iceland	Reykjavik	<b>Runolfur Oddsson</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The State of Israel	Beer Sheva	<b>Samuel David Sax</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The State of Israel	Ha Sharon	<b>Karol Nathan Steiner</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The State of Israel	Haifa	<b>Dan Mandel</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The State of Israel	Jerusalem	<b>Dr. Martin Rodan</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Yemen	Saná	<b>Adel Mohamed Al Huraibi</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan	Amman	<b>Khaldun A. Abuhassan</b> <i>generálny honorárny konzul</i>
Canada	Calgary	<b>Eudovít Zanzotto</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
Canada	Montreal	<b>Mark Kmec</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Canada	Toronto	<b>John Vojtech Stephens</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Canada	Vancouver	<b>Stanislav Lišiak</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Canada	Winnipeg	<b>Jozef Kiška</b> <i>honorary consul</i>

## Annexes

continued

The Republic of Kenya	Mombasa	<b>Christoph Modigell</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Korea	Pusan	<b>Bok Soon Ha (Seung Hee, Ha)</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Lebanese Republic	Beirut	<b>Roy Antoine Samaha</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg	Luxembourg	<b>Blanche Mourtrier</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Macedonia	Skopje	<b>Vlade Tome Stojanovski</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Malawi	Blantyre	<b>Salim David Babu</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Moldova	Kishinev	<b>Iurie Grigore Popovič</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Principality of Monaco	Monaco	<b>Cristine Noghés-Ménio</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Mongolia	Ulanbaatar	<b>Munchijn Enchtajvan</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Mozambique	Maputo	<b>Ismael Mussá Mangueira</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Nepal	Kathmandu	<b>Chatur Dhoj Karki</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Nicaragua	Managua	<b>Francisco Cifuentes Navas</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Bergen	<b>Morten L. Gjesdahl</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Drammen	<b>Zuzana Opavská Wahl</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Norway	Trondheim	<b>Erik Frederiksen</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
New Zealand	Auckland	<b>Peter Kiely</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Bad Homburg	<b>Imrich Donath</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Hamburg	<b>Ursula Meyer-Waarden</b> <i>honorary general consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Hannover	<b>Dirk Bettels</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Leipzig	<b>Wolfgang Fritz Eschment</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Stuttgart	<b>Christoph Goeser</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Federal Republic of Germany	Wuppertal	<b>Ivan Koval</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Islamic republic of Pakistan	Karachi	<b>Abdula Sikander Ghulamali</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Panama	Panama	<b>Julio César Benedetti</b> <i>honorary consul</i>

continued

The Republic of Paraguay	Asunción	<b>Ricardo Moreno Azorero</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Paraguay	Cuidad del Este	<b>Charif Hammoud</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Katowice	<b>Marian Czerny</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Poznań	<b>Piotr Stanislaw Styczinski</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Rzeszow	<b>Adam Góral</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Sopot	<b>Jerzy Leśniak</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Poland	Szczecin	<b>Roman Pomianowski</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Portugal	Porto	<b>Manuel de Sá Bastos</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Innsbruck	<b>Jurgen Bodenseer</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Linz	<b>Ernst Papesch</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Austria	Vienna	<b>Walter Hildebrand</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of El Salvador	San Salvador	<b>Nicolas Antonio Salume Babun</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Senegal	Dakar	<b>Mapathé Ndiouck</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Seychelles	Victoria	<i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Singapore	Singapore	<b>Chio Kiat Ow</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Cleveland	<b>Edward George Keshock</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Denver	<b>Gregor James Fasing</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Detroit	<b>Edward Zelenak</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Chicago	<b>Thomas Kenneth Klimek Ward</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Indianapolis	<b>Steve Zlatos</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Kansas City	<b>Ross Marine</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Miami	<b>Robert J. Petrik</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Minneapolis	<b>John J. Luknic</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United States of America	Pittsburgh	<b>Joseph T. Senko</b> <i>honorary consul</i>

## Annexes

continued

The United States of America	San Francisco	<b>Barbara M. Pivnicka</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United Mexican States	Guadalajara	<b>Jorge Gutiérrez Orvañanos</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The United Mexican States	Monterrey	<b>Dr. Atalo Luévano Bueno</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka	Colombo	<b>Mahen Roshan Andrew Kariyawasan</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Sudan	Khartom	<b>Nasreldin Ibrahim Shulgami</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Syrian Arab Republic	Lattakia	<b>Anas Dib Joud</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Barcelona	<b>Joan Ignacio Torredemer</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Spain	Zaragoza	<b>Jean-Pol Jules Marie Bastiaanas</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Swiss Confederation	Zürich	<b>Michal Čierny</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Göteborg	<b>Carl Henric Kuylenstiern</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Kingdom of Sweden	Malmö	<b>Pavol Miklian</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Florenca	<b>Massimo Sani</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Milan	<b>Luigi Cuzzolin</b> <i>honorární konzul</i>
The Italian Republic	Palermo	<b>Roberto Helg</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Terst	<b>Miljan Todorovič</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Italian Republic	Torino	<b>Giuseppe Pellegrino</b> <i>honorární konzul</i>
Togolese republic	Lomé	<b>Viwoto James Victor Sossou</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Turkey	Edirne	<b>Coskun Molla</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
Ukraine	Uzhhorod	<b>Ivan Julievič Šufrič</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Uruguay	Montevideo	<b>Carlos Alberto Tellería López</b> <i>honorární konzul</i>
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	Caracas	<b>Dušan Poloni</b> <i>honorary consul</i>
The Republic of Zambia	Lusaka	<b>Jaroslav Kulich</b> <i>honorary consul</i>



# Numbers of the members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic in Peace Missions

As of March 2007

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of the SR Armed Forces Members</b>
<b>UN</b>		
UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) – UN	Syria, Golan Heights	<i>95</i>
UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) – UN	Cyprus	<i>196</i>
UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon)	Libanon	<i>6</i>
UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) – UN	Syria, Israel	<i>2</i>
<b>NATO</b>		
ISAF (International Security Assistance Force)	Afghanistan	<i>57</i>
KFOR (Kosovo Force) – NATO	Kosovo	<i>135</i>
NATO Headquarters (Sarajevo)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<i>2</i>
NTM I (NATO)	Iraq	<i>5</i>
<b>EU</b>		
ALTHEA	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<i>35</i>
ALTHEA (Headquarters)	Bosnia and Herzegovina	<i>4</i>
EUMM (EU Monitoring Mission) - EU	area of former Yugoslavia	<i>2</i>
<b>Others</b>		
Iraqi Freedom	Iraq	<i>6</i>

Source: Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic ([www.mosr.sk](http://www.mosr.sk))

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